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The purpose of this work is to draw attention to the main ways in which the the functioning of the 
judicial system can be improved. For different reasons judicial reform is completely ignored as a 
possibility, not taken seriously, or it is done though half measures that do not take into account the 
complexity of regulation of other main parts of the judicial system. This neglect towards the issue 
often has theoretical and historical roots such as relegating institutional analysis in favour of market 
research in the US. In France, the issue is even more seriously ignored because judges are supposed 
to be just the mouth piece of the law and as a result the way the judiciary’s functional issues are 
almost completely neglected by both the French academia and the political leaders.  
This work challenges this state of affairs. The legal rules that regulate the functioning of the judicial 
system are within a spectrum of possibilities that could range from one extreme to the other. There 
are also possibilities of midrange legal rule choices within that scale. However, historical and existing 
rules in different countries point to a limited number of main possibilities. Examining and evaluating 
these rules is possible when there is specific goal that the rules try to achieve. The difficulty comes 
from specific environmental influences in that define the performance of different judicial systems. 
Even that complication is not insurmountable because at least some tendencies can be shown even if 
proving causality remains out of reach for the researcher. 
The initial inspiration for this work came from the personal experience of my experience as legal aid 
clerk. The problems of the judicial systems were starting to appear and take shape. These first 
involvement with the workings the judiciary highlighted some serious lapses in the access to courts 
mechanism. The judiciary then became a central interest of my academic career. The considerable six 
year research that I undertook as part of my doctoral degree showed further important issues and 
problems of the regulation of the judicial system. The most important element that stood out seems 
to be that the judicial system deals with extremely important social information that it moulds and 
that again considerably affects society but is often ignored. Filling that important gap in the way the 
judiciary is seen needs theoretical procedural and organizational analysis. 
My multinational educational and personal journey also gave a distinct flavour to the writing this 
work. Since I was educated in several legal systems I became both an insider and outsider in the way 
a view the laws of different jurisdictions. The research of this work was nevertheless dominated by 
the sheer volume of literature coming from the US. There three disciplines are actively pursuing 
research interests connected to the functioning of the judiciary: legal scholars, political scientists and 
economists. Since my background includes studies in all three disciplines I had to examine all three 
perspectives and then gradually extend my research to include the other two systems that are 
incorporated in this work the English/Welsh and the French. 
The system that I had to examine mostly as an outside observer was the French. The reason is that 
there are not that many things written about it that fit the style of this analysis. The literature that 
exists is mostly written by people with some practical affiliation to the judiciary. Probably the only 
exceptions that have gained enough traction in France were the works on history and procedure of 
the French judiciary. Also, my education was never that thorough in the French style of analysis 
because in France I have studied in international programs that were not that influenced by 
traditional French approach. That informational gap on the French system had to be remedied with 
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as an additional empirical research. The access to the inner workings of the French judiciary proved a 
difficult task but eventually I managed to conduct a number of interviews with French judges through 
random personal and conference contacts. Since the analysis of this work aimed at drawing 
conclusions about the French system and the knowledge of the other judiciaries were only used to 
illustrate points on France this empirical research was extremely important and it was used as a 
guiding light to reality.  
The English and Welsh judicial system also proved extremely useful to this analysis because it is the 
only system that has recently undergone large scale reforms. In addition, the historical insights 
gained from the examination of the rules that have guided its judiciary through the ages proved 
invaluable to the examining the spectrum of possible rules of judicial organization theory and 
procedure. The literature coming from the UK is also quite valuable mostly because it is written by 
judges with long careers and academics who were close observers of the judicial system.  
In any case, the biggest challenge of this work was to acquire this vast amount of knowledge on each 
judicial system from multidisciplinary perspective. That meant that I had juggle in my head all the 
complexities of each of the three legal systems and then to research and ultimately apply 
multidisciplinary analysis to this enormous amount of information. Most importantly I had to simplify 
the task of the reader by presenting everything in a digestible form.  I hope I have at least partially 


















































SECTION I: THE FOUNDATIONAL SETTINGS OF 
JUDICIAL MACHINE  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Origins of Comparative Law and Economics Research 
This work is a comparative analysis of the primary regulatory choices that determine how judicial 
systems operate from the perspective of comparative law and economics. This analysis focuses on 
three judicial systems: that of the French, American (United States), and English and Welsh systems. 
In his pivotal book, the founding father of the discipline of Comparative Law and Economics, Ugo 
Matei, stated:  
Comparative law and economics is a rather new discipline located at the frontiers of 
contemporary legal research. This innovative scholarly paradigm – combining the analytical 
tools of adjoining and complementary social sciences in order to develop a critical approach to 
legal rules and institutions— conveys a distinctive European perspective on the theory and 
practice of law and economics.1 
Another inspiration for this work is the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Ronald Coase, who made one 
very important observation that perfectly describes the framework of this thesis.  In his article, "The 
Lighthouse in Economics,"2 Coase argued that “we should try to develop generalizations which would 
give us guidance as to how various activities should be best organized.”3 Even more important was 
his assertion that the best way to create organizational solutions in law and economics is to “[study] 
how such activities are actually carried out within different institutional frameworks."4 This research 
affirms the assertion that there is no better source for institutional and organizational solutions than 
examples that already exist as part of different legal regimes. 
2.0 The Main Issues in the Introduction 
This introductory chapter follows the following steps. First, it highlights some problematic issues that 
occur in judicial systems. Several cases will be examined to demonstrate the need for a systematic 
analysis of judicial systems. Second, it explains the story of this work. Third, it presents a basic model 
to show how the judicial system operates. Fourth, it clarifies the objective of this study. Fifth it 
defines the objectives and limitations of the project.  
2.1 Cases 
Several practical cases have been an inspiration for this work. They have a twofold use within the 
context of this research. First, they demonstrate that the traditional model of the judicial system—
one which emphasizes judicial decisions based on substantive law—is insufficient to understand the 
                                                          
1
 Ugo Matei, Comparative Law & Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 
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complexity of the judicial system. Second, the cases also expose specific areas of the judicial system 
where failures commonly occur. 
Some of the cases listed below have not been published in official court databases due to their 
perceived “insignificance.” However, this author’s personal experience as a legal aid clerk has 
provided insight into the issues that arise when legal studies base policy decisions only on “important 
cases”—most notably, some judicial systems’ most pressing problems are ignored instead of 
rectified. Some of the cases that have never reached the courts or did not leave a substantial trail 
behind can also have powerful explanatory force. Thus, it is suggested that some of them are capable 
of pointing out failures of judicial systems that are otherwise ignored. This work will try to harness 
the lessons of four such cases. 
2.1.1 Milk Case: Dismissed before Trial, No Appeal Allowed (United States) 
This case is important because its progress stopped at the very first procedural hurdle. The case is 
also important for another sub-element of the judicial system: the theory that chooses for whose 
benefit the judiciary should operate. Thus, the case’s importance is in the impact on society certain 
settings of the judicial machine have. More precisely, this case is about the impact of the judicial 
machine on access to courts of indigent people, who do not receive court protection because of 
procedural technicalities. 
The case is about one client of a pro bono law clinic, a woman who described herself as “the working 
poor.”5  She had a job but it was not enough to pay her basic bills. She stated that if she won her 
case, she wanted to fulfill her dream of buying a cup of chocolate milk, hence the name the “Milk 
Case.”  
The facts of this case were simple. The plaintiff was a mentally underdeveloped individual who was 
disinherited by her parents. The law was clear; it protected mentally ill individuals and said that they 
cannot be disinherited. However, on a technicality (missed document filing deadline), the case was 
dismissed before trial. The technical error was due to the incapacity of the plaintiff to follow the 
complex procedures in the absence of a permanent lawyer attached to the case. The plaintiff refused 
a contingency fee lawyer because to her, the sum she would have paid the lawyer was a fortune. She 
only received sporadic legal advice from pro bono lawyers, which proved insufficient to overcome all 
the technical difficulties.    
The result was that procedure was followed but justice was not done. Here, the term justice is used 
in a narrow sense to indicate that the substantial law was not applied. Nobody stepped in to support 
this disadvantaged individual. An appeal could not be filed because there was no trial. 
A modern judicial system needs to have a theory of justice that deals with such cases. We need to 
answer the question whether we want to support such underprivileged individuals and prevent 
similar situations from happening again. Further questions that need to be answered are: Under 
what theories of justice should the underprivileged in society receive the support of the judicial 
system? How has the judiciary failed to apply substantive law? What are the procedural and 
representation alternatives that can ensure the application of substantive law? To sum up the issue, 
                                                          
5
 The case has never been reported and all case details come from the work experience of this author. 
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the question is how we want to organize the judicial system in order to get the result we want when 
it deals with disadvantaged people.   
2.1.2 Subway Case: Never Reached the Official Courts (France/United States) 
Similar to the Milk Case, this case is also important because it asks for whose benefit the judicial 
system operates. More specifically, for whom should it operate? 
The problem of this case is that the whole judicial system was purposely avoided because of a biased 
arbitration clause. The case created important problems in society that never got resolved, for 
instance, people's lifetime savings disappeared. Instead of turning them into viable investments, 
savings were engulfed into a predictably losing arrangement, jobs were lost, and taxes were not paid. 
The progress of the case was stopped even before the judicial system took action. Thus there were 
multiple problems caused to society by this initial contractual arrangement. The central issue of 
interest then for this study is the balance between the judicial system as a public good and 
arbitration as its alternatives. In other words, this case also shows the issues and challenges caused 
by the way the judicial systems and their private alternatives are set up at the moment. 
Here are the facts of this Franco-American case: Subway is a massive fast food chain that signs 
franchise contracts all over the world. In France, the franchisees signed a 600-page contract. In bold 
letters on the first page, there is an arbitration clause that declares a New York arbitrator, designated 
by Subway, will be competent to resolve any disputes between the parties. The contract also 
contains a royalty clause that is higher than the usual 7% most other franchise agreements use.  
Instead, Subway demands 12.5%. The result is that franchisees in France, in 40% of the cases, run 
into financial difficulties very quickly.6  
There are of course local conditions that make opening such fast food restaurants more expensive in 
France than in the US. For example, French customers may not see Subway as a healthier restaurant 
in comparison with the other available alternatives, so they may have other preferences such as 
French baguette sandwiches. However, the fact is that local businesses are set up to fail and when 
they try to solve the problem with Subway, they have to go arbitration proceedings in New York. The 
French entrepreneurs often do not speak English; they are already bankrupt because the average 
price to open a Subway restaurant is 200,000 Euros and they have used up all their savings and have 
mortgaged their real estate as a guarantee. The result is they do not go to the arbitration 
proceedings.  The legal issue is the biased forum clause, which avoids litigation and assures the 
victory of Subway.  
From an economic perspective, the first question that should be asked is whether the failed 
franchisee restaurants were just not viable or if the issue goes deeper than that. The problem is not 
that the franchisee loses but Subway gains. Jobs were opened and then lost (part of the high 
expenses in Subway restaurants are due to the high labor input because every sandwich is made 
individually). So that does not fit the definition of a neoclassical economic problem. However, it 
seems that Subway gains only minimal profits because the franchise restaurants do not function well 
enough to make large profits. 12.5% royalties from a small profit is still a small sum of money, 
whereas €200,000 is a substantial investment. So it would be wrong to see the problem as a simple 
                                                          
6




transfer. The loss is larger than the profits, which means there is no economic efficiency. Plus, the 
loss is on the shoulders of someone for whom it affects significantly more (the small entrepreneur) 
rather than the large company, which would not have felt the loss. Thus, there is no social benefit 
but a social loss from the operation of subway franchise restaurants.  
So the first major question is whether there is a problem with the way the forum choices work. How 
should we balance private dispute resolution with the public system of the courts? In other words, 
the question is whether we should ask the courts to allocate resources arising from unequal market 
actors’ contracts. 
However, the story does not end there. All Subway profits from Europe are directed to a tax haven in 
Lichtenstein. No taxes are paid in the European Union. All the profits go directly to a small American 
family that owns the chain of restaurants. Does that trickle down in the US economy? Maybe, but a 
more viable model for the economy would be to have well-functioning franchisee restaurants that 
create jobs long-term and make a profit for the franchisees. Also, it would be better to collect taxes 
on the income of the franchise. It all comes down to a contract signed by unequal parties and is later 
adjudicated unequally.  
In sum, what are the judicial system problems underlying this case? Courts can be providers of a 
public good, thus the question is whether there is an imbalance between the use of private dispute 
resolution and the utilization of courts that allows “the haves” to change the law (or avoid it 
altogether) to the detriment of the greater society. Thus, this work deals first with the need for a 
theory that tells us when we should subsidize cases in order for them to get access to the courts in 
order to resolve important social and economic issues that will have an impact on the future of our 
society. Secondly, the issue that needs to be understood is the relationship between economics and 
the operation of courts. Lastly, this case points to the issue of the balance between courts as 
providers of public goods and private alternative dispute resolution.  
2.1.3 Legal Aid Case (trial, appeal hearing, but appeal not allowed) (England and Wales) 
What happens when free legal aid is heavily subsidized by the state? Does that eliminate the 
problem of representation of disadvantaged people? The judicial system in England and Wales is a 
good illustration of what happens under that regime. This case shifts the focus of this work to 
another central issue— the appeals process.  
The case had the following facts: 
The plaintiff came for some advice at a university legal clinic. After the death of his mother, the 
plaintiff received a letter containing a remarkable claim from his bank. It said that he was fifteen 
years behind with mortgage payments. Later, the defendant (the bank) repossessed the house. The 
plaintiff received free legal aid. The legal aid lawyer did not investigate these unusual facts and even 
though the plaintiff was an outspoken individual, he lost the trial proceedings and his case was 
dismissed before reaching an appeal. (In England and Wales, there are now more stringent rules for 
allowing appeals). The experienced lawyers representing the bank used an old common law 
procedure reminiscent of the writ of error procedure, which gives defendants the advantage of 
asking for dismissal of the case on grounds of unimportance. The legal aid lawyer never realized (or 
did not want to realize) what happened. The case could not have been as unimportant as claimed, 
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not only because it left one individual homeless, but because of the astonishing period of fifteen 
years in which the bank had not taken any steps to demand mortgage payments. 
The important conclusion is that the legal aid system did not work properly. Legal aid often does not 
equalize the position of the weaker party. The reasons are that there is a chasm of experience, 
motivation, ability, and time between the bank lawyers and their opponent—the legal aid lawyer. 
Thus, the problem is that the system failed to move the case closer to a perfect competition and 
allowed maneuvering based on procedural law that should have been rendered obsolete ages ago. 
This case shows the following problems of the judicial system that this thesis will deal with: First, the 
acquisition of information (facts and evidence) of the case must be examined. The question is what is 
the optimal way to gather information on a case? Second, there is also an issue with the imposition 
of restrictions on appeals because cases that contain socially important information can be easily 
dismissed. The reason this case had important information for society is that it was about protection 
of property rights, which are the engine of the modern economy and society. Third, there is a clear 
problem with the unaddressed insufficiency of the legal aid system, which does not provide quality of 
representation and at the same time has high costs borne by taxpayers. 
2.1.4 The Bernard Tapie Case (France)  
This is a complex case but the central element is that the ease of accessing courts can become a 
question of money and power. Should we restrict access to the justice system? And how? There is a 
need for clear criteria for court access.  
The following facts are important to this work. French billionaire Bernard Tapie has been involved in 
numerous corruption scandals over the years. His initial case was decided by arbitration tribunal and 
should have rendered the case’s final resolution. However, a court refused to enforce the tribunal’s 
award. Then Bernard Tapie filed a suit against that refusal of enforcement in the courts. Now it 
seems likely it will go through every level of the judicial hierarchy. 
France is the most opportunity-equalizing system on paper, but having a case like this in the courts 
begs the question: can one buy himself justice? How could that possibly have any social benefit? A 
French millionaire forfeited the right to use the court system when he chose a final arbitration 
procedure. Nevertheless, his case is now being accepted in the court system and it is more than likely 
that Mr. Tapie will use all appellate possibilities to buy himself “justice.” 
For this work, the importance of this case lies in the following elements. First, the case is again about 
the theory of who should be able to use the judicial system and what restrictions there should be on 
using the courts. There is a negative impact on society when the judiciary is used at the expense of 
the taxpayers for the benefit of the powerful few. Furthermore, this case is important because it 
shows that “haves” vs. “have-nots” is not an exclusively American problem, as many people think it 
is. 
It is tempting to design a simple criterion on court use, such as giving the poor more access to courts 
than the rich. However, as this work attempts to show, the issue is far more complicated than 
assigning income-based criteria. The ultimate goal of any regulation or restriction must be social 
beneficence and creation of real competition between the parties.    
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Second, the case, similarly to the Subway case, touches upon the relationship between alternative 
dispute resolution systems and official courts as providers of public goods. Third, it also deals with 
how hierarchal courts are used to restrict or allow cases.  
The common problems in these cases are the theoretical issues: 1) For whose benefit the judicial 
system should operate; 2) The availability of information gathering by the courts in order to retain 
the socially beneficial outcome; 3) Procedural and organizational difficulties that occurred 
independently from the judicial system; and 4) How the judicial system deals with the relationship of 
private and public justice systems and provision of public goods. These cases also deal with the filter 
the judicial system uses to deal with the information it gathers and to use its complex structure, 
including appeals, to provide a socially beneficial result. The problems exposed by the four cases will 
help us to define the scope of this work. 
3.0 Defining the Scope  
If these problems occur on a regular basis, that means there is a flaw in the way we think about the 
judicial system. The problem comes from the fact that we usually define the judicial system as an 
adjudicative system. Thus, we think of the courts as public institutions that solve disputes in society 
by applying pre-existing law as criteria of adjudication. Thus, we have come to think of the judicial 
system as being influenced mainly by the judicial decision given at the end of the judicial process, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1: Model of Adjudicative System 
However, despite being technically correct, this model of the judicial system is not sufficient to 
explain a complex reality. The judicial system can influence society and the problems that exist 
between individuals independent from the judicial decisions it produces. In other words, the way we 
organize the judiciary can be as influential as the judicial decisions themselves. That complication 
calls for a different, more procedurally-based definition of the judicial system. The starting point is 
again society and the problems between individuals within it. However, the filter that decides what 
happens to a specific dispute between individuals is not necessarily the pre-existing substantive law. 
It should be the judicial system as defined by Jeremy Bentham to as a guiding theory, procedure, and 
judicial organization organized.7 As a result, the screen through which the dispute goes may be 
completely procedural and organizational. It may depend little or not at all on substantive law and 
the judicial decision rendered by the court.  





The court procedure and organization depend on the theory that gives the framework within which 
the regulator has decided to put the operation of the judiciary. In other words, what is missing in the 
definition above is the framework element that arranges the judiciary’s procedure, organization, and 
guiding theory. These two models are not alternative to each other; they are complimentary. 
Sometimes, the performance outcome that the judicial system produces depends almost entirely on 
substantive law and the resulting judicial decision. However, sometimes the outcome is completely 
dependent on the procedure, organization, and theory that gives them direction. This work limits its 
scope entirely to the second scenario and includes the following elements, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2: Judicial System as Procedure, Organization, and Guiding Theory 
 
4.0 The Story  
After having defined the framework within which this work will operate, it is essential to explain 
what will be included in the work. This thesis is the story of the performance of the judicial system. 
The story will be told in two parts. The first part follows the model of Jeremy Bentham, who saw the 
judicial system as a mixture of three elements: theory, procedure, and organization (see Figure 2, 
Judicial System). The purpose of this part is to create theoretical generalizations of how the judiciary 
operates. The second part will follow Ronald Coase’s ideas using concrete regulatory regimes of the 
three judiciaries examined here (France, United States, and England and Wales) as the best sources 
of real knowledge of how things work in practice. The goal is to draw general conclusions on both the 
theoretical and practical comparative level of how judicial systems operate and potentially how they 
can be improved. 
To better illustrate the subject of this work, the following analogy will be used to create easily 
understandable and visual image of this work.  The judicial system resembles a machine that has 
several levers. Each lever can be moved into different positions. The positions represent particular 
views of the theory of justice, its procedure, and its organization. This is the first part of the story. 
The researcher assumes the position of an operator of the judicial machine. In reality, that role is 
played mostly by the legislator who is capable of introducing changes to the way the judiciary 
operates. In any case, to improve the performance, the operator (or the legislator) can move several 
foundational regulatory levers that are capable of shifting in one direction or the other. So in this 
theoretical part of the study different positions on each lever will be chosen. These lever positions 
will be based on an approximation of regulatory positions that have existed in the past, exist in 
present, or are imaginary but have an important point to make regarding their effect on the 





Fig. 3: Main Levers 
The second part of this work is based on the fact that the judicial system machine can function in 
different environments that have influence on its performance. Each environment has its specific 
elements. To continue the analogy, the machine will not operate the same way in an icy and cold 
environment as it will in a hot, dusty desert climate.  
Most importantly, the machine’s performance has to reach certain goals. It has more than one 
purpose, thus its operation can lead to a variety of outcomes. Here, the aim is to outline the possible 
uses of the judicial machine and, if possible, show ways to optimize its operation in order to avoid 
the problems delineated in the cases.  
The role of the differences of the environment in which the judicial machine operates influences the 
results that are achieved. For the justice machine, that means that the legal traditions, the historical 
development of the legal system in general and the judicial system in particular, and the existence of 
other legal rules will have influence on the way it functions. This means if we want to know how 
different judicial machines will function, we need to examine not only the way they are organised, 
but all possible factors that can influence the performance. A full empirical analysis is beyond the 
scope of this work. Thus, the three judicial systems examined here will only serve to provide some 
examples of how the legal environment affects the functioning of the main parameters such as for 
example theory of justice, evidence (information) gathering, hierarchy, etc.  
An example of this model can be found in the 1992 reform led by Lord Woolf. He tried to move the 
regulatory lever governing theory of the judicial system (lever A) from position A1, which 
corresponds to complete justice at position A2, which is a majoritarian (utilitarian) justice theory. In 
principle, that was a superior position (the reasons for its superiority will be explained in the later 
chapters) that should have produced better performing judicial system. However, there were 
problems with defining precisely and finding the exact superior position. So the move was in the right 
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very quickly and a new reform aiming at enforcing the Woolf’s reform led by Lord Jackson followed. 
The failure was not so much in the choice of a new regime but in the second part that concerns this 
story — the environment. That resulted in judges simply followed the pre-existing court practices 
and did not apply the new theory.    
5.0 Basic Analytical Model 
This story of judicial system performance can be expressed formally in a very simple model. 
Following the two-part story, the formal analysis of the judicial system will also be expressed in two 
steps. The first can be represented formally in the following way: 
Let’s introduce a function called Figure of Merit8 F (A,B,C,...), where A, B, C, ... are functions (the 
positions of the different levers) for example lever A, which was designated as theory of justice, has 
values A1(maximum), A2(medium 1),A3(medium 2), and A4 (minimum).  
The formal analysis examines the effect the different values of A will have on the performance of the 
judicial system, which will be designated as P. The values chosen on Figure 3 above, where lever A is 
theory of justice are: maximum (complete justice), minimum (no functional judicial system), and two 
medium positions justice for the majority and for a minority.  
Some examples of the effects of the change in the value of A can also be represented in a graphic. A 
is our independent variable and the graphic in figure 4 will help us see how the change of its value 
affects the performance of the judicial system P. The change in A may be a result of the initial design 
of the judicial system or an estimated position of a proposed legal reform.  
 
Fig. 4. Effect of Function A on the Performance of the Judicial System 
 
                                                          
8
 Figure of Merit is a numerical expression taken as representing the performance or efficiency of a given 
device, material, or procedure. 
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The graphic shows how P is dependent on the previous function A. Here A is the independent 
variable and P is the function on it. 
5.1 Typical Effects the Functions Show 
1) P does not depend on A (P is a constant for every value of A). Legislating to introduce change in 
this situation is pointless because changing the regulation A will not produce any changes in the 
performance.  
2) P is very sensitive to a change of A. That is the ideal situation for making a change when one is 
needed. The legislator can enact a new law that will significantly affect the performance of the 
judicial system. However, further analysis is needed to see if the change is the desired one instead of 
a change that will affect the performance negatively.  
3) Performance of the judicial system (P) can be slightly affected by a change in this specific 
regulation of the judicial system A. In this situation, changing some other element of the judicial 
machine will probably produce the desired results more easily. 
The second environmental element corresponds to influences that come from the specific legal 
system in which we have values of A.  
Each one depends on independent parameters that form the legal environment, within which the 
judicial system operates, i.e.,  A=A(x1, x2, x3,...), B=B(y1, y2, y3,...), C=C(z1, z2, z3,...). Examples of 
independent parameters can be legal traditions, other legal rules within the legal system, historical 
development, etc.  
 
Fig. 5. Dependence of Function A on Independent Parameters 




In 2, the independent parameters are influenced substantially by the value of x.  Influencing the 
performance can push it in different directions.  
In 3, the curve is slightly influenced by the value of x.  
Note that A (Theory of the judicial system for example) is now the dependent parameter and x (legal 
tradition for example) is the independent parameter. 
5.2 Objective of the Model   
So why tell this story and create this analytical framework to analyse the issues of performance of 
the judicial system? The objective is to show a way to think about the problems of judicial systems. 
The objective is not to declare this or that system more efficient than the others. All systems run into 
problems of where to place the lever (how to regulate the judicial system). However, the issues and 
the regulatory solutions that try to solve them are recurrent in every system. Thus, creating a way to 
think about the issues and the corresponding regulatory responses will be useful in improving the 
performance of every judicial system.  
In sum, the research of this work is to view the judicial system from the perspective of a regulator of 
the judicial system. This research was designed to create a basic roadmap on how to regulate the 
judicial system. In order to achieve that objective, this work will give guidelines on how to think 
about what regulation of the judicial system should optimize and what it should minimize (Amax A 
min etc.). Whether to optimize and minimize depends on the goals we have set for the performance 
of the judicial machine. 
This work makes an important distinction between first instance litigation and appeal. This 
distinction highlights the division of the three parts of the judicial system that Jeremy Bentham 
made. Thus litigation refers mostly to procedural issues whereas appeal is found in the domain of the 
organizational structure of the judicial system. 
5.3 Formal Representation of the Objective of this Work  
The objective of this work can be expressed formally as a Figure of Merit. 
Let the function be F = A.B.C and find the extremes of it. This is, in fact, the Figure of Merit: 
F = (A.B.C.D.E) max or 
F = (A.B.C.D.E) min 
The simplest example: E max value could be efficiency, and D min value could be the cost. So that 
means we want to maximise efficiency and reduce cost.   
B could be initial acquisition of information (an example in laissez-faire system: B1 max acquisition of 
information, B1 min expenditure of judges’ effort; in managerial systems: B2 max acquisition of 
truthful information B2 min cost) 
5.4 The Importance of the Objective 
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Why is it important to achieve the objective of having a better framework for the performance of the 
judicial system? 
Well-functioning courts provide economic benefits. A number of studies9  have shown the benefit of 
strong and effective judiciaries for rapid economic growth and the development of both small and 
large firms.  The reason is better performing courts lead to more developed credit markets, whereas 
claims stuck in courts for many years mean that capital does not circulate in the economy, causing 
lack of investment and stagnation in the economy.10  
The prospect of an effective lawsuit provides incentives for desirable behavior in society:  
a) It corrects problems  
b) Reduces conflicts  
c) Channels appropriate behavior  
d) Improves the provision of public goods  
e) Provides stability by inducing loyalty of the population towards the current regime 
6.0 Limiting the Scope of the Thesis  
There is a further important limitation of the scope of this thesis. This research examines only the 
entry point of the judicial system (access to courts), the main ingredient that goes through the 
judicial machine (information/evidence), the places information goes (hierarchy), and the 
alternatives to the judicial machine (alternative dispute resolution). Importantly, there is also the 
theory on which the operation of the whole judicial machine is based. 
To limit the scope of the project, it is important to look again at the performance of the judicial 
system P and the way it is influenced by different levers (policy regulation) A, B, C, etc. The study will 
look at the degree to which the performance (P) is dependent on the different levers such as A. It will 
concentrate only on the levers that have an important influence on P.  There are other levers that 
have influence on P but they have been judged as not crucial to the performance of the judicial 
machine. For example, the existence of oral or written procedures in the different courts can have an 
influence on the performance (P) of the judicial system. However, previous studies have shown that 
the correlation is not a straightforward one.11 Consequently, this cannot be one of the main levers of 
the judicial system this work concentrates on.  
                                                          
9
 See for example Feld, Lars P., and Stefan Voigt. "Making Judges Independent - Some Proposals Regarding the 
Judiciary.". October 02, 2004. Accessed October 13, 2017 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=597721.); Susan Peck MacDonald, “The Erasure of 
Language,” College Composition and Communication 58, no. 4 (2007: 619. 
10
 For example, a World Bank study from Brazil and Argentina shows that firms doing business in provinces with 
better-performing courts enjoy greater access to credit. The explanation is simple: better courts means less 
risk, encouraging firms to invest more. 
11
 See, for example, Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). The author has argued that oral arguments influence the way the US Supreme Court 
operates. According to some of the accounts this books describes, that influence seems almost non-existent 
based on statements by Justice Clarence Thomas: “I think justices, 99 percent of the time, have their minds 
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Other elements of the judicial system, such as the availability of precedent, are very important to the 
functioning of the judicial system. However, precedent seems to be more closely connected with 
theories of adjudication and less with procedure and organization. As a result, the strength of the 
precedent system (or la jurisprudence constante) is also beyond the scope of this study.    
As mentioned above, there is also the limitation of adjudication theory (the way judicial decisions are 
taken), which is not examined in this work because it is beyond its procedural and organizational 
theory aim. 
7.0 Summary of the Basic Model 
To summarize, this thesis is about the functioning of the judicial system that profoundly affects 
society. Four cases have been sketched out to show some of the problems with the current state of 
the judicial system, which, as described by Bentham, has three main elements that will be examined 
here: theory, procedure, and organization. These elements are the main building blocks of the 
judicial machine and can be manipulated in order to achieve different results. The manipulation is 
done through what this thesis calls levers of the judicial system. These are subparts that can be seen 
as an extension of Bentham’s three-part model of the judicial system. Examples include the access to 
courts lever, acquisition of information lever, and court hierarchy lever. The chapters of this thesis 
will be centered on these levers. Only the most important levers in the judicial machine are 
examined in this work. The functioning of these levers can be affected by country-specific elements 
such as legal culture, history, and other legal rules that do not exist in the other judicial systems 
compared in this work. These are environmental elements or independent parameters. The 
manipulation of the positions of the levers of the judicial system can be done in order to deal with 
the problems the four cases identified. 
8.0 Content Summary 
The subsequent chapters will feature an overview of the research methodology (Chapter 2) as well as 
the underlying theories utilized in creating the model (Chapter 3). Starting in Chapter 4, each of the 
levers in the judicial machine will be described, including their effect on evidence gathering and 
access to the courts. Part I concludes with Chapter 5, which examines the overall judicial 
organization. 
Part II of this work includes an in-depth comparative analysis of the three countries’ judicial systems 
with a comparison of the procedural levers in each of the countries. Finally, the research concludes in 
Chapter 8 with closing thoughts and recommendations for future research. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
made up when they go to the bench” (p. 25). Other accounts of highly political cases such as Brown v. Board of 
Education are probably are more influenced by the composition of the Court and the addition of a new liberal 
judge to the court. However, the composition of oral argument and the corresponding questions by judges 
seem to have a high predictable outcome in 75% of the cases. Thus there seems to be some correlation 
between oral argument and the performance of the judicial system. However, this correlation seems 
insufficient to make oral vs. written argumentation in the courts one of the main levers of the judicial system. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
1.0 Extension of the Basic Model  
This chapter extends the basic model presented in the introduction. The design of this more detailed 
model adds a method of comparison and evaluation for the different regulations of the judicial 
system. It also gives a blueprint of how the legal environment can affect the performance of the 
judicial system.  
As Ugo Matei has put it:  
“Comparative law and economics treat the legal and institutional backgrounds as dynamic 
variables and attempts to build models which reflect the ever-changing layered complexity of 
the real world of the law, broadening the horizon of the underlying legal discourse and 
conferring a higher degree of realism to the theoretical analysis.”12 
This chapter does exactly that. It demonstrates how dynamic changes in regulations affect the 
performance of the judicial system. The goal is to have a methodological model of how to view the 
complex and changing legal and institutional background of the individual elements of the judicial 
system (the levers) within the existing literature on comparative law and economics.  
1.1 Real Cases Not Statistics 
In order to examine the functional problems of the judicial system that actually exist and occur 
regularly, this work will not use a statistical approach as a starting point.  
The advantage of this approach is that it goes deeper than the statistics of the cases that go to trial or 
appeal. Rather, it pays ample attention to cases that do not go through the judicial system at all 
because of its failures. That is not to say empirical and statistical research is not needed. On the 
contrary, future research will need to examine the statistics that underpin the examples given in this 
work.  
The approach in this thesis mixes a procedural approach with substantive law issues, injecting a dose 
of reality by using real cases to more vividly illustrate the functioning problems of the judicial 
systems. 
The intensity and benefit of the courts depend on the ability of court users to have competitive 
access to it. If a litigant cannot compete in court, the result is unsatisfactory and is, in practice, the 
same as denial of access to the courts. The importance of the underlying issues does not necessarily 
reflect the amount of attention these cases receive publically or from the courts themselves.  
                                                          
12
 Mattei , Ugo, and Alberto Monti. "Comparative Law & Economics ." Economia pubblica ed analisi economica 
del diritto, October 2, 2003. http://www.siepweb.it/siep/images/joomd/1399114907291.pdf. 
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1.2 Teleological Analysis  
Alasdair MacIntyre’s13 teleological critique of pure instrumentalism (telos [ancient Greek]: purpose, 
goal-directed) stated that people will never be satisfied with an activity that does not have a 
purpose. Modern economics has become too instrumental, which sometimes means we lose focus of 
what we try to achieve. Thus, this work incorporates an instrumental approach that is characteristic 
of modern economic analysis while maintaining awareness that this way of looking at things has 
reduced hard goals to mere preferences. That lack of direction can impede any human endeavor, 
even legal reforms, as the theories of what the regulator’s goals should be are ignored.  
2.0 Comparative Law 
This work uses a comparative law approach because it provides many examples of regulatory 
positions of the levers of the judicial machine that are otherwise unattainable by a single judicial 
system. Comparative methodology helps discern the differences and similarities between the 
positions of the levers. Each lever position represents current or past regulation of a governing 
theory, procedure, or judicial organisation. These positions are then used to create a theoretical 
model that uses some of them while adding additional positions that would help reveal specificities 
of how the movement of these levers affects the performance of the judicial system. Then the model 
gives examples of legal environmental factors and their influence on the performance of the judicial 
system at the designated positions of the levers of the judicial machine. 
Traditional comparative analysis, on its own, is not sufficient to construct a fully functioning model. It 
only shows what the similarities and the differences between two legal regimes are. It can also 
demonstrate that the same process has already been put in place somewhere else and did not 
produce the desired result. However, in order to truly evaluate and predict the results of a change in 
the position of a lever (a new regulation of the judicial system), we need economic analysis. 
Economic analysis will reveal, for example, that a move towards a more managerial judicial system 
will not be successful unless judicial incentives are improved as well. To put it directly, economic 
analysis will help evaluate the results of different regulations in the judicial system. 
2.1 The State of Contemporary Comparative Law 
Today, comparative law is reduced to pointless bickering whether the glass is half full or half empty. 
In other words, the analysis revolves around whether there are similarities or differences between 
the examined elements. Instead, there is a need to examine and evaluate how different regulatory 
solutions in different legal systems function as compared to one another. What really matters is the 
search for parameters that influence the performance of legal systems. Modern research should thus 
concentrate on the effects of potential differences or similarities. 
Simply proving similarity or difference without expanding into a more complicated analysis of their 
effects does not serve any practical purpose. What one sees as similarity, others will see as a 
difference, demonstrating the futility of elevating subjective tastes to be the goal of a whole legal 
discipline. Comparative law has to clarify the ends to which different regimes are applied, the results 
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 For more details, see Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue:  A Study in Moral Theory (South Bend, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2007). 
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these regimes achieve, and the means through which they should be manipulated in order to achieve 
a different result. In short, modern comparative law needs a more consequentialist approach.  
Comparative law is not about national pride in one’s one legal system; rather, it should concentrate 
on the impact different regulations of different legal systems have on the wellbeing of ordinary 
individuals. The most important task of a comparative analysis is to put to the fore the differences 
and similarities of regulation on a specific issue, then to evaluate the effects of possible reform 
changes, and finally to examine country-specific independent parameters that may influence the new 
regulation performance. 
In order to amend this widespread flaw in contemporary comparative research, this work deals with 
questions such as: What similarities and differences matter? How do they change the way the 
systems function? Answering these questions means examining more than one position of the lever 
of the justice machine (the regulation of the judicial system) and the independent variables that 
influence how the system functions under those specific regulations.  How are the users of the 
judicial system affected by choosing one regulation or another? What are the consequences for the 
wellbeing of individuals and society?   
The aim should be to learn from other systems what they are doing well and how can we emulate 
their success, or how to learn from the mistakes of others before we make them ourselves. The 
mentality of “our” system being special and unique and deserving of unquestioning loyalty does not 
serve any purpose. There is no perfect system of human institutional organization. The question is 
only how to serve best the individuals and the society it is designed to help.  Comparative analysis is 
about different views, about how others (outsiders) see our system and how we see theirs. It is about 
learning from different viewpoints. Ultimately though, it is about applying the knowledge we have 
gained and improving the lives of individuals and the functioning of our societies.  
2.2 The Comparative Methods Used in this Thesis  
The main three comparative methods that this work uses are empirical, structural, and functional. 
Briefly, the three methods here are used in the following way: The empirical method provides 
missing information that legal literature has not developed yet. It also serves as a reality check on 
whether the existing legal theories correspond to the way courts function on the ground. The 
structural method provides the units (elements) of the three judicial systems that will be compared. 
In this study, the main structures are the three elements of Bentham’s theory of judicial organization 
and, by extension, the levers of the judicial machine. 
In general, it is possible that sometimes these elements are not organizational, meaning there are no 
similar units within the compared judicial systems, but there are functional equivalences. That means 
different units fulfill the same functions in the examined judicial systems. Consequently, functional 
methods provide a more flexible model of comparison that also compares structures according to 
their functions, not their actual unit organization. These methods, however, are not sufficient for 
effective comparison because they run into the same problem—they do not have a clear way to 
evaluate the units that are to be compared.  
2.3 Empirical Comparative Method 
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Empirical research methodology is probably the first method of comparative methodology that ever 
existed. The origins of this method can be traced to Aristotle’s Politics.14  He conducted comparisons 
that are either based on the empirical method or the product of a first-rate speculative mind 
informed by some empirical knowledge.15 Another source that contains traces of that empirical 
method is the studies conducted on the 158 constitutions of Greek city-states. Only the work on the 
Athenian constitution survived to the present day. That one book alone does not contain enough 
evidence to reveal how a comparative method might have been used. As a result of this lack of 
surviving materials, all the evidence of an ancient comparative empirical method is circumstantial. 
That simply means the connection of this method with modern comparative law methodology is only 
analogical, not genealogical. In other words, the Greek empirical method is not an ancestor to the 
current comparative law method. Modern empirical research has very few historical connections to 
its Greek analog. 
The modern transformation of the empirical comparative method is twofold. First, it is used to 
challenge an established theory. That means this method is extremely useful in finding lack of 
connection between theory and practice. A good example is one of the most important works in 
comparative law in recent years: Mitchel Lasser’s "Judicial Deliberations."16 Even though the author 
does not say that in the book, his analysis is based on the empirical method (interviews with French 
judges). By using this method he has managed to prove that there is a bifurcation in France between 
what the theories say about what French judges do and what their actual practices.  
Second, the empirical method is used as an additional verification method, a good example of which 
can be found in Geoffrey Samuels’ critique of Zweigert and Kotz. According to Samuels, Zweigert and 
Kotz had wrongly argued that in England, most claims in courts were about damages for faulty 
performance. So Samuels’ argument is that Zweigert and Kotz had not performed an empirical 
research because if they had, they would have found that most claims in English courts for breach of 
contract were about the performance of a promise.17 An empirical research is essential as a 
verification of comparative assertions. In modern comparative studies, it is too easy to concentrate 
on what has already been written (legal texts or theories). However, additional empirical research 
can confirm or expose assertions made in a comparative study. 
In this work, the main empirical methodology involves asking French judges questions on how the 
system actually works in practice, thus following Lasser’s path to examine whether theory 
corresponds to reality. 
The empirical study is confined to the French system because for that system, there are fewer 
studies on the way the French judicial system works as compared to the already vast and steadily 
growing American and English bodies of literature. The lack of research in France on the operation of 
the judicial system is probably due to the predominant theoretical view that judges only apply the 
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 An argument can be made that Plato’s Republic also contains comparative analysis since his institutional 
analysis of a ‘just polis’ is based, at least partly, on Sparta’s institutions. Apparently, arguing in Athens that 
Spartan organization is better was not possible at the time he wrote The Republic. 
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 Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (Eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 4. 
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 Mitchel Lasser, Judicial Deliberations (Oxford, UK: Publisher, 2004). 
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 Geoffrey Samuels, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method Hart Publishing Oxford Portland 
Oregon 2014. p. 56 
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law (Montesquieu’s judge as only the mouthpiece of the law). The result has been that fewer studies 
have examined how the French judicial system actually operates. 
2.4 Structural comparative method 
The next method used in this work is the structural method. The first example of the use of this 
structural method is contained in the Institutions of Gaius, an ancient Roman lawyer, whose methods 
of thinking about law were transferred into modern civil law systems. The method was later 
transformed into a comparative method. The transformation of structuralism began with Gaius and 
continued with the Justinian method and its famous code; additionally, it was later used in Kelsen’s 
pyramid of norms.  
In structuralism, the comparativist focuses on the structures hidden in the phenomenon observed. 
The important element of this analysis is the way the structural elements of the system interrelate. 
The elements can be loose or they can be part of a system in which the elements interact with each 
other to produce creativity in the system.18 The elements of the system are compared to other 
elements in a different system via analogy.19 The method is seen as scientific as it escapes the 
dichotomy between time and timeless viewpoints and between individual and societal viewpoints.  
Structural analysis can be used to distinguish between law and non-law systems. That analysis can 
clarify a multidisciplinary comparative research. Juxtaposing these legal and non-legal systems in 
both the home and foreign system can help better explain a social phenomenon. 
The method can be used together with the functional method. The reason is this method deals with 
structures and classifications of legal systems. More precisely, structuralism can be used to rectify 
one of the weaknesses of functionalism that we saw above. It adds form (structure, classification) to 
function and thus changes into a more profound method. As a result of these possible utilisations, 
the structural method, whether used in combination with functionalism or on its own, is one of the 
main manifestations of recent comparative law methodology. 
A possible criticism of this method can be that it privileges signs over sense, space at the expense of 
time, the object at the expense of the subject, and the relation at the expense of nature.20Another 
possible difficulty with this approach is that participants (insiders) and observers (outsiders) of the 
system under examination may not agree with the particular structure proposed by the comparatist. 
The structure can reflect the thinking of the home system of the researcher and not of the 
researched system. Samuel gives a good example when he asked whether common lawyers perceive 
English law as a pyramid of norms with a superior constitutional norm at the top (Kelsen’s pyramid). 
Here it is used to find the structures that will be compared. In Figure 2, the main structure is shown 
as the Judicial System. Within that structure, there are three subparts that Jeremy Bentham dubbed 
the main elements of the judicial system: foundational theory, procedure, and organization. Within 
these three structures, this work examines the different levers (regulatory parameters) of the 
machine of justice. These levers of the judicial system are juxtaposed with economic structures such 
as incentives, information, externalities, and public goods.  
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However, these structures cannot always be formed the same way in different legal systems. 
Sometimes the same result is achieved by using different structures, hence the requirement for the 
functional method. 
2.5 Functional Method 
Before Zweigert and Kotz’ pivotal book, Introduction to Comparative Law, comparative law was in 
methodological disarray based on how recently it had formed as a discipline.21 These two authors 
proposed that the comparativist uses functional methodology to examine different arrangements in 
different legal systems and says that because legal systems deal with very similar problems, two legal 
arrangements may seem quite different at first sight, but in fact, they serve the same function. That 
means these two legal instruments achieve the same result but by following different paths. 
The functional method is useful in comparative analysis because it shows that different regulations 
or independent parameters can have similar functions without being identical. This highlights the 
essence of this method, which is the universality of problems. To put it differently, this method is 
about equivalence of ends not means. That’s why it works well with economic analysis, which is also 
essentially a consequentialist approach. 
According to Zweigert and Kotz, comparative problems should be stated without any reference to 
the researcher’s own system; ideally, the research would be initiated with a specific problem of rule 
application. 22 The issue here is to avoid the natural attachment and preference to the solutions 
proposed by the researcher’s own system.  
Zweigert and Kotz have used a comparison from both epistemological (related to the purpose of 
comparing social phenomenon)23 and ontological (related to objects of comparison)24 perspectives.  
Their analysis has leaned more towards an ontological approach. This project, on the contrary, starts 
with mostly epistemological problems. 
Zweigert and Kotz construct an abstract scheme or model. This abstract model allows enriching 
empirical data. The model also permits the researched object to reveal its properties.25The strength 
of their model is in the step-by-step method that can be applied in practice to a variety of 
comparative research projects. The two authors construct that method as a ‘guide’ to the beginner 
comparatist. 
What is crucial to this model is the sixth and last step, which contains critical analysis that a 
comparativist does at the end of her examination of the comparative issue. She has to find solutions 
to a comparative problem. Zweigert and Kotz are quite persuasive when they maintain that a 
comparativist is in a better position to formulate a new solution; even the most imaginative lawyer 
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who comes from one particular system does not have the wealth of solutions the comparativist 
has.26  However, they have come short of finding solid criteria for critical analysis. 
2.6 Problems with the Functional Method  
Although it is true that the comparativist has more examples of rules than any national lawyer, there 
is a problem with the criterion for evaluating and finding the right solution.27 Zweigert and Kotz have 
proposed a criterion that follows “the immediate sense of appropriateness.”28 What that means is 
this method simply elevates the researcher’s intuitions and preferences to the only criteria of 
evaluation. There is no other criterion for reasoning which rule or legal regime is superior and in 
what way. To put it differently, the functional method runs into problems with the evaluation of legal 
rules, which is not new to legal theory.  
3.0 The Evaluation Problem  
Long before the comparativists emerged on the scene, legal theory scholars have struggled with how 
to decide which legal rule is better. That may be called the inherent law problem. Historically, there 
have been two major schools that have purported to have the method to decide between two 
alternatives—positivism and natural law. 
3.1 Positivism from Comparative Law Perspective  
When faced with two alternatives, the positivist will try to find logic within the existing body of legal 
rules. That is, she will examine the positive law and find a provision that purports to cover the facts 
of the case at hand. This positive rule then is said to also provide the solution to the current legal 
problem. In some cases, the so-called “hard cases,” there is no obvious provision in the existing body 
of law to cover the facts at hand; the judge has to use her discretion. The problem with positivism in 
the context of comparative law is that making the decision over which alternative is better has no 
reference point. The unanswerable question comes down to the impossibility of deciding which of 
the two bodies of legal rules of the two different legal systems that contain the rules compared 
contains the solution. Using positivism thus opens the gate for personal preferences and 
attachments to the researcher’s own legal system.29   
Moreover, positivism regards the wisdom of the past as the best way to decide a case. One problem 
is that there is no way to show that the wisdom of one system is superior to that of the other. Also 
problematic is the fact that past wisdom does not always contain the truth because the social 
situation might have changed dramatically and a new solution could have become optimal. 
Furthermore, positivism can lead to entrenchment of rules that produce negative effects in society 
and actually hurt individual wellbeing because positivism is not easily open to change. This 
demonstrates that positivism leads the comparativist to a dead end. 
3.2 Natural Law from Comparative Perspective 
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The natural lawyer has another inclination to decide which possibility is superior, invoking a higher 
law that exists outside of the positive law. This higher law can have either religious origins, ius 
gentium, or can be found by the use of Kantian-style human reason. Through all these different 
versions of natural law theory, the “truth” can be found outside the positive law and it can be readily 
discovered. 
To put it differently, natural lawyers evoke justice as a correction to legal rules and application gone 
wrong.  As we will see in the next chapter, the concept of justice has its own severe ambiguities and 
contradictions that are very hard to resolve and it is not suitable to give the final say to which 
alternative is really better. For now, it suffices to use Plato’s description of justice he has used in his 
foundational work The Republic, which states that both sides of an argument can claim to be on the 
side of justice. As we will see in the chapter on the theory of justice, this ambiguity of what is actually 
just creates problems of using justice as the only criterion in evaluating two alternative legal rules. 
Nevertheless, justice is useful because it gives intuitions that can be quite utilized to direct the 
thinking of a comparative lawyer. 
4.0 Law and Economics Method  
In order to correct the above-mentioned flaws of the various legal methods, there is a need to 
supplement the analysis with the elaborate tools of evaluation of different legal regimes that law and 
economics provides. It allows us in simple situations to say outright which comparative alternative is 
better. In more complex contexts, it gives us guidelines for the positives and negatives in both 
alternatives.  
As Florian Faust put it, when the traditional methods of comparative law are used, it is often far from 
clear what the best legal rule is. 30 He has highlighted that in this regard, economic analysis can be 
extremely helpful. The reason is law and economics provide tools to think about what the better 
functioning rule might be. For example, trade-offs between different goals, costs, and benefits, as 
well as different ways of attaining a chosen level of provision of a good (justice) can cause different 
levels of transaction costs. As a result, the comparativist using economic analysis can provide more 
informed choices in constructing the judicial system. 
Furthermore, if the comparison reveals the superiority of the foreign rule, this rule cannot simply be 
introduced into domestic law. One must test if the foreign rule will maintain its superiority within the 
context of domestic law. Put differently, she has to examine the independent parameters of the new 
legal environment that can influence the application of a legal rule. For example, she can examine 
parameters such as legal traditions, historical development, social culture, etc.  Transplantation of a 
legal rule similarly to a fundamental reform has inherent transaction costs. Economic analysis can 
help predict the amount of these transaction costs.31   A good example is the extremely long time it 
took for the English reforms of the second half of the 19th century to catch on. The problem was that 
nobody understood at the time that a rule change had transaction costs when the legal culture was 
not receptive. Thus it took time to change the legal culture. In the US, it happened too with the 
introduction of a more managerial judicial system reforms.  
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 Florian Faust, “Comparative Law and Economics,” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, p. 847. 
31
 Ibid, p.848. 
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To sum up, the Law and Economics method provides the tools for evaluation of different levels of 
transaction costs, distribution, incentives, externalities, public goods, information, social benefit, 
public goods.  
5.0 The Extended Comparative and Evaluation Model  
This section tries to answer the following questions: How should one think about comparatively 
evaluating two or more rules? How can one make a correct comparative evaluation?  
The first step is to find some direct rule equivalence between two or more parameters in the 
examined judicial systems. In some cases, direct equivalence does not exist. Thus there is a need to 
use comparative methods to find structural and/or functional equivalences.  
5.1 General Steps of Comparative Research in this Model 
First, we should establish that A (where A=A(x1, x2, x3,...) in system β and A1 ( where A1=A1(y1, y2, 
y3,...)in system Θ have some equivalence (structural, functional, or both). We are looking for a policy 
equivalence on one of the levers of the judicial systems. We are not looking for similarity as 
traditional comparative law models prescribe.  It is sufficient to show that the examined parameters 
(A and A1) are on the same policy lever of the judicial machine. That means they correspond to the 
same type of regulation of the judicial system. For example, in the policy lever of control of the legal 
process (which shows us how evidence is acquired), the two extreme policy positions of the lever 
are: 1) full party control of information acquisition and its presentation in court; and 2) full judicial 
managerial control. Every position of the policy lever within this range of the two extremes can be 
compared and evaluated.  
As is normally the case, however, A and A1 are not absolutely identical. The reason is they are 
different positions on the policy regulation lever. One of them produces a better result according to 
our evaluation criteria as compared to the other. That may mean first that A is superior to A1 (A>A1) 
or the other way around A1 is superior to A (A<A1). The consequence is that we may have a superior 
regulation (policy) position of the lever.  
The second step then is when we suspect that superior A or A1 is superior we need to draw 
preliminary conclusions based on theoretical analysis. 
The third step is to verify the preliminary conclusion. Finding superiority of one rule over the other 
may be strongly influenced by independent parameters. The influence can be either positive or 
negative on the value of A and A1. As a consequence, the evaluation is impossible without 
considering as many of the independent parameters as possible in the two systems x1, x2, x3,... and 
y1, y2, y3,... A full analysis will examine as many independent parameters of a legal system. A project 
that tries to find and examine a full array of independent parameters is a huge undertaking. The 
challenge is the vastness of possible legal, historical, political, social, cultural, and ethical norms that 
can influence the values of the dependent parameters and the regulatory levers of the judicial 
system. Therefore, this project will content itself with only giving some examples that have 
influenced the performance of judicial system regulation.  
The fourth step is to reach a conclusion on whether there really is superiority of A over A1 or the 
reverse. The conclusion is conditional on the fact that there are not any important independent 
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parameters that were not revealed by the comparative study. Because revealing all-important 
independent parameters is a monumental task that deserves special attention on its own, this thesis 
only shows a way to think about reaching that conclusion but does not pretend to have the full 
information required to draw this final conclusion.  
If there is any incompleteness in the examples of independent parameters, other researchers can 
add to the model and most probably even reveal possible lapses in the conclusions. In other words, 
this work will not always give final solutions of what positions of A and A1 are superior in practice. 
However, it will hopefully trigger further research that will reveal in details the policy alternatives 
(other policy levers, the dependent parameters A, A1) and the independent variables in different 
systems these policy regulation levers depend on (x1, x2, x3,... and y1, y2, y3,....)  
The differences in performance of the different positions of the lever in different judicial systems are 
illustrated by the curves A1 A2 A3.  
5.1.2 More details about the workings of the model 
The complexity and number of the independent parameters (x1, x2, x3,...)  and  (y1, y2, y3,...) can be 
such that we may not be able to discover them all and consequently predict how they will interact. 
Missing independent parameters can be added in future studies that can change our understanding 
of the performance of A and/or A1. That simply means the comparative legal research cannot easily 
reach the certainty of an exact science. That can only happen if the independent parameters are only 
a few. That is the logic behind the argument that legal transplants do not always work well in a new 
system. The more similar the host legal system and society to the donor legal system and its society, 
the fewer independent variable surprises the researcher will have to deal with. 
Some of the independent parameters are unknowable because they depend on human behaviour. 
Some attempts to find patterns in that behaviour are possible for example by using incentives 
analysis, which is based on the premise that people follow patterns of behaviour when their personal 
interests dictate that. Thus, the aim is to align individual interests with the desired policy goal. 
However, there will always be exceptions of unpredictable behaviour that does not follow the 
incentives because human beings possess free will. On rare occasions, such a variance can 
conceivably throw off the model in the wrong direction.    
The research can concentrate on existing positions of the lever or ones that do not exist yet but could 
come to be. Thus, A could be a position in system β that actually exists (the lever is at that position). 
A1 does not have to be an existing position in judicial system Θ.  It can be used only as a 
contemplated position, which can be useful for demonstration purposes, or it could be used as a 
reform proposal. Preliminary prediction of the way the system will perform at the positions of the 
lever A and A1 can be made. To have a more accurate evaluation though, there is a need to examine 
the independent parameters (y1, y2, y3,...) that can influence its future performance so we can 
predict its possible results. The conclusion can be, for example, an approval of a proposed reform.  
If the A=A1, then the performance effects should be similar. If these effects are not similar, the 
comparison will have to concentrate on the independent parameters.  
If A and A1 are different (have different positions on the same policy lever), then the comparative 
analysis is concerned with both the dependent parameters and with the independent.  
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To make it a comparative analysis, we have to follow the same two-phase analysis for each system 
and compare both the independent variables x1 x 2 x3… with y1 y2 y3… z1 z2 z3… then compare how 
the change from A1 A2 A3 influences the performance of each system P P1 P2… can compare the 
results on the same policy lever A A1 A2.  
It is expected that if A and A1 are different, the difference in performance will be bigger. However, 
that is not always the case. As we will see from some examples, sometimes the independent 
parameters have such important values that they influence performance substantially. That is to say 
even at the same position of the lever, performance is not similar. In such cases, finding the 
independent parameter with a massive influence on the performance is vital for successful 
comparative research.  
Moving the lever may not produce strong results if one of the independent parameters has 
important value. For example, changing the judicial system from party led process to judge managed 
process may not produce the desired results because independent parameters such as legal 
traditions, legal education and current practice in the courts cannot are so entrenched in the way the 
judicial system functions that they have stronger influence on performance than the lever position 
(dependent parameters (A and A1). The reason is when the independent parameters have important 
values, they can impede the new regulatory change from producing results. 
That means the independent parameters can make the function inelastic (A3 in the graph above).  
6.0 Economic Analysis as a Corrector of the Other Comparative Legal Methods  
Theories that see the judicial system simply as a provider of justice miss one very important effect 
that legal rules have: they always work for the benefit of some and very often to the detriment of 
others. In practice, almost every new rule or legal regime creates winners and losers. The instances in 
which a new rule operates in the interests of everybody are quite rare.  
Thus, we need economic analysis to tell us whose interests the new rule defends and to whose 
detriment. If it operates to make one or more individuals better off and nobody suffers any loss from 
it, then we have the rare situation in which we have Pareto efficiency.32 However, if someone loses 
from the operation of the new rule, we need to understand and then analyse if we really think that 
rule superior to another by balancing the interests of different groups in society.  
The comparativist’s idea of justice is often intuitive but that is not enough because our sense of what 
is right may be wrong. We may think we create a rule that benefits everybody but in fact, it could be 
detrimental to important segments of society. Thus, we have to introduce concepts such as 
individual welfare, social benefit, and aggregate preferences in society as we shall in the next 
chapter. The researcher’s preferences and intuitions are not enough. 
As we saw previously, functional and structural comparative analysis cannot be used to evaluate and 
express a preference for one rule instead of another.  The reason is they elevate the comparativist’s 
preferences and intuitions into the only choice criteria, which can be corrupted by a bias for her own 
legal system. 
                                                          
32
 Allocation A is said to be Pareto superior to allocation B if both individuals are at least as well off under A as 
compared to B, and at least one is strictly better off. 
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Another other deficiency of other comparative methods is that their analysis often fails to identify 
and then evaluate the purpose of a rule. Thus, arguments such as the one that functional approach 
can be used to determine which one of several rules that have the same purpose is the best rule are 
wrong.  
Authors such as James Godley have further argued that the distinction between rules and their 
purpose is artificial. “One must interpret rules and concepts that inform them in terms of the 
purposes that they serve,”33 that is, moves the analysis in the right direction; but this is an 
oversimplification. Purposes of legal rules can be complicated and produce unexpected effects. That 
means we need to pay special attention to purposes of legal rules. 
7.0 The Relationship between Legal Rule, its Purposes, and its Effects  
To explain how economic analysis affects this study and what it adds to the functional and structural 
methods, the following chart will be useful:  
 
Fig 6. The Relationship between Legal Rule, its Purposes, and its Effects 
The model created in this work is based on a triple relationship between a rule, its purposes, and its 
effects. On both ends of the model is society, which inputs a problem and is affected by the judicial 
system.  It is suggested that Godley is correct to say that there is a very close connection between a 
rule and its purpose. However, the issue is that legal rule’s purpose exists only in the mind of its 
creator or its user. The purpose is not part of the real world. It is in the domain of our wishes and 
desires. What connects a rule back to social reality is its effect. So evaluation of a rule cannot be 
based only on its purpose but must include its effect.  
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If we look back at Figure one, we see that many non-consequentialist and non-sociological models of 
law completely ignore effects on society and individuals. Instead, their examination of the judicial 
system emphasises only the purpose of the rule and the judicial decision itself. 
8.0 Summary of Evaluation Defects  
The traditional functional method promotes intuitive evaluation (for example, evaluation is based on 
the immediate sense of what is appropriate), the positivist method evaluates rules based on other 
norms within the same legal system, and natural law is based on an ultimate source of law outside of 
positive law. Economic analysis makes the evaluation based on economic criteria that are better at 
measuring effects of legal rules on society (or at least add another set of criteria to evaluate the 
effects). 
8.1 Why Justice as Evaluation Criteria cannot be Excluded  
Justice gives the way to think about the fundamental issues in society. It gives us the most profound 
guidelines of how to organize our society. In economic terms, that means justice determines the 
social welfare function. The discipline of economics cannot determine by itself that function. A good 
example is the idea that justice gives answers to questions such as for whose benefit social 
arrangements exist. Questions such as whether to protect the weakest members of society are 
essential. This is important for this study because, without a reference to justice, no one can decide 
the dilemma posed by the Milk Case, which was explained in the beginning of the introduction. The 
question the case posed was whether applying the law that was informed by a theory demanding 
protection of the weakest members of society. Is there a need to change the procedure that stopped 
the case from proceeding to judgment? Similar questions are essential to our understanding of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the judicial system. 
8.2 Evaluation Criteria: Justice or Economics? 
In the law and economics literature, there are two options on whether economics can provide an 
independent criterion from justice for evaluation of legal rules. Shavell and Kaplow have maintained 
that justice can be replaced completely by economic and consequentialist reasoning.34 Michael Dorff, 
on the contrary, has convincingly argued that Kaplow and Shavell have just swept the justice analysis 
under the rug where it is less visible.35 This work uses both justice and economic analysis. The reason 
is that for the more fundamental issues of society, justice gives more profound answers than 
economics. However, when the question is to evaluate whether something works well, economics 
provides the better evaluation tools because it explains at the least the positives and the negatives of 
different legal solutions.  
Substantive law is informed and was, at some point in its development, profoundly influenced by one 
or more theories of justice. Substantive law has created the social welfare function by enacting 
human rights laws. How does this model reflect that? The evaluation can relate back to the input 
whether the issue at hand is a procedural problem or a more fundamental substantive law (justice) 
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 Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness vs. Welfare (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
35
 Michael Dorff, “Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell,” Southern California Law 
Review 75 (2002):847. 
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problem. Economic analysis can be quite good for the procedural problem but not as helpful if the 
problem is fundamental (human rights for example).  
To represent the evaluation in a chart it is useful to extend the one given in Figure 2. In Figure 7, the 
evaluation can be seen as feedback that moves from the output of the judicial system into society 
back to the beginning of the chart where measures can be taken to resolve problems in society. 
 
Fig. 7. The Judicial System as seen in the model  
In –Input (problems in society) 
Out   -Output (effects of problems in society after they have been grinded by the judicial machine  
∆ - Correction (correction is the blue line that comes from the effects on society back to problems in society  
FB – Feedback (evaluation) this correction is achieved thanks to using economic analysis and theory of justice 
F (∆) - Function of correction 
K - Coefficient 
Ref - Reference 
 
FB = K (Ref - Out) 
 
 
The reference is the ideal situation (value) that one wants to have (purpose of regulation – the ideal 
result as desired by the regulator). 
At the output, the aim is to have a value that is as close to the ideal value that has been set as 
reference (purpose of regulation). So if output is equal to the reference, the judicial system achieves 
the desired result.  
In a real situation, it is not possible for output to be exactly equal to the reference. That is something 
that most legal theories do not understand. They usually assume that as long as the purpose of 
regulation is clearly defined, it is always achieved.  If that were the case, there would have been no 
need for feedback (evaluation). Since that is incorrect, in order to get the desired result, first a 
realistic goal should be set. That means that the policy purpose has to be defined in realistic terms 
not ideal ones. Then it is much easier to have an output that can be close to being equal to the 
reference. If that aim is off and there is no equalizing the two(output and reference), the system 
needs feedback (evaluation) that can demonstrate how to make corrections in the future in order to 
get closer to the desired policy goal.   
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The value of reference minus output is proportional to the feedback. K is a coefficient showing that 
feedback is proportional to the difference between Reference and Output:  
∆ = In - FB 
∆ (the correction) has to be going to zero in order to make sure the input is equal to the feedback. 
The reason is then there is adequate feedback, which corrects the input.  
Out = F (∆)     
Output is constant when ∆ is going to zero. Whatever happens at the input, you have adequate 
feedback that corrects the input so the system functions correctly. 
9.0 Scientific Approach of this Work and its Limitations  
This thesis comes as close as possible to a scientific approach to resolve problems of the judicial 
system. However, there are inherent limitations to what social sciences can achieve in terms of being 
truly scientific. The key issue is that the feedback from a judicial system’s output into society can be 
correct or incorrect. The reason is that the feedback is done by human beings, who are prone to 
error. In a scientific system, for example in astronomy, the observation of the movement of the stars, 
the feedback is provided by a process that exists in nature independently of human behaviour. This 
feedback cannot be incorrect. That is the limit of scientific methods in social sciences—there is a 
human element. In a judicial system, that human element is usually provided by academics who 
examine the effects of the performance of the judicial system on society. 
John Stuart Mill was the first to explain the difference between social and hard sciences, which also 
shows the limitation of the scientific approach this thesis uses. The reason for the existence of that 
difference is human free will. In hard sciences, when a new scientific fact is observed that 
contradicts, for example, an existing law of physics, it simply means that the law formulated by the 
scientists is wrong. In human-made law, if an individual does not follow the law, that does not mean 
the law is wrong. It simply means the individual is exercising her free will to break the law. So 
knowledge of individual behavior is much harder to obtain because that individual might not have 
followed the law for myriad reasons. We can observe tendencies, but knowing all the facts that result 
from the exercise of free human will is impossible. That is a serious weakness of all social sciences. As 
a result, in law and other social sciences, we have a substantial information problem that does not 
exist in such form in hard sciences. A way to bridge that gap provided by economics is an incentives 
analysis that gives a better way to observe tendencies of human behavior. 
That means that instead of improving the problems in society with a subjective feedback the 
situation can be made worse. So that is where the force of economics is because it provides a more 
objective approach. As we will see, justice as equality is another such objective approach. However, 
the economic approach is also far from infallible because it is also prone to human error (the 
feedback comes from humans not nature itself). Thus, it is important to see who can be the best 
feedback (evaluation) provider. 
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9.1 Who Provides the Feedback in a Judicial System? 
In a system to which hard science is applied, the feedback comes from observation and 
measurement of natural phenomena. In a system with a strong human element, the first option is 
the government. In the case of the judicial system, if it is the government there may be serious 
concerns over judicial independence. 
Another way is to let the system to self-regulate itself. Judges higher up in the judicial hierarchy can 
also argue that they can evaluate the performance of the judicial system. The problem is that they 
will regulate in the interest of judges, not society. For example, they will find ways to reduce judicial 
caseload pressures so judges would not be overwhelmed by the caseload they face. However, that is 
not the optimal solution for the whole of society. As we shall see, access to the judicial system both 
at first instance court and appeal levels is probably one of the most complicated issues the regulation 
of the judicial system has to deal with. Thus, allowing judges simply to serve their own interest and 
find ways to reduce their own workload is the wrong solution. That is a major problem that concerns 
judicial independence and regulation of the judicial system that this thesis deals with. 
So the feedback has to be provided by academic analysts. That is the most effective way if they are 
independent both from the government and from the judiciary. In some systems, that is not the case 
and as a result, the quality of the feedback suffers.  
Thus, this thesis tries to examine the main elements of the judicial system and provide this feedback 
in order to improve our understanding of how to improve the performance of the judicial system. 
10.0 Summary of the Model after Adding the Methodology Details 
First, we should establish that A (where A=A(x1, x2, x3,...) in system β  and A1 ( where A1=A1(y1, y2, 
y3,...)in system Θ have some equivalence (structural, functional or both). We are looking for a policy 
equivalency on one of the levers of the judicial systems. We are not looking similarity as traditional 
comparative law models prescribe.  It is sufficient to show that the examined parameters (A and A1) 
are on the same policy lever of the judicial machine. That means they correspond to the same type of 
regulation of the judicial system. For example, in the policy lever of control of legal process that 
shows us how information (evidence) is acquired the two extreme policy positions of the lever are 1) 
full party control of information acquisition and its presentation in court and 2) full judicial 
managerial control). Every position of the policy lever within this range of the two extremes can be 
compared and evaluated.  
As is normally the case, however, A and A1 are not absolutely identical. The reason is they are 
different positions on the policy regulation lever. One of them produces better result according to 
our evaluation criteria as compared to the other. That may mean first that A is superior to A1 (A>A1) 
or the other way around A1 is superior to A (A<A1). The consequence is that we may have a superior 
regulation (policy) position of the lever.  
The second step becomes defining the reference which is the ideal situation that you want to have 
(purpose of regulation – the ideal result as desired by the regulator). That step requires purpose 
analysis of the regulation of the judicial system and identifying the ideal goal it tries to achieve. If 
that ideal situation is achieved, there is no need for correction ∆. The reason is the judicial system 
functions as desired or in other words it operates optimally.  
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How are the lever positions chosen for examination? There are a few options: First, they may reflect 
real policy choices taken by the three judicial systems either presently or in the past. Second they can 
be real policy alternatives around which there is a debate of which one is preferable. Third, they may 
contemplate on ideal policy alternatives and their counterparts in reality.  
The third step then is when we suspect that superior A or A1 is superior, we need to draw 
preliminary conclusions based on theoretical analysis.  
The fourth step is to see if there is superiority of one lever position over another. If there is no clear 
advantage of one position over another, we have to describe what the pros and cons of the different 
positions are. Moreover, we have to explain for whose benefit the possible functions operate. In 
economic terms, we have to define the trade-offs that the regulator has to make when deciding 
which position of the lever she chooses. 
The fifth step is to verify the preliminary conclusion. Finding superiority of one rule over the other 
may be strongly influenced by independent parameters. The influence can be either positive or 
negative on the value of A and A1. As a consequence the evaluation is impossible without 
considering as many of the independent parameters as possible in the two systems x1, x2, x3,... and 
y1, y2, y3,... A full analysis will examine as many independent parameters of a legal system. A project 
that tries to find and examine a full array of independent parameters is a huge undertaking. The 
challenge is the vastness of possible legal, historical, political, social, cultural, and ethical norms that 
can influence the values of the dependent parameters, the regulatory levers, of the judicial system. 
Therefore this project will content itself in only giving some examples that have influenced the 
performance of judicial system regulation.  
The sixth step is to reach a conclusion on whether there really is superiority of A over A1 or the 
reverse. The conclusion is conditional on the fact that there are not any important independent 
parameters that were not revealed by the comparative study. This thesis only shows a way to think 
about reaching that conclusion but does not pretend to have the full information required to draw 
this final conclusion.  
If there is any incompleteness in the examples of independent parameters, other researchers can 
add to the model and most probably even reveal possible lapses in the conclusions. In other words, 
this work will not always give final solutions of what positions of A and A1 are superior in practice. 
However, it will hopefully trigger further research that will reveal in mode details the policy 
alternatives (other policy levers, the dependent parameters A, A1) and the independent variables in 
different systems these policy regulation levers depend on(x1, x2, x3,... and y1, y2, y3,....)  
The short version of all this is as follows:  
First, identify the positions of the levers to be examined and explain how and why these particular 
positions are chosen. 
Second, define the purpose(s) of each lever. 
Third, draw a preliminary theoretical conclusion based on pros and cons of each lever position. 
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Fourth, perform a comparative analysis – find the independent parameters that can influence the 
performance of the lever positions. 
Fifth, when taking into consideration these country-specific parameters, attempt to draw more 
concrete conclusions about the lever positions. 




SECTION II: GUIDING THEORIES FOR THE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE JUDICIAL MACHINE 
This section demonstrates that the quality of a modern judicial system comes from having a clear 
theoretical perspective of justice and what the judicial machine tries to achieve. The two regulatory 
lever positions of the judicial machine considered are the use of a theory of justice with specific 
direction and a theory of justice that dispenses complete (substantive) justice.  
1.0 Theories as Guidance to a Modern Judicial Machine (First Lever)  
In order to demonstrate the importance of having a clear theoretical perspective, this part of the 
chapter will examine several key theories that are capable of elucidating what guidance from a 
modern judicial machine may look like. In the first lever, which this chapter argues to be optimal, the 
following key theories will be discussed at length:  teleological, utilitarian, consequentialist, and 
economic. These theories have been chosen because they propose a specific view of justice that 
underlies what this thesis defends as optimal functioning of the judicial system. That means that the 
choice of these theories is based on their pragmatic appeal and sense of direction they can give to 
how justice functions. 
2.0 Complete Justice Theory (Second Lever) 
There is an alternative lever position that proposes fulfillment of the so-called complete or 
substantive justice. This way of looking at justice is rejected because it leads to contradictions and 
cross-subsidies in the way the judicial system functions. In the discussion of the second lever 
position, a brief overview will be given of the complications found in delivering complete justice 
according to legal philosophers from its inception to the present day. The brief overview of what 
justice has meant to the greatest minds in political and legal theory is designed to demonstrate the 
controversial character of the concept of justice and impossibility that undermines the theory that 
attempts to deliver complete justice.  
It should be said that neither lever position leads to perfect results. Thus, it is important to note the 
weaknesses and limitations of the chosen theories. This thesis subscribes to the view that there is no 
perfect way to regulate human societies and their institutions. Consequently, every solution that 
proposes a way to organize institutions is bound to be imperfect, laden with shortcomings, and 
bound by limitations. It is important to be aware of those negative sides so when some of the 
theoretical ideas are applied to the judicial machine, the problems existing problems will not be 
replaced with new myths of a perfect judicial machine. In other words, the argument here is that 
perfection is not possible but improvement is. 
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3.0 The Four Theories of the First Theoretical Lever of the Judicial Machine 
This work will combine the purpose analysis, which is a broad teleological approach and central to 
legal analysis, 36 with the strength of economics—the idea of consequentialism37 that tells us 
intentions do not always transform into intended consequences. That analysis explains the difference 
between what is desired and what is achieved. The analysis is also inspired by utilitarian theory 
because bringing institutional improvement is central to that theory and the essential aim of this 
work.  
The four theories forming the bulk of the discussion in this chapter are related. They are a series of 
models that can be pulled apart to reveal another one with some resemblance or common subject 
inside. So the actual relationship between the three theories is that utilitarianism is a type of 
consequentialism, which is a type of teleological theory. Moreover, modern economic theory is a 
direct descendant of both utilitarianism and consequentialism. So the approach here is designed to 
see a larger system within which each theory is framed in the context of the others. 
3.1 Teleological Theory  
The task of teleological ethical theory is to define in explicit terms the principle behind 
consequentialist moral judgment and resolve some fundamental issues concerning its application. 
The purpose analysis stays purely in teleological grounds because it is not only interested in 
improving utility. Attention is paid to a broader array of purposes, not just the attainment of a 
certain goal—utility. The reason is these purposes reveal important unexpected elements that enrich 
the consequential and utilitarian analysis. 
3.1.1 Why Use Teleological Approach and Talk about Purposes? 
In order to take seriously the ideas of Friedrich Hayek, a trained lawyer, who is considered to be one 
of the two leading economists of the 20th century, there must be a discussion of his key ideas in the 
book Law, Legislation, and Liberty. 38 The argument he has developed there is that human action 
brings about complexity of results. The reason can be found in an important distinction he makes 
between spontaneous and made order. The conscious intention is something that a firm or 
governmental bureaucracy has as purpose vis-à-vis the society.  He calls that a “made order.” This 
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Teleology deals 
mostly with the finding of "ends.” It is an ethical theory that judges the rightness of an action in terms of an 
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conscious intention can change or be very difficult to achieve as compared to the naturally occurring 
spontaneous order (the market), which achieves goals that are not necessarily intentionally 
articulated. Spontaneous order achieves superior coordination of the interests of each individual by 
following as Adam Smith’s invisible market hand.39 This way of thinking is characteristic of the 
philosophy of the Austrian school to which he belonged. The idea was also accepted by neoliberal 
economics and has resulted in a purely consequentialist economic analysis. The idea that made order 
brings about unintended and complex consequences should be taken seriously. It is indeed a 
monumental task to uniformly design different elements of society so they fit together and function 
well without producing negative results. In this work, this is called the Hayekian Warning.  
Nevertheless, it should be made clear that this way of thinking has also had two negative results. 
First, it has stopped the development of human ingenuity and endeavor in answering an important 
question pertaining to human institutions. Second, there has not been enough attention paid to 
analysis from the initial purpose perspective. So modern economic analysis very often directs its 
research only to the consequences and very little to the complexity of purposes institutions try to 
achieve (intentionally and unintentionally). Institutional research has also been relatively neglected 
as compared to pure market behavior.  That is done for no other good reason but because the task is 
too complex and some purposes may be omitted or have unintended consequences. In any case, the 
result has been that the chain connecting the four theories has been partially broken. 
Hayek has also argued in favour of human institutions that have occurred as a result of “evolution, a 
process in which practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or purely accidentally, 
have been preserved because they enabled the group in which they had arisen to prevail over 
others.”40In practice, that means there is a need to wait a thousand years to see what institutions will 
develop, how they will develop, and which ones will perform best. The other choice is to see the 
institutions that have already developed and by using comparative analysis find at least some of the 
reasons they developed better than others. 
Hayek has made one very important exception to his scepticism about made order. He has admitted 
that the design of the court system is absolutely necessary for the whole economic spontaneous 
order to function.41 The reason is courts serve as protectors of the market. Property rights and 
contracts need to be enforced. As a result, even in the eyes of the most vigorous opponent of made 
order, which includes institutions, the design of the judicial system simply must be done. So to his 
credit, Hayek has clearly understood that the judicial system is probably the most important 
institution. The problem of his theory is that he does not elaborate at all on how to organize the 
judiciary. 
Human-made institutions are important for the functioning of society. So Hayek is right to find the 
most important exception to his theory but he is also wrong in undermining the role such institutions 
play in society. There lies the general point of where he has come short in his theory of made and 
spontaneous order. In a modern society, not every action can be coordinated by markets. He simply 
did not pay attention to the fact that human institutions simply have to be created when the 
transaction cost of organizing human relations through markets are too high. In that situation, there 
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is a need for a hybrid form of coordination because there is no ideal market, which means one 
characterized by the fact that prices act as sufficient statistics for decision-making. In such 
circumstances, organizations must to step in. Organizations are characterized as simply another form 
of coordination of transactions that do not use prices to communicate information between the 
transacting parties.42 In reality, most transactions (individual relations in society) are governed by 
hybrid forms of coordination.  
In a personal conversation with the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Jean Tirole, this idea to start 
from purposes received an important encouragement. He exclaimed that economics is all about 
purposes. That makes sense because the main subject of his inquiry into economics has been not the 
market but industrial organization (organization of the firm). Similarly, in this thesis, the center of 
attention is also organizational but it deals with one political institution (the judiciary). Both are 
created as a result of human action. One simply cannot rely on market forces to self-organize this 
intentional creation. So it all depends on the branch of economics and in this work, that branch is 
organizational economics.  
In any case, human organizations cannot exist without a defined purpose or goal for which they are 
created. Thus, the purpose of the organization has to be part of at least a comparative analysis that 
reveals the successes and failures of models of organization. So in this work, the more narrow 
consequentialist and broader teleological approaches go hand in hand. The teleological approach 
means that the purpose analysis does not necessarily lead to intended consequences but is needed 
to show the complexities that can occur because of difference in purposes. The pure 
consequentialism helps to uncover the cause-and-effect relationship between purposes and results 
and allows to a certain degree (if causality can be established) to evaluate the alternatives based on 
their results.  
Because of the Hayekian warning against made order, which says that human action necessarily 
entails more complexity than a single human mind can grasp, this thesis will not be able to explore all 
the purposes and all their consequences. That observation is nowhere more accurate than when 
comparative analysis is concerned. There the possible purposes, causes, and consequences can be 
extremely complex. It would take a large international and multidisciplinary team of specialists to 
deal with just some of them. Nevertheless, undertaking a complex task should not be avoided 
because there may currently be facets to it that this author cannot perceive. Revealing some of the 
complexities of human action in a judicial organization is already a success even if they are 
debatable. The reason is sparking a debate will already be an important step towards revealing more 
of the complexities. The purposes and consequences that remain “undiscovered” by this work should 
be subject to further research. In any case, if the variety of purposes is not explored a variety of 
effects will be completely ignored as well because they are part of a cause and effect relationship. 
All that said, there is one final, very simple, and convincing reason to use teleological approach—it is 
deeply embedded in human psychology; people simply want to know what the purpose is. This view 
has already been developed by the prominent modern philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre.43 He has 
critiqued contemporary academic literature on being too instrumentalist, saying that social scientists 
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cannot have a scientific approach to means and be agnostic about purposes.44 The bottom line is that 
human beings will never be satisfied with an activity that does not have a purpose.  
Human purposes are simplified cognitive instruments that allow humans to act in daily life. After all, 
people do not usually spend two hours per day thinking about the pros and cons of buying milk.  That 
is not the case when dealing with complex issues. Unfolding the complexity and exposing the 
simplifications needed to function in daily life is necessary when considering more important issues 
such as the organization of a country's institutions. Taking shortcuts in thinking (simplifying purposes) 
leads to unpredictable consequences that are far from the intended outcome.  
Another similar opinion is that of the Nobel Prize-winning economist, A. Sen, who has developed a 
teleological economic theory based on the principle that people have potential and if they do not 
realize it, they will not be happy. The same is true for judicial institutions. If they are not developed 
to reach their potential, they will not be able to deliver a quality service to society. This line of 
thought follows a long tradition starting with Jean Jack Rousseau, who said that in designing of 
institutions, “we should take man as they are and laws as they might be.”45  
In sum, Hayek sees a conflict between teleology and consequentialism. His reason is that defining 
purposes consciously by humans leads to the wrong consequences. He is wrong though because 
organizations sometimes can do a better job and be more efficient in coordinating human action. He 
openly admits that the judicial system must be well organized so it can serve as protector of 
spontaneous order (markets). Hayek’s warning of the complexity of human action and purpose 
analysis is absolutely correct; without taking complexity into account when designing human 
organizations, they will end up as malfunctioning and deficient institutions. Finally, finding out the 
reason of things is deeply embedded in human psychology. Making that process conscious and the 
subject of serious research will help us escape shortcuts taken in daily life that can have disastrous 
consequences for institutions.       
3.2 Why Use a Consequentialist Approach? 
Consequentialists believe that public policy choices should be made by examining their possible 
outcome.46 The preference for one policy over another should be based on which one of them brings 
about a better outcome. Consequentialists’ focus, then, is on society’s overall welfare, however 
achieved, measured, or defined.47 
Consequential analysis brings a dose of reality to the teleological approach described above. The 
reason is the only way to bring ideas and desires back to reality is to see the consequences of 
individual actions. Thus, it is important not to forget fallibility of teleological purposes. The reason is 
they are not part of reality. Thus, they should always be examined together with their results. To put 
it in the words of the classical liberal thinker, William Graham Sumner48: “Motives are in the brain 
and heart of man. Consequences are in the world of fact. The former are infected by human 
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ignorance, folly, self-deception, and passion; the latter are sequences of cause and effect dependent 
upon the nature of the forces at work.”49 
Consequentialism’s central claim is that the right thing to do is always the option whose 
consequences are best.50 The logic behind this theory is that no one would make a choice that would 
produce bad consequences, especially when there are better alternatives out there. 
3.2.1 The Follies of the Traditional Legal Approach 
Imagine a new law designed with the purpose of helping the poor or delivering a better quality of 
justice. Of course, with any new law, looking into consequences is essential, as even the best-
intended lawyers can sometimes bring about unintended results. There are a lot of assumptions that 
the purpose of doing something is clear, but in fact, Hayek’s warning is in play—purposes can be 
extremely complicated and lead to unintended consequences. 
What happens then when purposes are not examined from a consequentialist perspective? 
Conventional legal methods seem to be paved with “obvious” purposes, but the effects seem to be 
quite different. Consequentialist theory does better in practice than a rigid deontological theory. It 
provides answers as to the best state of affairs given a few choices. The decision is based on the 
optimal allocation of a desired good. For example, in talking about human rights, a consequentialist 
will be able to decide that providing the best possible protection of as many fundamental rights as 
possible is preferable than a state of affairs in which the stated goal is to defend human rights but, in 
practice, the result is defending none or only a few of them. This approach is also useful in identifying 
the necessary steps in achieving that optimal result.  
4.0 The Critique of Consequentialism  
The critique of this approach is that surely there is more to morality than consequences. There must 
be criteria on which to base the evaluation of an action’s moral rightness. Paul Hurley has mounted 
one of the most serious attacks on consequentialism in recent years.51 In his work, he has argued 
against “standard act consequentialism,” which evaluates acts rather than “rules or motives.”52  
There is merit in this critique. Consequentialism cannot only evaluate acts and their results; the 
human endeavour is more complex than that. It contains purposes (motivations) and rules to which 
society adheres. Without examining the motivations, there can be no analysis of what laws are 
intended to achieve. There needs to be three concepts of motivations, rules, and consequences as a 
continuous chain that produces results. Motivations (even ill-defined and unconscious ones) lead to 
rules of behaviour, which in turn produce results in society. If the first two are not clear, there can be 
no understanding of how to profoundly evaluate the consequences of human behaviour.  
Hayek’s theory of analyzing motivations and rules is less important when talking about spontaneous 
market order, but the situation changes when dealing with made order. In this case, the judicial 
machine needs a clear idea of the motives behind its creation and function, the rules put in place to 
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achieve those goals, and finally the consequences to individuals and society they produce. To put 
that in philosophical language, the combination of purposes and consequences this thesis uses 
means not being contained only the narrower consequentialist approach. A broader teleological 
inquiry, which does not have to move towards deontology, also reveals important details. 
5.0 Why Use Utilitarian Theory and Jeremy Bentham in Particular   
Jeremy Bentham is one of the leading political philosophers of the 19th century and he is also the 
precursor of modern welfare economics. He proposed an extensive analysis and design of the judicial 
system and wrote a powerful critique of the judicial system in England. His insight into the three 
building blocks of the judicial system—procedure, structure, and a theory of justice as the driving 
force behind the whole system—is as useful today as it was back in the 19th century. That is why his 
three-part analysis is the structural foundation for this work.53  
5.1 Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory 
The definition of justice, according to Jeremy Bentham, is summarized in the powerful phrase, 
“greatest happiness for greatest number.” Bentham’s theory has concentrated on maximizing 
general happiness through the principle of utility. Human beings, in a causal sense, are seekers of 
pleasure and avoiders of pain. The utility principle understands and applies that in practice by 
improving institutions that govern society.54 
Bentham is also the founder of the modern conceptions of value. He linked the good to what people 
desire and sought a more scientific approach by basing politics on science. Here is a concise list of his 
theory that visually represents the significant elements of his theory.    
5.1.1 Brief summary of key elements of Bentham’s theory:   
• Comprehensive: It encompasses all human actions, even the ones that seem altruistic 
because they are pain and pleasure driven. 
• Reformist theory:  aiming at improving the judicial system in 19th-century England.  
• Institutional theory: One of the most useful features for this work is Bentham’s focus on 
social institutions and more specifically on the judiciary.  
• Deterministic theory: It prescribes solutions in every situation. (Kaplow and Shavell theory 
follows the Bentham’s tradition.)55 
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• Radically consequentialist doctrine: Being concerned with results of actions and nothing else. 
Intentions do not matter. 
• Egoistic but not subjectivist: People are self-interested seekers of pleasure and avoiders of 
pain.  
• Not dependent upon preferences: It does not matter whether it is true or not. It is 
objectively the case that people pursue pleasure and avoid pain. 
• Distributive theory: The goal was not achieving justice in individual cases but distributive 
justice, fair distribution of utility across society by maximizing the production of the justice 
system.56 
• Utility above all: Commitment to ensuring either partially or absolutely, the frustration of 
substantive justice in order to maximize utility. 
• Substantive justice theory: Commitment to achieving substantive justice, securing the 
effective enforcement of the substantive law.  
• Hedonistic theory: Morally good action creates more happiness or pleasures than suffering. 
57 Morally bad action produces more suffering than happiness. Assessing moral value is then 
about assessing the sum of the effects.58 
• General social theory is not concerned with any individual; It focuses on the whole society 
rather than on individuals.59  
• Calculative theory: The way to tell if the utility principle is followed is by aggregating 
individual happiness or utility to find out what the social utility is. 
• Flexibility theory: This feature allows the judicial system to remain flexible in enforcing 
justice. This poses the question of when the use of the judicial system conforms to the 
principle of utility.  
• His theory was also profoundly interested in the value of courtroom evidence.  
Several of the features of Jeremy Bentham’s theory, described above, have been influential for this 
project. The first one is that his theory calls for reform of the judicial system.60 Since Bentham, there 
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have very few theorists with such a determined and clear agenda about the functioning of the 
judiciary. A good example of a relevant issue even today is Bentham’s critique that the justice system 
of 19th-century England was not able to maximize social utility because courts existed to satisfy the 
financial self-interest of lawyers and judges.61 This work examines the issue of whether spreading the 
judicial system across an unnecessarily complicated web of courts and competing 
jurisdictions62results in positive or suboptimal function of the courts. This analysis will be part of the 
greater analysis in the Hierarchy and Appeal chapters. Moreover, Bentham argued that the court 
structure had to be simplified and that procedure had to be improved. Thus, Bentham has been a 
substantial influence on two of the parts of this thesis structural organization and procedural rules.63 
The legal reformist agenda of the judiciary has long existed and even though there have been 
arguments that they have been based on Bentham’s ideas, they have not produced clear 
results.64Thus, a reformist agenda has to be backed up by substantial research and have a clear 
direction, which this thesis aims to make steps towards. 
The second important feature of Bentham’s theory is the institutional character of his theory. 
Although institutional analysis has seen some development since Bentham, it is surprising that there 
has not been much progress. Mainstream economic analysis has shied away from institutional 
analysis, resulting in a limited number of new theories.65, 66 That will become evident in the chapters 
of Hierarchy, Appeal, and Public Goods where the sources used are not theories on the court and 
other state institutions but on organizational analysis developed only about firms; part of the task of 
this work is to analyze what parts of these theories have analogies in the judicial system.  
Third, the utilitarian approach Bentham started has been very influential on the economic analysis of 
law and therefore will be useful to consider in a bit more detail so that the origins of the methods 
used in this work can be clearer.   
The fourth useful element of his theory is that it is deterministic; the use of the principle of utility 
gives directions on deciding what may be an optimal arrangement of the judicial system.  
Fifth, his theory is consequentialist, one of the main theoretical approaches used in this research. 
Nevertheless, that is also a weakness of his theory because, as with utility, Bentham takes 
consequentialism to an extreme, which is something that prevents the practical use of his theory. 
Every extreme theory also exaggerates its defects. Thus the consequences and utility cannot 
measure everything. The utility principle has deeply influenced economics, especially welfare 
economics where the welfare principle is a direct descendant of the utilitarian principle. Other 
concepts such as efficiency are also based on the utility principle. For example, the Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency—which states that for something to be efficient, the winners should win more than losers 
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will lose and there is no transfer between them—is closely related to Bentham’s mantra of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
Sixth, another of Bentham’s foundational ideas concerns the chapter on Access to Courts. The danger 
Bentham saw in potential litigants who refrain from commencing proceedings or who abandon their 
claim before judgment or court proceedings that result in an incorrect decision because of the 
reduced amount of evidence obtained67 are central themes to the analysis in the chapters on access 
to courts and on information (evidence). The result of these defects in the use of the judicial system, 
according to Bentham, is that substantive law is not executed and utility is not maximized. This idea 
is a precursor of the Kaplow and Shavell’s idea (widely used in this thesis) that the judicial machine 
should use different ways to subsidize potential litigants’ access to justice in order to channel the 
proper future behavior in society.  
Seventh, Bentham also considered the opposite solution that will allow the court system to be a 
utility maximizer— refusing further course of court proceedings. If such applications were refused, 
the court would fail to maximize utility either through reaching the right decision or by reaching the 
wrong decision.68 The criterion that allowed a claim to proceed to justice would be determined by 
the amount of utility and disutility by using felicific calculus. This felicific analysis has been quite 
controversial because it is hard to measure and compare the happiness of different individuals. 
Nevertheless, the idea of disallowing claims in courts because they will bring disutility in society or 
hurt individual wellbeing is something that will be considered at length in this thesis. 
Eighth, modern economic analysis similarly to Bentham’s also places emphasis on individual self-
interest. The difference in modern economics is based on aggregation of individual utility whereas 
Bentham is less subjectivist. The reason modern mainstream economics has focused on the 
individual because of liberal ideas of individual freedom. Bentham is more interested in the whole of 
society. However, recent ideas such as Kaplow and Shavell’s assertion that it is crucial to channel the 
desired behavior is society by promoting the policies is a correct move in recognizing that both 
individual and societal perspectives are important.  
Ninth, Bentham’s theory also propagated the utility principle through ideas about cost efficiency of 
the judicial system. So he sought ways to reduce the costs of operation of the judiciary by avoiding 
unnecessary delay, vexation, and expense. What is really commendable in his approach is that he did 
not just identify the direct costs of using the judicial system such as court fees. He recognized that 
legal proceedings can have indirect costs. A good example is the time spent on procedures. So 
Bentham argued that the waste time leads to disutility.69 
Tenth, the flexible character of Bentham’s theory avoided absolute rules that propagate justice at 
any cost. He argued that the judicial system would fail to maximize utility in those cases where the 
price to be paid for enforcing substantive justice outweighed the benefit to be derived from 
enforcing substantive law.70 The key to this definition is to understand what a “benefit” is. This 
flexibility feature of the theory leads to discretion but can also result in enforcement or non-
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enforcement when in the wrong circumstances and thus producing disutility.71 Again, the whole 
understanding of this theory is— what are the circumstances in which disutility can arise from 
discretion in the wrong direction? 
Eleventh, Bentham also examined court evidence in great detail. That is an essential element of this 
thesis. Here, evidence or information is seen as the most crucial element of the judicial system. It is 
the fuel on which every part of the judicial machine runs.  
Bentham’s treatment of evidence included ideas such as that there should not be exclusionary rules 
of evidence or privileges against disclosure.72All evidence that can be called should be accepted.73 
Then Bentham admits that there are exceptions based on greater evil. These ideas mean that he 
thinks that there should be some selection of the information that flows through the judicial system. 
Bentham also recognized that further adjournment to obtain evidence must be refused, although it 
would increase the prospect of reaching the wrong decision (cost-benefit analysis); 74in other 
circumstances, the opposite would be true (depending on the value of the missing evidence). He 
stated that unnecessary delay does not always reduce or destroy the probative value of evidence.  
The procedural element of the system also stands out as relevant to this study. Bentham indicated 
the power of procedure is in the link between evidence and correct decisions.75 Procedure provides 
the courts have all the evidence. According to Bentham, judges have freedom in procedure but not in 
the application of substantive law.76 
5.1.3 Problems with Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory  
Of course, as with any other theory, Bentham’s has evoked profound critiques. All the critiques 
deserve mentioning and should be explained:  
• Whether to allow a claim to proceed to justice will depend on the enforcement of the utility 
principle, which is in turn based on felicific calculus. 
• Equation of utility with happiness and pleasure is questionable.   
• How are different peoples’ valuations of happiness compared to each other?  
• How can the consequences of an action dictate what is good? 77 
• How can utility promote happiness when the distribution of benefits leaves some members 
of society with very little and others with a great deal?  
• Bentham’s simple aggregation of individual utility does not always lead to overall 
improvement in society (optimise social benefit). 
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• No distinction between quantity and quality. 
Egalitarian society reform is limited by security so distribution will stop when security is threatened. 
5.2 The Aggregation Issue or How to Measure the Social Interest  
Economics deals with preferences resulting in the ordering of alternatives based on what people 
want to consume. Bentham’s idea of utility is based on his hedonistic view that pleasure (satisfaction 
of desires) is the highest good.  
The first problem with both concepts is that they go against the Aristotelian tradition of 
understanding what is virtuous in human life. The Benthian concept of utility is limited in its scope 
and does not capture more complicated issues that go beyond the search for pleasure and avoidance 
of pain. Questions of human happiness are most certainly not only about pleasure.78In welfare 
economics, the attempt is to avoid that problem by including in the concept of welfare everything 
including preferences for Aristotelian style virtue.79     
The second problem is the need to aggregate utility (or preferences) in order to see what the society 
as a whole wants or, in more technical terms, to determine the social welfare. Whichever way the 
social welfare problem is viewed, there is no perfect solution that easily encompasses everything 
important in human life. Most importantly, there cannot be policy solutions that can satisfy 
everyone.  
Kenneth Arrow80 has explained the problem as the lack of a perfect decision-making rule. 
Preferences or utilities cannot be aggregated in a perfect way because choices have to be made. That 
means almost any rule accepted will be in someone’s favor and will be detrimental to someone else. 
It follows that there will be people who will object to it. It is inescapable that their objection will be 
legitimate.81  
What stands in the way of the perfect rule is the fact that it is not easy to compare interpersonal 
utilities or preferences. Thus, it is hard to answer the question: Whose desires are more important? 
The institutional law and economics movement has put the issue in the center of its theories. 
Institutionalists have argued that measuring the welfare of different persons (measuring 
interpersonal utilities) is possible82 and comes down to the way wealth is distributed.  
Some other economists, such as the most influential economist of the London School of Economics, 
Lionel Robins, even relinquished such interpersonal utility comparisons as being outside the 
boundaries of economic science altogether.83 
Famous 19th- and early 20th-century Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto’s assumption that there is 
nothing scientific to be said about interpersonal comparison had the greatest influence on the issue. 
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His point was not that such comparison should be avoided. Rather, he has elegantly demonstrated 
that interpersonal comparison cannot be scientifically measured. Pareto has shown that there is no 
scientific way to compare individuals beyond the Pareto improvement, which is achieved through 
private means (contract). Neoclassical economic theory took up his assertion and has avoided the 
question of interpersonal comparison and distribution altogether. That has had a chilling effect on 
the reformist spirit that Bentham brought about. Also, institutional research has been significantly 
demoted in importance as compared to private contracts as means of achieving efficient solutions in 
society.   
6.0 The Milk Case as an Example of Interpersonal Comparison and Aggregation 
To exemplify the problem of interpersonal comparison let’s look at the Milk Case with which was 
introduced at the start of this thesis. The first question is: How does the utility of the mentally disable 
plaintiff compare to that of the other members of her family who actually received the inheritance to 
which she was denied a part? Although utilitarian and economic arguments are possible in making 
that choice84 it comes down to deep moral choices in whose protection both substantive and 
procedural law operate. The relevant question from a societal perspective is: does the society want 
to protect the weakest members of society and to what extent? How do the interests of such people 
rank against the interests of others in society? The answer to this question was demonstrated in the 
Milk case; the choice was substantive protection that was not guaranteed by procedure. These two 
questions come down to an interpersonal comparison of utility or preferences and their aggregation 
in society. Moral arguments must be considered to decide how to distribute wealth in society. That 
case clearly demonstrates the limits of utilitarian and economic arguments. That means Bentham’s 
strong reliance on aggregation of individual utilities is problematic. 
6.1 Bentham’s Hedonistic Theory 
Bentham’s hedonistic theory is also problematic. It states that morally good action is only the one 
that creates more happiness or pleasures than suffering. 85 That is essentially a moral theory that 
ignores many other aspects of what is good and admirable in human behavior and goals. 
Another problematic issue which also underlies an important difference between modern economics 
and Bentham’s theory is that his theory is based on objectivity and not on subjective preferences. 
The reason is it is impossible to objectively assess what reduces pain and what promotes pleasure. 
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Bentham’s aim for an objective method which is extremely hard to measure and as a result makes his 
theory quite impractical.    
6.1.1 Utilitarianism and Consequentialism Compared and Why the Former Should Not Be 
Ignored   
From a philosophical perspective, the difference between Hayek and Bentham is a difference 
between two sets of approaches utilitarianism and consequentialism on one hand and on the other 
between governmental interventionism and free-market approach. Consequentialists do not talk 
about purpose and design that is why Hayek says nothing about how the system should be designed 
and what purpose it should try to achieve.  That is not so for utilitarians.  
Utilitarianism and consequentialism are different, yet closely-related philosophical positions. 
Utilitarianism is usually consequentialists, and the two views meet in many areas, but each rests on a 
different claim. Utilitarianism's starting point is the greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
Everyone attempts to seek happiness and avoid pain; therefore, the moral focus ought to center on 
maximizing happiness and minimizing pain. This is both about what future goals should be and how 
to achieve them. In other words, utilitarianism defines purposes and ways to achieve them. 
Consequentialism asserts that determining the greatest good for the greatest number of people (the 
utilitarian goal) is a matter of measuring outcome, and so decisions about what is moral should 
depend on the potential or realized costs and benefits of a moral belief or action. This is largely about 
determining how to attain stated goals, which are taken to be self-evident.86 
Why is this significant for this project? An economist can afford to be a pure consequentialist if she 
prescribes no state intervention in the economy and concentrates on pure market research. Legal 
scholars cannot do that. The reason is lawyers always work within institutional settings. In order for 
the law to exist, it has to be organized in a consciously created system.87 Otherwise, there will be no 
modern legal system to speak of. As a consequence, it is suggested that legal scholars need a 
utilitarian element to their approach. It is submitted that this means lawyers need to consider both 
well-defined purposes of human action together with the consequences they produce. A pure 
consequentialist approach impoverishes scholarly understanding of complex legal institutional 
organizations.   
In sum, the above arguments have shown that Bentham’s theory although problematic at some 
important points, where he has taken his theory to an extreme; his ideas are still important and 
arguably even fundamental for the good functioning of judicial systems. It can be argued that the 
most important of his ideas for this work are his reformist agenda, attention to the judicial institution 
as one of the key social organizations in general, and his particular interest in procedure and access 
to courts. His foundational ideas about utility are another way to measure improvement and provide 
real solutions in society.  
7.0 The Two Law and Economics Theories 
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Which economic theories are most useful in providing evaluation criteria for a well-functioning 
judicial machine? If a system’s operation is improved, it will produce better results. The question of 
whether those results are of greater quality or of quantity comes down to two different theories, 
which propose to maximize different things—wealth or social welfare (utility). In this analysis, there 
are a few concepts upon which economics analysis of law bases its evaluation of regulation. 
7.1 Value  
The first one is value, which is essential because the common understanding of what is valuable in 
human life determines what needs to be improved (maximized).  The two main views are that value 
is a willingness to pay and happiness or as Bentham called it, utility. The two approaches to 
improving value are wealth maximization and welfare (utility) maximization.  
7.2 Aggregation  
The second one is aggregation—for whom is the improvement being made? This concept is 
fundamental because it determines whether what is important for individuals is being promoted, 
how individuals are compared, and how that reflects on the way everybody’s interests in society are 
perceived. Aggregation is the way economists evaluate what is in the social interest. That is an 
extremely important concept because lawyers and judges, in particular, say that they do or decide 
something in the social interest. That is an extremely vague statement with very little sense behind 
it. The reason is it is unknown what they actually mean by social interest and how they evaluate what 
is and what is not in the social interest. 
This concept can be underlined by two diametrically opposite views— individualist or collective. 
Combinations of the two are also possible. The issue is that individual freedom is valued more than 
anything else but individuals are simultaneously completely dependent upon their societies.  
Hayek’s theory that he has developed in his pivotal work, The Road to Serfdom,88 promotes an 
important argument against collectivism. He has described the totalitarian fascist and communist 
societies that use collective approach to introduce restrictions on individual freedom that in turn 
produce horrifying economic and political results. This concept is deeply embedded in economic 
theories and thinking. As a result, the aggregations used by mainstream economists are based on 
individuals as the foundation of aggregation.  Such aggregations are contradictory by definition 
because almost all legal rules result in a benefit for some and a loss for others. That means it is 
important to balance interests in society in order to promote what is best for society without hurting 
individuals. Rules that improve or worsen the situation of everybody are easy to deal with and 
aggregate. The problem is that they are relatively rare. In any case, deciding who benefits and who 
loses is extremely important and nowhere as important as in designing the way the judicial machine 
operates. The reason is it profoundly affects individual interests and thus society as a whole.  
7.3 Distribution 
The third one is distribution, which deals with the overall allocation of income or wealth. That 
concept is about the way individuals are treated in society—with equality or inequality. Some 
authors refuse to accept distribution in society. Their view is based on a concept developed by John 
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Locke whose concept of property is based on the labor principle. Whoever put labor into something 
he owns it. So one cannot distribute from the person who worked hard to the one who did nothing. 
However, property cannot be only about labor and having an unequal society can have a devastating 
effect on its stability and can result in violence. 
7.4 Efficiency and Individual Welfare  
Measuring whether a regulation performs well can be based on two concepts: efficiency and 
individual welfare. They are very close in meaning but improving individual welfare is not 
synonymous with improving efficiency. The former is a much broader concept that includes more 
factors that people value. Efficiency is mostly based on measuring wealth.  
8.0 Posner’s Theory  
8.1 H.L.A. Hart’s Summary and Classification of Posner’s Theory  
It will be useful as an introduction to Posner’s theory to examine how H.L.A. Hart, one of the giants of 
legal 20th-century legal thought, has correctly summarized his theory:   
This school of thought claims to have laid bare a profound relationship between law and 
economic order. As an explanatory theory it is the claim that great areas of the common law 
may be illuminatingly seen as mimicking an economic market, for many established legal rules 
are consistent with the conception of law as a system of incentives, used to ensure that 
economic resources are allocated to uses which are economically most efficient.89 
Hart has made two statements that will help classify the two law and economics theories examined 
in this work in terms of each other and utilitarianism. First, he has said that utilitarianism is quite 
explicitly acknowledged as the inspiration of the Chicago style economic analysis of law. 90 Second, in 
Posner’s theory, “efficiency is defined as maximizing aggregate want satisfaction.” 91 So are these 
qualifications correct? Posner himself has argued that only normative law and economics are 
inspired by utilitarianism and he has distinguished his law and economics approach from 
utilitarianism.92  
The first distinction is that Bentham’s utilitarian theory is interventionist. Posner, similar to Hayek, 
sees that as the greatest threat to individual liberty. So Posner has tried hard to distinguish his theory 
from utilitarianism. He has considered freedom to be in danger not only because of interventionist 
tendencies of utilitarianism, but also because, under Bentham’s theory, the majority can dictate to 
the minority and thus suppress individual freedom. Posner’s position is not absolute though; 
uncompromising insistence on individual liberty without any attention to consequences to people’s 
happiness is unacceptable.93  
8.1.1 The Key Element of Posner’s Theory for this Thesis 
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The most useful feature of Posner’s theory is that he thinks courts should serve as hypothetical 
markets when the transaction costs of using markets are too high. That is an idea that will be often 
used in this thesis. It is suggested that by making the analogy between courts and markets, this work 
can use market features and adapt them to the world of the judiciary in order to show problems and 
suggest improvements. 
In his own words, Richard Posner has equated the court tribunal, “with a consumer forced to decide 
between similar goods of two fiercely determined salesmen… the legal process also resembles the 
market in its impersonality… the invisible hand of the market has its counterpart in the aloof 
disinterest of the judge…”94  
8.1.2 Difference Between Welfare and Wealth Maximization 
The main difference between the two approaches is the way they measure what is worth maximizing 
and thus the way they define what is the value worth promoting. To Posner, the value is a willingness 
to pay rather than the happiness people will derive from having something, which is the normative 
law and economics and utilitarian concept.95 Value and happiness are related because a person 
would not buy something unless she derives more happiness from having that particular thing than 
from alternative goods and services.  Value is not the same as utility though.  An individual who 
would like very much to have some good but is unwilling or unable to pay anything for it, does not 
value the good according to Posner. For example, if a destitute individual wants something but is 
unable to pay for it, Posner’s theory indicates that means she does not value the good.96  
8.1.3 Aggregation 
Aggregation is not a feature only of utilitarianism and welfare economics. The wealth in society is the 
aggregate satisfaction of those preferences that are backed by money, which means they are 
registered in a market.97 So Posner aggregates as well: is Hart then right to confuse Posner’s theory 
with utilitarianism? 
“Value is not the same as price…The wealth in society includes not only the market value in the sense 
of price times quantity of all goods and services produced in it, but also the total consumer and 
producer surplus generated by those goods and services.”98 So in Posner’s theory, there is also an 
aggregation, but only of wealth.  
How is that justifiable? A voluntary market transaction improves the net benefit of society because it 
allocates resources to those who value them the most, as they are the ones willing and able to pay 
the most for the good. Moreover, at every stage in the accumulation of that money through 
productive activity, net benefits were conferred on other people besides the producer.99 So that 
theory is based on the Lockean notion of value as a result of productive labor.  
8.2 The Problems with Posner’s Theory 
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In practice, if Posner’s view of value is accepted, that will exclude people who value a good more 
than the ones who have the capacity to pay for it. The implications for access to the court system are 
important; only people who can afford the expenses incurred as part of litigation can use the civil 
court system. So if Posner’s version is accepted, only contingency fees can soften the harshness of 
such a theory to access to justice. The reason is contingency fees allow even people who cannot 
afford to pay the expenses associated with a lawsuit to transfer them to a lawyer who is willing to 
take on the risk of the case in return for a chunk of the potential profits. Thus, ability to pay coincides 
more with willingness to pay and access to courts is somewhat broadened.  
Thus, his theory is also majoritarian in nature, even more so than Bentham’s. Wealth maximization 
means he aggregates only willingness and ability to pay. People who are not able to pay are excluded 
even if they value something more than the individuals who have the ability to pay. 
Another problem with Posner’s theory is that he is not interested in how the courts should be 
organized to fulfill their market-like task. Without Bentham’s interventionist attention to reform and 
court organization, it is impossible to make the courts function as well as markets. The reason is 
improved court organization and procedure can have a huge influence on how courts fulfill their 
market-like function.  
Next, Posner limits the court’s service as hypothetical markets only to evaluating tort or contract 
liability. That is too narrow a view, which will be exposed in the following chapters. What will be 
demonstrated is that courts serve as information and distribution conduits in society in order to 
acquire the needed information and distribute access to individuals (not to only the ones willing and 
able to pay). 
Also, Posner has failed to recognize that like in any market-like structure, the courts do not function 
under the conditions of perfect competition. So he has not dealt with problems of market failures 
that are intrinsic to any market in real life and thus to courts as substitutes for markets.  
His idea of efficiency as promoting wealth then is also not perfect because if efficiency is only about 
maximizing wealth, then it is only a proxy measure of human welfare. That is a direct result of 
Posner’s theory of wealth, which is far too narrow. 
The theory that avoids some of these important critiques is the economic approach of Kaplow and 
Shavell. The way they do it is by measuring everything in terms of welfare, which is defined to include 
anything that enhances or detracts from a person’s well-being. 
9.0 Kaplow and Shavell’s Welfare Economics Theory 
This theory is probably the most important for this work. It will help us examine and evaluate 
different policy choices in constructing the positions of the levers of the judicial machine. Thus, the 
importance of Kaplow and Shavell’s theory is that it makes a normative attempt to direct the choice 
of legal policy. The point of welfare economics, as Kaplow and Shavell themselves state it, is to 
“guide society in its evaluation of legal policy.”100The subject of welfare economics is legal change 
and its effects. The goal of welfare economics is to direct policymakers towards identifying and 
elaborating legal regimes that will increase individual well-being. This theory has proposed a way to 
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improve the quality of legal regimes by making the distinction between the ones that will bring 
increased individual and social welfare and one that makes people worse off.    
Their theory will not help us eliminate other theories of justice. The reason is despite the authors’ 
opinion, they do not eliminate political, moral, or justice choices. However, it remains useful because 
it redirects to certain justice theories that are also useful in this endeavor, which will be examined 
later on. 
Another strength of this theory is that it allows for the imperfect solutions to complicated choices the 
legal system has to make. Thus, it makes the efficiency evaluation criteria from absolute to 
conditional on individual and social welfare. This theory is also useful for this work project because it 
deals with some court organization issues. 
9.1 Classification of the Theory  
The difference with Posner’s work comes from the theoretical pedigree that connects Kaplow and 
Shavell to Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian theory. 
Still, Kaplow and Shavell’s theory is close to both Bentham and Posner’s theories. However, they 
reject both Bentham’s utilitarian definition of welfare (utility) that maintains utility is the 
predominance of pleasure over pain and Posner’s view on welfare that he defined as the 
maximization of society’s wealth.  
Kaplow and Shavell’s theory is an extreme consequentialist theory. The reason is they argue that 
welfare should be the only concern of legal policymakers. They argue that any alternative theory 
based on other concepts of justice is inferior to their approach because it can lead to policies that 
decrease social welfare and can make society worse-off as a whole. 
9.2 Kaplow and Shavell’s Definition of Welfare 
Kaplow and Shavell use a very broad definition of welfare that eliminates the narrow view promoted 
by Posner, who has argued that only willingness to pay is the foundation of what is maximized—
wealth. This theory, in contrast, maximizes everything human beings think is valuable.  As they have 
put it: 
The welfare economic conception of individuals’ well-being is a comprehensive one. It recognizes not 
only individuals’ levels of material comfort, but also their degree of aesthetic fulfillment, their 
feelings for others, and anything else that they might value, however intangible . . .  Welfare 
economics thus accommodates all factors that are relevant to individuals’ well-being and to its 
distribution.101 
9.2.1 The two-step analysis of Kaplow and Shavell  
Kaplow and Shavell propagate both positive and normative economic analysis which is designed to 
evaluate social policy. The first positive analysis aims to determine the effects of the policy.102 
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Second, the normative analysis proposes policy solutions in order to determine its social 
desirability.103  
9.2.2 Discerning the difference between Kaplow and Shavell and traditional wealth 
maximization 
At first glance, Kaplow and Shavell’s theory is very close to the two versions of aggregation of the  
traditional utilitarian and wealth maximization approaches. That is, policymakers would perform a 
simple summation of everyone’s expected welfare under each of a range of policy choices to 
determine which of those policies to adopt as law. Under traditional utilitarian and wealth 
maximization, policymakers are exhorted to perform a similar calculus, only with wealth instead of 
welfare. 
9.3 Evaluation Criteria 
The most important for this thesis is to evaluate different regulatory regimes of the judicial system. 
So what do Kaplow and Shavell propose as evaluation criteria between different legal arrangements? 
9.3.1 Similarity and difference between individuals 
In order to make a choice between two different legal regimes, the first question to answer is 
whether individuals concerned by the different regimes tend to be alike. If they are, the solution is 
relatively easy—welfare economics would combine individual regimes of wellbeing in order to make 
overall evaluations of the two regimes. The one that produces the greatest net benefit per person 
will be chosen.104 
The choice between different regulatory regimes becomes more complicated and there is no 
immediate clear answer as to which one is superior when the individuals concerned are different in 
relevant aspects. The welfare analysis then has to consider distributive issues as well.105Kaplow and 
Shavell do not provide a final decisive way to make a choice in that situation. As Michael Dorff has 
argued, that is because there must be a choice of social welfare function that requires us to have a 
clear notion of the type of justice that is supported.106 
So let’s have a look at the way Kaplow and Shavell see efficiency as a criterion to make the decision 
between different legal regimes. 
First of all, they see efficiency not as the ultimate criterion of choosing between alternative regimes. 
To them, efficiency is subordinate to wellbeing of individuals: 
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Efficiency is also a concept that captures aggregate effects of policies on individuals’ wellbeing 
and invocations of efficiency should thus be understood to entail a concern for individual’s 
wellbeing rather that obeisance to some technical or accounting notion.107 
Depending on how it affects individuals, efficiency can be an easy case when all individuals are made 
better off or all are made worse off. In that situation, the ultimate judgment about policy is 
clear.108That is an application of the Pareto optimality that refers to a state of allocation of resources 
from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference criterion 
better off without making at least one individual worse off. 
So in order to use the concept of efficiency as subordinate to individual welfare, Kaplow and Shavell 
are obliged to include in the evaluation of regimes another concept—distribution. 
9.3.2 Distribution  
What do they mean by distribution? “We use the term to refer to concerns about the overall 
allocation of income or wealth—that is, about economic equality and inequality.”109 Who should 
prevail in a particular legal dispute, often described as distributive welfare economics, is not a 
concern in this situation, but it can affect individual wellbeing in a number of ways.110  
If some individuals gain and others lose under a policy, welfare economics requires making a 
distributary judgment of income and wellbeing.111 
The distribution according to Kaplow and Shavell is mainly based on the argument of marginal 
utility,112 which states that someone who has a lot of something values having it considerably less 
than someone who has none of it.113 So they basically argue for distribution from the well off to the 
worse off. 
9.3.4 Aggregation 
Policies are assessed in terms of their effects on the well-being of individuals. Welfare economics 
aggregates the information about each individual’s wellbeing to form an overall judgment.114 
Kaplow and Shavell’s theory allows counting some people’s welfare more than others’ to become a 
legitimate aggregating principle opening the door to redistribution as an independent value.115 
So the question is how Kaplow and Shavell use traditional efficiency measurements. They still 
purport to use the Pareto efficiency when Pareto actually said that there is no scientific way to deal 
with distribution. Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shavell are concerned with distribution.  
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First, they argue that “[the] Pareto principle may not directly determine policy choices in most real 
situations. The reason it is almost never the case that a change in policy will make everyone better 
off. It nevertheless has powerful implications for what criteria for making policy choices one can 
plausibly employ.” If a rule makes everyone worse off, it cannot be normatively good because no 
rational person could favor such a policy. Policies that make everyone better-off should always be 
adopted.116  
Second, they argued that since efficiency does not reflect a concern for the distribution of income, 
like wealth, it is only a proxy measure of social welfare and one that is incomplete in an important 
aspect.117 That goes against the Richard Posner’s view of efficiency as wealth maximization for whom 
efficiency is not only a proxy but a real measurement.   
The Kaldor Hicks efficiency is based on cost-benefit analysis and it states that the winners win more 
than the losers lose so there can be compensation from winners to losers.  The Kaldor Hicks 
efficiency test produces indeterminate results. The reason is the paradox that both a change from 
one regime to another and vice versa changes from the second to the first regime can be argued to 
be efficient. The reason Kaplow and Shavell gave is that when a regime changes, the distribution of 
income may change as well. Individuals’ valuations of what is available under each regime depend on 
their levels of income.118 
So Kaplow and Shavell have argued that one cannot make a policy recommendation if a policy 
significantly changes the distribution of income while ignoring distributive questions.119Since 
normative welfare economics deals with distributive issues, the paradox is resolved. The example 
they give is a 100 and 50 distribution is inferior to a 75 and 75 one because the latter is more equal 
and thus is better from individual wellbeing perspective.  
Still, the Kaldor Hicks approach to efficiency is not fully acceptable in principle; it is quite useful and 
provides a nearly complete appraisal of many legal rules which do not have significant distributive 
effects. The problem with that approach, as Kaplow and Shavell themselves admit, is that assessing 
individuals’ wellbeing under different regimes is difficult.120Even the reduction of the Kaldor Hicks 
paradox does not work if the distribution is not clearly understood. 
9.3.4 The powerful critique on fairness (justice theories) 
One of the strengths of Kaplow and Shavell’s theory is the powerful critique of other theories. The 
strength of their approach comes from exposing the lack of analytical vigor of what they call fairness 
theories and what is referred here as mostly complete justice theories. Kaplow and Shavell argue 
that it is always the case that everyone will be worse-off whenever fairness criteria lead to the 
selection of a social policy different from the recommendation of welfare economics.121 
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9.3.5 Inferiority of other theories of justice 
According to Kaplow and Shavell, other theories of justice are based on conditioned social norms. 
That means these social norms are embedded in human consciousness because they are part of our 
early social evolution. They are thus very attractive for us to apply when choosing a social policy. The 
problem is their origin is in different (often simpler) social situations from those the law generally 
addresses—situations having different penalties for violations, different administrative costs, and 
different amounts of information available to enforce them. As shown in the Access to Justice 
Chapter, what works in a simple society of hunter-gatherers is hard to implement in complex modern 
societies. Thus, the insight of Kaplow and Shavell is profound. Different administrative costs, 
information issues, different social pressures, and sanctions do matter in how social policy is 
implemented. As a consequence, in order to have a working policy regime, there needs to be an 
insightful analysis that questions presuppositions that evolved in different social conditions. Social 
norms are still very important, but they should be only one factor in determining which policy regime 
is chosen. 
9.4 Critics of Kaplow and Shavell 
Dorff has constructed a critique of Kaplow and Shavell’s model that exposes some of its limits. He has 
argued that the attempt the two authors have made to construct an extreme consequentialist theory 
that does not depend on anything else has not been successful. His critique from even a 
consequentialist’s perspective goes like this: 
In order to determine which public policy will maximize social welfare, Kaplow and Shavell need a 
method of tallying up individual welfare functions into a unified social welfare function. That is, 
they need to figure out whose welfare counts when it comes to determining social policy, and for 
how much. As they readily concede, there are many, perhaps infinitely many, possible social 
welfare functions. A social welfare function might count everyone’s welfare equally, might count 
only adults’ welfare, only that of brown-eyed children, or only that welfare that is produced on 
alternate Tuesdays.122 
Here is the important problem with their argument: the choice of a social welfare function inevitably 
involves the use of another theory of justice that will determine what a given society perceives as a 
good goal and what values it rejects. It is impossible to avoid either endorsing or rejecting some type 
of justice that is based on principles such as equality or distributional to the worst-off individuals in 
society. A given society will either prefer or reject different visions of justice. 
Kaplow and Shavell concede that welfare economics rests on pillars of value judgments. They point 
to at least three value judgments critical to welfare economics: that social welfare is a function of 
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individual welfare, that social welfare increases as the welfare of individuals increases, and that other 
factors such as well-being do not count.123  
Their argument that the use of welfare economics overrides any other theory of justice is not fully 
correct. The reason is the choice of a social welfare function determines welfare economics’ policy 
recommendations.124 As Dorff has put it, “Kaplow and Shavell simply sweep [the justice analysis] 
under the rug where it is less likely to be noticed.” 125 
Kaplow and Shavell have argued that individual welfare is paramount but the choice of social welfare 
function may seriously affect individual welfare because it will determine how social welfare is 
measured, thereby influencing policy choices that in turn affect individual welfare.126The reason for 
that is that they use distributive concerns in their theory. Even though that makes the theory more 
realistic because often in choosing a regulatory regime there are distributive concerns the problem is 
the way distribution is implemented depends on values incorporated into welfare economic analysis.  
These values may be different and they come from deciding how to count the welfare of different 
individuals. As Dorff has put it:  
We must somehow determine when (or whether) to count everyone’s welfare equally,127 when 
to privilege the welfare of some over that of others, and when to refuse to count some welfare 
altogether. These are all fundamentally questions about values or ethics, so the discussion about 
which social welfare function to adopt will inevitably involve the issues at the heart of moral and 
political philosophy.128 
All these concerns have to be aggregated somehow. So in order to evaluate a policy option, it is first 
necessary to select a measure of social welfare, some function that will aggregate individual well-
being into the societal equivalent.129 
That categorizes the Kaplow and Shavell theory as both egalitarian and Ralwsian (which many 
authors also consider egalitarian but in fact is distributive). It is also restrictive because it refuses to 
count welfare altogether in certain circumstances.  
9.5 Summary of the Two Law and Economic Theories  
The two law and economics theories have a lot to say about how the judicial machine should 
operate. Posner’s theory, if properly extended to account for the failures of market-like judicial 
processes, can lead to considerable insights into the judicial machine. Also, the influence on 
measures characteristic of Posner’s approach such as efficiency is quite important indicators of how 
judicial organization and procedure should operate. Kaplow and Shavell’s theory is probably the most 
influential for this work. They combine a normative attitude needed for any reform-oriented model. 
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They also create a more sophisticated modern approach based on the foundations of Bentham’s 
utilitarian theory. Most importantly, their theory is a logical one that accounts for the complexities of 
modern needs that are different from human concepts that have evolved in simpler conditions and 
are not adapted to modern societies. Kaplow and Shavell’s attention to the judiciary and the 
procedure, in particular, are very influential on this work. Also, their sophisticated evaluation criteria 
are very useful for this thesis. Their vision of individual welfare is also inspirational; however, their 
theory needs to include some further considerations.   
10.0 Another Modern Economic and Political Theory of Justice  
It is suggested then that there is a need for further elaboration of a theory that will give additional 
elements to Kaplow and Shavell’s model. Amartya Sen’s theory130 is helpful because he has argued 
there are large, hard-to-resolve issues and it’s better to fix the smaller problem when found. That is a 
very useful idea because even the most profound analysis cannot pretend to encompass everything 
that is to be said on certain subjects. In the case of this work, the analysis of different policy 
possibilities that can be manipulated in the system of justice is an enormous topic; it cannot receive a 
full analysis, diagnosis, and remedy in one single work. The aim here is to show that this topic 
deserves more profound consideration.  
Amartya Sen’s vision of justice is pleasantly humane.131 He views people as developmental creatures 
whose well-being depends on achieving their potential in healthy and satisfying ways. Sen has 
operated with a more fully rounded idea of human well-being, espousing there should be an 
opportunity for people to realize capabilities.132 This means that, although he has shown strong 
egalitarian impulses and often recommends anti-elitist policies, Sen has demonstrated a strong 
commitment to the idea that human freedom lies at the core of justice. Despite his antipathy for 
preference-satisfaction as a moral yardstick, he has resisted appeals to externally identify “interests” 
that might trump an agent’s sense of his or her priorities and purposes. 133 The main task of Sen’s 
theory of justice is to identify obstacles to his vision of justice and to point the way to their 
removal.134 
Another important argument in Sen’s theory has been that one cannot measure everything; 
identifying the fundamental problems first is more important. The “search for transcendental justice” 
can divert attention to difficult (perhaps unanswerable) questions that are irrelevant to identifying 
severe problems in the application of justice and deciding what to do about them.135  
Ian Shapiro cites Sen’s lecture in which he proffered the image of a man locked in an unbearably hot 
sauna who calls urgently to a friend outside to lower the temperature. The response resembles what 
current research on the application of justice concentrates on—details and measurements. So the 
friend answers that he must be told the exact temperature to which he should lower the sauna 
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thermostat and refuses to act if he does not get an exact number.136 The unpleasant result for the 
friend in the sauna is what policy should mostly aim to avoid. 
Sen is absolutely correct that there is a need to see the big picture first, act on it, and only then be 
concerned with measuring the exact effects of the visible problems. His theory has given an essential 
direction to this research project because it is a critique of transcendental political theory and 
promotes a similar to the comparative approach used here. 
Amartya Sen has also applied a comparative approach to resolving problems with justice. As Sen has 
said, comparative theory is about ranking the alternatives. He has not mentioned exact criteria but 
this work uses a variety of economic criteria such as incentives, information, efficiency, optimality 
etc.  
10.1 Sen’s Call for a “Comparative” Approach 
The foundation of his comparative approach is Adam Smith’s idea of an impartial spectator. There is 
a need to adopt such perspective in order to see reality from a certain distance from the usual ideas. 
The aim is “to avoid local parochialism of values” by taking account of arguments from outside one's 
own culture and traditions in order to scrutinize “not only the influence of vested interest, but also 
the impact of entrenched tradition and custom.”137 
This work tries to follow exactly the perspective of the comparativist who is an impartial spectator. 
Since this author has been vested in all of the discussed judicial systems a certain distance is 
presupposed to exist because there is no identification with one of the systems that can be called 
this author’s own system. 
10.2 Amyra Sen and the “Soft” Consequentialism  
This work comes close to the approach of Amyra Sen, who explains that the connection between 
action and result inspires one to think about dealing with the complexity of the process, not only 
results:138 
We may do the right thing and yet we may not succeed. Or, a good result may come about not 
because we aimed at it, but for some other, perhaps even an accidental, reason, and we may be 
deceived into thinking that justice has been done. It could hardly be adequate (so the argument 
would run) to concentrate only on what actually happens, ignoring altogether the processes and 
efforts and conducts.139  
Further in his work, he continues to define this approach as “arrangements and realizations” that 
resemble “the old contrast between deontological and consequential approaches to justice.”140 His 
concept goes in a very ambitious direction because it appears that Sen has expressed a desire to 
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define a form of soft consequentialism that includes deontological concerns.141 That may be plausible 
but this work has no such broad ambition. Here, purposes only show the context and directions in 
which consequences occur. 
So the important part of discussing purpose is to see what is happening in reality and what the 
participants in the judicial system actually want or do through the judicial system. The move towards 
the reality is also important from a comparative perspective. Law and economics will never see a real 
lift off in Europe if it is not adapted to European reality. Almost all of the literature comes from the 
US. Even though it is mostly based on abstract models, these models are necessarily connected to 
the American judicial system and the way it functions. Without understanding the basic principles of 
functioning of the judiciary in Europe, the American models will remain foreign to Europeans.  
10.2.1 Critiques of Sen’s theory 
Ian Shapiro has criticized Sen’s comparative approach as cherry picking that does not clarify why 
considerations from elsewhere will “enrich our thinking,” never generating a reasoned case about 
why this enriched thinking will reveal the destination he believes theory of justice should reach. That 
is an important critique that can be directed at this project as well. An explanation of why a 
comparative perspective enriches the research is in order. In the case of the judicial machine, the 
levers are chosen not at random but have been judged to be the most important ones to direct the 
functioning of the judicial machine. They are not the only ones that have a strong influence but are 
the fundamental ones. This judgment is subjective though. This author is well aware that at least a 
few other levers may have the pedigree to be considered main levers, especially in the context of 
other judicial systems.  
Comparative analysis enriches thinking with the wide variety of lever positions that even an author 
with substantial imagination will have difficulty producing. These lever positions can be found both in 
the past regulatory solutions and current legal order of the examined judicial systems. Moreover, 
some of the effects these positions had in the past and have today on the functioning of the judicial 
system is an enormous plus for deciding which alternative policy position of the lever is optimal. The 
theories of justice chosen here are relevant to the project because they follow a certain direction and 
logical consistency that basically follows the main information flow into the judicial machine from the 
entry point where there are societal problems to the highest courts which are the last to operate 
with and transform that information and send it back into society. The whole aim then is towards 
improvement of the functioning of the judicial system and, from there of society.  
Another problem with Sen’s theory is that he spends a considerable time on the problems of justice 
presented as incommensurable values. He has argued that there is no compelling way to choose 
among appeals to happiness, economic equity, or entitlement to the fruits of one’s labor.142  
While utilitarians, or economic egalitarians, or labour right theorists, or libertarians, may disagree 
with some outcomes, it is important to note that if everybody is to be happy at the end, they must 
receive the maximum satisfaction. To use Sen’s example of who should receive an imaginary flute, 
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there must be the right incentives to have production first (because otherwise the flute will not come 
into existence) and then through exchange or distribution, give a flute to everyone. First comes the 
market incentives to produce more flutes, then allow the musician to get one, and then produce one 
for the poor in order for him to raise them out of his poverty. This shows that the process cannot 
start from the distribution; it must start with the production market and then distribution. 
Sen’s theory also lacks criteria for identifying what policies are preferable and why. The sauna 
argument is persuasive but there needs to be guidelines as to whether one temperature setting is 
superior over another.143 There must be criteria about how to make the comparisons. 
In sum, Sen’s theory demonstrates the importance of finding important issues and doing something 
about them. It also paves the way to a richer comparative examination of different policy choices, 
very much as Coase did in his argument that there is a need to examine and compare real regulatory 
regimes and then make the necessary conclusions. 
11.0 The Alternative Lever Position of the Judicial Machine—Complete Justice 
It is tempting to say that the above-described theories do not represent what justice really is and 
instead argue that the theory of what the judicial machine should do is to dispense justice between 
the parties.  
This is the alternative lever position that has to be considered. The basis of this theory is then that 
the courts should not be organized according to a specific theory but they should follow a path that 
delivers complete justice to the parties to the dispute. Here it is argued that this lever position is 
completely impractical because of the complexity and contradictory character of the concept of 
justice. If complete justice is followed, it will lead to cross subsidy to opposite ends. The reason is the 
concepts of justice developed throughout the ages are almost always pairs of contradictory 
understanding of what it actually means.   
11.1 Revealing the Complexity and the Contradiction of the Alternative Theories of Justice 
If the courts are to achieve justice between the parties in a legal process, it must be clear what 
justice actually means.  In order to foster a clear understanding of this, it will be helpful to examine 
the brilliant exposé of one of the most important Francophone legal philosophers of the 20th 
century— Chaim Perelman, who describes justice as it has been understood by the major 
philosophers throughout the ages.144   
11.1.1  Justice as universal value 
Perelman has argued that justice is a universal value but only in a very limited sense. That means 
justice is simply universally acknowledged. According to him, however, it does not change the fact 
that justice is a confused notion.145  
It is proper to start from the beginning—the Ancient Greek philosophers. In his pivotal work, The 
Republic, Plato has argued that both sides can bring up arguments they claim to be just.  
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So is there such a thing as justice as a universal value? That is, of course, the first dispute on the 
matter. On the one side, Perelman cites Plato, who has contended that the existence of universal 
justice must be acknowledged. The contrary position is that of Eugene Dupreel, who, in his “Traite de 
Morale,” has maintained that everyone is free to define justice “as he likes and as suits his 
interests.”146  
11.2 Aristotle 
Aristotle, in the fifth book of Nicomachean Ethics, observed that the idea of justice is ambiguous:  
The term unjust is held to apply both to the man who breaks the law and a man who takes more 
than his due, the unfair man. Hence it is clear that the law abiding man and the fair man will both 
be just. ‘The Just’ therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal and fair, and “the 
unjust” means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or unfair.”147 
The view that Aristotle has juxtaposed is that ‘just’ is anything that produces or preserves happiness 
for the political community. Here Aristotle uses virtue in a general sense as a global attribute of an 
ideal society.148 
But Justice can be a specific virtue. It follows one is just if he accomplishes the good prescribed by 
law and avoids the evil that law prohibits. Here Aristotle has contended that justice is, on the 
contrary, only part of virtue.149  
In modern philosophy, these two positions can be found in the views of justice of political 
institutions. On the one hand, justice can be seen as only the name given to the common good.150 On 
the other hand is Rawls’ position that justice is one of the many virtues of political and social 
institutions. The reason is institutions may be degrading and inefficient without being unjust.151  
Justice is also used to justify change and revolt against inequalities of actions, situations, and 
institutions or for protection of the status quo.152 The other juxtaposition is that some (Pascal for 
example) identify justice with power153 and refuse to acknowledge that it possesses any distributive 
elements. Others call for equality and distribution of wealth and power in society. 
11.3 Narrow and Wide Sense of Justice 
In the wider sense, it can be said that to be just is to be charitable and to be unjust is to be cruel. On 
the contrary, in its narrow sense, justice may coincide with cruelty and charity.  How does an 
arbitrary decision fit into Aristotle’s argument that it is just to obey the law? When a judge makes an 
arbitrary decision (creating an arbitrary norm), does she create a norm of just conduct?  Or should 
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the opposite be emphasized—that it is necessary to take into account the interest of the community 
to preserve its happiness? 154 
From one perspective, it can be said that just action also provides equal treatment for all those who 
are equal. From another perspective, however, it can be argued that a teacher is cruel but just 
because she treats everyone equally. Is a judge who feels pity and lets a guilty man walk free just? Or 
is a judge who sends him to prison a just one? 
Justice supports both a call for change and the presumption against change. A frequent justification 
for change is that it is just because a group or someone who has the authority to decide or even God 
wants it. However, there is also a presumption against change because it is presumed that what is, is 
what ought to be. Second, the inertia principle provides stabilizing role in society. Finally, , change is 
possible only if change is proven to be necessary.155  
Prerequisites of justice can be both legitimacy claims on one hand as well as objective criteria of 
justice on the other. Historically, there have been four sources of legitimacy of norms and 
commandments: custom, divine will, the will of Individuals, and will of the nation as represented by 
the state. These are all sources that give the law its authority. However, a prerequisite of justice can 
also be objective criteria for justice such as equality and efficiency.156 
Besides the contradiction of justice, it can be argued that it is easy to say justice and thus the judicial 
system should provide equality and the judicial system should be used equally by everyone. That is 
more easily said in theory than done in practice. None of the above theories give us solutions as to 
how that should be done; they only state it is desirable. As will be described in the Access to Courts 
section, in practice, there are quite a few impediments of delivering equal justice for all.   
In sum, justice is an extremely contradictory notion that mostly consists of diametrically opposed 
views. Saying that the judicial system should simply aim at dispensing justice between the parties 
means all those opposites will be applied in a random fashion according to judicial tastes. 
Organizational and procedural foundations and aims of the judicial system will also be extremely 
contradictory and result in cross-subsidies and lack of direction for the judicial machine. 
12.0 Deontology 
The theories used in this thesis as a foundation are also part of one of these contradictory pairs in 
their understanding of justice. The alternative theory of justice that has long disputed the beliefs of 
both consequentialism and utilitarianism and thus modern economics is deontology. The debate has 
been fiercely raging since at least the 19th century.157 Deontologists believe potential policy choices 
must be sifted through an array of moral rules and principles, which cannot be challenged. Their 
principles can derive from various sources, such as religion, biology, psychology, metaphysics, 
culture, language, etc.  
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There are two main divisions of deontologists. The first group sees one or more of these rules as 
absolute and thus impossible to contest. The other group of “softer” deontologists sees principles as 
prima facie, which means they can be overridden only by a more important duty or that rules are 
conditional (only hold under specified circumstances). Nevertheless, both types use rules and 
principles to point out that some actions are simply morally wrong and that consequences do not 
matter.158 
12.1 An Example of a Deontological View  
Consider this example:   
On [the deontological] view, justice is not merely one value among others, to be weighed and 
considered as the occasion arises, but the highest of all social virtues, the one that must be met 
before others can make their claims. If the happiness of the world could be advanced by unjust 
means alone, not happiness but justice would properly prevail. And when justice issues in certain 
individual rights, even the general welfare cannot override them.159 
That view dictates different principles and values should be weighed, but it says absolutely nothing 
about how that should be done and on which criteria to base the decision. Every evaluation is just 
intuitive. 
12.2 Origins of Deontology  
The origins of deontology can be traced as far back as Aristotle whose fixed list of human virtues160 
reads as a real controversy in modern times.161  So the argument against Aristotelians runs along the 
lines that there are no universal values. This type of theory claims there are features within the 
actions themselves which determine whether or not they are right. These features define the extent 
to which the actions conform to recognized moral duties. Deontological theories do not consider 
consequences to be important when determining whether or not an action is moral.  
12.2.1 Critics of deontology  
Authors such as Kaplow and Shavell consider the deontological approach inherently wrong. They 
argue that moral views must be challenged because upon deeper inspection, they may turn out to be 
philosophical shortcuts that are not suitable to dictate social policy. The reason they give is that is 
often called "fairness" has been created to fulfil different, simpler purposes; what is right in daily life 
may be wrong for making complicated policy choices.  
This view is partially correct. The strength of this argument is that intuitive moral perceptions can be 
challenged by analyzing them deeply when bigger policy issues are concerned. There is nothing 
wrong with developing even counter-intuitive arguments. However, as Dorff has argued, one can 
never escape making moral choices even if they are swept further away in the analysis. One always 
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has to make a choice at a certain point that involves a moral argument.162 For example, when 
deciding whom to grant access to the judicial system, there is necessarily a moral argument involved. 
There is a need to look at welfare consequences, which can help make the choice, but the moral 
choice remains.  
12.3 Deontology Cannot Be Ignored 
Rawls’ theory is teleological, interested in purposes, but not consequentialist or utilitarian. This 
theory of justice is a good example of the importance of deontology. In it, Rawls has proposed a 
solution to how to choose a social welfare function, arguing that when setting up a social system, it 
should give an equal chance to everyone and support the least advantaged in a society. That is a very 
useful theory that shows in a compelling way on what principles society should be organized. The 
problem with that theory is it sets the scene for institutions that do not exist yet. It simply creates a 
blank canvas on which Rawls has designed the system he likes. It is hardly applicable as a general 
evaluation criterion to judicial systems that already exist. So this theory will be only partially useful.  
This theory talks about a possibly applicable concept of justice; a good example is the Milk case at 
the beginning of this thesis. Deciding to grant this type of plaintiff's real access to courts means 
making a moral choice. The reason is the welfare of individuals and society will not change 
dramatically if the plaintiff receives the inheritance or her siblings get to keep it. Arguments can be 
piled up on both sides. It can be argued that the marginal value of a dollar is higher for the plaintiff. 
Giving her the inheritance can also lead to a reduction in welfare spending by the state. On the 
contrary, it can also be argued that the other siblings will be more productive in the use of the 
inheritance. But at the end of the day, the argument is purely moral and Rawls’ idea that the least 
advantaged members of society should be protected gives the solution and the social welfare 
function. Can someone take away a right from someone who is defenseless? The answer to that 
question indicates there is a limit to consequentialist and utility arguments. 
Thus far, Chaim Perelman’s overview of justice and the review of deontology have shown that by 
using such theories of justice, it will be very easy to say that this or that judicial system needs to 
change because it is unjust or that it currently promotes inequality. But it will be equally easy to say 
that the judiciary is doing the best it can and it should be protected so judges can do the best job 
they are capable of, since they know best what their job consists of. Both arguments lack analytical 
vigor. Their merit is intuitive and they should not be ignored because intuitions are useful as 
guidance. That does not mean those intuitions ought not suffer intellectual scrutiny. 
13.0 Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are five theories chosen here that contradict complete justice in general and 
deontology in particular. A judicial system based on all the possible theories of justice by claiming it 
provides complete justice to the parties will simply result in cross subsidy. The reason is any pair of 
those theories is diametrically opposite. Thus, lack of clear vision/direction in the application of 
justice theory leads to the judicial machine sending contradictory signals to society. 
However, there is inspiration to be gained from the five related theories. The inspiration for reform is 
provided by the utilitarian theory and, more specifically, Jeremy Bentham. At least in the 
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construction organization and procedure of the judicial machine, there is a need of vigorous analysis 
of how to optimize the functioning of the judicial system.163 That can be done only by challenging 
presuppositions of the way society views the judicial system. Kaplow and Shavell have proposed the 
most compelling theory that can be applied to the problem of judicial organization. Many of the tools 
and the parallel to markets have come from Posner’s theory.  This thesis argues that the best 
evaluation criteria are provided by consequentialist economic theories. The inspiration for finding 
multiple policy solutions will come from comparative theory as Sen has argued. 
Moreover, the lever of procedure and organization is not set to complete justice, but to use the 
above described pragmatic theories to help us improve the way the judicial machine operates. 
Finally, the examination of the failures of complete justice will be examined in more detail in the 
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SECTION III: MAIN PROCEDURAL LEVERS OF THE 
JUDICIAL MACHINE 
Chapter 3: Access to Courts 
1.0 Introduction  
In this chapter, the policy lever discussed is access to courts. This topic is focused on how the judicial 
machine provides access to its services and whether individuals are given the chance to leave a mark 
on the law and defend their position in society. This is the lever that examines the first contact 
potential litigants have with the judicial system.  It is one of the most important levers of the judicial 
machine as it reveals for whose interest the judicial system operates.  
2.0 The Two Main Lever Positions 
The question is where to put the lever—at position maximum (full access to courts) or somewhere 
else? In most modern societies, everybody pays at least lip service to the “right” to full access of 
potential litigants to the courts. That full access is the first lever position of the judicial machine. The 
second position of the lever is set somewhere just below full access to courts. This position is based 
on the view that such access is practically impossible in modern societies and that optimality of the 
lever is somewhere below full access but striving to allow access to as many people as possible.  
2.1 The Argument  
The argument of this chapter is that the judicial machine has to be set carefully to achieve a higher 
level of access. That is not something that comes easily or naturally to the judicial system in modern 
societies. It is a complex task that requires thoughtful regulatory choices. Thus this chapter clearly 
defends the position that the full access lever position cannot be introduced with a simple legal 
provision. Rather, the judicial machine must be carefully designed in order to have the best possible 
level of court access with the resources available.   
2.2 The Main Legal Provisions Regarding Access to Courts 
There is a substantial amount of literature in the US that supports full access to courts. “The 
American citizen’s access to the courts is one of the pillars of a government of laws,” 164argue some 
authors. Other state that the Constitution supports parties that cannot afford access to courts.165  
In France, the right to access justice is recognized as a fundamental right with diverse legal 
mechanisms and guarantees supporting it. The French 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizens, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, and several codes such the Civil Code 
in its Article 4 support that right. 
2.3 Identifying the Problem of Full Access to Courts 
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This full access to courts view is commendable. Every judicial system should strive to achieve a 
situation in which everyone can go to court and resolve her legal issues.  Put differently, that means 
full access to courts is the purpose of regulating the judicial machine with which this chapter is 
preoccupied. However, it is suggested that it is practically impossible to have such full access and it 
will not become reality by enacting legal rules, even if those rules contained fundamental 
constitutional provisions. So the question of this chapter is how to achieve optimal position of the 
lever that gives the best possible access to courts in reality?  
2.4 The Optimal Lever Position  
This chapter will show that the maximum position is a combination of positions of the access lever. 
Doing that requires an examination of the issue first from a legal perspective in order to establish the 
current problems that the judicial system faces. Then it requires using an economic analysis of law to 
determine a path to get closer to the ideal situation in our utopian society and see how to best come 
close to emulating its model in practice. 
2.5 The Basic Chapter Structure  
This chapter has the following structure: First an ideal society will be examined, in which full access 
to the courts is easily achievable. Second, this ideal social structure will be examined to see how it 
differs from modern societies. Third will be an examination of what actually happens in practice 
when the legal system says it provides full access to courts. Then there will be an explanation of why 
these problems occur in complex modern societies. Finally, a model will be presented that can work 
better in providing more citizens access to courts than the current system. Possible critiques of this 
model will also be addressed. 
3.0 The Two Perspectives of Examination 
Legal analysis will show the reality concerning access to courts. It will also identify the problems in 
achieving the ideal situation. The description will show that the realistic situation is far from our 
utopian society, which is our benchmark for equal access to courts.  
To better understand this reality and the impediments of equal access to courts, this work will use 
the theory of Mark Galander who, in his 1974 seminal work “Why the Haves Come out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,”166 triggered a whole wave of research in the United 
States. From his perspective, this work will add the more recent findings of the research that 
followed in his footsteps.  
To promote further comprehension on the subject, however, it will be useful to examine both the 
traditional legal perspective and that of law and economics, which will allow us to better evaluate 
the regulatory regimes of the judicial system. To accomplish this, the model of arguably the most 
influential author in the Law and Economics movement, Richard Posner, will be examined. In his 
model, he has argued that the judicial system can be seen as resembling a market will be examined 
and a way to extend it will be proposed. Second will be an examination of the model of the Harvard 
professors, Steven Shavell and Kaplow, who are the authors of an important book called Welfare vs 
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Fairness.167 The two authors develop a model for access to courts that is pivotal for a thorough 
understanding of this issue. 
These three theories will be the theoretical foundation for this chapter, in which the legal 
perspective will be supplemented with a view from law and economics.  
In this chapter, the question will be posed as to whether the different levers are opposite or not. 
• Maximum position: Full access to courts 
• Medium position 1:  Natural access to courts  
• Medium position 2:  Subsidizing access 
• Minimum position: Restricting access to courts  
4.0 Ideal Situation vs. Reality  
4.1 The Ideal Society 
The following imaginary example describes a situation in which there appears to be an ideal position 
of the policy lever at which everybody in society has equal access to the justice system. The question 
is what are the elements of this ideal society that can serve as reference points, those that can be 
implemented in a complex modern society?  
Imagine a small hunter-gatherer group or small farming community with an equal contribution to 
hunting and gathering or farming activities. Such a society will turn to a wise person for judgment 
whenever there is a conflict. It will reward him or her with an equal portion of their work. The 
condition for the wise adjudicator to pass judgments is that he or she receives equal contributions 
from each member of the society so that nobody can influence unduly the decision-making process. 
4.2 Characteristics of the Ideal Society  
The characteristics of this ideal society are: 1) full equality of its members in general economic and 
social terms. There is also complete equality in access to adjudication services; 2) equal contribution 
of the members of society in order to have access to adjudication services; 3) The members of this 
society are perfect gossipers—everyone knows everything about their neighbours because of the 
small size of the society; 4) Simplicity in the legal disputes and legal system because small agricultural 
or hunter-gatherer societies do not have a sophisticated economy that in turn requires complex legal 
rules. That means there will be no additional costs to the parties in presenting their respective cases 
in front of the adjudicator that complex legal provisions inevitably require; 6) The adjudicator is easily 
replaced by someone else. As a consequence, there will be no issues related to legal representation. 
To put it in economic terms, the transaction costs to dispute resolution in this imaginary society are 
low.   
That society is our ideal reference point. However, this kind of situation is not achievable in modern 
complex social reality. The reason is granting access to courts to everyone will be overstretching the 
society’s resources to impossible proportions. This chapter will attempt to explain why this is the 
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case. More importantly, how should modern societies deal with and understand all the pivotal legal 
provisions such as the due process clause in the US Constriction and Article 6 of ECHR? There is an 
adage that courts fulfill their purpose when they grant full access to everyone. However, in practice, 
these provisions reflect the reality as much as our utopian society does. So the question is threefold: 
1) how can this ideal society be used as a reference point? And how can this reference be expanded 
in order to take into account the complexity of modern societies? How can the purpose of the 
provisions be fulfilled? How can the participating societies in this study come closer to granting full 
access to everyone to the courts? 
This chapter will first examine what stands in the way of achieving this equal access for everyone to 
the judicial system. This will assist in finding the realistic optimal position of the lever, which will not 
be equal to full access but should include subsidies for access and restrictions of access and allowing 
a degree of flexibility of whether access to courts is allowed.  
5.0 Legal Perspective  
5.1 Sources of Law and Challenge to the Top-Down Perspective  
Usually, legal analysis starts from the highest level legal rules available in a legal system. In the case 
of the US judicial system that would be the Constitution. The main clause that concerns the judicial 
system is then the 14th Amendment Section 1, which contains the due process clause. It states the 
following: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
In Europe, a very similar provision exists as well. That is Article 6 § 1 of ECHR: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.  
The “right to a court,” the right to commence proceedings before courts in civil matters, has been 
confirmed by the European Court for Human Rights in Golder v. the United Kingdom. The right of 
access to court is not absolute and limitations are possible.  This restriction must not restrict or 
reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of 
the right is impaired (Philis v. Greece (no. 1), § 59; De Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France, § 28; Stanev 
v. Bulgaria [GC], § 229168 
This law, in general, guarantees due process/court protection of rights to every person. The aim of 
the law is then to reach the level of court protection of rights delivered by the full access to a wise 
adjudicator in our ideal society. It also provides for reasonable restrictions to this access that will 
allow us to argue for such a way to better place them in order to improve access to courts.  
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In three out of the four cases with which this thesis started,  access to courts was, in practice, a 
problem even in cases that fully deserve such access to be granted to them. 
In the Milk case, a poor person did not manage to get to use the courts to defend her rights. In the 
Subway case, many potential plaintiffs did not use the court system at all. Only in the Tapie case did 
the plaintiff manage to get access to the court system even though he should not have been able to. 
What is the explanation for these judicial system problems?   
Mark Galander has elaborated an explanation to these defects of the judicial system. He has 
maintained that, “[m]ost analyses of the legal system start at the rules end and work down through 
institutional facilities to see what effect the rules have on the parties.”169 However, that type of 
analysis does not give us the full picture of what happens in reality in a judicial system. To expose 
some of the practical truths of the judiciary he has completely changed his examination angle: “I 
would like to reverse that procedure and look through the other end of the telescope. Let's think 
about the different kinds of parties and the effect these differences might have on the way the 
system works.”170 
This different perspective has allowed Mark Galander to reach the basic conclusion that not 
everybody receives equal consideration from the judicial system. For this work, that conclusion is 
important because it shows that the model of the ideal society where everybody is supposed to have 
equal access to the courts is not easily reached in practice. It is thus essential to explore the ways in 
which the judicial system in practice comes short of the ideal situation prescribed in the foundational 
human rights of ECHR and the US constitutional norms. 
5.2 Issues of Inequality in Front of the Judicial System 
Mark Galander has found the following practical deficiencies when different groups of litigants try to 
use the judicial system. First, the “haves” possess superior resources that allow them to hire the best 
available legal representation. That means they are under less pressure to accept a disadvantageous 
pre-trial settlement and if there is a trial, they can handle delays in the legal process and deal with 
the other opportunity cost associated with litigation.  
Second, more often than not, the “haves” are “repeat players” in the legal process whereas the have-
nots usually take part in a legal process just once. Consequently, they enjoy a superior experience in 
handling cases that results in freedom to choose which cases to take to court and where to take 
them. Thus, they are able to choose whether to go to court in particular instances and, more 
importantly, to choose their forum.  
Third, repeat players have strategic advantages in shaping the case law because they can settle cases 
that can lead to disadvantageous new rule outcomes. At the same time, they can afford to push 
cases that can create advantageous to them rules. Have-nots, on the contrary, should be willing to 
trade off the possibility of making "good law" for tangible gain. So the question is can the repeat 
players dictate the rules? Can they set up substantive or even procedural rules that are in their 
favour? Galander has maintained that they can. Overall, that means that upper-dogs can implement 
an all-encompassing strategy for dealing with cases.  
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“We might assume that RPs (tending to be larger units) who can buy legal services more steadily, 
in larger quantities, in bulk (by retainer) and at higher rates, would get services of better quality. 
They would have better information (especially where restrictions on information about legal 
services are present). Not only would the RP get more talent to begin with, but he would, on the 
whole, get greater continuity, better record-keeping, more anticipatory or preventive work, more 
experience and specialized skill in pertinent areas, and more control over counsel.”171 
5.3 Who are Galander’s haves and the have-nots? 
Galanader defines repeat player as follows: “a unit which has had and anticipates repeated litigation, 
which has low stakes in the outcome of any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-
run interests.”172 
The have-not who is a one-time player, on the other hand, is a “unit whose claims are too large 
(relative to his size) or too small (relative to the cost of remedies) to be managed routinely and 
rationally.”173 
Galander has not suggested that repeat players are to be equated with "haves" (in terms of power, 
wealth, and status) or one-shotters with "have-nots." Most repeat players are larger, richer, and 
more powerful than are most one-time players so these categories overlap. Still, he has described 
only ideal types. In reality, there are obvious exceptions such as repeat criminal offender who is also 
a repeat player. 
The preoccupation of Galander with these categories has one aim: to elucidate the issue that legal 
systems are supposed to be formally neutral as between the two parties but the position of 
advantage between "haves" and "have-nots" may be perpetuated and augmented by the difference 
between these two categories. Or simply these issues were not considered when the legal process 
was designed. 
5.4 Galander’s Matrix of Cases 
5.4.1 Box 1: One-shotters vs. One-shotters 
The most numerous occupants of this box are divorces and insanity hearings. Most (over 90 per cent 
of divorces, for example) are uncontested. A large portion of these are really pseudo-litigation, that 
is, a settlement is worked out between the parties and ratified in the guise of adjudication. Neither 
party is likely to have much interest in the long-term state of the law. This group involves few 
appeals.174 Still, in moving beyond statistical analysis, as this thesis does, there are some exceptions 
that deserve attention, such as our Milk Case. 
5.4.2 Box II: Repeat Players vs. One-shotters 
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The great bulk of litigation is found in this box. The law is used for routine processing of claims by 
parties for whom the making of such claims is a regular business activity.  It is mass processing with 
little of the individual attention of full-dress adjudication.  
5.4.3 Box III: One-shotters vs. Repeat Players 
All of these are rather infrequent types except for personal injury cases, which are distinctive in that 
free entry to the arena is provided by the contingent fee. Outside the personal injury area, litigation 
in Box III is not routine. It usually represents the attempt of some OS to invoke outside help to create 
leverage on an organization with which he has been having dealings  
5.4.4 Box IV: RP vs. RP  
When there is law suit between repeat players the expectation is that they will settle out of court in 
most cases so there will not be too many such cases. If such a case goes to court, it will be extremely 
expensive and complex. Galander expects that the focus of such lawsuits will be on rule creation. 
6.0 Methods for Extending the Access to Courts 
The most important question in this section is this—are there legal arrangements that allow 
widening access to courts? 
6.1 The Role of Lawyers 
Do lawyers equalize the scales and allow for better access to courts? Mark Galander has put the 
question in the following way: “What happens when we introduce lawyers? Parties who have 
lawyers do better. Lawyers are themselves repeat players (RP). Does their presence equalize the 
parties, dispelling the advantage of the RP client? Or does the existence of lawyers amplify the 
advantage of the RP client?”175 
6.2 Owen Fiss’s Contingent Fees Rule Analysis  
One method to extend access to courts and achieve parties’ equality of arms is by introducing 
contingency fees rule. That means that lawyers take on a case at their own expenses in order to 
share a percentage of the profits with their client if they win the case.  
“I also doubt that institutional arrangements such as contingent fees or the provision of legal 
services to the poor will, in fact, equalize resources between contending parties: 
The contingent fee does not equalize resources; it only makes a have-not plaintiff vulnerable to 
the willingness of the private bar to invest in his case. In effect, the ability to exploit the plaintiff's 
lack of resources has been transferred from rich defendants to lawyers who insist upon a hefty 
slice of the plaintiff's recovery as their fee. These lawyers, moreover, will only work for 
contingent fees in certain kinds of cases, such as personal-injury suits. And the contingent fee is 
of no avail when the defendant it is the disadvantaged party.”176 
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Hadfield177 has argued that contingency fees rules create an incentive for lawyers to spend time and 
effort on a case. She has identified three problems with this arrangement. First, this incentive is far 
from of limited application. The lawyer does not receive the whole sum that represents the value of 
the case. That means she has to evaluate whether the effort is worth the private return of usually 
around 30% of stakes of the case. That means a contingency lawyer will give up the case not when it 
is optimal for the client but far earlier when the profit the lawyer can get is not existent. Second, the 
contingency lawyers maintain a portfolio of cases to distribute the risk and minimizing losses if they 
lose a case. When the stakes of a case are high the client’s case will receive a lot of attention. 
However, if a more important case with higher potential profits comes along their case may be 
sidelined. Third, in contingency fee arrangements, it is difficult for lawyers to estimate the probability 
of success which has to be higher than in non-contingent basis.178 
Thus it can be inferred that contingent fees have a limited impact on improving the access to courts. 
They are limited to certain areas of law such as personal injury and do not put the interests of clients 
before those of the lawyers. 
6.3 Legal Aid in the US 
The next method designed to produce an equalizing effect between the haves and have-nots is legal 
aid. In the U.S., its influence is small. The reason is that it is provided on a voluntary basis and as seen 
in the Milk case, lawyers often just provide some advice once and do not follow through with the 
cases until they are resolved. The statistics show that only about 10% of US lawyers participate in 
bar-run pro bono programs.  A 1985 ABA study showed that only 20% of U.S. lawyers donated more 
than 1 hour a week (50 hours/year) to pro bono work.179  In the U.S. in 1988, only 1% of lawyers were 
working as legal aid lawyers or public defenders. The revenues of legal aid societies are less than 1% 
of the total revenues to legal services nationwide in the U.S.180 
6.4 Extensions of the Galander’s Model: New developments in Legal Services After 1974 
The changes in the landscape of legal services negatively affect who receives quality legal services.   
In recent decades, there has been a substantial change in the markets for legal services in the United 
States. During this period, the strong trend has been twofold—first to increase the size of the law 
firms, which has led to the emergence of the corporate law firm. Second, the legal work has become 
increasingly specialized in these big firms. The corporate firm size has grown from a few hundred 
lawyers in 1970 to today’s thousands of lawyers in multiple states and countries.181  
That trend has also led to changes in the balance between corporate legal services and services to 
individual claimants. Between 1975 and 1995, legal efforts devoted to corporate and organization 
clients had risen 11% from 53% to 64% of all legal effort. By 1995, this figure had risen to 64%, 
whereas legal effort devoted to individuals fell from 21% to 16%.182 
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6.5 New Have-Nots Disadvantages  
There are several newer disadvantages for small claimants that stem from the changing landscape of 
legal services. First, the quality of legal service has been affected.  Top corporate law firms hire 
graduates from higher-ranked law schools, whereas lawyers serving individual clients tend to come 
from local law schools.183 
Second, organizational clients receive specialized top-rated legal services. Lawyers serving individual 
clients are mostly not so specialized and work in solo and small firms.184  
Third, corporate law firms use economies of scale; differences in the scale of practice have significant 
implications for the resources organizations and individuals bring to bear on litigation. Increased 
scale means that more resources are available to invest in increased human and organizational 
capital. That, in turn, means better lawyers and a better structure of the law firm. 
Fourth, the lawyers in top law firms have better network connections, which is also in a sense an 
advantage for the big law firms and thus their clients because they can draw on a different type of 
social capital. 
Fifth, the prestige is also different that lawyers working with corporate and organizational clients also 
tend to have higher levels of influence and prestige within the profession. Indeed, “prestige” is 
arguably defined within the legal profession as distant from serving individual clients.185 
As a result, the observations Hadfield made thirty years after the Galander’s seminal work were that 
the trends of the influence of resources on the legal process outcome have accelerated. That means 
that Galander merely anticipated a growing problem. 
6.5.1 Who sues who? 
Hadfield has found that in the U.S., thirty years after the Galander’s “have-nots” 1975 analysis, there 
has been an important shift towards “have” defendants against “have-not” plaintiffs since more than 
90% of all federal civil cases name an organization as the defendant. 
6.5.2 Who wins lawsuits? 
Farber and Eisenberg have examined whether the success rate depends on the differences between 
individual, government, and corporate litigants.186  
They have found that plaintiffs of the same type when they face each other (corporate v. corporate 
or individual v. individual) their win rate is 72% to 75%. 
There is a great difference in the success rate when corporate plaintiffs sue individuals. They win 91% 
of the time. Whereas when individuals sue corporations they win only 50% of the time. 
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Another study also had similar results. Dunworth and Rogers have also studied the differences 
between individuals and the “Fortune 2000”companies. The study included the period 1971 to 1991. 
Fortune 2000 companies have win rates (against all types of parties) of 71% as plaintiffs and 61% as 
defendants, whereas non-business parties succeed only 64% of the time as plaintiffs and a mere 28% 
of the time as defendants. 
6.5.3 The consequences of the current U.S. lawsuit trends  
Hadfield found there are three possible consequences of this shift towards individuals increasingly 
facing organizational defendants: 
1) Fewer trials: If organizations are more likely to settle their cases because of better legal 
advice or fewer benefits associated with going to court than individuals, then there will be a 
fall in trial rates based on the change in the average incentives influencing case outcomes. 
2) Changing procedure: If defendants as a group had more and better legal resources at their 
disposal as they became more “organizational” on average, then they would eventually 
succeed in changing underlying civil procedure, such as increasing the hurdle that a plaintiff 
has to surmount to get past summary judgment, or shifting doctrine towards greater 
acceptance of alternative dispute resolution tracks that reduce legal costs or expected 
damages. 
3) If there is a court case the corporation defendants should win more often. The reason is they 
have considerable advantages in gathering evidence and legal arguments in the great 
majority of cases; thus defendants should win more because they have more resources.  
6.6 Analysis of Hadfield’s Findings  
The first point shows why trial rates show more litigation that pits individual plaintiffs against 
corporate defendants. Corporations use different means to resolve their conflicts.  
The most interesting scenario is probably the second one. It is clear from the Subway case that there 
is a shift towards finding alternative procedures where the haves can win more easily and cheaply 
than in court. That example does not exclude the possibility that, in time, procedural rules will 
change as well. That is particularly true when experienced lawyers find loopholes in the system to 
exploit. In our example, that was an ADR procedure, which does not balance equally the interest of 
the two parties. 
The third scenario also shows disparity. Defendant corporations win far more often than individual 
plaintiffs because they have opportunities to gather more and better information to prove their 
claims. Put differently corporate clients gain from better representation. That is quite worrisome. 
The reason is the law changes in favour of some and in detriment of others over time because there 
is no real competition of different social interests in the courts. 
6.6.1 Rule Creation 
The Subway case shows that the big company did not go for a rule change; for them, it was enough 
to avoid the court system. Businesses rarely go for rule creation. Business people and organizational 
leaders do not often think in terms of creating favourable rules unless they were trained as 
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lawyers.187 Most business people think in terms of avoiding legal hassles.188 So what they often do, as 
shown in the Subway example, is to create a favourable legal situation that avoids the courts 
altogether.  As Galander himself has pointed out, the repeat players very often use their previous 
knowledge to structure the next transaction because they are the ones who write the contract. They 
also enjoy economies of scale and have low start-up costs for any case.189 All these advantages are 
clearly seen in the Subway case.  
Another crucial element to business people and other repeat players is their reputation. They must 
establish and maintain credibility as having a successful business that should not be threatened by 
even temporary courtroom failures. That image maintenance is more important than strategies that 
will allow a final victory in court.190 So avoiding courts and using tough bargaining strategies that 
include creating an image as a tough bargainer is more important for big businesses. What that 
means for the purposes of this work is that stopping an inexperienced opposition is probably more 
often done by means that exclude courts in which a potential loss can create a bad image. As a result, 
looking only at court statistics shows only part of the picture. Most cases never go to court, mainly 
because as Galander has argued the have-nots with no bargaining reputation to maintain will take 
the immediate gain of settlement.191 
If the big businesses go for rule creation that is procedural rule creation which gives more power to 
the haves than substantial rules which are looser and subject to judicial interpretation when applied. 
The repeat players with interest to change the rules are not the so much the haves clients but the 
lawyers that habitually represent them. If they change the rules (procedural or even substantive) in 
favour of the haves, their job in the next cases will be much easier. 
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6.7 Individuals Persist with their Cases 
It is important to note that according to Hadfield, individual plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss cases in only 
3.5% of the cases, which means they are quite determined in their pursuit of big companies. So the 
question is: do they do that because they are sure they are right or because the stakes of winning 
against a corporation are so tempting that they do not want to let that opportunity get away? 
Hadfield’s assessment could be correct because the stakes of a case of an individual against a 
corporation can be extremely high in the U.S. The reason is in the U.S. there can be punitive damages 
that can make the stake an astronomical for an individual plaintiff. Moreover, the existence of 
contingency fees in certain cases by which it costs almost nothing for an individual to hire a lawyer 
also means that there is a low barrier of entry to anyone who has or thinks she has, for example, a 
strong personal injury case.  
There is one very good way to check if Farber and Eisenberg192 have drawn the right conclusions—to 
examine a system in which there is no contingency fees or punitive damages, such as the French one, 
and see if the results are the same. That is an important topic for future research. 
7.0 Economic Perspective 
7.1 Explaining the Problem from an Economic Perspective  
To explain the access to courts lever of the judicial machine, two main theories will be examined, 
those of Posner and of Kaplow and Shavell. 
7.1.1 Posner’s Theory: Courts as a Market 
Courts, according to Posner, can function as a hypothetical market that allocates resources when the 
transaction costs are too high to use the normal market mechanism. 193  In this statement, Posner has 
identified two important elements for the exposition of this chapter. First, he has argued that courts 
function as distributors of resources in society and second he has said that courts approximate 
markets. This first distributive role will lead us to a way to achieve better court access by using 
Kaplow and Shavell’s model of subsidies and restrictions. The second market-live element of court 
function will help us to show why in our small utopian society the adjudicator can provide full access 
to her services and why it is so hard to achieve the same level of access in modern societies. That will 
be done by analysing the market type for legal services.  
To put it in the exact words of Richard Posner, he has equated the tribunal, “with a consumer forced 
to decide between similar goods of two fiercely determined salesmen… the legal process also 
resembles the market in its impersonality… the invisible hand of the market has its counterpart in the 
aloof disinterest of the judge…”194  
Posner’s theory is based on the belief that in many cases a court can make a reasonably accurate 
guess as to the allocation of resources that would maximize wealth. However, the determination of 
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value made by a court is less accurate than one made by an actual market, which is defined by a 
voluntary transaction in an actual market. Posner has put a strict limitation on such use of the courts. 
They should be restricted to cases such as accidents, where market transaction costs preclude the 
use of an actual market. 195  
This is simply a less common purpose of the courts that is based on the need for institutional 
allocation that arises when movement of resources from one place to another is costly (the 
transaction costs are high). As a result of that need, the courts are the devices (institutions) that 
humans create in order to effect this movement. 
Posner's purpose makes sense in a neo liberal theoretical context which there excludes the 
possibility of distribution of wealth. Judges do not usually play a strong distribute role but when they 
do the results are strong law making. That also explains why tort law has been created by judges (at 
least initially) in France, England, and the U.S.  
7.1.2 Extending Posner’s Model  
This section shows why is so hard in a modern society to attain the ideal of full access to courts that 
existed in our utopian society. The argument is that Posner’s model misses the point that courts 
when they function as markets function as imperfectly competitive ones. So how can courts function 
as a hypothetical market that allocates resources when the transaction costs are too high to use the 
normal market mechanism? Posner has limited the resource allocation function of courts to torts 
because of one very important problem: the market for legal services is not a perfectly competitive 
market the way it is in the utopian society. That means that the plaintiff and defendant, who can be 
compared to a buyer and seller in a normal market, do not function under perfect competition as 
they would have in a real market. That difference is the main reason full access is not possible in real 
modern societies as opposed to our ideal small community.  
The characteristics of a perfectly competitive market are the following: 
• All firms sell an identical product  
• All participants are price takers  
• All firms have a relatively small market share  
• Buyers have complete information about the product and prices  
• The industry is characterized by low barriers or no barriers to enter and exit an industry  
As Hadfield has put it, “The economic framework for analyzing the operation of markets is essentially 
comparative: we assess the extent to which the market deviates from the hypothetical benchmark of 
‘perfect competition.’” In our utopian society, there is perfect competition. Thus that is why that 
society is so useful to use as a benchmark.  
So let’s examine each point of a perfectly competitive market in order to find the deviations in which 
Posner market-like courts function. 
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The perfectly competitive market is one in which goods are distributed by sellers with no ability to 
influence market price to buyers who also have no ability to influence market price; everyone is a 
price taker under conditions of full information. For the court analogy, that means that the plaintiff 
and defendant know everything about the facts of the case they are involved in. Price is equal to 
marginal cost and output is the quantity demanded at that price. 
The reason perfectly competitive markets are of interest to our argument here is because economic 
analysis shows that these markets function optimally.  They result in prices that are as low as 
possible and the output is as good as it can be. That means that in such conditions, the adjudication 
system functions as cheaply as possible and produces maximum results. That is exactly the case in 
our imaginary society of farmers/hunter-gatherers where the adjudicator provided services at low 
cost to everyone and rendered decisions based on full information which everyone involved had 
access to. 
Since there many of these requirements are not fulfilled by courts functioning as markets, the result 
is that they depart from the perfectly competitive benchmark and thus cannot be assumed to 
achieve the best outcome possible. 
The exact deviations are the following: repeated players can influence the market price for litigation. 
They can affect the market so there is no more perfect competition. The competitive price is not 
equal to the marginal cost of production. That means they can raise the marginal cost of future 
litigation. They can increase the future costs of potential future litigants that can potentially file a suit 
against these repeated players. There is also an information problem because neither the court nor 
the parties know all the facts to the case. Barriers of entry can be substantial to some parties (the 
have-nots). Litigation can concern a myriad of issues thus the product offered by litigants is not 
identical.  
So what does it mean for the haves and the have-nots, according to Galander? It is suggested that 
there is another Hayekian solution to the problem of dealing with the failures of the laissez faire 
approach to creating competitiveness between the parties who choose to engage in the legal 
process.  
A pivotal author of the laissez faire approach is Hayek, who argued that the economy has run on free 
individual entrepreneurship that is unrestricted by the state has seen two important limits. The first 
limitation is that the courts are the protectors of the individual market actors and the second 
limitation is that if there is to be a functioning market competition, rules have to direct the market. In 
the legal process, it is suggested the two failures come together. There is both a need to have a 
judicial system that protects individual economic actors but also a need for free competition 
between them within the judicial system governed by competition rules. These rules are missing 
from the legal process altogether. It is strange to expend so many resources on enforcing 
competition law in other areas of law and none in the judicial system.   
The important question is why then are there no procedural competition rules to protect economic 




What is effective competition between the parties of a legal process? As Simon Bishop has argued, 
what matters are the outcomes that competition in a particular market delivers and not the 
particular form the competition process takes. This pragmatic and consequentialist view then states 
that whether there is competitive market depends on the outcome it produces.196 Clearly, from 
Galander’s exposition, it can be deduced that there is a competitive problem in the legal process 
market since the ‘haves’ come out ahead of the ‘have-nots’. That claim has been confirmed 30 years 
later by an empirical research by Gillian Hadfield.197 An important body of literature has been 
developed in both first instance and appeal context by studies that have dealt with the issue from 
the perspectives of Supreme State Courts and US Courts of Appeal198 that deserve careful 
consideration. 
Besides the result, there is another way to show that there is no perfect competition between the 
parties to a legal dispute. That is to look again into representation issues.  
7.1.3 Representation Indicates lack of perfectly competitive market 
Why is examining the market for lawyers important for the judicial machine? Because it shows one 
more reason that this market is not perfectly competitive. That is something that the judicial 
machine has to work with and something that cannot be changed. Without taking that factor into 
consideration in addition to the other imperfections of the market, there will be an accumulating 
force that goes against the proper functioning of the judicial machine. The strength and direction of 
that force must be absolutely clear. Thus the examination of the market for lawyers is absolutely 
essential for understanding what is hindering the functioning of the courts as quasi-markets. 
Following Hadfield’s work on imperfections of the market for lawyers, there follows a list of ways in 
which the market for legal services deviates from the perfectly competitive market: 
•  The complexity of law means that lawyers cannot guarantee a result because even full 
effort on their part may not achieve the desired goal.  
•  The complexity of law reflects the amorphous and multifaceted nature of human conflict 
and conflict resolution.  
•  Law is sensitive to context and to the multiple factors that must be weighed in reaching a 
decision on a case.  
•  Law is a result of human judgment and communication, processes that are subject to 
influence by a multitude of considerations—idiosyncrasies, past experience, personal values, 
time, cognitive biases and limitations, politics, and so on. The process of resolving anything 
other than a routine legal matter involves many cumulative effects. Despite that, their work 
is complex and requires the use of abilities acquired through extensive training. 
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The growing complexity of economic and social relations leads to increased sophistication of law. 
That makes lawyers even more important/indispensable. As a result, the legal profession provides 
services at increasingly higher wages to cover the cost of effort and knowledge that complexity 
requires.   
That corresponds to an observation made by Adam Smith who has argued that high wages are 
required by such professions because of the expense incurred in learning the trade.  
1) The other major that causes market failure in the market for a lawyer is what economists 
refer to as credence good. Such goods are provided by an expert who also determines the 
buyer’s needs. The reason that is possible is that buyers do not have the knowledge to access 
how much of the good or service they in fact need. They also cannot tell whether or not the 
service was performed or how well. This puts buyers at risk for opportunistic behaviour on 
the part of sellers: they may be sold too much of a service or billed for services not 
performed or performed poorly. In addition, the lawyer can charge the highest price 
possible—the monopoly price.  Legal services are credence goods. The sheer complexity of 
law makes it difficult for clients to judge the service they are receiving. So the market failure 
is informational about the actual issue—society simply does not know the value of a lawyer’s 
service. 
2) Yet another reason the market for legal services is not perfectly competitive and does not 
function optimally is its tournament-style setting. What this means is that the winner takes 
the prize. Having a lawyer who is marginally better pays off disproportionately. Whether a 
lawyer will have a positive influence on the outcome of the legal process depends to a 
certain degree on her professional qualities. In order to show that she has that quality, the 
lawyer can only convey that to potential clients through signals. That means that like in 
sports only the very best can charge high gees whereas the rest earn significantly less. These 
markets are characterized by high stakes: small differences in quality result in large 
differences in rewards.  
There has been a dramatic increase in the size of law firms over the past two decades and a 
corresponding tendency for reputations of quality to attach to the firm as opposed to 
individual practitioners. As Galander and Palay have argued, the large law firm allows more 
lawyers to share in the human capital and reputation of successful lawyers; individual 
partners can act for a larger number of clients when substantial portions of the work are 
delegated to junior colleagues. 
Their fees will reflect the amount clients have at stake and not, as in the perfectly 
competitive market, the opportunity cost of the service. This is the basic characteristic of 
market power—prices driven by the value that consumers place on the good rather than the 
cost incurred by producers of the good. The deep uncertainty in the law and the all-or-
nothing nature of the stakes for clients give lawyers market power through winner-take-all 
dynamics. 
This is not a matter of just one legal tournament, but several. Clients form different pools 
based on the types of legal problems they have, the amounts at stake, and the amount they 
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are able to pay. Lawyers who fail to win big in a high-stakes pool with resource-rich clients 
will move to compete in other pools. 
3) Sunk costs—once a client has chosen a lawyer, it is hard to change and find a new lawyer. 
The reason is the initial costs incurred. If the lawyer has taken some actions on the part of 
the client these are expenses that the client has to take. The larger the expenses the larger 
the sunk cost, which means expenses that the client can never recover. So if she switches to 
a new lawyer these expenses have to be incurred again. These sunk costs are another market 
power for the lawyer. 
Legal markets, however, offer few mechanisms for controlling opportunism. Again, the problem is 
complexity and the difficulty of judging the quality and necessity of legal work. It, therefore, becomes 
rational for legal fees to exceed the amount of money at stake. If the other side is willing to talk 
settlement, there is an opportunity to quit the game and rationally weigh the cost of continuing. 
7.2 Monopoly 
Monopoly in the market for lawyers comes from two different sources: limitations on the number of 
people admitted to law schools and the artificial barriers to entry the state’s monopoly on coercive 
dispute resolution.  
In sum, complexity, sunk costs, legal services as credence goods, a tournament-style market for 
lawyers, and monopoly raise the costs legal services and show that the market for lawyers is not 
perfectly competitive. That is a difficulty that is hard to avoid. Still, a judicial machine that does not 
take these issues into account is bound to reduce the access to a large proportion of potential 
litigants.    
7.3 The Utopian Society and Economic Optimality 
This section explains how law and economics each deal with optimality of the lever position. It will 
demonstrate why the complete access to justice that our small utopian society had could not easily 
be achieved in practice.  
To find optimality, economists usually resort to marginal analysis. Here the goal is to find optimality 
of the position of the policy lever access to justice. This begins by considering the extreme 
positions—complete access or no access at all. The latter is definitely undesirable. Complete access 
can be the ideal and the goal of substantive law prescribes it, but as shown in the legal analysis in the 
previous section, in practice it shall not be achieved.  
The second economic reason for that to be the case besides lack of competition between the parties 
and their legal representatives is the judicial machine has a maximum capacity to deal with cases at 
the current level of resource spending. 
Economists define marginal cost as the increase in total cost associated with the production of one 
additional unit of output. For example, four units cost $4, the production of five units cost $5 the 
marginal cost is $1. Optimality on that policy lever depends on the cost and benefits on the margin.  
7.4 Marginal cost of Hearing Additional Cases 
85 
 
This section shall examine the marginal cost in two different ways. The first one is in looking at the 
marginal cost borne by the judicial system every time one more case is heard in the courts. This 
perspective is important because it shows that there are an optimum number of cases that can be 
heard by the courts at the current level of the judiciary budget. This marginal cost equals the change 
in total costs of the judicial system divided by the change of the total quantity of cases heard. The 
point is that the more and more people use the court system beyond this optimal point the marginal 
cost may get disproportionately high per new case. In other words, there is a tipping point at which 
the cost of hearing one more case is so high that no matter the importance of the case it is not worth 
hearing it. Somewhere before that point, the courts achieve economy of scale, which allows 
optimizing the hearing of cases and overall operation. This optimal point is the market equilibrium at 
which the given resources are used best.  
Courts incur a few types of costs: 1) fixed costs that remain the same even when output changes; 2 
variable costs that change directly in proportion to output, also called short-run marginal cost; 3) 
Step-fixed-costs that remain constant for a certain range of output and changes when output 
exceeds or falls below a certain threshold; 4) Long-run marginal costs, which are short-run marginal 
costs plus the step-fixed costs that change in the long run as adjustments are made to staffing levels 
in response to larger changes in output. 
What is important to note that when the optimum point of hearing cases with the resources 
available is reached, courts have to increase the step-fixed costs in order to hire more judges and/or 
supporting staff that in order to hear more cases. In other words, they have to change the long run 
marginal costs.  
So when the resources allocated to the judiciary per case become lower than the marginal cost of 
hearing one more case then the courts usually stop hearing cases.  The result is that even important 
cases with a strong effect on the future behaviour of individuals in society are discarded by the 
judicial system or become backlogged and left to be decided next year when the judicial budget is 
renewed. That backlog can accumulate with time. 
The first effect on the economy as a whole within which the courts operate is in stagnation because a 
lot of claims for a substantial amount of money are stuck in courts. The investment flow in the 
economy is reduced. The second important effect is that cases with important influence on future 
behaviour are not dealt with, meaning undesirable behaviour in society continues to cause further 
damage.  
The bottom line is that courts cannot hear more than a certain amount of cases with the resources at 
their disposal. Hearing more cases means, for example, that judges have to work 20 hours a day or 
that more court staff has to be hired. When that cannot be done (when the long run marginal costs 
cannot be changed) because judicial budgets cannot be extended at will, reaching the utopian 
society where everybody has in practice access to the courts is impossible. 
So it is crucial that the judicial system finds a balance between the marginal cost of hearing a new 
case and the benefit of resolving social problems. Unfortunately, that balance cannot be at a point of 
full access as in our small utopian society. So even though legal systems guarantee in theory that full 
access with important provisions such as due process in the US Constitution and Article 6 of ECHR in 
Europe that goal is unattainable or it is subject to court delays because the judicial system does not 
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dispose of unlimited resources. That reason is again that the judicial machine reaches the point at 
the margin when hearing one more case becomes more expensive than the allocated resources per 
case. The other way to look at marginal cost is the change in cost caused by the change in policy. 
The benchmark of high-quality judicial system performance is achieving the small ideal utopian 
society with full access to the courts. Since this complete access is impossible to grant without a 
significant and impossible extension of the resources given to the courts, quality cannot be achieved 
with a simple imposition of a legal rule such as Article 6 ECHR. The status quo position of the lever 
does not come close to providing the same access as in the ideal society. To achieve better access to 
courts in reality or to move the lever upwards towards the utopian society, the judicial system must 
perform better (use its available resources more efficiently) within the boundaries of current budget 
restraints.  That means that in order to hear a higher number of important cases, it becomes crucial 
that the judicial system reduces its total operating costs. Kaplow and Shavell have proposed a model 
that achieves exactly that result. It gives criteria that allow both for restrictions on the hearing of 
some cases and at the same time allows increasing the number of important cases heard by using 
subsidies and restrictions to court access. In the terms of the judicial machine, that means the second 
and the third positions of the lever have to be used at the same time.  
7.5 Source of Savings on Access to Courts 
It has been discussed that some people are just cut off from or badly disadvantaged in receiving legal 
services. Yet, the resources of the judicial system are not limitless. It is impossible to grant access to 
everyone to the judicial system without having unlimited resources.  
The existing solution is to have artificial barriers and rules that stop potential litigants from getting 
access to courts. The other way is to have rules that have an equivalent effect on restrictions to 
access to courts. There are rules that quietly restrict access to courts by making access too difficult by 
design complex convoluted paths to justice that only a top lawyer can deal with. The people who 
never get to be heard in court are usually the Galander’s have-nots.  
But is there a better way to both grant more access to courts to diverse groups of people, not only 
those who can afford the top lawyers in the land? Is there another way to find savings on access to 
courts and yet grant access to more people? A model is needed with criteria that distinguishes 
situations in which access should be granted from those in which it should be restricted. In other 
words, the model should use two additional levers of the judicial machine—the subsidy lever for 
some cases and restriction lever for others. 
8.0 A Way Forward: Kaplow and Shavell’s Model  
Shavell and Kaplow have created the following model that is important because it shows how the 
courts should play a greater allocation role when the access to their services is concerned. 
Lawsuits may make everyone better off, even when the cost of litigation exceeds the stakes of the 
case. So a rule that encourages litigation may not be generous enough. On the contrary, suits may 
make everyone worse off even when the costs are only a small fraction of the stakes. So a stringent 
general rule that limits litigation would be insufficiently strict. 199 The point is that when considering 
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where to put the regulatory lever of the judicial machine, all the pertinent factors have to be 
considered. The often omitted factor, which is crucial for the successful function of the judicial 
machine and can affect positively society, is the effect of the suit in channeling future desirable 
behavior. 
Kaplow and Shavell explain the issues that occur under different procedural rules. Plaintiffs will be 
affected by different procedural regimes when they make the decision whether to sue or not.200 
There are three possible regimes: 
First, under a rule that states plaintiffs must pay their own costs of litigation, they will sue only if the 
harm and expected damages exceed the litigation costs. So they will sue when their cost of litigation 
is, for example, 10 and expected damages 100. However, if the cost of litigation is 110, they will not 
sue if they expect to recover only 100. 
Another case is possible. A plaintiff decides not to sue because, for example, she does not have the 
required funds. Then the second regime is one in which there is a subsidy (legal aid, legal costs 
insurance) that will induce them to sue. Thus if the legal aid system covers or exceeds the 10 
litigation costs they will sue. That regime is the position of the lever that provides for subsidies. 
The third regime is when the plaintiff is willing to sue but there is a prohibition to sue (for example a 
high tax on lawsuits that exceed 90). In that situation, they will not sue. That is the position of the 
lever that provides for restrictions on cases. 
The most important element is to introduce social improvement by channeling future behavior that 
also leads to improved individual welfare. To achieve that, Kaplow and Shavell use a very powerful 
idea: some cases should be subsidized and some cases should be restricted based on their influence 
on society in the future. They achieve that idea by including one more element in their model. The 
cost of taking care (fulfilling contracts, avoiding accidents) that defendant incurs to avoid the 
negative result. 
There are four possible situations depending on the costs of care and litigation: 
1) Cost of care is low (25) and plaintiff’s cost of the suit is low (10). Under the first regime, the 
plaintiffs bear their own litigation costs and under the second, a subsidy is provided in order 
for the plaintiff to be able to sue. In that situation, the defendant will take care because his 
cost of taking care (25) is lower than the litigation costs he will otherwise incur. So in this 
situation, there will never be any harm and thus no lawsuit because the plaintiff will have the 
incentive to take care. However, if the suit is prohibited, harm will occur (100) and there will 
be no legal costs because there will not be any litigation. 
2) Cost of care is low (25) and plaintiff’s cost of the suit is high (110). Under the first regime, 
victims will not sue because costs are prohibitive. The damage will occur and total costs will 
be (100 in other words the cost of the damage inflicted). If the suit is subsidized, potential 
injurers will take care and there will be no harm and thus no suits so total costs will be only 
25. Under the third regime that prohibits lawsuits, the result is the damage will occur and 
total costs will be 100 because the injury will occur and the defendant will not take care. 
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3) Cost of care is high (150) and plaintiff’s cost of suit low (10). Under the first regime, the 
plaintiff will sue because their cost is low (10) and the award expected is 100. However, the 
defendant will not take care because it is cheaper for him to pay the litigation costs and 
damages than the cost of care (150). So the total cost will be 120 (100 in damages and 10 for 
each party’s litigation costs).201 If the suit is subsidized the result is the same: the defendant 
will still not take care. However, if the suit is prohibited the total costs will be lower: 100. The 
reason is the litigation costs of 10 each are avoided and the only cost is the damage.  
4) Cost of care is high (150) and plaintiff’s cost of the suit is high (110). Under the first regime, 
the plaintiff will not sue because costs are prohibitive. The defendant will not take care 
because the cost of care is high. This results in harm, thus the total costs will be 100 (the cost 
of the damage). If suits are subsidized victims will sue so the legal cost of 120 will be incurred 
but since the cost of care is high as well and defendants will not take care the total cost will 
be 220 (legal costs 120 plus harm of 100).202 
Thus it is far more interesting to look at the two medium positions of the lever—the position of the 
regulatory lever that keeps the natural flow of cases to the courts and the lever position that 
prescribes subsidizing access to the judicial system.   
8.1 Extending the Kaplow and Shavell Approach by Adding Imperfect Competition 
Kaplow and Shavell do not talk about stakes, but rather about the cost of care. They basically say a 
lawsuit is brought because there is a joint responsibility for the occurrence of the conflict situation. 
They are not so interested in stakes that have stronger influence under contingency fees than they 
do under hourly fees. That seems like the more common situation. So the lawsuit is a result of joint 
causes. The defendant did something wrong (he did not take care). The plaintiff decides to bring a 
suit in order to remedy the situation. The decision to bring a suit depends on the incentives of the 
plaintiff and her lawyer. Very often their incentives deviate from one another.  
The incentives to bring suit differ depending on the way the lawyers are paid—hourly rates or 
contingency fees. Under an hourly fee regime, the frequency at which lawsuits are brought is too 
high; people bring more suits than they should because it is the lawyer who decides whether to do it. 
It is in the lawyer’s interest to bring a suit even if the gains are modest or none. The individual with 
the legal claim has to accept that decision because he does not know the real cost. The reason is the 
market for legal services is not perfectly competitive.  
What does that mean for the cost of taking care? The defendant has to take care more because it is 
easier to bring suits than it should be; thus the cost of taking care is higher than it should be. The 
result could be that there are more suits than there should be because the costs of care are too high.  
The cost shifts up because of the imperfectly competitive market for legal services. 
To resolve this problem, let’s examine a more realistic model in which there is a difference between 
the interests of lawyers and their clients when a decision of whether to bring a lawsuit is made.  
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If the stakes are high, too many suits will be brought—even those with a low chance of winning. That 
is could be the case under the contingency fee rule. Under hourly-rate fees, the lawyer does not care 
about how high or low the stakes are. The reason is he will get paid the same amount in any case, 
unless there is a clause providing for additional payment in the case of victory. That means more 
suits will be brought that are worth bringing.  
If the personal stakes of a plaintiff are low, the lawsuits will not be brought unless the lawyer is 
unethical and for personal gain and goes against the interests of the plaintiff. For low-stakes cases, 
there is substantial chance that the case will not be brought, even if there is huge social benefit from 
bringing a lawsuit. So there is a divergence between private and social incentives. 
Under an hourly rate regime, when individuals hear the price the lawyer quotes, they do not 
continue with the case. That means that too few lawsuits are brought. So that compensates for the 
desire of lawyers to bring more suits than they should. But does this status quo align with the socially 
optimal situation? The answer is no. Cases that should have been brought because they contain 
important information that will facilitate appropriate future behaviour in society are not filed. On the 
contrary, cases that do not contain such information continue their use of the judicial machine. That 
takes us back to Galander’s model and his idea that cases are failed by those who can afford it (the 
haves) and cases do not get filed when the concern the have-nots. The problem then is that in reality, 
the failing of a case does not depend on who has important social information that will introduce 
positive future social change but on who has the material possibility to file a suit. Thus the final result 
in society is not improvement and resolution of social problems but a pro-haves bias in both 
substantive and procedural law.   
8.2 Possible Critiques of This Model  
What is important here is that Eisenberg has found a different cause of individuals winning less often. 
This study found the reason of the weaker success rate of individuals to lie in the way they select 
their cases. The argument is that they select their cases based on the idea it is cheaper for them to 
sue than it is for corporations. They find individual plaintiffs as a consequence of having lower than 
average litigation costs for those who most often file suit in the first place. 
It is reasonable to conclude that it is the selection of cases and not an emphasis on the differential 
resources available to individual and organizational plaintiffs that determine the outcome. That is an 
important difference because it challenges the foundations of the model on which the idea of the 
weaker position of the have-nots is based. This challenge is based on the causality of why have-nots 
lose more often.  
8.2.1 Further critique 
Eisenberg’s argument that individual litigants have lower litigation costs is true only for contingency 
fees or for the haves suing corporations. In a contingency fees setting, the plaintiff will choose to file 
a suit if the stakes are high. But the lawyer will take a chance only if she decides that the possible 
gains are high enough and she can distribute the risk of losing in a bigger portfolio of cases. So filing a 
lawsuit is relatively cheaper than for corporations and many such cases are driven by high stakes 
such as punitive damages. 
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In the hourly fee context, only the haves can afford to sue a corporation. Again Eisenberg is right that 
their costs of litigation can be lower than those of corporations. However, the have-nots cannot 
afford to sue a corporation if they have to hire a lawyer on an hourly fee basis. For them, the cost of 
litigation will be disproportionately high because the value of a dollar to them is incomparably higher 
than for a massive company.  
This thesis argues the justice machine should use multiple positions of the lever such as restrictions 
and subsidies to cases that directly affect court access. The strongest critique against such approach 
is, of course, the vindication of rights theory. Laws bestow rights upon individuals. They can vindicate 
them in the courts. How can an economic theory say that some people can rely on their rights but 
others cannot? 
Kaplow and Shavell have developed a compelling argument against such critique. They have argued 
that if the vindication of a right puts everyone in society in a worse off position, including the person 
who vindicates her rights, then there should be a restriction on that right. That is not something new, 
even for human rights theorists, because they are engaged in a constant balancing of rights of 
individuals against the rights of others. So in that light, making everyone worse off is a very 
compelling argument that is comparable to such a balancing act. 
It is a perfectly legitimate argument to say that human rights should trump everything including 
making everyone worse off in society. However, that is simply a different philosophical perspective 
on society (in economic terms, that is a different welfare function) that defends an extreme form of 
individualism. What is more important is that putting into practice that view will run into the same 
problems as trying to imitate our ideal utopian society. That view in practice will run into 
unaffordability problem. Practically giving access to courts to everyone is an extremely expensive 
proposition, as demonstrated by the de facto collapse of the extensive UK legal aid system.  
8.3 Equality Critique  
The approach proposed here does not use equality as a criterion to decide how the distribution of 
resources should be made by the courts. From a first glance, this approach promotes inequality 
because it does not give equal initial rights to everyone to have access to courts. Nevertheless, if the 
problem is examined from a consequentialist perspective, it can be shown that it more strongly 
promotes equality than the vindication of rights approach. The former approach provides for equality 
on a specific criterion that has to be fulfilled. So everyone who fulfils the channelling of desirable 
behaviour in society receives equal protection by the courts. The latter approach has been shown in 
this chapter to be the aim of highest-level legal norms in existence (14th Amendment in the U.S. and 
Article 6 of ECHR). The practical result though is that it provides for excessive differences between 
haves and have-nots when court access is concerned. 
Will subsidizing cases lead to more equality? It depends on what cases will be subsidized and how 
that will be done. The first type of cases to be subsidized are the ones that will have substantial 
effects on channelling desirable future behaviour in society but have low stakes for the plaintiffs so 
they will not bring those cases to court. In those cases, equality may be improved or maybe it will not 
because the distribution may not be from the haves to have-nots. The reason is even the haves may 
not file lawsuits that are socially beneficial if their private benefit is not large enough compared to 
the social one. 
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The other case type that will be subsidized is exactly the type that Galander has identified: a case 
that is not brought before courts because the claimants do not have the resources to do so. In this 
type of case, the Kaplow-Shavell model of allocation of resources that extends access to courts by 
subsidies will promote equality. This model produces substantial social benefit in both types of cases. 
Thus an abstract right to court access that can actually be harmful to society will not be followed; in 
this model, there is always a positive social result.  
8.4 Birth Control Limitations and Controversies     
Another example when channelling the right behaviour becomes controversial. Imagine a couple that 
signs a contract to complete expensive fertility treatments. Before the completion of the treatments, 
one of them decides to quit. Should the courts enforce the contract? Will the situation change that 
happens in a country with an extremely low birth rate that puts an enormous burden on the 
economy with its aging population? Will the court decision be different in a country with the 
extremely high birth rate? In the former situation, it can be argued that the socially desirable 
behaviour is to fulfill the contract. Will that trump the human right of the person who quit the 
treatment to decide what happens with his or her body? The argument may continue that in the high 
birth rate country the contract should not be fulfilled. Applying this criterion outside private law 
(contract, tort law) becomes more controversial and there it raises more questions than answers.  
However, it is argued that in private law setting applying this approach can be quite useful and can 
improve the functioning of the courts immensely. Individual Justice Critique:  Another critique can 
say that no matter the results, there should be a concentration only on justice in the concrete case 
no interest in channelling future behaviour.203  
Access to justice is one of the most fundamental levers of the judicial machine. It directly concerns 
the theory of justice that governs the whole judicial process. It decides for whose benefit the judicial 
system functions. In economic terms, that means that in order to grant certain individuals access to 
courts, the social welfare function that a given society wants implemented should be chosen. 
If such a choice is not made and instead there is an argument that everybody should have equal 
access to courts, in theory, the result is a judicial system that is left to function on own inertia. In 
practice, that means, as Mark Galander has argued, that the haves will enjoy extensive privileges in 
the use of the court system and indigent people such as the lady from the Milk Case will not be able 
to enforce even her clear substantive rights.  
Distortions to the access to courts lever are possible in other variations as well and may not concern 
only the weakest members of society. In a peaceful and harmonious society, many groups and 
individuals must have access to the courts so they can send information regarding wrongdoing and 
problems in society. Misbalance of the societal sources and the exclusion of large groups in society 
from the possibility to send their information of problems in society can lead to disloyal opposition to 
the current political regime and ultimately endanger peace in society. Mark Galander has argued that 
is done through change in the substantive law. Nevertheless, the Subway case shows that this can be 
achieved through other means such as avoiding the courts all together thanks to private contracts 
and their biased arbitration clauses.  
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In short, the most important issue in the regulation of the access to courts lever is to be aware of 
who is able to send information of social problems through the judicial system and whether as many 
of the desired groups and individuals receive that problem signalling opportunity in practice.  
Chapter 4: Information (Evidence) Gathering by the Judicial 
Machine 
1.0 Why is Information Important for the Judicial System?  
A judge who has all the relevant information for each case must give a perfect judgment every time. 
The condition is that she has the cognitive ability to process the information. The problem of relying 
on the cognitive ability of judges and actual judicial decision-making is beyond the scope of this work. 
All that can be hoped for is that the optimal conditions are created for each judge to produce the 
best decisions possible. Here, the focus is on the quantity and quality of information a judge receives 
in the judicial process in order that she may render the best decision possible.   
In the current information age, a huge quantity of information is easily available and transferable, 
resulting in an overall oversimplification of the notion of information. Instead, societies should be 
asking questions of how to best treat information gathering. The problem is that certain information 
flows can have harmful effects—not all information has quality. As a consequence, finding the best 
way to acquire information is essential for the proper functioning of the courts. 
2.0 What Types of Information go Through the Judicial Machine? 
At this initial stage of the judicial machine’s functioning, information will be defined in a limited 
way.204 Here, it is equated it with evidence that allows judges to decide the cases they hear. In this 
section, information will be placed in basic categories of evidence in order to ascertain how costly 
acquisition of each type is. The cost will determine the extent to which performing a search is 
affordable to unveil the information.205 The reason is any cost has to be borne by someone. If its 
acquisition is costly, then the tradeoff with reducing uncertainty may not be worth it. The result is 
that a full extensive research of facts would only make sense if the information was available at a low 
cost. 
2.1 Two Special Types of Evidence from an Economic Perspective  
Two types of evidence written evidence and expert witnesses deserve special attention because 
market distortions therein can lead to a high price in acquiring them. 
2.1.1 Written evidence  
Written evidence can take the form of any number of different documents with a variety of sources. 
In other words, it is a commodity that can be acquired in many ways. The problem is that this kind of 
information is a commodity that cannot be easily divided and measured in an economically relevant 
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way.206 The reason is these documents can be highly complex or produced on individual request to 
the prospective purchaser. The range of costs of acquiring written evidence is quite wide—from 
trivial, easily accessible documents to expensive, personally tailored documents.  
2.1.2 Expert witnesses 
In this case, information is in the form of human capital. To become an expert witness it takes time, 
money, and effort. Human capital can be increased or allowed to depreciate or to become obsolete. 
Its use does not usually exhaust the knowledge acquired by that witness. What can make such 
information costly is the fact that experts expect a return on the resources they have invested in 
developing the expert skills. However, their skills can become obsolete because, for example, of new 
technological developments. As a result of this uncertainty of future yields, experts will require 
higher returns on their investment. In other words, the cost the expert invested in acquiring her 
knowledge is a sunk cost. Thus hiring an expert witness has to bear the cost of both his past 
investment and future uncertainty of the relevance of her skills.  
2.2 Identifying the Two Main Lever Positions: Information Acquisition Alternatives 
“Information can be received only where there is doubt; and doubt implies the existence of 
alternatives.”207 So the question here is what are the alternative lever positions of the judicial 
machine concerning information (evidence) acquisition? 
In the policy lever of control of legal processes that shows us how information (evidence) is acquired, 
the two extreme policy positions of the lever are: 1) full party control of information acquisition and 
its presentation in court; and 2) full judicial managerial control. There are other positions of the 
policy lever within this range that can also be compared and evaluated. These solutions to acquiring 
information are not similar as far as traditional comparative law models are concerned. However, for 
our purposes, it is sufficient to show that the examined parameters—party control and managerial 
acquisition—are on the same policy lever of the judicial machine, that of information acquisition. 
That means they correspond to the same type of regulation of the judicial system and thus are 
situated on the same regulatory lever of the judicial machine. 
“Information is the essential ingredient of choice, and choice among source resources is the central 
question of economics.”208 This chapter includes an evaluation of the results of the use of different 
lever positions. Does one of the two extreme positions yields better results? What is our evaluation 
to make the judgment that managerial (M) or party control (P) information gathering is superior?  Is 
P >M, or the other way around? In any case, the superior regulation (policy) position of the lever will 
be identified. Another possibility is that both ways of gathering information show sufficient flaws 
that require us to look for a position that is somewhere in-between the two extreme possibilities. 
3.0 Economic Characteristics of Information 
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Information is like any other economic good—it has to be produced and its value will only be known 
after production.209 However, information goods can also be different from other economic goods. 
One important aspect concerns rivalry. Many economic goods are ‘rivals.’ That means the use by one 
consumer precludes the simultaneous use by another consumer. Contrast this with information. 
More than one person may look up a certain page on Wikipedia at the same time. One person’s use 
does not prevent another’s, and vice versa.210 
Information is also like a public good in the sense that its use by one person does not curtail its 
usefulness to another (public broadcasting, disseminated at a very low cost). To produce it in the first 
place can be extremely costly but then to disseminate it can be an almost costless activity. One major 
obstacle in the way of good decision making that requires improvement in the environment in which 
judges decide cases is the elimination of uncertainty. Generally speaking, uncertainty is a source of 
inefficiency; the remedy for that is information.211  
How much information should be revealed in court proceedings depends on whether information 
that courts need in their decision making process is easily available or is costly to obtain. That would 
have a huge impact on the way courts deal with it. If the information is readily available at low cost, 
the search for information in litigation settings will be extensive. On the contrary, if the required 
information is scarce and costly, there is a problem how much search should be performed.212  
4.0 Purpose of Information Acquisition 
Here, the question of purpose for information finding in the courts is closely related to the quantity 
of information that should be unearthed in judicial settings. 
4.1 Two Main Legal Approaches to Court Information Finding 
The first approach’s purpose is to find the truth about the facts of the case. That means detailed and 
profound investigation of the facts must be conducted.  Most often these are managerial type legal 
system in which the theories often purport that truth is a necessary condition for successful 
resolution of cases. In such legal systems, the problem of truth finding is often seen from a general 
political and regime perspective. This presupposes the existence of a managerial type of government, 
which tries to control the social problems that have occurred in society. To legitimize its intervention, 
this managerial type of government sees finding the truth as essential. 
The second, somewhat contrary, purpose of information acquisition is to dissipate (absorb) conflicts. 
The argument is that if courts only aim at finding the truth, that can lead to serious problems. 
Damaska has argued that some legal systems do not see the truth as an absolute value that the legal 
process should have as its purpose. The reason is that truth can engender hatred and escalate a 
conflict because the truth often offends. These systems are more dedicated to dissipating the dispute 
rather than finding the truth at all costs.213 Often the view of governance in such systems follows a 
laissez faire approach in which the value of absolute truth is diminished. Truth is a product of 
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debate.214  Since only difficult cases are litigated, from this perspective, the truth appears elusive and 
ambiguous.215  
5.0 Clarifying the Main Lever Positions  
The question of the approach to truth finding directly pertains to the choice of the lever position of 
the judicial machine. There are two main alternatives. The first lever position is party autonomy in 
fact finding, which is characteristic of the laissez faire approach. The second lever position is 
extensive judicial intervention in the fact finding, which best describes the managerial model in 
obtaining evidence. 
5.1 The Two Coordinating Mechanisms  
These two lever positions are called two different coordinating mechanisms in economics. What is 
important is to determine which one is more efficient. 216 Since information has cost, the method of 
acquisition must be determined according to cost.   
The party autonomy method relies on the market-like coordination mechanism to find the 
information. In other words, it is the parties to the process who play the main role in the 
coordination because they follow their own private interests to find information that supports their 
case in court. That is why this approach is related to a laissez faire governmental approach as 
mentioned above. 
The second coordination mechanism depends on the judicial system to reveal information. The 
judicial system can be viewed as a type of organization in which there are designated officials who 
investigate the facts of the cases. This approach uses a managerial coordinating mechanism for fact 
finding and is thus characteristic for managerial style governments.  
Markets and organizations differ most essentially in the way they acquire information.217 The 
problem both systems face is that information may not be easily observable. The result is the cost of 
its acquisition can be substantial.  
In the party-led process, fact finding depends on the market price system as a coordinating device. In 
other words,  the parties decide whether a piece of evidence is worth obtaining based on how much 
it will cost each party to acquire it. The cost may be time, effort, or direct monetary value.   
In the managerial model, courts arrange for independent inspections of information to try to 
overcome the evidence acquisition problem. That means that within organizations, the price system 
is, in Coase’s view, replaced by authority as a coordinating mechanism.218The reason is there are 
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many situations in which the price cannot absorb all the information necessary to enable the 
execution of transactions. Consequently, organizations arise as solutions to information problems. 
Organizations are more suited to dealing with certain information problems than are markets.219 
Ideal organizations can be characterized as all those forms of coordination of transactions that do not 
use prices to communicate information between the transacting parties.220 That is an unrealistic 
model because most real life organizations use hybrid forms of coordination. That means it is not a 
costless activity for organizations to order the production of information. 
5.2 Optimality of Information Acquisition  
From an economic perspective, again as in the previous chapter, the optimality of information 
acquisition must be sought. Economists find optimality by conducting a marginal analysis—ensuring 
marginal costs should be equal to marginal benefit. In this work, there is no general rule when that 
optimal position is reached.  The only rule that has to be followed in the context of litigation is that 
the search for information has to stop when the cost of an additional effort to find it would exceed 
the benefits one could derive from it. 
What that means is that the ideal of finding all information about a legal case is unrealistic (See the 
Access to Courts section). Instead, it makes sense to seek the best solution that is worth looking 
for.221 In our case, that is economic optimality: the position of the lever at which marginal costs 
should be equal to marginal benefit. The task is complex but necessary to make the judicial machine 
function in the best way possible. If that ideal situation is achieved, there is no need for correction, as 
shown in Figure 7 in the Methodology Chapter. The reason is the judicial system functions as desired 
or, in other words, it operates optimally.  
There is also a social element of finding information as seen in the previous chapter. This is 
channeling the appropriate future behaviour in society. Hence, there may be cases in which there is a 
need to spend more on information finding than the marginal analysis suggests.  
What is our benchmark for quality of information? Information should be available easily and cheaply 
and the investment in information gathering should have marginal costs equaling marginal benefit. 
Anything that goes beyond that point is not optimal, unless future behavior in societal issues is 
concerned. No matter if the purpose of information finding is to achieve truth revelation about what 
actually happened or the legal process’ purpose is to dissipate conflicts in society.  
So now let’s apply the benchmark to the two positions of the lever: party-led process and managerial 
process. 
5.2.1 Lever I, Party-led Information Finding 
What are the legal theoretical underpinnings of this position? 
In most judicial systems, underestimating the role of the parties in a legal process is essential to 
understanding what the judicial machine actually does. According to Jürgen Habermas, the process 
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starts from the parties. A theory that ignores that fact is too “monopolistic.”222 His theory is a critical 
reply to the theories of Chaim Perelman and Ronald Dworkin. By “monopolistic” he means that 
judges do not have the monopoly of legal argumentation because she is not the only one to make 
arguments. In practice, judges are arbiters of a contradictory dispute. The parties develop the 
arguments and judges have to reply to them afterwards.223 In terms of the scope of this work, it 
means that the information flow starts from the parties and they cannot be ignored as a source. 
What makes Habermas’ theory interesting for this thesis is that he has identified the source of the 
quality of the judicial system. He has suggested that the foundation of the legal process lies in the 
conditions for the debate between the parties. He rejects again the view of Perelman that the 
motivation of the judicial decision or its content is the main source of quality of the judicial system. 
To put that argument in the words of this work, the judicial machine has to create the conditions in 
which it is possible to say that the quality of the judicial system comes the information the parties 
present to support their respective positions.224 
5.3 Incentives for Parties to Reveal Quality Information 
What are the informational incentives for the parties to engage in such a quality debate? From an 
economic perspective, for that to happen, information the opposing parties possess must be easily 
and cheaply available to the other side.  
The general position in a party-led process is that the parties have strong motives to share some of 
the information with each other. The reason is they want to reveal what they know in order to show 
the strength of their respective positions. In other words, all the economic models examined here 
predict that parties will share information that is in their favour. Thus, the plaintiff will try to show 
that she has a strong case in order to force the defendant to give up the case or reach a favourable 
settlement. If the defendant reveals that she is in a solid position, the plaintiff may drop the case. It is 
also possible that the two perspectives are not so fundamentally divergent, but there are variances in 
the details. For example, the defendant may not have realized that the plaintiff’s losses are bigger 
than she envisaged beforehand. Thus the defendant will adjust her position. What is important then 
is that the parties meet before proceedings have commenced in order to reveal the information they 
possess, which is usually information in their favour rather than to their disadvantage. 
6.0 Two General Issues of Law and Economics Models 
The first issue is asymmetric information; the parties possess private information that they do not 
reveal to the other side of the legal dispute. The second is the optimism model, which states that the 
parties may have different opinions about the outcome of the trial. 225  Because of something called 
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self-serving bias (people think they are always right), parties tend to be too optimistic about the 
outcome of their case.   
Cooter and Rubinfeld’s model, for example, follows this line of thought and is based on the so-called 
optimism model that states that the parties may have different opinions about the outcome of the 
trial.226 First, there are incentives to reveal information in order to correct false optimism. That 
creates leverage in the settlement negotiations for the party that reveals the information. Second, 
there are no incentives to correct false pessimism. Basically, this model says that favourable 
information will be shared and what is unfavourable will not be. 
There is another model that extends this general model to a more realistic strategic behaviour of the 
parties. Shavell gives a threefold account as to why the parties do not reveal all information they 
possess. First, inability to share information—it may be difficult to share it in a credible way. The 
example he gives is that of a party to a dispute whose losses are difficult to demonstrate without 
experts witnesses providing the estimate at trial. 227The defendant’s belief is that the damages are 
smaller. There is a clash between her beliefs and reality that does not get demonstrated only during 
the trial. 
Another possibility is a mimicking strategy. In this situation, Information will not be shared 
deliberately. A party with a relatively low-value case can choose not to reveal the information 
because of strategic behavior. This party wants to be mistaken for the party from the previous 
situation (a high-value claim that cannot be revealed) in order to reach a better settlement.228 
Finally, there is strategic behavior in order to introduce a measure of surprise that may prove 
advantageous during the trial. Information might not be shared because that may reduce its value to 
the party that has it if the case actually goes to trial. The reason is the other party may find a way to 
counter the evidence if it knows it exists.  
6.1 Other Problems with Party-Led Information Finding  
For the party-led system, information acquisition has several conditions that must be fulfilled.  
The first one is the price of evidence has to contain all the information needed. In the words of 
Frederick Hayek, the price has to be a sufficient statistic.229 For that to be the case, the information 
good must be homogeneous—one that comes in only one standardized form. Without that 
assurance, there will be quality differences that are not included in the price, meaning court 
evidence has to have limited information requirements in order to be ‘absorbed’ in the price. 230 As 
discussed earlier, testimony types of information good can be quite diverse and difficult to 
categorize.231 That means that is not a homogenous standardized good. As a consequence, its price 
will often have difficulties in containing all the information needed and will not be a sufficient 
statistic.   
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Second, there have to be numerous providers and acquirers of evidence. The quantity of both 
providers and acquirers have to be sufficient so that in any given situation, there is some competition 
between on both sides of the evidence-acquiring transaction.232 Some courts (mostly in civil law 
countries) restrict the number of expert witnesses to a very short list who are very well known to the 
court. Such arrangements destroy the competition for information acquisition and result in 
substantial market distortions in the price of evidence. 
Third, as Coase has maintained, usually there is a cost associated with using the price system.233 
There is usually a cost involved in finding out what the relevant prices are. Following the previous 
argument, it is clear the parties do not have a lot of information on the price of evidence. This 
information is mostly in the hands of their lawyers, which leads to another serious distortion in the 
market of evidence.  
Finally, the transaction costs of acquiring some types of evidence may be high. That would be the 
case when evidence is hardly accessible for some reason or its disclosure contradicts the interests of 
those who provide it. All four issues with party-led information gathering lead to distortions in the 
markets for evidence.  
6.2 First Intermediate Position of the Lever: The Discovery Right 
The question then is what will happen if this basic adversarial model is changed by introducing new 
legislation dealing with the way in which information is shared? One way to do that is to introduce a 
right to discovery. Such a right changes the position of the lever of the judicial machine. On the one 
hand, discovery is a more interventionist approach because the judicial system changes the rules 
applicable between the parties. However, it gives more power to the parties and not the court to 
intervene in information gathering. They forcefully try to make the parties share all the information 
they possess. The possibilities are mandatory disclosure and a right assigned to the parties to 
“discover” the information held by the other side. 
The problem this discovery right tries to solve is that information is private; the owner can decide 
whether to disclose it or not. There is no incentive to do so when disclosure would harm the owner’s 
private interest.234 
Discovery changes the purely adversarial system of adjudication, which sees any attempt to compel a 
party to reveal any information to the opposing party before the trial as unnecessary. This change 
means that the right to discover provides judges with more information in order for them to make a 
better-informed decision. 
It is apparent that in the basic adversarial model, not enough information is revealed because there 
are incentives to reveal only information favourable to the party. In addition, as seen in Shavell’s 
model, there are restrictions to the revelation of even that information. The question is what effects 
will that right introduce to the incentives to reveal information?  
The main purpose of discovery is to make reluctant opponents to disclose information relevant to 
the case.235 Other purposes discovery can serve are: reducing surprise at trial; leading the parties to 
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new evidence; making parties perform a more accurate evaluation of their cases; and narrowing the 
issues of the case at hand. 236  
It is important to note that the discovery right can have a different scope in the different judicial 
systems in which it is used. So the positives and negatives can vary according to its manner of 
operation. 
It has been argued that, at least in theory, the benefit for the parties is that cases are litigated fully 
and achieve a more accurate result because it reduces informational asymmetry and makes 
settlement easier. Second, the judicial system benefits because it produces more accurate decisions 
based on better factual record and saves litigation costs with higher settlement rate. Third, society 
benefits from the realization of deterrence gains from greater outcome accuracy and reduced 
process costs.237 
So what results does discovery actually achieve according to the different authors and their models? 
According to Cooter, there are incentives to reveal information in order to correct false optimism. 
That creates leverage in the settlement negotiations for the party that reveals the information. 
Additionally, there are no incentives to correct false pessimism. Thus, Cooter has found that in this 
false pessimism situation discovery decreases settlements and increases trials by compelling the 
involuntary exchange of information.  
Shavell’s model is the most sophisticated because it makes the convincing claim that information 
beneficial to the party will be disclosed but on the condition of strategic behavior. For example, it 
makes complete sense that evidence will be withheld up to a moment at which the other side will 
have a difficulty to counter it. In a context of the short common law trial that is held in simple cases 
in a day and in more complex cases in the span of several consecutive days. This special characteristic 
of common law trials makes countering a piece of evidence a complicated proposition in a day or 
two.  
The question then arises as to whether discovery reduces such surprises. In examining the three 
claims of Shavell’s model in detail, he predicts that in the first situation in which the party is unable 
to demonstrate its information credibly, discovery cannot affect the outcome because the party is 
unable to establish losses due to the absence of an expert’s evaluation.238 
In the mimicking situation, information in which low-loss plaintiffs stay silent in order to mirror the 
one who cannot reveal their losses they will be forced by discovery to reveal their information.239 In 
the strategic behavior that counts on creating a surprise to the opponent, the plaintiff will be forced 
to reveal their information if the right to discovery exists. So in two of the three situations, the 
existence of discovery procedure can be helpful. However, that is not the whole story. There are 
secondary effects. 
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In the second mimicking situation, there would be an indirect complex effect on settlement offers 
that would raise the settlement rate.  Because low-loss plaintiffs who can reveal their losses would 
be forced to do so, defendants would raise their settlement offers to plaintiffs who cannot supply 
information about their losses. That will raise the settlement rate because more of the plaintiffs who 
are unable to disclose their losses will accept the settlement offer rather than go to trial. 
There are, however, negative effects of discovery, including responding to the request for 
information and administrative costs of the satellite litigation it causes. It is also possible that the 
parties use discovery for purposes other than fact finding. That can lead to abuse of the right in order 
to wear down the opponent financially.240 Cooter and Rubinfeld have argued that discovery is 
misused when compliance with the requests for information costs more than the increase in the 
value of the claim of the party that makes the demand. 241 
Discovery usually uses significant time and resources to produce information. This raises the question 
of whether discovery is socially optimal and, as previously discussed, the marginal cost should not 
exceed the marginal benefit. Does discovery produce enough marginal benefit? Is there a cheaper 
way to achieve the revelation of the information problem caused by strategic and mimicking 
behaviour? Is it socially optimal to reveal that information?   
6.3 Divergence between Private and Social Benefit 
There is a divergence between the private and the social benefit. A party may benefit more from 
winning than is socially optimal. So a party can invest a lot in reaching a positive result if the case 
stakes are high. However, that does not mean it is socially optimal. To be socially optimal, the case at 
hand has to channel the desired future behaviour. That is the problem with one of the four cases this 
thesis started with. In the Bernard Tapie case, the stakes for him were extremely high so he was 
willing to take any action to win the case, even though the case should have been closed because of 
legal impossibility to continue with the lawsuit. The social benefit is quite doubtful. What future 
behaviour will be channelled in society if billionaires are allowed to make the taxpayer pay them 
millions when they do not have a valid legal case? 
Discovery may produce more settlements because people try to avoid it. The reason is it is too 
expensive. In the mimicking situation, the fact that there are more settlements can also be a problem 
because they do not create more desired behaviour. Settlement does not often produce any result 
beyond the case at hand. So it hardly channels desirable future behaviour.  
It can also serve as an expensive threat. Requests for information can be seen as a threat, for the 
costs of compliance with discovery requests are generally borne by the side asked to comply. Thus 
one party to the dispute can simply be priced out of the litigation and it has to concede defeat. 
So what does discovery do in practice? It can be argued that it blunts the rough edges of the 
adversarial system. It is suggested that is not the case; discovery actually only provides another tool 
in the disposal of the two adversaries. This tool though changes the character of the judicial system. 
The traditional adversarial system is a product of societies that are ruled by laissez faire principles for 
which is more typical that the legal process is seen as a way to dissipate (absorb) conflicts in society. 
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So adding discovery to such adversarial system blunts the edge of something commentators have 
dubbed ‘sporting’ theory of justice where parties battle only to win based on their arguments not on 
their merits. Thus, discovery moves the judicial system towards following a truth-finding purpose of 
the legal process. By revealing more information the discovery process, in theory, leads to more 
accurate results.  
However, in practice, because of the high cost and sometimes abusive use of discovery, what is 
achieved is further restricting the access to courts for the have-nots, as described by Galander’s 
model in the previous chapter. The reason is discovery reveals the truth more but makes the process 
more expensive, especially when lawyers are hired on an hourly fee basis, giving lawyers for both 
sides strong incentives to make the process more expensive to the parties.  
6.4 Second Intermediate Position of the Lever: Mandatory Disclosure  
Another way to deal with the information problem and make inroads on the pure adversarial model 
of adjudication is to introduce mandatory disclosure. That means parties at the outset of a lawsuit 
exchange certain core information voluntarily without any formal requests.242 The goal is to exchange 
information from the beginning rather than at a later stage of the dispute.  
The introduction of such rule again changes the position of the lever towards more interventionist 
model. Basically, the lever moves towards the managerial model because it is the courts that 
supervise and control whether the mandatory disclosure has taken place. 
The question is if there is any advantage over the model of request discovery. In any case, the parties 
are willing to exchange information that is their favour. What this regime can achieve is to improve 
on the third issue that Shavell highlighted—that is, information that may reduce its value to the party 
possessing it and be easily countered by the other side. The result would be that information could 
be revealed in a timely fashion that otherwise might have remained undisclosed until a later date.  
There will not be an improvement in the situation of inability to disclose evidence and there could be 
some improvement in the mimicking strategy situation. Some plaintiffs with low-value claims will 
reveal their information and stop their mimicking behavior. Others will continue their bluff under the 
new regulation and risk losing the case altogether in order to receive higher payoff at the end that 
they actually deserve by reaching a settlement. What will separate the two types of plaintiffs is 
whether they are risk averse or not. The risk averse will take what is due to them whereas risk takers 
will continue with mimicking high-value plaintiffs.  
An additional issue can be the reputation of the lawyer who represents low-value claim. If she is 
often caught bluffing, that may ruin her reputation and make it harder for her to bluff in the future, 
thus reducing her winning rate. 
There have been arguments that mandatory disclosure reduces the settlement surplus through sunk 
cost effect. 243 In economic terms, that is correct. The surplus in settlement negotiations under 
discovery regime is higher. That means that the parties can gain more than they are willing to accept 
in settlement. However, by revealing more information early on, they will only get in settlement 
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something closer to what is due to them. From a legal perspective, mandatory disclosure is closer to 
a realistic model of parties only getting what is due to them. So a low-value claimant who is risk 
averse and reveals the true value of her claim will not get a higher settlement (surplus on what she is 
willing to accept) but will get something closer to the real number the court should award her. So 
from legal perspective actually mandatory disclosure achieves better result even though it is an 
economically inferior situation.  
A real danger of mandatory disclosure is that a defendant, for example, can reveal too much 
irrelevant information in order to overwhelm her adversary.244 That will lead to high costs in order to 
sort out the good from bad information. So this is another kind of strategic behavior that exists under 
discovery but can be amplified under mandatory disclosure regime because now information can be 
provided not upon request so that the requesting party chooses what information she wants 
revealed but the other side has the freedom to give irrelevant information.  
Mandatory disclosure regime can exist both independently or can exist alongside a discovery regime. 
That means that mandatory disclosure can be independent setting on the judicial machine or be 
combined with the discovery setting. The result can differ slightly. A mandatory disclosure, when 
used together with discovery, does not do anything to reduce abusive discovery. In addition, it may 
double the cost of revealing the information because that happens twice. 
7.0 Managerial Model  
The second major contrary position of the lever of the judicial machine is the regime of litigation 
information of gathering is the state-led-managerial model. Correct fact gathering is at the heart of 
managerial systems. They are based on an optimistic epistemological model that maintains that true 
fact finding is not unrealistic. It is an unrealistic exaggeration to maintain that managerial models try 
to attain the truth in every case because of excessive costs. So this model tries to attain the highest 
possible standards of fact finding within its constraints. Such a model pertains that optimal 
investigative strategies require a viewpoint independent of narrow partisan perspectives. It sees the 
party led information finding as two private individuals who act as lobbyists and who pretend to 
devise a regulatory scheme in public interest.245  
7.1 Organization Methods of Managerial Models  
In the pure inquisitorial model, the person in charge of rendering the decision on merits dominates 
both the proceedings and fact finding. So it is the trier of fact who is responsible for eliciting 
testimony. He generates the questions to witnesses and the sequence in which they will be 
interrogated. 
The negatives of such a model, Damaska finds, are psychological and result in a reality in which the 
trier of facts' involvement reduces the accuracy of the result reached. She forms a hypothesis that 
favours one side so it is easy for her to become biased in the decision making. The fact finder 
occasionally challenges witnesses as he does that the calm and dispassionate weighing of fact may be 
affected. 
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Another way is to have a different official, not the decision maker who gathers the information. Thus 
the decision maker only gradually gets involved in the production of information and only to a limited 
extent that cognitive needs require. 246 
7.2 The Economic Negatives of the Managerial Model  
To analyze this model from an economic perspective it will be useful to go back to Richard Posner’s 
theory, which equated courts with markets.247 Courts in which the authorities take a very active part 
in information finding are similar to markets within which the state intervenes. 
This analogy shows that the court officials basically own the means of production in this quasi-
market. The thing courts produce is information, so when the information is produced by the court 
instead of the parties to the process, the officialdom assumes ownership of the means of production. 
Another thing the officials do is to set the price of information. It is not up to the party to decide if 
the information is worth getting at the price of acquiring it. It is the official that makes that decision. 
The result is a choice that is not optimal for the private party and her interests but corresponds only 
to the limited means and motivations of the official. 
In this situation, the benefit of something Hayek calls the division of knowledge disappears. He has 
argued that economic actors do not have all the information in the world to a make decision. They 
can only make a reasonable prediction.248 In our case, for courts acting as quasi-markets that 
prediction is based on their own interests, incentives, and costs of acquiring information. It is the 
court official charged with finding the information who is presumed to have all the information in the 
world and to have the incentives to take the right amount of effort in revealing the required amount 
of evidence. So instead of the interplay of private actors, there is one person who decides it all.  
As stated in the section on party-led processes, the private actors are negatively affected by 
asymmetric information self-serving bias and optimism/pessimism problems. That is why it seems 
reasonable to have an intervention of an official to resolve these problems. 
However, the biggest problem of the official is her incentives. Court officials’ efforts are usually 
spread over a large number of cases. That means they are usually overwhelmed by the number of 
cases they have to deal with. Their incentives thus are to find a way to work less and not to pay 
attention to the details of every case and find all the required information. It is absolutely the same 
as requiring the police to investigate every single case that gets reported to them. For anyone who 
has filed a complaint in a police station, for theft for example, it is clear that the number of crimes 
that actually get investigated is quite limited. The same applies to court officials. They are not paid by 
the case they investigate. The salary that they receive will not award them if they work harder and do 
a thorough investigative job on more cases than their colleges. 
Another way to look at this problem is a marginal cost for the court official to deal with the 
investigation of one more case. The reason is the price of information finding is set not according to 
the incentives the parties have but according to an external factor that has nothing to do with case—
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the price for the official to hear one more case (marginal cost). Above a certain equilibrium, the 
marginal cost of dealing with one more case becomes disproportionately high with the current 
amount of resources available to the judicial system. That restriction means there is no cost 
advantage of the official gathering the information over the parties. So unless the courts can hire 
unlimited staff to deal with new cases and unless there are no budget constraints, the managerial 
system runs very quickly into unresolvable problems and achieves mediocre results. That means a 
resolution of court cases becomes directly correlated to the amount of government expenditure. 
Obviously, government budgets cannot be spent without limit on the judicial system. 
The managerial system then can only work if the officials have a way to cheaply acquire all the 
information needed to resolve a case and they have superior knowledge to the parties of where to 
find it or how to produce the evidence accurately and cheaply.  In the majority of cases, there is no 
such advantage. The optimism underlying superior truth finding of managerial models have been 
exposed time and again as a false hope.  
At best, a managerial machine of justice can be used to impose certain views on society, especially 
those with oppressive effects on individuals. The reason is the only thing such a judicial system can 
produce is officials that in a very short time reach conclusions and thus pretend they have performed 
the appropriate information finding. The result is that such system imposes the officials’ insufficiently 
informed point of view on the individual parties to a legal process. 
As Damaska has put it, such a managerial process can turn the parties to the process into objects of 
procedural action. The officials impose duties to cooperate with the parties and stop treating them 
as independent, autonomous sources of information.249  
The managerial model can be used only in limited circumstances when the imperfections of party-led 
information gathering are severely compromised by the failures described above. The problem can 
be resolved if the right incentives for the officials are created. So if officials can have the incentives to 
intervene in order to improve the quality and quantity of evidence and then do it in a cautious 
manner, that prevents their intervention from leading to the subjugation of individual freedom.  
The quantitative problem is easily resolved. Officials can receive extra financial incentives for the 
number of cases they resolve and not a fixed salary. The bigger problem is the qualitative issue. 
Devising a system that makes sure officials acquire quality evidence is an extremely complex task. 
Other ways in which the managerial model of information acquisition can be used is to reduce delays 
when one of the parties has the wrong incentives to postpone the process in order to wear down the 
other party or to create another advantage.250 It can also be used to reduce the inequality of arms. In 
that situation, the problem of creating the right incentives for the judge to intervene seems quite 
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substantial. How can you make a judge intervene when her incentives are to reduce her workload 
and not to take on extra duties? 
Consequently, setting the judicial machine on the managerial position seems like a perilous 
endeavour in most cases. This positioning of the lever can be used only in limited circumstances. 
8.0 Preliminary Conclusions 
1) A pure party-led process has problems with information not being revealed. The first step to 
remedy that is a meeting of the two opposing parties to the process in order to reveal at 
least some of the information both of them possess. If there is such a meeting, at least the 
information that is favourable to the party that reveals it will be disclosed. 
2) To reduce the cost of information acquisition, first there has to be a scheme within the 
courts to classify and homogenize evidence as much as possible. There must also be 
numerous providers of evidence, especially quality expert witnesses. 
3) Adding a right to discovery can help reveal more information. However, there is a trade-off. 
With discovery, the information acquisition can be superior but the cost of the process goes 
up as well. If the party that conducts discovery has enough experience and asks the right 
questions, the information that otherwise would not be shared will, in fact, be revealed. In 
addition, information kept for a later time for strategic reasons can also be revealed. 
Information that cannot be revealed because it requires an expert evaluation during the trial 
cannot and will not be revealed. So the question with discovery is whether the revelation of 
that information and more accurate settlement or judgment is worth the extra cost. The 
problem can come from the possibility to abuse the right to discovery and increase the price 
of information substantially. 
4) Mandatory disclosure can be a cheaper alternative to discovery. It reveals less information 
because, in the mimicking behaviour problem, some parties will choose to continue to 
pretend they are in a superior position than they actually are. Still, some will reveal their 
weaker-than-assumed position if they are risk averse. If mandatory disclosure is sufficiently 
restrictive in allowing evidence at a later date, a party that tries to keep information for a 
later date when it will be harder to counter it, the result will be a revelation of such 
information as well. If mandatory disclosure does not limit the acceptance of further 
evidence at a later date, it will not help reveal that information. If mandatory disclosure is 
used together with the right to discovery, the cost can be doubled because information will 
be revealed twice.  A judicial system that wants to expend fewer resources but achieve an 
almost comparable result to discovery can prefer that option. That is even more so in the 
case of equality of arms concerns. Discovery will exacerbate them whereas mandatory 
disclosure will not increase significantly the expenses of the weaker party. 
5) The managerial model produces some worrisome results such as turning the parties into 
objects of procedural action. It puts the party under the control of administrative type 
decision makers and it fixes the price of information not based on the cost of acquisition by 
the parties, but on administrative cost of conducting an investigation that is dependent on a 
limited government budget for the judiciary. That budget very quickly can exceed the point 
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of equilibrium, at which it becomes too expensive for officials to find the facts of an 
additional case so they will stop doing it. The reason is the marginal cost goes beyond the 
point of equilibrium of services that can be provided with the current resources available. 
The managerial model can be used only when there are severe failures in the party-led 
process and only if the right incentives for officials to act are created. On its own, it is a poor 
choice and even dangerous for individual freedoms.  
Another confirmation for the importance of information for the good functioning of the judicial 
system has come from Natalie Fricero, who finds the quality of the judicial process in the best 
possible revelation of information.251 So this quality evaluation does not give us enough to decide 
whether quality control works. All rights of the equitable process may be followed (for example the 
right to be heard etc.), but the judge may not receive enough information or be overloaded with 
irrelevant information. So the question must be examined as to what quality information is and how 
can it be optimally delivered to the judge so she can take the best decision she possibly can. 
Competitive markets require full information to function efficiently. If legal parties use the given 
resources to ask each other questions, it is purely distributive information. But if they invest in 
finding new information and that information improves social value instead, then the discovery 
process can be useful and should be encouraged. So the question is what type of information 
availability produces social value? That is what provides quality. 
Reducing delays in rendering a judgment is also highly necessary. Delays reduce the probative value 
of evidence (the information gets lost or becomes out-of-date) and thus can lead to an inadequate 
judicial decision.252 It can also lead to inequality of arms because prolonging procedures can be a tool 
in the hands of the wealthy few to disarm otherwise valid claims against them, which gives rise to the 
maxim, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” The more simple arguments such as a delay of, for 
example, ten years may find the claimant not even alive to collect her due. A more complex 
economic viewpoint is that there can be a stagnation of the economy because debts are stuck in the 
courts and money and investment cannot circulate in the economy. The reason is fear of investing 
because the courts do not defend rights fast enough, the emergence shadow lending, and the 
pervasiveness of corruption. 
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SECTION IV: JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION 
Chapter 5: Judicial Hierarchy  
In this chapter, the focus will progress from management of a case’s information flow to 
management of the whole judicial system. In other words, the analysis moves from specific features 
to structural organization of the judicial machine. 
1.0 The Two Lever Positions 
This chapter deals with judicial hierarchy and its two basic positions of the lever—strong and weak 
judicial hierarchy. 
1.1 The Structure of this Chapter  
This chapter will first examine the natural origin of hierarchies, then specifically the historical 
development of judicial hierarchies; third, it will define their purpose and potential problem. The 
analysis of this chapter is based on the model of Peter Drucker, the founder of modern management, 
who has seen organizations as consisting of two types of capital. The first type in human capital, that 
is, judges plus other court personnel. The second type is the institutional divisions in which they 
work.253  Both types will be examined to find out how the types of capital are used in both strong and 
weak hierarchies.  That is the path to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the two lever positions 
of the judicial machine. There are several models used to gain insights into the way the positives and 
negatives of two lever positions function, including the above-mentioned Drucker’s model, 
Damaska’s hierarchy model, Ian Shapiro’s cautionary account of hierarchies, Kornhouser’s model of 
decentralized judiciary, Agency theory, and Tirole’s model of accountable and unaccountable 
officials.  
1.2 There Are No Perfect Organizations  
When analyzing the two possible lever positions, it is important to keep in mind that the complexity 
of choosing a strict or weak hierarchy comes from the fact that there is no such thing as a perfect 
organization. As Peter Drucker, the father of modern management has argued, there are 
organizations with “distinct strengths, distinct limitations, and specific applications.” Organizations 
are only productivity tools.254  They have to fit their time, the current social conditions, and they have 
to perform specific tasks. Thus, the choice of strong or weak hierarchy is not an absolute one but it 
depends on the intended purpose of a specific organization.  
That means moving the position of the regulation lever of the judicial machine should be flexible and 
be done according to the purposes intended when using the hierarchical elements of the judicial 
machine. Keeping traditions for sentimental reasons or simply because they are comfortable is the 
wrong approach. The choice between strong and weak hierarchy and all the possible intermediate 
positions has to be made because it will make the judicial machine function better at a specific place 
and time for a specific purpose.   
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1.3 Why Keep Old Organizational Structures 
Drucker has provided an insightful observation of why old organizational structures remain intact: 1) 
leaders think they have a few good years left in them, meaning that these procedures are already 
obsolete. 2) When an organizational structure is fully written off, leaders mistakenly only think about 
the costs and difficulties of replacing them because there are no costless changes. However, the right 
question to ask is not only what will they cost to replace but will the old organization produce 
something valuable? 3) Most importantly, if the old organization causes neglect to better 
alternatives, it is a barrier to the adoption of new structures that can do a better job regarding their 
existing goal. 
The choice between strong and weak judicial machine hierarchy requires deeper reflection and 
understanding of what those two models actually mean. They have real historical examples of the 
judicial organization as their foundation. Consequently, in order to analyze their “good” and 
“negative” features, theoretically, it will be first beneficial to examine their historical development. 
The important thing is to keep a situational awareness and escape absolute views that one of those 
two systems is superior in all conditions and for all purposes. Further, some other descriptions of 
hierarchy and its purposes will be analyzed in order to define it. After that, the two lever positions 
will be evaluated. 
1.4 The Origins of Hierarchy 
From a broader perspective, hierarchy can be seen as a natural phenomenon. For example, Harold J. 
Leavitt has proposed the following perspective: “Hierarchy, of course, is not just an organizational 
construct. It is a phenomenon intrinsic to the complexity of the natural world. Indeed, all biological 
organisms are made up of systems—circulatory, skeletal, and respiratory—which themselves 
comprise many subsystems. Our mental processes are also often hierarchical, especially when we 
perform complicated tasks.”255 
Considering this biological origin of hierarchy, it is not surprising then that hierarchical organizations 
are also deeply embedded in the psychological profile of human beings. They can provide 
psychological rewards such as feelings of power and status in society. Even more importantly, they 
provide a way for human beings to be evaluated. Most people feel gratified when they receive the 
craved approval that is usually in the form of performance appraisals, salary increases, and 
promotions. People may complain of unfair evaluations and meager raises, but most of them still 
want to see their grades.256  
There is a problem, though, with our attachment to such “benefits” of hierarchy. Modern complex 
societies do not have the same organizational structures as the ones our very recent hunter gather 
ancestors had. The result is that the benefits that gratify our psychological needs travel a way more 
complex path in modern societies than the simple approval of the elders of a small society. This more 
complex path to the psychological benefits of hierarchy has to be examined within the functioning of 
modern organizations. 
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Despite that cautionary remark: “multilevel hierarchies remain the best available mechanism for 
doing complex work. It is unrealistic to expect that we will do away with them in the foreseeable 
future. It seems more sensible to accept the reality that hierarchies are here to stay and work hard to 
reduce their highly noxious byproducts while making them more habitable for humans and more 
productive as well.”257 
1.5 Historical Overview of Implementation Hierarchical Organizations to the Judiciary   
The modern judiciaries are no exception. They have developed different types of complex hierarchies 
in order to fulfill their complex and crucial task in society. This complexity of the task and its 
importance requires close examination of judicial hierarchies. Looking at them from a historical 
perspective will reveal their pattern of emergence that will be useful in our examination of the two 
lever positions of hierarchy strong and weak. The reason is historical development led to the creation 
of two such general types of hierarchy. Examining the historical development will also be helpful in 
defining the purposes of hierarchy.  
1.6 The Two Traditions: Hierarchical Courts and Single-level Courts 
As Mirjan Damaska, the author of the most significant work to date on comparative judicial studies 
has argued, the origins of hierarchy in the judicial system can be traced back to the emergence of the 
judicial apparatus on the European continent. The judicial organization followed the example of the 
successful fight for unity in the Catholic Church.258 Similarly, the judicial hierarchy was built around 
the top-down model of ecclesiastical authority, which in turn followed the perceived order in heaven 
with God on top of the pyramid of power. Even the word ‘hierarchia’ was first used by a Syrian 
Christian monk to express this organizational ideal.259 
1.7 There Has Not Been an Absolute Hierarchy 
It is important to emphasize in talking about the origins of judicial hierarchy in the Roman Catholic 
Church is that strong hierarchies should not be taken as an absolute. The path of organizational 
development even within the Catholic Church itself was not a straightforward one. The reason is 
even the church did not evolve in strict adhesion to a rigid hierarchy. The social environment was a 
strong outside influence. As Drucker has argued, every major social change produced new and very 
different orders in the church: the Benedictines in 500 AD after the barbarians overturned the 
Roman Empire, the Dominicans and Franciscans seven hundred years later when cities re-emerged in 
the Middle Ages, and the Jesuits as a response to the Protestant Reformation.260 Thus, even the 
Catholic Church, given as the most rigid example of a hierarchy, has adapted to the purposes it 
served in times of change. 
That influence of the Church highlights another somewhat surprising fact—hierarchical court order is 
a relatively modern invention and thus cannot be taken for granted. Largely unknown to the Romans 
in its present form, the appeal institution261 first emerged as a specific feature of the judicial process 








 Drucker, p.37. 
261
 A short remark explaining the connection between hierarchy and appeal is necessary. These two concepts 
are closely related. For now it will be sufficient to think of the appeals process as the most common use of 
111 
 
in medieval times on the Continent. Only relatively recently the appeal has become a characteristic 
of other judicial systems. Despite its relatively recent history, judicial hierarchy has followed a trend 
of becoming dominant structure to organize the judiciary worldwide. This has been the result of 
broadly similar circumstances in contemporary states which put at the forefront of institutional 
development the trends of professionalization, centralization, and expertise of the judiciary.262 
1.8 Legal Traditions Determine the Strength of Hierarchy  
This chapter focuses on the difference of strength of hierarchies. This difference can roughly be 
traced to legal traditions. The continental tradition tends to adhere to stricter hierarchies and the 
common law in the US and especially in the UK hierarchies have been relatively weak and flexible. 
The Continent, of course, was strongly influenced by the Catholic Church, whereas the English 
common law tradition cut its ties with the Church during the formational period of its judicial system. 
The result was stronger traditions of appellate justice that followed the church’s hierarchal trends on 
the Continent. Whereas, in England, the traditional common law jurisdiction, a real appeals court 
was introduced as late as the 19th century.  
That strong hierarchical background has made the continental lawyers less inclined to pose the 
question of the judicial hierarchies’ utility. They take the appeals process as an essential part of the 
judicial process that necessarily follows the trial. On the contrary, this is not the case for common 
lawyers for whom the strong hierarchy is not inevitably engrained in the judicial process. 
Consequently, the subject of this chapter is more important for continental lawyers since examining 
the performance of judicial hierarchies is not something continental lawyers tend to consider, as they 
often take tend to take hierarchies for granted.    
1.9 Functional and Purposeful Characteristics of Hierarchy 
Judicial hierarchies have emerged and become an inevitable part of modern judicial systems. The fact 
that they are so widespread means they have an important function that is necessary for modern 
societies. But what is their purpose? What do hierarchies actually do? It is time to define the purpose 
of the element of the judicial machine examined in this chapter.263 Peter Drucker has given a good 
explanation of the purpose of hierarchy: “[it] is necessary because someone has to make the final 
decisions.”264 These decisions have to be obeyed because in a case of common danger the survival 
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depends on clear command: “In a crisis, hierarchy and its unquestionable acceptance by everyone is 
the only solution.”265  
Another purpose of hierarchy is to impose a particular vision. Stronger hierarchies exist in order to 
impose more intensely a particular vision of how things should be according to someone at the top of 
an organization. Drucker has put that very well hierarchies “put a lid” on things.266 That means that in 
the judiciary hierarchies impose a final authoritative vision of how the judicial system should function 
by putting a lid on the issues to be discussed and scope on the decisions to be taken. It imposes one 
view that takes precedence over all others. The view presumed to be superior is the one from the 
top of the hierarchy. The origin of hierarchies in religious organizations with God on top, imposing 
the right moral vision presupposes superiority for the decisions given from the top.  
2.0 Potential Problems of Hierarchy 
Even in the Catholic Church, there was not an absolute positive vision of hierarchy. What is more 
important on top of any human hierarchy, there is no God who can always make the right decisions. 
Consequently, it is important to critically examine hierarchies. Professor Ian Shapiro from Yale 
University267 has proposed the following useful way to think about hierarchies and the potential 
problems they can create.   
The first possible problem a hierarchical system can create is to eliminate an opposing view.268 What 
can be useful in making a decision in a looming crisis but it can be a detriment in complex, prolonged 
decision making process. That is very often the situation of judicial decision making. When judges 
make decisions, it is rarely about urgent matters. Normally, they have to consider two or more 
possible legal positions and decide which is the right one, given the existing sources of law. Since 
there is no perfect decision-making (no perfect social welfare function) judges have to consider all 
the available alternatives. The reason is their choices will have profound consequences that are not 
always easily seen. What seems fair on its face may actually be a detriment to that same party upon 
closer inspection. It follows that there will be people who will be unhappy with that new rule. These 
people have to have a way to legitimately object to that new rule. Their objections should be 
considered well-founded in principle.269 The reason for that has to do with institutional design. In an 
open society, there must be a way to institutionalize people’s objections by allowing them to form an 
opposition to a new rule. If you do not create avenues for loyal opposition, in time, you will get 
disloyal opposition. If the system does not have in-built mechanisms for change, unhappy people 
may as well reach for their guns. In practice, one of the most important ways in which opposition is 
institutionalized is by having a presumption against hierarchy.270 That presumption only applies in 
case of atrophy of hierarchies. The goal is to deal with judicial hierarchies that restrict the access of 
opposing views. The reason for preserving such divergent thinking is that it can be a source of 
progressive new ideas, which are more adept to current social needs and conditions. Different 
thinking can also point to problems in society that otherwise will remain unnoticed. 















 The second related problem is whether the hierarchy is insular.271 That means do hierarchies accept 
within their ranks people who think differently? So if the judiciary accepts people from a similar 
background, educated in the same law schools and promoted to higher judicial posts on the same 
principles there could be a problem with the quality of the judicial decision making. New ideas will 
not be able to penetrate groups with a rigid and similar thinking. Consequently, these groups will 
struggle to provide adequate solutions for current social needs. 
The third issue is whether the hierarchy provides a possibility for vertical mobility of its most talented 
members. If the most gifted judges are not allowed to rise to the top the quality of judicial decision 
making will suffer. The reason is they are the most capable of producing the best judicial decisions. 
Thus, a hierarchy that promotes judges based on seniority or political loyalty not on ability does not 
function optimally.272  
The fourth possible problem is that hierarchy can serve the wrong interests.273 The judiciary is 
supposed to work to improve social conditions, reduce conflicts in society etc. To put it differently, 
the judicial machine should aim to produce quality judicial decisions. However, it is possible that 
judicial hierarchies can serve narrow political interests or create the wrong incentives for judges to 
prioritize personal over social interests. Thus, it is important to align judicial and social interests 
within the judicial hierarchies. 
The fifth problem is that many layers of hierarchy can create information noise and lead to a badly 
functioning judicial organization. According to Peter Drucker, one principle is that an organization has 
to have fewer hierarchical levels, in other words, to be as flat as possible. According to Information 
theory, “every relay doubles the noise and cuts the message in half.”274  
All these dangers of hierarch together with the fact that they are biologically encoded in human 
beings and the only way to accomplish complex tasks means that there is a necessity  to examine  
hierarchies and  the way they function in great detail. 
Hierarchies have to be at an appropriate level because they are simply not inevitable. So the degree 
of hierarchy is the most important question this chapter deals with. It will be examined by analyzing 
the two main positions of this regulatory lever of the judicial system—weak or strong hierarchy. 
These possible positions will be questioned in order to answer whether each version fulfills the 
purposes of judicial hierarchies to provide quality decision making to members of society. 
2.1 Summarizing Judicial Hierarchy  
Hierarchies are pyramidal organizations in which the top has the upper hand. Their existence is due 
to the fact that they serve the physiological needs of most human beings to be praised, positively 
evaluated, and their desire to grow (to get promoted for example). They promote the view from the 
top as “the right” one. However, assuming that they always perform a positive role is erroneous 
because there is no infallible God on top of the pyramid, no assurance that the decision-maker will 




 An extreme example is of armies that in peace time promote the best politicians because they are the ones 
who manage to navigate their way to the top but these generals fail at war time when the hierarchy has to 
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always make the correct choice. Thus, hierarchies must be approached with caution to ensure they 
function for the good of society.  In order to make sure they fulfill their purposes, they must be 
properly constructed, be at the appropriate level of strength, and do not create the wrong incentives 
for judges and other personnel.   
2.2 How Hierarchies should be Organized 
The goal of any judicial machine, whether it has a strong or weak hierarchy, is to produce something. 
In the case of the judiciary, the product is quite complex, as will become evident from the chapter on 
the purpose of appeal. For now, let’s assume that that the judiciary produces a socially valuable 
product.  
2.3 Damaska’s Legal Perspective on Judicial Hierarchy  
Damaska has argued that there are three pervasive elements of judicial hierarchy: First, the 
attributes of officials (professionalization); second, relationships between officials (centralization); 
and third, the manner in which judges take decisions (expertise, specialization).275 
2.4 Economic Model of Hierarchy  
The economic model of hierarchy used here sees it from a slightly different perspective.276 The model 
is loosely based on Drucker’s view of organizations. The judicial machine operates on information. 
That information is the problem that exists in society. It has to flow through the whole judicial 
machine as accurately as possible. The task of the judicial machine is to use that information 
optimally. To do so the judiciary has to allocate its scarce resources. To process the information the 
judicial hierarchical machine uses resources with which it disposes. They can be called capital. Capital 
can be two types. The first one, judges plus other court personnel forms the human capital. The 
second type is the institutional divisions in which they work.277 So the question is how to organize 
human and institutional capital in an optimal structure for the judicial system. The goal is that judicial 
performance (judicial decisions) is the best it can be. This chapter will look at human capital mostly 
seen as the creation of the right incentives for judges and the judicial structures seen as a weak and 
strong hierarchy.  
2.5 The Common Elements between the Economic Models and the Damaska’s Legal Model 
This work examines a few economic models such as agency model, Korhauser’s team model, and 
Tirole’s accountable and unaccountable officials. The common elements between these models and 
Damaska’s legal theory are first that there are judges with certain characteristics that are at the 
center of the judicial hierarchy. The legal model more strongly emphasizes the type of their 
professional character (whether they are trained as judges or have received a different kind of 
training and become judges at a later stage of their careers). The economic models take a more 
comprehensive view of judges that also deals with their personal desires and motivations. 
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Furthermore, both approaches are interested in centralization, which refers to the authoritative 
relationship between judges. Specialization is the other common theme that can include 
specialization of different levels of courts or the courts specializing in different areas of law. The legal 
model pays more attention to the way judicial decisions are made whereas economic analysis 
concentrates more on the influence of institutional design on judicial decision making.  
What the two models add to the analysis here is the following: Druker’s model adds clarity because it 
deals with two simple categories: the human element of hierarchies as one type of capital and 
institutions and design as another. Damska’s elements are also useful because they highlight the 
common elements between the legal and economic approach. These elements are centralization, 
specialization, interaction between judges, and different levels of hierarchy. All these elements will 
help us examine the influence of institutional design on quality of judicial decision making.    
2.6 Distinguishing between the Two Positions of the Lever: Strong and Weak Hierarchy 
It is the legal traditions of judicial systems that usually decide how strong the hierarchy is. For 
example, in England during the period of the duality of the judicial system that saw it divided 
between Equity and Common law, only the former part had an appeal function. In common law 
courts, there was simply no appeal. The system was horizontal with a multiplicity of courts at the 
same level and no clear hierarchical structure between them. Even after the unification of the two 
systems, the appeal system remained complicated. Even to this day, there are some courts, such as 
the High Court, with mixed functions and they serve both as first instance and appeal court. Court of 
Appeal judges are also hierarchically mobile and they can sit in the High Court when the court hears a 
case that is estimated to be important.  That complicated history and practice of the English system 
define it as a much weaker hierarchical system.  
On the contrary, the French system has strong hierarchical traditions. The reason is twofold. First, it 
followed the tradition of the Catholic Church. Second, the French kings made deliberate efforts to 
unify the country and consequently the courts as well. Only later was the tradition interrupted with 
the creation of the cassation procedure.  
The important question then is what is achieved by weaker or stronger judicial hierarchy? In order to 
find an answer, there must be an examination of the difference between the two types of hierarchy. 
2.6.1 The Elements of Strong Hierarchy  
The first important element of hierarchy is centralization. Centralization has two connotations. It 
either concerns the place where the activity is brought together or it concerns authority. Only in the 
latter sense does increasing centralization lead necessarily to strong hierarchy. The reason is 
hierarchy can mean the top authority and in this second sense, centralization can mean control of an 
organization by a single authority. So they are almost synonymous. In contrast, when hierarchy is 
concerned with the place, then there may be a weak but centralized hierarchy. A good example is the 
English judicial system at its inception when it was centralized in London but there was no hierarchy 
to speak of. Strong hierarchies have strong authoritative control over the organization or in other 
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words centralization in the sense of strong authoritative control. That control in strong hierarchies is 
also defined by clear arrangement according to level of importance.278  
The second element that strong hierarchy needs is officials that are specifically trained for that 
purpose. The judges have to be professionally trained and not layman coming from other professions 
at a later stage of their careers. The strongest type of judicial hierarchy is when the judges share 
many characteristics with administrators.  
The third element of strong judicial hierarchy is comprehensive review by the superior courts. Such 
review implies that the lower court decisions are subject to regular review that leaves fewer aspects 
of their aspects not examinable.279 That prevents the wide distribution of unreviewable authority, 
which can only lead to discretion in the decision making of lower echelons of authority.280  
What strong hierarchical review actually does is manage the flow of information. To permit regular 
comprehensive review of lower court decisions judges at the top have to receive information that is 
manageable. The reason is that there are fewer judges at the top of the hierarchy than at its base. 
The judges at the top cannot decide many cases if they have to review the cases fully. To achieve that 
result a special mechanism is required, which allows the information in a digestible form to reach the 
top judges. That mechanism is to put the information in understandable simple “code” that higher up 
judges can easily read. In other words, the lower officials put it in schematic form that leaves out the 
messy life details.  
Part of that comprehensive review can be the fact that new evidence is allowed. A reversal does not 
have to mean an error was made in the decision making of the lower court; it is sufficient if new 
evidence turns up to reverse or modify an impeccable decision at the time of rendition281 
(specialization issue). 
The fourth element of strong hierarchies is permanent placement of judges. The reason is with time, 
officials carve out their own institutional niche and culture that distinguishes them from outsiders. 
This institutional insider’s view is quite intolerant of any imposition of decisions from outsiders. 
Damaska has called that official exclusivity.282 Because of considerations of impartiality, though, 
permanent judicial positions are characteristic common for modern weak and strong hierarchies.  
Fifth, to strengthen hierarchy long terms in office can be combined with standard operating 
procedures or organized routines.283 The effect of this routinization is that decisions are not based on 
individual justice but follow habitual patterns of taking a decision. Thus, the official can take a 
decision in her official capacity that she would never make as an individual.  
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Routinization allows lower courts to typify the situation.284 This edited information allows the top 
court to easily disregard the equities of the case and concentrate on correcting inconsistencies in 
low-level decisions and cultivation of broad ordering schemes for decision making. The real question 
of interest is whether these decisions manage to protect broader social interests that may be left 
unresolved or poorly resolved by strictly individualized justice. Higher court judges make decisions 
based not on the entire file accumulated at the previous stages of litigation but on short impersonal 
written summaries. This written text is created in order to facilitate making formalistic decisions. This 
summary turns easily into a syllogism. The reason is it is much harder to turn a complete file of messy 
real life details and everything that has happened at trial into a simplified logical construct than a 
short summary.285 
Fifth, specialization can lead to stronger hierarchies, but that is not always the case. Specialization 
can lead to a stronger hierarchy when there is a division of labour on specialized tasks.286 In that 
situation, it is not enough that different officials perform their tasks well because specialized courts 
need general review and control, which concentrates on the big picture. However, specialization can 
be a feature of relatively weaker hierarchies. For example, that is the case when appellate courts 
review lower court decisions only on point of law and leave the determination of the facts entirely to 
the lower court. Specialized courts can also lead to increased routinization. To deal with 
routinization, some specialized courts rotate judges from one division to another in order to avoid 
judges becoming overly cynical and becoming immune to individual plights. Moving them to another 
court in a different location is also possible. 
The sixth characteristic of strong hierarchy is that review is not an extraordinary event it is just a 
sequel of ordinary legislation that is to be expected in normal circumstances.  
Seventh, in strong hierarchies the emphasis is on quality control. This makes the lower court decision 
seem more provisional. 287  
The eighth feature of strong hierarchy is that the power of higher court judges to discipline (to teach 
a lesson) the lower court judge who is said to have erred in her decision. That power can be 
combined with the possibility to demote or dislodge recalcitrant lower court judges. That, in fact, 
means that in strong hierarchies, lower court judges lack internal independence from higher judges. 
That inequality can be highlighted by a strong lack of equal decision making.288  
Nine, control over the judiciary shows strong administrative features. Promotions and evaluations of 
judges are done by special commissions and specific evaluation procedures. Judicial merit is 
evaluated based on the administrative evaluation file, which is constructed from multiple evaluators, 
most prominently the immediate superior of the judge.  
The tenth way to have strong hierarchy is to have a requirement the court speak with one voice, 
which leads to suppression of divergent opinions. The choice becomes strictly binary. A yes or no 
answer is often insufficient to represent complex social reality. Judges have to vote for one of the 
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two options presented to them. A third way to approach things is impossible.  It is thus much easier 
for hierarchies to control such yes-or-no decisions than a complex decision with different arguments.  
Eleventh, strong hierarchies use formal and informal networks to learn of court operations to a far 
greater degree than weak hierarchies. 
2.6.1.1 The effects of strong hierarchies  
The elements of strong hierarchies also help us summarize the main effects of strong hierarchies:  
• Better control of lower court decisions because there is an emphasis on quality control that is 
exercised more often. 
• Stronger imposition of a particular view that comes from the top of the judicial hierarchy 
because more control means less divergent opinions.   
• More appeals are filed because an appeal is not seen as an extraordinary event but a natural 
consequence of trial. 
• More cases are heard by higher courts. That necessarily follows from the previous point.  
• Lower court decisions are more provisional because, by right, litigants can appeal their 
decisions; thus an appeal naturally follows trial. 
• They lead to technical and routinized decision making.  
• Less attention is paid to individual justice and more to the technicality of decision making. 
That is the result of routinization caused by specialization of the courts. 
• There can be strict formalism at the highest courts: logical legalism.289 That is the 
consequence of formalization and condensation of messy life facts into short technical 
summaries. 
• Promotions and evaluations of judges are based on proxy signs of merit seen through the 
eyes of judicial superiors and administrative organizations. That is because juridical 
performance is based on administrative evaluation files in which their superiors have an 
important role to play.  
• There is also a distortion of the information that comes from society until it reaches the 
higher courts. The reason is condensation of information in short summaries means that 
there is more noise in the informational message. 
2.6.1.2 Positives of strong hierarchy  
The positives of strong hierarchy are that strong control from the top can, in certain social 
circumstances, produce better decisions. The condition is that the top knows more or has a superior 
vision of what society actually needs. Strong hierarchical judicial control is extremely useful for new 
political regimes that want to impose a new vision of what society should look like and what values it 
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should have. To work well, strong hierarchy needs the best judges to be promoted to the top 
positions in the system. The reality is that there can only be a limited number of great legal minds per 
generation. If these judges sit on top of the pyramid and correct and improve judicial decision making 
at lower levels, society will benefit enormously. It can also increase productivity and quality judicial 
decision making. Thus, the aim of strong hierarchy should be to create the best possible system of 
promotion of judges. The fact that strong hierarchies exercise control over a large number of cases 
can thus be quite beneficial for the quality of judicial decision making. Specialization of tasks in the 
decision-making process can also have a positive impact and produce more accurate decisions 
because judges will not have to be educated on the issue they deal with. 
2.6.1.3 Negatives of strong hierarchy 
As made apparent in the problems Professor Ian Shapiro pointed out, strong hierarchies can cause 
serious problems. If the promotion system is flawed, the quality control of judicial decision making 
throughout the system will suffer. This extensive quality control may reduce productivity because 
less faith is put in lower court judges so there is no specialization in the task of appeal and trial 
courts. They both do the same job to hear cases de novo that could be redundant.  
The next issue is that every hierarchical level cuts the information that goes through the judicial 
system roughly in half. Thus, even with the best judicial minds at the top, there is a tradeoff with a 
correct understanding of the social problems that caused the dispute. The reason is these extremely 
talented top judges do not receive accurate enough information on what the problem in society is. 
They receive only short distorted summaries that are done for expedience and to allow many cases 
to be heard.  However, the result is that judicial decisions are based on a distorted premise and thus 
flawed. To put it in different words, the judicial machine works on information which is its “fuel.”  
The low-quality fuel mixed with undesirable impurities reduces productivity and quality of the 
functioning of the judicial machine. 
What causes the information flaws simultaneously also increases formalism and technicality of 
decision making. The binary choices that result can also have a negative impact on whether the 
optimal resolution of conflicts is achieved. The reason is complex social and individual relations are 
rarely simply binary. The result of the decision-making process that does not take that complexity 
into account and it can give the wrong oversimplified signal back to society and may not reduce 
future similar problems. All these problems reduce the quality of judicial decision making the strong 
hierarchy produces. 
2.6.2 The Models of Weak Hierarchy  
There is no one single position of the lever for weak hierarchy. There are different variations 
possible, ranging from no hierarchy at all to superior courts that hear only a few cases per year. 
2.6.2.1 Decentralized System with No Upper Court 
The model without hierarchy has a completely decentralized system of courts. Complete 
decentralization does not need hierarchy because it has no authority or specific vision to enforce. 
The courts may be located at different places and there is no upper court level of authority above 
each of those courts.  
120 
 
Complete decentralization is the simplest way to organize the courts. Instead of one single judge for 
the whole community, there are a number of them with no hierarchical relationship between them.  
Each judge is autonomous and essentially unconcerned with the existence and activity of the other 
judges. The positive effect of this system is the following: the productivity result of such a system is 
that each judge allocates time optimally across his or her caseload without regard to the behaviour 
of the other judges in the system. However, a decentralized system is better than no system at all 
because the quality of judicial decision-making increases, that is, the consequences of the reduced 
caseload each judge has to deal with. The reason is simple—there are more judges to deal with the 
total demand for judicial services. In other words, the allocation of the judicial resource is superior to 
when there is no organization and a single judge. 
 The detriment of completely decentralized courts is that they have to give intensive consideration to 
each case before them without having any shortcuts for decision making. That means each judge 
spends more time on a case than she should have, had she had other resources to rely on. For 
example, she will not have any guidance how to resolve commonly occurring disputes. So instead of 
focusing on new and important cases, judges will expend maximum effort on all cases. That is not the 
maximum allocation of that judge’s resources such as time, intelligence and competence. 
2.6.2.2 Decentralized system with case reporting  
A more sophisticated form of non-hierarchical judicial organization, however, might allow judges to 
learn from the decisions of other judges. In other words, it may create short cuts that simplify judicial 
decision making in those cases that often repeat themselves in slight variations. In such a system, 
each judge reports her own decisions to a common to all judges information database. So in such a 
system, there is something akin to precedent at the horizontal level only.290  
This system can be superior to the previous one if judges can communicate the results of decided 
cases to each other at a low cost. There are two possible problems. First, the judge who has decided 
a case has to also report it correctly. Second, the judge who relies on the information contained in 
the decisions rendered by the other judges should be able to keep up with the cases decided by all 
judges in the system.291 
2.6.2.3 Benefits of Midrange Strength Judicial Hierarchies  
Kornhauser has shown very clearly the benefits of the existence of relatively midrange strength 
hierarchy. First, these if these hierarchies have some appellate functions they but without the 
extensive controls mentioned above that characterise strong hierarchies (such as disciplining lower 
court judges). Such hierarchies use labour specialisation. Trial judges have different tasks than 
appellate judges, which achieves a better allocation of judicial resources. 
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Second, within such a hierarchy, a trial court judge has to consult a smaller set of cases for 
precedent. The judge need only read the cases decided by the court above and not all cases decided 
by other judges. 
Third, hierarchy permits greater coordination in the selection of precedential cases. Only the 
appellate judges need to have a systemic perspective on the caseload. 
What this model, which is reminiscent of most common law systems today, shows is that weaker 
hierarchies place more emphasis on the existence of precedent. The reason is clear: they have fewer 
mechanisms to impose the view from the top of the hierarchy to the lower court judges. In strong 
hierarchies, they hear more cases, discipline judges for manifested errors, and have promotion and 
performance evaluation mechanisms of judges by their hierarchical superiors. That is in stark 
contrast with midrange hierarchies where the strongest power the higher courts have is to overrule 
the lower courts. What can be expected then is that with the weakening of hierarchical control, 
precedent becomes even more important to the judicial systems. 
2.6.2.4 Effects of weak and midrange hierarchy  
• More importance of lower court judges  
• Fewer resources are expended on defending the view that comes from the top  
• Precedents become more important to impose that view because there is lack of other 
mechanisms strong hierarchical control  
• Reversals become more important  
• There are fewer appeals because quality control is limited to fewer cases that gave some 
signals to the highest court to hear them  
Ultimately, the practical aim is to align hierarchies with social interest; as such there should be an 
examination of a society’s overall aims and what influence strong or weak judicial hierarchies have 
on society. The question has to be put to each specific society whether a strong hierarchy is worth 
implementing and to what degree. Will it give positive social change? For example, the tradeoff 
between controlling extensively lower court judges has to be measured against the fact that strong 
hierarchies can reduce the quality of information that reaches higher judges because they have to 
hear a lot of cases and cannot spend enough time on detailed information. What can economic 
models teach us about the resolution of such issues? 
It is evident that achieving hierarchies’ results and their purposes require complicated tradeoffs. That 
is a pivotal issue for the organization of the judicial machine. Whether the purposes of hierarchy are 
worth the tradeoffs they require is an issue that deserves a special chapter. It will be discussed in the 
next chapter, which discusses the most important application of hierarchy in the judicial system—the 
appeals process.  
2.7 Two Additional Economic Models of Judicial Hierarchy 
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Here the aim is to enlarge our understanding of the way hierarchies function by examining two more 
economic theories. These additional insights can be useful to better evaluate the two lever 
positions—strong and weak hierarchy.  
2.7.1 Principal agent model  
Principal agent theory can be applied to hierarchical analysis because it can be used to analyze the 
relationship between higher and lower courts. Principal-agent theories highlight the fact that judges 
do not decide cases in isolation. The reason is their interactions with other actors in the judicial 
system have an impact on their decision-making.292  
The principal-agent model focuses on a situation where one party (the agent) takes action on behalf 
of another party (the principal).293 From the legal point of view, the emphasis is on the extent to 
which legal duty owed by an agent to her principal is fulfilled. 294 From the economic perspective, the 
aim is to determine what forms of contracting will create the right incentives so that the wishes of 
the principle are fulfilled and at the same time the agency costs are minimized. Put differently, the 
aim is to have a contractual relationship that creates a better allocation of the human capital 
resources of the judicial system in order to increase efficiency. That is why this model is a good 
addition to Drucker’s model of institutional and human capital description of organizations. 
Weaker hierarchies delegate more tasks to agents without exercising direct control. In strong 
hierarchies, the delegation is combined with more stringent control. The two alternative regimes 
have to be examined by trying to answer the following questions. The first question is whether 
stronger hierarchies are less efficient. The reason for asking this is the following: It would be easier, 
faster and cheaper to delegate the task to the agent. Alternately, are there benefits associated with 
strong control exercised by the top hierarchical level? 
So the final question is whether the strong or weak judicial hierarchy is more adept in dealing with 
the following four problematic features of organizational relationships: the probability of conflicting 
interests between the agent and the principal, the need to narrow the gap caused by information 
asymmetries, which are caused by the gap between the amount of information the principal and 
agent have,295 and adverse selection of the agent problems. 
The first problem is basically that the agent does not have the same interests as the principle. The 
problem is the same no matter whether the problem arises from a legal perspective as fulfilling a 
contractual duty, or from an economic perspective, which is based on creating the right incentives 
for the contractual relationship to work.  The purpose of the whole principal agent analysis is to 
make sure that the agent follows the desires of the principal. If he does not, there is a problem from 
both legal and the economic perspectives.  
The second problem is that the agent has more information. The first reason for that is that when 
hiring the agent the principle has less information of the qualities she possesses. In addition, after 
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hiring the agent, it is she who deals with the problem at hand and consequently knows more about 
the problem and the actions she has taken to solve it. In both situations, the principle can only follow 
proxy signs to guess what information exists. Economists have elucidated this twofold problem with 
the help of two concepts—adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Adverse selection affects the process of choosing an agent because the potential agent has hidden 
information about her true “type,” skills, values, and objectives. The principal knows the type with 
which she desires to contract but cannot reliably detect all the relevant information. Only proxy signs 
such as education and experience are available to the principal to make her hiring decisions.296 
Moral hazard exists in this situation because the agent does not take the risk upon herself (it is borne 
by the principle) and there is the danger that the former will act differently than if she incurred the 
risk for herself. Thus because of the observation problem, the disparity in available information and 
the different interests create a risk of moral hazard. 
Fourth, informational asymmetries plague the agency relationship after its formation because 
following the desires of the principle is normally a continuous process. 297The problem comes from 
the lack of opportunity for the principal to always directly observe the agent’s activities. So the first 
question is how to deal with these problems? 
2.8 Historical Overview of the Legal Solutions  
2.8.1 The beginning:  Roman law 
Legal systems have struggled with those issues since the inception of the principal agent relationship. 
In Roman law, the first legal system to deal with the problem of agency (mandatum contract), the 
problems had been dealt with in certain ways.  
To deal with the fact that the principal and the agent do not have the same interests, the Romans 
decided that the agent principle relationship was created only for specific legal or non-legal action. 
That means that they limited the relationship to something specific that the parties agreed to be 
performed so the conflict of interests was lowered to a minimum. One party (the principal) simply 
told another (the agent) what prestatio (performance to be tendered) he wanted to be done on his 
behalf. If the agent did not perform exactly the prestatio as stated in the madatum contract he was 
presumed to act for himself and not for the principle. If the deviation from the exact terms of the 
contract was slight and it benefited the principle (for example getting a better price) only then he 
was presumed to have acted for the principle. So again the agent could not benefit from an 
information asymmetry if he tried he incurred obligations only for himself. In that way, the Romans 
dealt with information asymmetries. The agent could not benefit from knowing more than the 
principle. He was there only to perform a specific task and could not deviate from it.  
Moreover, mandatum was only contracted between friends. For the Romans, friendship was 
extremely important. That is an important cultural specificity that was not easy to replicate 
everywhere else. That special relationship between the two contracting parties also resolved the 
adverse selection problem. One would not have contracted with someone one did not know and 
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trust explicitly. These solutions, however, are not easy to apply in complex modern economies where 
there is a need for the agents to perform continuous and complicated tasks. Plus, not every principle 
can know and have close ties to her agent.  In our context, if the Roman vision of the principal agent 
theory is accepted, superior judges have to have close relationships with every single lower court 
judge. Plus, they will have to delegate specific tasks that can be performed once by the lower court 
judges. 
2.8.2 Common law trusts and the agency problems 
Trusts have also dealt with these agency problems. In common law trusts, there can be a number of 
trustees, which comes closer to the relationship between higher and lower court judges analogy. 
That is in contrast with the Roman law mandatum contract that was only between two individuals. 
One way to deal with the divergence of interests between principles (the trust beneficiaries) and the 
agents (the trustees) is to require unanimity in the decisions taken by the trustees. That reduces the 
chances that one of the trustees will act in her own interests. Another way to deal with the 
informational asymmetry is the right of the beneficiary to demand information.  
2.9 Economic Theory’s Solution 
The economic principal agent theory explains that the principal cannot perfectly control the agent's 
behaviour, but can minimize conflicts of interest between them through monitoring and incentives 
that form part of the agreement that created the agent principle relationship.298Superior courts have 
the capacity to exercise their power to be the ultimate authority in the land. Strong hierarchies give 
more power to that final authority. One of the main manifestations of the degree of hierarchical 
strength is the number of cases the superior court considers annually in proportion to the number of 
cases delegated to lower courts. Strong hierarchies consider many more cases than the weak ones. In 
other words, they have a more hands-on approach to the control of the lower courts’ decisions. To 
put it in the words of the principal agent theory: The principle expends more resources to control 
directly the agent and relies less on proxy monitoring sings. It thus reduces the possibility that her 
desires are not followed because of the information problem that states the agent possesses more 
information than the principle. In this way, she also reduces the moral hazard problem because it 
observes the agent directly. However, there is a trade-off. Doing that is more costly and undermines 
the whole principal agent relationship. If the principle could carry out the job herself, why would 
there be an agent at all?  
3.0 Micro-Management vs. Macro-Management 
This trade-off can be examined in terms of micro and macro management of lower court caseload. 
For perfect enforcement, higher courts can use micro-management. That means they would review a 
large number of decisions given by the courts below them. However, that is a way to deal with the 
problem of the principal’s control over the agent. It reduces the moral hazard, adverse selection, 
continuous observation issue, and problems arising from different interests. However, the sheer 
volume of lower court cases makes such a practice an expensive one.  
The question is then how to reduce the cost of micromanagement? The solution is to have a large 
number of highest court judges to hear a large number of cases at a lower cost. In other words, this 
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kind of system creates economies of scale to deal with the large caseload of higher judges. A crucial 
problem remains though. The identity of the principle is watered-down. Who is the principal if you 
have a large number of judges fulfilling that role? For a Supreme Court of nine or twelve is not easy 
to have a distinct identity. How about a court of more than two hundred judges? If the court has that 
many judges it is inevitable that the identity is diluted and various different interpretations and even 
contradictory decisions are bound to exist at the same. In that situation, the principal does not really 
exist. So there is a need for a more elaborate scheme to create a single judicial identity such as 
identical legal education for judges and similar career paths. That, however, means only like-minded 
people are part of the organization and, as seen above, one of the main reservations Professor Ian 
Shapiro had about hierarchy was that it destroys opposite opinions and it needs to add new 
divergent people with different opinions. 
Such an elaborate micromanagement court system also increases the cost of access to justice. The 
reason for that is the use of a court that exercises a high degree of control is by definition expensive. 
Somebody has to cover these costs. In some cases, that could be the state but that is too expensive 
for a government that needs to substantially increase its budget for the judiciary. More often than 
not, this does not happen and the price is that potential litigants do not get access to the courts.  
In macro-management, the highest court in the land hears a much lower number of cases relative to 
the caseload of the lower courts. It relies on signals given by interested parties and the lower courts 
to decide which of the limited number of cases will be heard. The emphasis is on individual cases. 
The court examines petitions requesting a leave of appeal (certiorari) and chooses which cases to 
hear. 
The most common signs the highest court can rely on given by the lower courts are: a circuit court's 
reversal of a lower court and en banc hearing. Also, the court also can decide to monitor closely 
lower courts with different ideological inclinations caused by regional political difference. 
Studies have shown that businesses and state governments have been particularly active in the past 
two decades in getting access to the highest courts. That can be interpreted as a solid sign given to 
the court by “experienced, credible parties with compatible interests to inform the Court.”299 But as 
stated in the Access to Courts section, there may be a problem of lurking underrepresentation of 
other parties that do not have the resources required to go to the pinnacle of the judicial system.   
3.1 The Lessons from Agency Theory  
So what does this theory teach us about the two lever positions of the judicial machine examined 
here, strong and weak hierarchies? 
Strong hierarchies deal with many of the economic problems that principals can have in achieving 
their goals and imposing their views. They reduce moral hazard and informational asymmetries 
problem by strengthening the control over the agent. However, this result is achieved by expending 
more resources. That is something to be compensated for in other ways such as having many 
“principals” and thus creating economies of scale. The need of creating one identity of these courts 
leads to further problems such as lack of divergent judges and lack of influx of new ideas of how the 





judicial system can deal with problems in society. There is also the problem of uniformity of 
interpretation in the decision making of the highest courts.  
Weak hierarchies, on the contrary, allow for more informational asymmetries and more moral 
hazard. That is a serious problem in itself if the best judicial minds of their generation sit atop the 
hierarchical pyramid. If that is so, they will hear as many cases as possible to increase the quality of 
judicial decision making in the system. Weak hierarchies produce fewer negative results than do 
strong hierarchies, so long as they have good promotion systems, keeping the best judges at the top 
of the hierarchy. If these judges are not at the very top of the system, the intent of justice will not be 
followed. The best judges’ decisions need to be visible, even at a lower court, so they can influence 
the law in the future. Thus following the principal’s desire in every system is not such a crucial goal to 
justify the tradeoff of expending more resources or creating a different kind of problem such as lack 
of identity of the principle. Weak hierarchies allow for more divergent opinions to exist. However, 
they have to have other mechanisms to keep the system whole. If they do not, the system will simply 
cease to exist as a unified unit. 
3.2 Negatives of Principal Agent Analysis 
The application of the principal agent analysis to the judicial system has to be conditional. The reason 
is that there are major differences between the private law principles behind agency contract and 
the way the relationship that exists between superior and inferior judges in a judicial hierarchy.  
So what are the differences between the two that make applying the principal-agent model 
misleading? The origin of the legal relationship that first created the principal agent model was the 
Roman law mandatum contract. This was a consensual type of contract, which simply means that to 
conclude such contract the requirement was to have the mere agreement between the parties. So 
both in legal doctrine and economic theory, agency depends upon the parties’ agreement to a 
particular type of relationship.300 In the mandatum contract, the agent is just one. In trusts, the 
agents can be a few. Lower court judges are numerous. That creates additional difficulties of 
controlling their behaviour that cannot be achieved by using the same methods such as personal 
friendship relationship between principal and agent or unanimity rule to authorize any action, which 
is the way trusts operate. 
In the court system, many of the usual tools for minimizing agency costs are unavailable.301 Higher 
judges do not have a direct role in the selection process of lower court judges, thus the problem of 
adverse selection persists because a contract with the right incentives to attract high-quality agents 
and reduce monitoring and other costs is unavailable. The principle does not appoint the agent and 
thus cannot structure the terms of their agreement. 
Instead, modern legal systems use different ways to appoint judges that range from selection based 
on political consideration, a bureaucratic procedure within the judiciary itself, or rely on the bar of 
practicing lawyers or an administrative organization that performs the selection task. However, all 
these procedures of judicial selection are more akin to administrative and political control than to 
principal agent control in which higher judges appoint the lower ones as it is in the private law 
principal agent contract. 
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3.3  Objections to the Principal Agent Model  
In strong hierarchies, higher judges play a role in the promotion and evaluation of judges that work 
under them. That makes them play a role closer to the traditional principle. Still, they can be 
restricted in that role by administrative-style bodies that also play an important role in the 
promotion and evaluation of judges. In strong hierarchies, it is the superior judge in the same court 
that plays an important role and it is a less common task for judges from a superior court. Through 
the power of evaluation, these judges can affect significantly the conditions of employment of their 
inferiors. They can send them for more training or to a court with less significance at a different 
location. 
Kim is correct that in weak hierarchies, lower court judges who aspire to promotion are evaluated 
based on proxy signs such as the number of times they have been reversed.302 That observation is 
incorrect though and is in stark contrast with the practice in strong judicial hierarchies. There, the 
judicial evaluation is based on an administrative-style personal career file. In it, superiors include 
supposed errors the judges have committed and motivated opinion as to the qualities of the judge 
under examination. Then the file is evaluated by an administrative style commission. In this style of 
evaluation, there is a principle who is not necessarily a member of the superior court but who has a 
superior administrative style rank within the same court. 
So in weak hierarchies, the most common sanction available to higher courts is its ability to reverse 
decisions with which it disagrees. A difference between strong and weak hierarchy exists because a 
strong hierarchy additionally disposes of the instrument of disciplinary appellate review. Some 
principal-agent models can be correct in regarding some reversals as a disciplinary tool but that is the 
case only in some judicial systems. In other systems with relatively weak judicial hierarchy, however, 
reversal alone is insufficient to ensure compliance with the highest court’s desires. 
Fear of reversal can operate as an effective sanction only if it imposes other costs—such as damaging 
a judge’s reputation or decreasing her chances for promotion. In strong hierarchical court systems, 
however, the sanctions are much more direct and severe and can have a serious negative effect on a 
judicial career. 
Principle-agent theory, on the one hand, describes more strong hierarchies because the principal 
exercises control over the agent that is closer to the private law original principle. On the other hand 
though the direct control that strong judicial hierarchy’s exercise by hearing a lot more cases show 
that they ignore the possibility of creating a principal agent relationship because they do not rely on 
the agent as much as weak hierarchies. That shows that using this theory is only partially helpful 
because it does not capture the distinction between judicial systems as well as the dichotomy of 
strong and weak judicial hierarchy. 
What does this theory show us in the comparison between strong and weak hierarchy lever position 
of the judicial machine? Applying principal-agent theory to the judicial hierarchy raises a question: In 
what ways do the actions of lower court judges impact the interests of the higher judges? Should the 
higher judges always be followed? 
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The answer to that question depends upon how one understands the interests of the higher court. 
Certainly, there is no impact on the judges’ individual material interests. If strong judicial hierarchies 
exist for their own sakes rather than to impose a particular opinion or vision of how courts should 
operate, that likely means they are inevitable.  
The worst feature of this system is that it can eliminate other opinions, as Ian Shapiro has argued. In 
private companies, that can be good because they follow the economic strategy of one person. 
However, in a public institution such as the judiciary context, that can be a disaster when no fresh 
opinions are injected into the system. As a result, the principal-agent theory does not perfectly 
translate to the public domain. 
The biggest problem of principle-agency theory is that it assumes the higher judges have to control 
their ‘agents’ the lower court judges. So the question is: do control and accountability always 
produce desirable social results? 
3.4 Lessons of Principal agent Theory for Choosing a Strong or Weak Judicial Hierarchy  
The inference that can be made is that strong hierarchies are more costly to operate and they are 
worth implementing if judges are the guardians of the power of the regime or new values or some 
other view that is worth protecting in society. If there is no such view that comes from the top and 
strong hierarchies exist for their own sake, there is nothing to protect.  
The most important question that arises from principal-agent theory is what is the benefit of 
extensive control? Does an extensive control (strong hierarchy) over lower court judges, which can 
be seen as a high degree of accountability, produce positive results? 
To help answer that question, this work applies the model of the Nobel Prize winning economist Jean 
Tirole, which deals with aligning the interests of accountable and unaccountable officials with social 
interest. Strong hierarchies create more accountable officials. Weak hierarchies create more 
unaccountable officials. 
3.5 Tirole’s Model of the Unconstrained Official  
In the judicial machine, judges are the human capital that keeps it running. In Tirole’s article, there is 
one interesting conclusion that is very useful for this chapter. He has argued that accountability 
(strict control) does not always produce desirable results because such control does not always 
produce an alignment with social interest. That is important for this chapter because accountability 
of judges is one of the main reasons for the existence of judicial hierarchies. In addition, the level of 
accountability is one of the most important elements that show how strong the hierarchy is. Thus, in 
order to decide which position of the lever of the judicial machine (strong or weak hierarchy) 
produces what kind of results, there must be a careful examination of accountability of judges to 
their superiors.  
In his article, Tirole describes two types of officials—those who bear a high burden of accountability 
and those who remain uncontrolled. When there is a weak hierarchy in the judicial system, the 
model comes closer to Tirole’s theory of non-accountable officials, as most of the judicial acts remain 
uncontrolled by the hierarchical superiors. With strong hierarchy, the model comes close to the 
accountable official model, where top officials use a hands-on approach to control their hierarchical 
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inferiors. The different between judges here and the official in Tirole’s article is that the official is 
responsible to an electorate but here the judge can be controlled by her superiors. 
The effect of that accountability to a hierarchical superior can be positive. Periodic evaluation creates 
two major potential benefits. First, it may induce a judge who is otherwise inclined to act in the 
public interest. Since the superior cannot always be able to evaluate the official's actions directly but 
she still acts in the right way because she is concerned that there may be control, Jean Tirole calls 
that "moral-hazard-correcting" benefit of accountability.303 Second, the superior evaluation may 
allow correcting judicial behavior. It can also set “the right kind of judges” on the path to promotion. 
Tirole calls this the "adverse-selection-correcting" effect.304 
On the negative side, Tirole has argued that accountability also carries serious possible drawbacks. In 
order to have a successful career, a judge may choose an action, not because it is right for the 
litigants and for society, but because it is popular with her supervisors.305 Thus, accountability may 
provide an incentive for wasteful information acquisition (the judge will expend efforts to learn what 
her superiors think) and a disincentive for acquiring information about the optimal decision for the 
litigants and society.  
In order for evaluations by hierarchical superiors to work, they need to affect the motivations of 
judges. The main motivations of an official according to Tirole are: to leave a legacy and a taste to be 
in office. He formulates them thus: “First, we suppose that an official wishes to leave a legacy, i.e., he 
wants to be remembered for great things. Indeed, in our setup, it is not enough for the official that 
great things be done; he wants to be the one who does them (although we allow for the possibility 
that her conception of what is ‘great’ may differ from that of the average citizen, that is, he may be 
noncongruent with society). Second, he values being in office for its own sake, perhaps because he 
enjoys the perquisites that come with the job, perhaps because he simply has a taste for wielding 
influence”306 
Jean Tirole has identified the main problem that has to be resolved by any political organization. That 
is to align the official’s interests to the public interest. That is true in our particular case that concerns 
aligning judicial interests with the public ones through the judicial organization. 
From the above, it can be deduced that what a judicial organization has to achieve is to make judges 
desire more to leave a legacy than to wield power for its own sake. When they do the former they 
will be more likely to act to the best of their ability to serve the public and thus would maximize 
public interests as best as they can.307 When they do the latter the effect is that there may not be an 
alignment with the public interest.  
                                                          
303









There may be numerous other motivations. For a fuller picture, see Posner, Richard A. "What Do Judges and 
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)." Supreme Court Economic Review 3 (1993): 1-41. 
He has argued for example that judges lack incentives to work hard because the judiciary is organized similarly 
to a nonprofit organization. So some judges may have chosen that career in order to work less than they would 
have otherwise worked in private practice. Another motivation can be that they prefer longevity of judicial 
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The problem is that in strong judicial hierarchies, the desire to leave a legacy can be almost 
completely eradicated. One of the characteristics of strong hierarchies is that they often have a rule 
that the court has to speak with one voice in order to strengthen the authority of the judicial 
decision. The result is a collective judicial decision that has no individual author. Consequently, if 
there is no individual responsibility, there is no individual reward of pronouncing a good decision and 
there cannot be a desire to leave a legacy. What judges in strict hierarchies have to do then is to 
receive a positive evaluation from superiors or for some lower court judges that are in closer contact 
with the parties to receive the satisfaction that they are doing justice between the parties. In any 
case, strong hierarchies radically change the motivations of judges.   
There are possible variations of what happens when judges act to maximize their taste for being in 
office or in strong hierarchies, which all come down to the same thing—to receive approval and a 
positive evaluation from a superior. Their motivations can be career driven and judges care more 
about things such as getting promoted.308  
Two other types of motivations that are possible are: first, in the absence of a rule that provides for 
judicial tenure for life the motivation of judges will be to stay in office. Second, if there is no 
permanent placement of judges, they will be motivated to be assigned to courts in better regions or 
cities. These are completely natural desires because hierarchies serve to fulfill natural human desires 
to be positively evaluated and acquire status in society. 
The fulfillment of all these judicial career preferences depends on other officials. If these officials are 
within the judiciary itself, meaning that if judges are appointed, promoted, and disciplined by other 
judges, the result is a strong judicial hierarchy. There is also the possibility that judges are appointed 
and their careers depend also or exclusively on other officials outside the judiciary. Consequently, 
there is either weak judicial hierarchy or a hierarchy that is not a judicial one. Only the former 
situation is of interest for this work.309 
What Tirole has found is that when the motive to hold office is strong, officials (in our case judges) 
yield to whoever holds the power of the continuous and successful holding of the office. That means 
if there is a strong hierarchy that is able to control judicial careers then judges are likely to follow the 
preferences of the judges higher up in the hierarchy. The result is that judges in lower dependent 
positions will try to please their superiors. Consequently, when promotion in strong hierarchies is 
dependent on the evaluations of superiors in the file of their inferior the result is judges that get 
promoted are those who are more likable, servile, and humble. That means that not necessarily the 
best judges get promoted but those who manage to best navigate the complex politics in the court.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
career as compared to private alternatives. Posner has pointed out another motivation as well. Some judges 
may be content to make small contributions such as a voter in election. She knows that she will not make a 
difference in the final outcome but she is willing to give her small contribution to the result she prefers. 
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change. Thus there is no guarantee that such motivations will continue later on in their life. That is one danger 
of selecting judges early on in life and not a later stage of their careers when they have more or less set 
personalities. 
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131 
 
3.5.1 Aligning the superior judge’s motivations with social interest 
The goal is to harness the motives of judges and align them with the public interest. However, the 
problem is that a strong hierarchical structure tries to replace the motivations of the inferior-level 
judge with that of her superior. How can both of their motivations be harnessed to work in the public 
interest? Or at least the motivations of the higher court judge?   
The four possible combinations are:  
• Lower court judge decision = public interest and higher court judge = PI  
• LCJ < PI and HCJ< PI 
• LCJ=PI HCJ<PI 
• LCJ<PI HCJ=PI 
Naturally, another question arises: what are the motivations of supervising judges? Are they aligned 
with the public interests?  In a way then, in strong hierarchies, the motivations of the judges at the 
top of the hierarchy are the most important. There are three main options. First, higher judges may 
value the most servile inferiors who make them feel well personally. Second, they may value inferior 
judges who see the world the way they do and share their opinion on important legal, political, or 
moral issues. Third, they may not pay attention to personal preferences and follow the quality of the 
work done by their juniors. 
It may be tempting to think that the third option is optimal. The problem is that it comes at the 
highest personal cost for the superior judge. The reason is she has to actually keep a close eye on the 
work of all the inferior judges. For example, she needs to read the majority of the judicial decisions 
produced by her inferiors in order to know who produces the best ones. The other two options for 
supervision are almost costless. In personal conversations and contact, the junior judges can express 
their views and try to please the superior.     
Being aligned with social interest is then dependent on whether a superior judge on whom the 
careers of inferiors depend has to read the decisions of lower court judges. There are two 
institutional arrangements. In a strong hierarchy, the judge who is the immediate superior is a 
member of the same court and he rarely reads the decisions of her inferiors. The second one is when 
the superior judge is a member of a court that regularly reviews the decisions of inferiors. Only in the 
latter sense is there alignment with the third option and the superior judge is in a position to 
evaluate the inferior judges’ ability. 
Another way to align these interests is if superior judges see their task as more socially-oriented than 
the lower court judges who concentrate their opinion only on the case at hand. So the argument 
holds that the difference between the two types of judges is the focus on individual decision making 
vs. social interest judgments.   
3.5.2 Formal model 
Formally, the functioning of the judicial hierarchy can be represented in the following way: 
H = C x G x T / (1 - T) 
T is hierarchical control 
132 
 
How well a hierarchical judicial system (H) performs depends first on the personal cost (C) of a judge 
to make a decision that is aligned with social interests. Second is the personal gain this judge receives 
from making a decision in that direction. The third factor is the strength of hierarchical control. That 
means if the value of T is close to 1, then there is a strong judicial hierarchy that influences the 
outcome of what the system produces. If the value of T is close to 0, then there is a weak hierarchy 
that has no influence on how the judicial machine functions.  
In a strong hierarchy, sometimes judicial decisions may depend on hierarchical approval. The direct 
superior’s evaluation and possibly the evaluation of an administrative-style commission that has final 
say on the file of a judge can have an influence on judicial behavior and decision making.  
That process replaces a different motivation of the one in weak hierarchies where there may be a 
desire to leave a legacy. Here the desire to leave a legacy may be overruled by more immediate 
concerns for maintaining status in the hierarchy. If, in addition, judicial decisions are collegial and 
speak with one voice and there is no author, then the desire to leave a legacy is completely 
eradicated.  
Where 
H – Function of Judicial Hierarchy 
C – Personal Cost to take correct decision 
G – Personal Gain 
T – Strength / Degree of Control 
M – Motivation of the Judge 
ES – Evaluation of the judge from the superior 
EC – Evaluation from the Commission 
R – Reversal of the Decision 
Where T depends on:  
D – Evaluation of administrative commission, value – from 0 to 1. 0 – reject, 1 totally approved 
B – superior’s evaluation, value 0 to 1, where 0 disapproval, 1 approval 
R – Reversal of the Decision 
Values 
M = ES x EC x R 
T = K x M 
Where 
 0  Reversal 
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R =  1  Approval 
 From 0 to 1 Partial Reversal 
ES = From 0 to 1 
EC =  From 0 to 1 
0 – Negative Evaluation 
1 – Positive Evaluation 
K – Coefficient of Influence 
In the end the result is this: 
H = C x G x [ (K x ES x EC x R) / (1 – K x ES x EC x R)] 
The motivations of the superior depend on whether she reads the opinions of lower court judges and 
thus knows their abilities, is in the same court, has personal interactions, and shares their views. 
3.6 Extending the Model: Informational Issues  
The functioning depends on three main factors: 1) enough information to determine what the social 
interests are; 2) the ability of judges (lower court or superior court) to correctly recognize social 
interests; and 3) the judge’s ability to relay it up the top of the hierarchy. What that means is the 
success of strict hierarchy depends on the availability of enough correct information and the ability 
of judges to interpret it. The important information is twofold. First what the social problem is and 
second what the optimal resolution that is aligned with the social interest is. 
3.6.1 Information flow and judicial decision making  
The information flow is mainly discussed in the previous chapter but to summarize for judges to take 
correct decisions, each judge, no matter her position in the hierarchy, has to have a firm grasp on the 
facts. The reason is there is a need for clear identification of the problem that exists in society. If, for 
example, the higher court judge receives distorted information of the nature of the social problem at 
stake in the case, his decision making will be inferior to the lower court judge. The reason is she has 
to decide on the wrong premises (the distorted social problem). Thus, distortion of information is 
one of the major causes for a hierarchy’s suboptimal performance. 
3.6.2 Practical implications 
In sum, the practical implications are two. The first, implication is that the judicial system has to be 
designed in order to optimize the flow of information in order for judges in the hierarchy to receive 
correct information at all levels. Second, superior judges have to receive extra training in order to be 
able to decide cases with socially optimal results. That is not such an easy and intuitive task as most 
lawyers believe it to be.   
3.6.3 The cost of acquiring information under strict and weak hierarchy  
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As Tirole points out, whether an official will gather the required information depends on how much 
she will gain from it and the personal cost that she will incur in getting the information. 
In a strict hierarchy, if the first thing the judge looks for is to follow the wishes of superior judges, 
then it is crucial to know whether it is easy to acquire the information what their preferences are. 
The clearer it is the more judges will follow their superior’s wishes.  
Strong hierarchies incur one additional cost. The reason is in such a system, judicial careers depend 
on pleasing the superiors. In order to do that judges have to undertake the costly activity of finding 
out additional information, which is their superiors’ preferences. These preferences may not be 
aligned with the social interest. Still, for the lower level judge, it can be at least as costly to research 
this information as it is to find out what the social interest is. Thus the lower court judge performs 
two tasks—decision making and research of the opinion of superiors. It is optimal for them to render 
only judicial decisions and not to research socially unbeneficial information. 
If such a system has some notion of precedent and is combined with vigorous supervision from the 
top that is followed, then it will be quite clear what the supervisors want. If the notion of precedent 
is weak then the wishes of superior judges have to be clarified in other ways. An example can be 
meetings with the higher judges and conferences. The problem is that the number of these 
gatherings that can be held in a year is limited and that organizing these events is not costless. 
In addition, the number of superior judges can also play a role in how clear their wishes are. If the 
number of judges is high then it becomes harder to predict what their preferences are and which 
judge will actually hear a possible appeal. This dilutes the strength of hierarchy and gives freedom of 
judges below to exercise more discretion in deciding a case. The result is judges may be freed from 
researching additional information as to the preferences of superiors and that may lead to more 
attempts at socially optimal decision making. Thus, if the hierarchy is strict, the extra resources 
expended to control inferior judges are just wasted because the result is the same as a weak one 
would have achieved. 
On the contrary, on the level of clarity of the opinion of higher judges depends how much effort 
judges below them in the hierarchy will expend to know what their superiors think. Since judicial 
resources spent on this effort means less effort on normal judicial tasks. Thus it is undesirable to 
have uncertainty as to what the superiors think in a strict hierarchy. The reason is judges should 
concentrate on their judicial tasks, not on pleasing superiors whose opinion on the legal issues may 
or may not be superior  (optimal for the parties and society). 
The information flow is too complex, leaving the lower court judges to do extra work in order to 
ascertain what their superiors want.  The multitude of possible superiors can render the guessing 
game too complicated, although it all depends on how many judges sit on the appeals court. When 
there are too many superior judges to predict how they would decide a case, the judge is left to 
decide on his own. In other words, the decision is not based on hierarchical motivations. So the result 
is de facto no hierarchical pressure (control) on the lower court judges. Consequently, a higher 
number of superior judges can eliminate the problem of deciding a case against the public interest in 
order to please a superior.  
3.6.4 Information in weak hierarchy 
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In a weak hierarchy, judges have more room for discretion. They do not need to follow superior 
judges because there will not be that much control over their decisions. The only negative result can 
be a reversal of a higher court. So to use Tirole’s dichotomy they have a better chance to desire to 
leave a legacy rather than to please superiors.  
Judges in the weaker hierarchy are more likely to look for decisions that are optimal for society 
(because of the legacy incentive) and less likely to try to please superior judges. 
3.6.5 Negatives of weak hierarchy  
If weak judicial hierarchies were optimal, they would not have tried to strengthen their ranks by 
introducing the concept of precedent. Having this weak hierarchy with no precedent then comes 
very close to Kornhauser’s model of a completely decentralized system, which has already been 
declared suboptimal. Painstaking analysis of even simple cases leads to the comparatively ineffective 
use of judicial resources. So weak judicial hierarchies need to put limits on discretion in order to 
prevent wasteful use of their resources.  
Weak hierarchy misses on the two benefits Tirole has identified: moral hazard correcting (it may 
induce a judge who is otherwise inclined to act in the public interest) and adverse selection 
correcting benefit (promoting the judges who have the ability). An unaccountable judge would not 
incur expenditures to ascertain the opinion of her superiors. That will avoid the type of socially 
wasteful behavior that strict hierarchy tends to encourage. 
3.7 The Effects of Training Judges 
A hierarchical system will function better than a system with weak or no hierarchy at all if it fulfills 
two conditions. First, the system will promote the best judges to superior positions and even more 
importantly these superior judges will receive a special training. Superior judges will then fulfill their 
function better because it will be cheaper to train only superior judges in how to promote social 
interest. In other words, the benefit of hierarchy will be specialization as Kornhauser has correctly 
pointed out. If these two factors are in place strict hierarchy will do better than weak hierarchy. 
Otherwise, the benefit of having a strong hierarchy has to be found elsewhere. The reason is it is not 
known whether superior judges have any advantage over lower court judges in decision making in a 
system in which promotion is not always based on merit and superior judges do not receive more 
specialised training. In that situation, there is a random result—either the hierarchy helps to produce 
a better judicial decision or it produces a worse result. If the hierarchy is strong, then the lower court 
judge will try first and foremost to please her superiors.  
3.8 Incompatible with Our Model Theory—Kornhauser’s Team Model  
This model deserves brief mentioning because it is useful to point out the limitations of the 
hierarchical analysis. Kornhauser’s model is based on a different explanation of hierarchy than the 
agency theory. He has rejected a vision of hierarchy based on the claim that lower court judges and 
upper court judges may have conflicting interests. Instead, he has based his model on the 
assumption that all the judiciary does is to act as a team that seeks to maximize the expected 
number of correct court decisions.  
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All he says is that when judges decide cases, they try to reach the correct outcome, which makes 
them seem like a team deciding cases with one single objective—finding correct answers. He does 
not make any assumptions as what those right answers may be. 
Kornhauser has argued that agency model is more consistent with civil law systems whereas his team 
model describes more common law systems. It is suggested that this is incorrect and the real 
difference is the level of strength of hierarchy. Kornhauser has pointed out that in civil law systems, a 
new assessment of the facts by the appellate court is possible. Such arrangement strengthens the 
power of higher court judges and weakens the power of lower court judges. In common law systems, 
de novo fact-finding by appellate courts is not practiced and thus trial judges have more power 
because they are the only ones dealing with fact finding. That is indeed the case and the result is 
stronger and weaker hierarchies respectively and that arrangement has nothing to do with a team 
model. 
3.8.1 Possible objections to Kornhauser from Drucker  
It is important to examine a very strong claim that says this is an oversimplification. Against this 
claim, Peter Drucker has proposed that teams rarely exist in real organizations. He has criticized the 
view that the team organization is viewed as the “right” organization. He has called it ironically the 
“politically correct” organization. He has called for a study of mixed organizations.310 That means 
individuals have to work in different organisational structures at the same time. For one task, they 
have to work as a team. For another, they have to be part of a hierarchical command and control 
structure. That description is way more accurate as far as modern appeal court organizations are 
concerned. The reason is that higher level judges decide cases in teams; they sit in panels of two311 or 
three judges at the appeal level and nine or more at highest court level. At the same time, they serve 
a command and control function because they are part of a hierarchy that examines the decisions of 
lower courts.  Exaggerating either the team character of the task or the hierarchical task is misleading 
modern courts and can lead to misconceptions of how courts should be structured.   
Moreover, there is more than one kind of team.312 At least half a dozen very different teams exist. 
Each has its own area of application, limitations, and difficulties and as a result, each requires 
different management. So what kind of team is applied in the appellate judiciaries? The answer is the 
teams are very different. In the US, the standard three-member team at the appellate level and nine 
members at the Supreme Court level require communication and negotiation from a majority of 
court members. Behind the scenes are the supporting staff such as law clerks that help shape the 
views of the judges through their research.  In the UK, the traditional model was to not have teams 
but individual judges deciding on their own without discussing the decision with the other judges on 
the panel. The dynamics have changed and now there is more judicial team work and law clerks have 
been hired to aid judges. But there are new teams in the UK now in some cases there are UK courts 
appellate courts with two members in order to save costs on a third judge. But that has changed 
considerably the dynamics of the team.  The French style of a judicial team is also completely 
different. It is the reporting judge who prepares two versions of a decision and the other judges just 
vote on one of the two versions. This structural diversity of the judicial “teams” in the different 
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countries show that if we accept the existence of team model in reality the study will be of mixed 
hierarchies with command and team elements and not simply of a team and agency model. 
It is suggested that Drucker is correct. It would be far-fetched to argue that judges think of 
themselves as a team. Even weaker seems the argument that most of them want to maximize correct 
decisions even with the understanding that judges may have different views on what is a correct 
decision. What Kornhauser has described is simply a weak hierarchy with limited top-down control. 
That is not surprising because his conclusions have come from observations of the US judicial system.  
It simply means that the issue is not teams or agency, but weak v strong hierarchy with mixed team 
and command structures.  
What is useful in Kornhauser and Drucker’s theories is that they show one more element of the 
judicial machine—it is not a pure hierarchy and the dynamics of its operation depend on teams as 
well as the hierarchical organization. That is most obviously the case in judicial panels that include 
collective team elements in the judicial decision making that have an important influence on how the 
organization of the judicial system performs and the way it performs. This is an important point for 




Chapter 6: Purpose of Appeal 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores in more detail the organizational part of the judicial machine. As stated in the 
previous part, the appeals process is the most common legal manifestation of judicial hierarchies. 
The problem is that the way the judicial machine function becomes more complicated over time 
insofar as its organizational part is concerned. When talking about procedure, the judicial levers have 
been simplified to a few main positions. Here, the levers become more intertwined and the machine 
will have a few smaller appeal levers that tweak the performance of main one: judicial hierarchy. 
Consequently, the purposes of appeal will be examined in order to identify the appeal-related mini 
levers of the judicial system.  
2.0 Defining Appeal 
Here the term appeal is used as a generic term describing any proceedings that follow trial. It does 
not simply refer to the stage after trial and before the final court. This term includes all the types of 
appeal. The term is used in this broad sense in order to be inclusive and to describe judicial systems 
in general. Without broadening the term, there arises a severe problem because, as the leading 
expert on the English judiciary Gavin Drewry has argued, it is misleading to “impute a precise 
meaning to the term” and to assume that “an appeal means the same thing in a wide range of 
systems.” Drewry has helpfully distinguished between several species of appeal: Appeal by writ of 
error, appeal by rehearing, appeal by case stated, appeal by prerogative order and cassation.313 Thus, 
the term appeal here is used to describe everything from hearings in front of the final French civil 
court level (cassation) to proceedings in the US Circuit courts and the English Court of Appeal. That 
means all the second and third levels of the judicial hierarchy are included in this term. However, 
that definition is insufficient and further examination is required. 
3.9.1 Legal perspective 
Drewry has helpfully described some common features of all appeals. They all include three basic 
elements: 1) A decision (usually a judgment of a court) from which an appeal is made; 2) aggravated 
person(s); and 3) a reviewing body, authorized and willing to deal with the appeal.314 Drewry has also 
highlighted two important elements of appeal: first, there are differences in the way it is organized in 
different legal systems and, second, the appeals process tends to be from the perspective of the 
losing party at trial.   
3.9.2 Political perspective  
Martin Shapiro, a leading American expert in this field, has added to both of these assumptions. His 
main contribution is that he has included the political regime as another participant. Appeal is in the 
center of state power and its political interests. Thus, Shapiro has changed our perspective because 
appeal is not only a bottom-up process that seeks to protect the losing party at trial from an arbitrary 
trial decision, but “[a] powerful means of fostering loyalty to the central regime.”315 As a result, he 
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has shed light on the reason political regimes are willing to pay for such an expensive procedure.316 
To put it differently, political regimes pay for their image as justice provider (even if that means they 
are only the ultimate favour providers) that enhances their power. The interests of the regime 
coincide with those of the individuals who want protection from arbitrary decision making. The 
purpose of the existence of the appeal process is thus to provide for the mutual interests of regimes 
and aggrieved citizens. 
The other Shapiro contribution is the idea of the top-down perspective of appeal that transgresses 
time and national borders. In other words, he finds a universal model that it is true for a wide range 
of regimes concerned with the preservation of their power.  He has also provided for a 
comprehensive overview of the other commonly discussed purposes of appeal such as viewing the 
appeals courts as “ensuring uniformity among subordinate courts,”317 correcting errors, and the 
“recognition that appellate courts announce or make law.”318  
3.10 Economic Models 
The economic model of appeal propagated by Kornhouser is concerned with limited judicial 
resources. The quality of judges together with the number of cases they have to decide results in 
inadequate judicial decision making in the lower courts.319 Ultimately, that inadequacy justifies the 
need for an appeal. As Kornhauser put it, “If we had enough reliable judges there would be no reason 
for hierarchy. In reality, we can have insufficient numbers of reliable judges to handle the 
caseload.”320  That statement simply means that there can be only a few great judicial minds per 
generation. It is unreasonable to expect the highest quality of judges to be a common occurrence. As 
discussed previously, according to Kornhauser, deciding whether a judge is reliable can have either a 
team model or an agency explanation. In a team, judges have a common goal that could be anything 
from deciding cases according to precedent to dispensing corrective justice.321 The agency model 
sees judges as having different preferences and interests on how to decide a case. Judicial systems 
based on this model are initially designed to control the differences between judicial 
predispositions322 and not so much to achieve a “correct” result.323 According to Kornhouser, the 
team model is reminiscent of common law judicial systems and the agency model of civil law judicial 
structures.324 
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 This agency explanation fits perfectly into Shapiro’s model of appeal as a means of a political control. As we 
will see, the French judicial system is created with the specific idea to control ‘anciene regime’ judges and 
restrict them from imposing their political views.  
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Without having enough reliable judges at the trial level, why not invest the existing resources only in 
improving the trial judiciary? The answer is found in the model constructed by Shavell,325 who sought 
to find the optimal distribution of resources between trial and appellate courts. He has included in 
the calculation both the social and the litigant’s resources. Shavell has investigated the conditions 
under which the appeal procedure is optimal as opposed to devoting more resources to trial courts326 
or random review of lower court decisions. Most importantly, he has argued that the appeals process 
allows society to use information that litigants have about erroneous decisions and thereby to 
reduce judicial mistakes at low cost. In Shavell's model, the appellate courts have a limited role—only 
to correct the errors of lower courts. Thus one can draw a parallel with Kornhouser, who has also 
argued that besides limited judicial resources the other important factor that justifies appeal is the 
possibility of error.  
Korhouser and Shavell’s theories fit very well in Drucker’s model, as seen in the previous chapter. 
The reason is the Drucker model has been similarly concerned with the allocation of resources.  To 
do its work the judiciary uses resources that can be called generally ‘capital,’ which can be one of two 
types—human and institutional.327  Korhauser has been concerned with the human type of capital. 
Thus, when he talks about the availability of high-quality judges to handle a large caseload he simply 
states that human capital is a limited resource.  Shavell has focused more on the second type of 
capital. Thus, when he talks about the optimal organization of trial and appeal courts so that they will 
be fewer errors in the system he basically talks about optimization of the institutional divisions in 
which judges work. The inference can be made then that Kornhauser and Shavell have in common 
the desire to optimize the capital of the judicial system.  
4.0 Defining the Main Purposes of Appeal 
4.1 Error Correction 
Both Drewry’s legal model and Shavell’s economic model put error correction as the most important 
purpose of appeal.  The first sees it as grievances of aggravated parties who are unhappy with the 
result of the process. The other sees it from a functional perspective; it allows society to use 
information that litigants possess about erroneous decisions. Since the litigants are the ones who 
possess the most information regarding whether they have been wronged, the result is a reduction 
of judicial mistakes at low cost. 
In any case, it comes does down as a question of whether the trial judge had made an error in her 
ruling. As seen in the previous chapter, in strong hierarchies, error correction can turn into 
disciplinary action in an appeal. 
4.2 Disciplinary Purpose 
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The disciplinary function (censorship of erroneous decisions of the lower courts) can be seen as error 
correction but with a stronger connotation, which exposes the strong administrative style of the 
organization of the judiciary. Usually, it has to do with complete submission to the will of the 
legislator and eradicates any discretion of the judge. In its more relaxed version, it can also be a 
control for the reasoning behind the decision. In other words, control of the motivation of the judge. 
4.2.1 Unification 
Both error correction and unification are types of hierarchical control that atempt to move the law in 
a certain “right” direction. The problem is in a system that tries to achieve complete “justice” the 
correct direction is not self-evident. Many possible interpretations of what is “right” are possible. 
That leads to divergent decisions even in a very strict hierarchical system such as the French. That is 
the reason divergent Cour de Cassation decisions are possible and different chambers render 
opposite decisions. So hierarchical control achieves its goal only if there is agreement on the 
“correct” direction the law should follow.  
When considering doctrinal unification (harmonization), the question should be asked: are there 
externalities? Historically, the problem was substantial with rampant parliaments that resulted in as 
many interpretations of the law as there were regions in France. That must have caused huge 
insecurity of what the law of the land was. In turn, that would have affected things like security of 
exchange, property and so on. An example of a more current externality in France may be the 
weaker form of precedent (jurisprudence constant) that requires the top court to exercise far more 
control over the decisions of the lower courts because its decisions are not always followed. So there 
may be a reason for a strong harmonization role, but further studies on the existence of externalities 
are needed to decide whether that role is excessive and whether richness of divergent opinions on 
what the law should be is not simply suppressed, having a negative impact on the legal development 
in France.  
4.2.2 Lawmaking 
Lawmaking is obviously a substantial function of the appeals process, not only in common-law 
countries but also in the amplification of the civil code in civil-law countries.328 
Korhouser and Shavell together in their economic definition actually give us the definition of the goal 
of the hierarchical managerial system because the two models perfectly fit in Drucker’s model, which 
is a purely managerial model. Peter Drucker has been called the father of modern management and 
his theory is designed to explain and apply to business organizations.  
There can be a difference in the strength of such managerial model. If a given society and its judicial 
system tries to achieve a goal or vision of the “good society,” then there is a very strong hierarchal 
system that imposes itself on society through the judicial system.  If instead there is a weaker judicial 
hierarchy that does not impose such a strong vision, it still has some common goal similar to what 
Korhauser described in his team model. What is the alternative then? 
4.3 Hayek’s Made Order 
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According to Hayek, a “made order” such as a firm or government bureaucracy has a purpose vis-à-
vis the society. The problem though is that such a conscious purpose can change with time or it can 
be very difficult to achieve. He compares this situation with a naturally occurring spontaneous order 
that achieves goals which are not necessarily intentionally articulated.329 He has put it in the 
following way: “Spontaneous order of society provides more… for the general welfare, than most of 
the particular services which the organization of government can provide.”330Thus he argues that 
such natural order achieves better results because it follows naturally occurring needs that 
individuals fulfill because of their own self-interest.  
Hayek’s theory has pointed out that societies have two options. The first they can choose to evolve 
by following spontaneous bottom-up (market-like) forces that are best at finding efficient solutions. 
Second, they can create public institutions to achieve specific goals. If they choose to follow the 
latter approach, the problem is that the institutional goals can change with time or become very hard 
to achieve.  
This approach has correctly identified the important two-fold problem that institutional goals change 
over time and that they continue to exist without the needed adaptations to new conditions in 
society. Moreover, it is difficult to argue against the fact that it is hard to define institutional 
purposes since there can be a myriad of secondary purposes and effects that are not intended by the 
designers of these organizations. 
Despite that, this approach is not entirely convincing. The reason can be found in the writings of 
Hayek himself. He admits the design of the court system is absolutely necessary for the whole 
spontaneous order to function in society; societies have no choice. They have to design at least a 
well-functioning judicial system. However, designing that institution requires expertise in 
institutional design. Without conscious human effort that is impossible.   
Thus it is suggested that in order to justify an interventionist approach in institution building, Hayek’s 
warning ought to be taken seriously and judicial leaders should spend considerable time and effort in 
defining the purposes of institutions and examining all of their effects. In other words, the 
institutional design must be justified in detail, including an analysis of why the proposed institutions 
are better than natural evolution in society. Without that step, important issues of institutional 
design will escape notice, resulting in poorly functioning institutions.  There will always be intended 
and unintended consequences of our institution, meaning there is a great benefit in examining the 
different purposes of appeal.331  
It has to be noted though that the judicial system as a whole and the appeals process, in particular, 
can be a mixed system, which Richard Posner identified as a quasi-market. Thus within the judicial 
system, there is a different balance of both spontaneous and “made” order elements. It is 
spontaneous order to start with because it uses private interests to direct its functioning. These 
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private interests are the claims that are filed. Still, especially the appeals part of the judicial system 
turns into ‘made’ order because it fulfils some public purposes such as unification and law making. 
Unification is a public purpose because there is a conflict between different legal rules that have for 
some reason remained unresolved.  Law-making also moves away from individual dispute resolution. 
In creates new rules that only use the dispute at hand as a stepping stone to produce a new legal 
instrument that society needs. 
The system can also run into market failures when it functions as a spontaneous order that simply 
resolves disputes. At that point, there should be a correction for the errors a spontaneous order 
created. Hayek himself has argued the lawmaking function and its product, case law, can “develop in 
undesirable directions that need correction by deliberate” public action.332 
In legal terms, that tension between spontaneous and made order can be expressed by the 
public/private law dichotomy. Hayek has argued that only public law serves as an instrument that 
organizations have to achieve particular purposes.333 In private law, Hayek finds the existence of 
specific purposes that law has to fulfill to be problematic because the purposes of a law can be 
enumerated and in private law, the legal rules only serve as correspondence between the actions of 
different persons.334 
It is suggested that the demarcation line between market and institutional design approaches is not 
absolute but there should be a balance between them. Moreover, discussing the purpose of appeal is 
not a preference statement for deliberate institutional design approach. The reason is that even the 
Hayekian version of the judiciary as a maintainer of the spontaneous order is not without its 
institutional purposes despite the fact that the judicial goals are not being willfully designed. Hayek 
has argued that in order to secure people’s expectations that follow from the existence of law, 
judges need to protect the spontaneous order from the danger of legal rules that are not observed, 
or are unclear, or are not adequate to prevent conflicts even if observed.335  These are all purposes 
that have a strong purposeful element even though they are based on protection of individual 
freedom. The inference then is that even the fiercest opponent of the purposeful approach uses it in 
the case of the judiciary.   
It may be asked how realistic is such a laissez faire model? It is all is very well explained by the history 
of the American system. Though it took many elements of English common law, in America, the 
system was actually designed to fit the new conditions on the new continent. It did not grow 
organically, as in a Hayekian model. The only system that fits this model to a certain degree is the 
English system. The reason is it has grown in a more evolutionary manner over the centuries. Still, 
that system also underwent several reforms that watered down the pure laissez faire evolutionary 
growth model.336 In any case, in examining such evolutionary arrangements, there needs to be a 
closer look at the English system and not so much at the American. Of course, in a way, the two 
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recent reforms will be ignored because they were very much managerial in character and further 
erased traces of the Hayekian evolutionary model. 
That tells us something else though; even if the evolutionary model can create some efficient ways of 
doing things, it is elusive. It takes many centuries to construct and for that reason, it is quite 
impractical. No one can wait to achieve a goal by using the judicial system a few centuries for results. 
That is why in a way the managerial model dominates and why the system must be better 
understood—in any case, that system must be designed.  
To design a system there should be a goal or purpose that is to be followed. In this chapter these 
purposes can be seen as different mini levers of the hierarchical part of the judicial machine. This 
portion of the chapter will deal with two of these mini levers: error correction and unification. They 
both have considerable influence on the way the judicial machine functions. The first such mini lever 
error correction has  two main positions of the lever which are strong error correction and weak 
error correction. 
4.3.1 What is error? 
So far, it has been stated that hierarchy serves to put a lid on things to impose a particular vision of 
law is on the lower courts. The fact is that law does not have the right answer all the time of what an 
error is.   So how can hierarchy correct errors if there is no exploration of what is law and what is 
error in law? Thus a question that seems easily answerable only on the surface under careful scrutiny 
yields less uncertain answers of what legal error actually is. Some authors such as Shavell have tried 
to briefly elucidate the term. Others such as Burton Atkins have defined error correction as the main 
function of appellate courts that depends on specific rules. A third group of authors, probably the 
most important one, has spent considerable time on related concepts. At any rate, examining legal 
error needs extensive analysis of existing legal theory. 
As Stephen Mathis has argued, legal theory cannot give ready answers. The theories that exist are 
competing theories.337 The discipline of philosophy of law is rather recent. It contains a lot of 
competing theories that do not give ready answers. It is suggested that it is quite illuminating to 
explore what the leading theories say about the nature of law and error in law. Thus, there is the 
great battle of ideas on what and how court hierarchies put the lid on what should be corrected by 
appellate courts.  
4.3.2 Burton Atkins’ legal definition of error correction 
 “An appellate court's basic contribution is error correction.” In the center of his concept of error 
correction are rules and policies that determine the role and the limits of operation of forums below 
the appellate level. To him, error correction affects the immediate parties to the dispute but also 
because of the hierarchical and pyramidal structure of courts, it synthesizes outcomes and policy for 
the system as a whole by harmonizing legal rules.338 This definition is useful because points out to an 
existing legal regime with rules that determine the role of appellate courts mainly as error correctors. 
However, this definition does not have any transcending features that can help determine what an 
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error is beyond the fact that all procedural and organizational rules in a legal system are publicly 
available for reference. This is a positivistic flaw of the definition that cannot help us elucidate 
further what an error is in general. Moreover, the definition of error correction spills over into 
hierarchy, unification, and harmonization.  
4.4 Shavell on Legal Error  
Shavell has also pointed out that error correction is not a well-defined concept. However, he has 
given a useful summary of the types of error that can occur. The simplest kind of error concerns the 
facts of the case at hand. Another type can occur in the determination of the applicable legal rule to 
the facts. Whether the latter type of error is conceptually clear depends on whether the law is well 
defined.  Shavell helpfully remarks that what could clarify what an error is, is the availability of clear 
direction of the law in general. To have such a direction, the law has to have a specific well-defined 
aim. In other words, it has to have a definition of what “social good” is.339 In such a situation, it is 
relatively easy to say that anything that goes against that social good is a legal error. That means that 
if the top of the judicial hierarchy has a clear vision of what its values are it can impose them on the 
lower courts and direct their decision making.   
It is not always possible though to have a clear idea of what “social good” is. Moreover, depending 
on the formulation of social good, this concept is not always unproblematic. Economists, for 
example, can argue that the social good is attained when the legal rules applied bring about the 
social net benefit.340 Another example of such a concept can come from the theory of Jeremy 
Bentham. Thus, if any society decides to follow Jeremy Bentham’s idea of social good is “the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number” any rule that goes against that principle can be seen as going 
against the social good. The social good can also be a political goal, for example, promoting a specific 
ideology. If any legal rule goes against that ideology, it is, therefore, an error. Having a clear idea of 
what social good is not always a good idea because the societies with the clearest definition are 
usually the totalitarian ones that promote their ideology at the expense of individual freedom. That 
means that what constitutes legal error is the clearest in those societies. In a free society, there are 
more definitions of what social good is and thus the question of what legal error is becomes more 
complicated. 
To come back to Shavell’s view of error, he identifies two types of errors: 1) when an error is made 
on the application of well-articulated rules, errors are conceptually clear;341  and 2) when the law is 
not specific enough in a relevant aspect and must be amplified (interpreted).342 The application of 
well-defined rules usually brings about socially desirable consequences because rules have proven 
over time that they work well and should be followed so any deviation usually means that a case is 
decided wrongly.343  
This chapter has simplified the complexity of legal theory on the issues so far. When it is decided 
what an error is, it is impossible to ignore the most important legal theory debate of the twentieth 
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century, the one between Ronald Dworkin and HLA Hart. But this is precisely what happens when 
stating  hierarchy and appeal serve error correction. That is simplifying the law to fit economic 
theory. Here, there should be posed the opposite question: Where does economic theory fit in legal 
theory?  
4.4.1 The relationship between error correction and the question of what is law 
In order to determine if a lower court judge made an error, an arbiter must know the criteria for 
deciding whether an error has occurred. Building the criteria starts from deciding what law is. What 
should the judge take into consideration and what she should not? Can it always be agreed upon 
what law is and thus on what error in deciding the law is?   
4.5 Dworkin’s Theory 
Shavell’s model seems to have drawn upon the theory of Ronald Dworkin. According to Dworkin, 
there are three issues. The first two are rather simple and easily discoverable in any society. He more 
closely examines the third one. For the purpose of finding what constitutes an error, they are all 
relevant, as they serve as an outline of where judges can make an error that higher courts in the 
hierarchy correct. In other words, they are the reasons appeal as error correction exists.   
1) Issues of fact answer the question “what actually happened?” This is supposed to be a 
straight-forward problem that requires judges to go over the facts and uncover them as they 
happened.344  
2) Issues of political morality or fidelity whether a decision or a judge is faithful to the structure 
of things in society (political morality).  
3) Issues of law – what is the law in a given case. There is a view that judges should follow the 
law as it is written rather than try to make it better. That leaves us to a false dichotomy—
judges have only the option to discover the law or invent it. Issues of law are not always just 
about finding the law as it is written or inventing the law. The reason is there are deep 
philosophical disagreements about what the law is. So if theoretical disagreements exist 
regarding what law is, there will most certainly come disagreements on what making an error 
in law is. 
Dworkin’s analysis to the first of fact finding is not as accepted as straight forwards in many legal 
systems. For example, some systems do not find fact finding to be as final as the US system.345 
Appeal courts are also charged with that duty. As Dworkin elucidated, the issue is more important 
than Dworkin has made it appear. Fact finding can be as problematic as any other procedure and can 
lead to judicial errors.   
The second issue of political morality depends on the strength of the definition of social good in a 
given society. In countries with strong ideas about what that idea means, the issue of fidelity to what 
the system holds dear is much stronger. The result in such societies is strong hierarchies that enforce 
that all important political morality.  In such societies, the idea of error is more defined and easier to 
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identify. Strong hierarchies spend more resources on “correcting” wrong decisions that go against 
that fidelity to important values. Conversely, in societies with less defined political morality, these 
types of errors are harder to define and the system uses fewer resources to correct them. Thus the 
judicial hierarchies are weaker. However, all societies have some principles that they find dear and 
they are ready to enforce them when there is a departure from the ideals. Thus it is a matter of 
degree of how important political morality is and how much it will be enforced. The stronger the 
ideal, the easier it is to define the type of judicial error. Another factor is the area of law; some have 
less to do with political morality and are thus less influenced by the eventuality of such judicial 
errors. 
The third issue of theoretical disagreement is probably the most serious obstacle Dworkin found on 
the way to defining legal error—theoretical disagreement about what counts as law and how much it 
should count in relation to other things. The important distinction Dworkin thus makes is a 
distinction between empirical and theoretical disagreement. Empirical disagreement is something 
that can be verified in reality. Empirical disagreements are about facts; they are hardly mysterious.  
He places a substantial amount of faith in procedures that can help us identify the facts.  
Dworkin further maintains that fidelity to political morality is also empirical because they can be 
verified as well whether or not judges follow the law. Then again he does not deal with a situation in 
which there is a disagreement as what the political morality in a given society.  
To go back to theoretical disagreement, there can be situations in which the judge is not clear on 
what the law is, the two parties can disagree as well as to what the law says. There may be a statute 
that can be examined or text that can be read, but that may not clearly resolve the issue. If there is a 
doubt about the application of such authoritative text, if the decision can still go either way, there 
remains a theoretical disagreement.  
The basis for the distinction is that at in empirical disagreement at least one party of the two is 
wrong. If one party says that hills are higher than mountains, the contention could be verified. It 
could be that both parties are wrong. If for example, the second party maintains that trees are higher 
as well. But the main point is that the information is empirically verifiable. There is a clear right 
answer to be found. That view is applicable only to simple facts in a lawsuit. If they get more 
complicated, it is not clear if the facts alleged by the two parties will not be controversial as well. 
In theoretical disagreement though, the parties can provide different readings to that statute. They 
will maintain that the text says different things. So it is not clear that there is one right answer. 
Dworkin’s approach is argumentative. Both sides can make arguments and propose interpretations. 
The sides provide reasons that support their arguments. They also offer evidence to support their 
argument but this evidence does not automatically win the case because it is not empirically 
verifiable.   
What that means for errors is that if law is argumentative, when there are theoretical disagreements, 
it will not be clear if the judge has made an error. All that will be apparent is that she has positioned 
herself on one of the sides of the theoretical disagreement. If what cannot be empirically verified or 




Dworkin’s view is not subjective and wide open though. Not every argument is acceptable. The 
restriction he places is of random arguments that have nothing to do with society. Dworkin’s theory 
can be contrasted to a realist point of view as completely subjective; there is no way to tell whether 
any analysis made is a good or a bad one. 
So what Dworkin has argued is that legal practice as a whole is then argumentative. Law gets 
contentious when there is a theoretical disagreement. In accepting his argument, then it is plain 
there is a problem with error correction. Of course, leaders can build a complicated hierarchical 
appeal system that is supposed to deal with errors. However, the problem is that only when 
empirically verifiable facts are at issue can any person or entity say without a doubt that the judge 
made an error. In cases of theoretical disagreement and some other fact and political morality 
situations which are not verifiable, the system in place evaluates arguments and does not provide 
“right” answers.  
The problem of error is thus fundamental. It puts into question whether erecting complex judicial 
hierarchies really corrects errors at all. That is, unless there is a way to look at the issue of error from 
another perspective that will at least reduce this theoretical uncertainty. So far it seems like putting 
the mini lever of error correction in a position that signifies intensive error correction of appeal 
courts seems not to be very useful unless there is empirically verifiable evidence and clear political 
morality to enforce.  
4.6 HLA Hart and Hard Cases 
Hart would see the problem of legal error from the perspective of hard cases. In these cases, there is 
disagreement about what law is and consequently what a legal error is. However, in most cases, the 
criteria are general and people agree on them. Disagreements about the law and error only occur at 
the margins, at the penumbra.  
In that situation, there is often an appeal to social aims, purposes, and policies in order to decide 
what the law and legal error are. That means the examination is of how different social aims play 
against each other. In other words, it is a question of prioritizing one social aim over the other and 
deciding which one takes precedence over the other. The positivist limitation is that discussions must 
be framed in terms of what the law is and not talk about what the law ought to be. Thus errors occur 
only when there is a problem of the application of the substantive law. 
So what that means for error correction? When the two theories come together, the result is the 
following. In order to decide what an error in law is, it is necessary to have an idea what the law 
prescribes in a given situation.  If in the case at hand there is a theoretical disagreement about the 
law, then defining an error becomes quite complicated. For the positivist, that happens only at the 
margins when the law runs out. For Dworkin, the problem is a matter of interpretation and it 
happens more often. Consequently, the disagreement between Hart and Dworkin is regarding the 
frequency with which marginal cases occur. 
The frequency of theoretical disagreement is extremely important because whether appeals deal 
with easy-to-verify empirical questions or with fundamental disagreements changes the realistic 
expectations to have from appellate courts. It is interesting to put that in a perspective of what the 
president of the Cour d’appel of Toulouse said in an interview. The first thing he said during the 
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interview is that French law students, who start working at the court, do not understand that every 
case can go either way. Thus he has argued that the frequency of theoretical disagreement is much 
higher than even Dworkin thinks. That probably reflects specific features of the French legal system. 
However, isn’t that the system where judges are supposed to simply apply existing law? 
If Dworkin’s theory of interpretation is applicable to every case as the President of Toulouse Court of 
appeal argued then it is quite meaningless to talk about error correction. The lever of the judicial 
machine should be set a minimum position and appeals for error should be restricted. On the 
contrary, if Hart is correct, then that presents a marginal theoretical disagreement and thus the issue 
of what constitutes an error occurs only at the penumbra of legal disputes. Then it makes more sense 
to talk about error correction and invest resources in appellate justice in order to correct judicial 
errors. Thus the lever of the judicial machine should be set close to the maximum because real errors 
will be corrected and cases at penumbra will be clarified. It is not surprising then to say that legal 
systems that were built around positivist views than others that tend to see law as argumentative 
have more extensive appellate systems and expend more resources on error correction. 
4.7 The Semantic Sting and Errors 
Ronald Dworkin has elaborated another concept that can help us clarify what an error is: the 
semantic sting. In the attack he has mounted against positivism, he has maintained that they have a 
semantic theory that states that in order for a phenomenon to be considered law it has to meet 
certain criteria. Austin and Hart offer definition of what the law is. The problem is that if laws are 
defined differently, there will be different popular ideas of what law is, thus preventing a deep, 
widespread theoretical disagreement. The same logic applies to errors. If disagreements persist 
about the definition of error, parties will merely talk past one another because they fundamentally 
disagree about the nature of error. 
Most analysis of error and appeal as error correction ends with the statement that the dissatisfied 
party to a legal process appeals because she claims an error has been committed by lower-level 
judicial forums.  The danger of this superficial analysis of error is that it can create semantic and not 
theoretical disagreement. This level of superficiality will mean that the errors simply pass unrectified 
while parties remain enthralled by fundamentally different definitions. 
Dworkin’s view internalizes morality into law, which is why when he talks about pivotal cases, he 
mentions the case in which the social values have changed. For example, in the US the social 
opposition to slavery had grown to a degree that the old pro-segregation laws had become morally 
unacceptable in the 1960s. So laws had to be changed. A pivotal case like Brown v Board of Education 
came along to respond to changes in moral perceptions in society. 
Dworkin’s view is somewhat limited though. On the one hand, his point of view is of the internal 
argumentative practice of the law. People from the inside law argue how the law is best understood. 
That is different from what law ought to be. This is not normative jurisprudence. On the other hand, 
he has opened the gate of law to an outside element changing moral perceptions in society. 
However, pivotal cases are not only about changing morals in society. In our dynamic world, more 
things change in society. 
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So what is the primary difference between Hart and Dworkin? Dworkin has argued there is an 
internal morality of the law but that’s all. If you want to examine the law from a moral perspective, 
you have to step outside of it. So he tries to incorporate into law another social phenomenon. That’s 
where economics comes in from an external point of view.   
In contrast, Hart has seen morality and other social phenomena such aseconomics asexternal to law. 
In other words, he has maintained that the problem of theoretical disagreement is external to law. 
The disagreement comes from external perspective. That perspective includes social aims, purposes, 
and policies that have to be evaluated in order to decide which one has precedence over the other. 
They have to do with disciplines such as sociology history or economics.  
In any case, the high level of complexity of modern societies does not allow us to approach social 
issues in a purely legalistic manner. However, holding a purely internal perspective does not promote 
the overall good of society. Rather, leaders must evaluate and use the myriad of other social 
phenomena that have intersecting points with law.   
4.8 Error in Law and Right Answers  
The analysis of the correct meaning of right answers is important because if there are right answers 
then everything that does not comply with them may be an error. The correlation between right 
answers and errors is not perfect. It depends on the theory being followed. As seen in the previous 
chapter, an error can simply involve not following the desires of the top the judicial hierarchy that 
imposes its own as the “correct” one that everybody at the lower levels of the pyramid has to follow.  
That is not actually a “correct” answer per se.  Whitman shrewdly calls that definitive answer.  That 
means the same answer should always be given by every legal official, leaving no room for variation 
or discretion. 346 That view actually explains what with strong hierarchy does when it imposes one 
view and puts a lid on other alternative judicial solutions to a legal issue. 
A second possibility is that a “right” answer means that the answers are correct according to the 
dictates of some understanding of legal reason.347 One possible variation of this view where such an 
external element guides us to the right answer is Ronald Dworkin’s theory in which political morality 
is the main guiding force.  Even though Dworkin’s theory is argumentative in character, he also 
argued348 that there must always be a right answer to any given question of law, despite the two 
problems of theoretical disagreement and the semantic sting that seem to cause many seemingly 
adamant disagreements between judges and lawyers. According to Dworkin, the right answer exists 
when the best possible interpretation that fits the given legal system and political morality is 
produced. Other interpretations are erroneous. 
As such, error can mean not following definitive answers given by higher ups of the judicial hierarchy 
or making an error by not following the dictates of the specific understanding of legal reason.   
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Whitman has made another a sharp critique of what he calls the simplest version is an idealistic 
version in which most legal philosophers do not believe in. 349 This variation consists of “imagining a 
legal system in which there are unique correct answers to all legal questions, specified with perfect 
clarity in easily understood legal texts, such that persons who are subject to the law can know in 
advance, with perfect certainty, the legal consequences of any action they may take.”350 The aim of 
such a system is to provide definitive answers to every possible legal question and not to provide 
correct answers unless such system is based on a strong well-defined idea of what social good 
means.  He is even more critical of another variation of the legal system, which he calls “the most 
naïve one.” Such a system is formed on the belief that it is possible to deliver right answers to every 
possible legal question that are both correct and definitive.351 
What that means is that Whitman does not really believe in the easy attainment of right answers. 
Where does this pessimistic view come from? What are the difficulties in finding the right answer? 
4.9 Damaska and the Problems of Finding the Right Answer 
Marjan Damaska proposes an enlightening overview in his article “Truth in Adjudication.” The first 
problem is language, which is not an objective means for transmitting information. Simplistic 
theories say that true thought or language reflects what is out there in reality. Damaska has strongly 
criticized such theories.  
The second problem is that it is difficult to arrive at a definition of objectivity that is applicable to all 
situations and all facts subject to proof in court. 
The third problem is that adjudicators work in a social reality that depends first on whether there is a 
common belief in a community and second on whether people's viewpoints on reality converge. That 
means that in a deeply split society, there will be conditions for more conflict. Damaska has argued 
that in the administration of justice there is more convergence than in other intellectual spheres. 
Thus “many facts that are the object of proof, people's points of view coincide, or overlap, across 
ethnic, class, gender and other divisions in society.”  
The fourth problem is that fact-finding methods are fallible especially when human behavior is the 
object of investigation. 
The fifth problem is that there is a difference between constructing reality in a convincing manner 
and what the facts actually are. Coherence theories hold that a statement is true if it flows from a 
body of consistent propositions. But for any adjudicative event, there may be several coherent sets 
of statements. Coherence of facts in adjudicative practice is not a sufficient reason to believe that 
these statements are true. 
According to Damaska, many theories shift the emphasis from truth to the process of justification of 
claims to knowledge. “These theories seem to posit that if there is no clear access to truth, we should 
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at least arrive at fact-finding decisions in proper ways. As a consequence of this shift of emphasis, the 
line has become thin between a belief that is properly justified and a belief that is true.”352 
Damaska has remained optimistic about finding truth in courts and overcoming these difficulties. To 
declare there has been an error in a court decision, there are two options: 1) overcome the above-
cited difficulties in every single case, which seems like a monumental task or 2) accept the view held 
in coherence theories that a statement is true if it flows from a body of consistent propositions. In 
Dworkin’s version, that means the set of most convincing propositions fitting the legal system and 
providing the best interpretation will have to be accepted as the right answer.  
4.9.1 Economic analysis of error correction 
Richard Posner’s definition of "error costs" includes “the social costs generated when a judicial 
system fails to carry out the allocative or other social functions assigned to it.”353 In other words, 
Posner replaces the dictates of legal reason as a criterion for defining error with an economic 
framework that includes the allocative role of courts. Posner has argued that courts serve as quasi-
markets that allocate resources between the parties when the transaction costs are too high and real 
markets cannot do that.  Thus for Posner, the main definition of error by the courts is an incorrect 
allocation of resources between the parties.  Posner also leaves the door open for other social 
functions courts may be assigned. That can make the definition of error quite broad and basically 
include many of the types of error discussed above.    
The social costs errors create are the reason we want to correct them. The view accepted here is that 
happens when future desirable behavior is not channeled by the imposed rules.354 In accepting that 
judges are influenced by previous decisions, it is reasonable to predict that if the judges continue to 
follow a similar line of thinking in the future, they will continue to impose a high cost on society. 
Thus, it is important for the system to correct wrong (inefficient) decisions. 
As Micelli has argued, there may be occasions when inefficient rules get entrenched into the legal 
system and there is a need to change the rules.355 First, that happens when a rule gets entrenched in 
the legal system because the individuals bearing the cost may not have sufficient incentives to try to 
change it. In other words, their interests are dispersed and they are not willing or able to act. Second, 
that happens when a value of the legal system is strict adherence to traditions (or precedent/ 
jurisprudence constant) then litigation of inefficient rule further gets deep roots it in the system.356   
For some economists, a perfect legal system can be one in which it would cost nothing and 
implement substantive law with 100% accuracy.357 However, here we diverge from this positivistic 
view.  Both Hayek358 and Micelli359 have argued that substantive law can go in a wrong direction and 
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become entrenched resulting in high social costs, even if there is a better (optimal) legal rule. Thus 
the economically perfect system is the one that is able to correct such dead ends in law 
development. Such corrections of substantive law are necessary when law does not channel the 
desirable future behavior, for example reducing dangerous behavior that can lead to more 
accidents.360  
Posner also confirms that view. He has argued that substantive tort rules have an influence on costs 
of errors.361 Thus different substantive rules can produce different costs of error. Posner gives the 
tort law example; if the law is based on compensation of the victim (returning the victim of a tort to 
the position she would have been in had the tort not occurred), then tort law should restrict future 
undesirable behaviour.  The problem is that choosing “the right” legal rule that reduces error costs 
can cause a deep theoretical disagreement not of what the law says but of what the law should say. 
Such choice of the best rule can also cause deep divide on what Dworkin calls political morality, 
which deals with the question of what should be considered the law in a given society.  
Klerman provides a helpful description of types of error. Error costs can result from three types of 
mistakes: false negatives, false positives, and the miscalculation of damages. False negatives are the 
failure to impose liability when it is appropriate and, as has already been discussed, they reduce 
deterrence. False positives are the imposition of liability when none is appropriate. 
If false positives were truly random, they would have little negative effect. Instead, they would be 
roughly equivalent to a head tax, which would have little or no effect on primary behavior and thus 
little effect on welfare. However, to the extent that certain activities—such as running a railroad or 
manufacturing consumer goods—make it more likely that the person conducting those activities will 
be sued and that liability will be mistakenly imposed, false positives act as a tax on those activities 
and may cause reductions in beneficial activities. Kaplow and Shavell362  call the reduction in 
beneficial activity from false positives chilling costs. 
Kaplow and Shavell find another type of error—in the calculation of damages. If such mistakes were 
purely random and average liability calculations were correct, then mistakes about damages would 
have little effect on behavior and thus contribute little if at all to error costs. However, to the extent 
that damages are systematically too low or too high, they could cause either under deterrence or 
chilling costs.363 
4.9.2 The judges themselves as a source of error 
Why are judges prone to errors? In a perfect world, judges would decide each case on its individual 
merits. In a resource-constrained world, judges rely on strategies for reducing the problems 
associated with making a new decision.364 These strategies are shortcuts.365 They allow judges to 
reach a decision faster and more accurately by using previously accumulated information on the 
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issue at hand.  To put it differently, the real issue of judicial decision making is lack of information. If 
judges had perfect information (and of course perfect cognitive abilities) they would have been able 
to look at each case individually and decide each case on its own evidence and achieve the best 
result possible.366 Thus, the important for us reason judges make errors is because they lack 
information and use imperfect strategies to attain it.  
Klerman clearly identified the limitation of an economic concept of error. It is easily applicable to 
legal fields such as tort, contract, property, environmental law, and antitrust, where the goals of the 
law can be easily expressed in economic terms. In other areas such as anti-discrimination law or 
privacy, this concept of error is less clear and more controversial. 367 
 4.9.3 Deciding where to put the error correction mini lever 
Where, then, should the mini lever concerning error correction fall within the judicial system? Saying 
that litigants were aggravated and they want to correct judicial errors by appealing their case is an 
ambiguous statement. Judicial errors can be about the facts (what actually happened), about not 
following societal trends (political morality), or about disagreements of what law actually says 
(theoretical disagreement).  The frequency with which theoretical disagreement occurs is also 
fundamental. If it occurs often, that simply means there is not an agreement on what the dictates of 
legal reason are. In such a situation, the problem can be that the semantic sting is in play and parties 
simply talk past each other because they do not even agree on the basic definitions of the legal issue 
at hand. All these problems can be brushed aside if the decision is made not to seek “correct” 
answers from the courts, but definitive answers that substitute correct with the view of the law given 
by the top of the judicial hierarchy. In that situation, though the litigant who was wronged will not be 
able to prove the “truth,” his claim is pointless because the top of the hierarchy substitutes its 
version of the truth with what actually happened.  
Is there any value of having all the decisions unified in definitive answers? That question will be 
answered by examining the other important mini lever of appeal section of the judicial machine—
Unification.   
4.10 Uniformity 
4.10.1 Historical overview 
The origin of unification on the European Continent can be traced back to Corpus Juris Civilis, the 
codification of Roman law ordered by Emperor Justinian and issued between 529 and 534 AD. In the 
18th century at the end of the Enlightenment period, this legal tradition continued with studies of 
the law common to all continental Europe. These studies were based on Roman law, canon law, and 
natural law, and they produced a corpus jutis different from and considered superior to the local 
customs.368 The culmination of this unification of legal process was the codifications of the Code Civil 
in France. 
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Currently, unification has entered a different phase. Unification in centered around a different 
mechanism, which is a judicial hierarchy that imposes a particular vision (goal) of law. 369 When you 
impose one vision from the top, it necessarily unites what is happening in the lower levels of the 
hierarchy. Since the previous chapter included the assumption that appeal is the main manifestation 
of a judicial hierarchal system, it also has to impose a particular vision on putting a lid on how the 
judicial system functions. The vision comes from the top and manifests itself as unification.  
4.10.2 Purposes of unification 
All these historical moments reveal different purposes of unification. The first codification that was 
accomplished by Justinian was done to preserve the great achievements of Roman law, which had 
entered a deterioration period. This “preservation” work was needed because the Eastern Roman 
Empire’s economy was in decline.  The flourishing and complex trade and social relations, the old 
Roman law, and the Roman Empire that spawned it were at an end. The new economically simple 
feudal regime did not need the complex solutions that Roman law provided. 
During the second codification period at the time of the late Enlightenment period in Europe, the 
purpose of unification was facilitating newly expanding complex economies that were held back by 
law that did not develop at the same pace as social reality. The economy in Europe had grown more 
complex again but the law applicable was not always clear. Roman law was used because it was 
better suited for such expanding economy but it was created in different social conditions and was 
not always adapted to the needs of the time. Customs also played a crucial role but were local in 
character and could not serve as a way to facilitate commerce in a large territory. This disparity had 
to be overcome with unification. Major codification projects followed. 
The current period follows some of the inertia of the previous unification period.  The social 
conditions are different though. They are dictated by globalization. This period is characterized by 
twofold development—first, at the international level where the disparity of national laws is contrary 
to the requirements of modern economy and hostile to the development of international 
relations.370 This issue is beyond the scope of this work. Second, of interest to this work is the 
unification that occurred within national borders because it concerns the functioning of the judicial 
machine. Law in this period has been unified not by huge codification projects but mostly by the 
judiciary that makes sure that law is applied the same way within national borders.  
The unification process can have “normative” goals.  That means that the new uniform law is chosen 
because it is a “better” law than an existing law. Unification can also be driven by “non-normative” 
reasoning.  In the latter situation, there is an international element. The adoption of uniform law 
happens only because there is a benefit of sharing a common rule with other States. The substance 
of the new law is secondary.371 
In the different periods of unification, different combinations of normative and non-normative goals 
were dominant. The Romans preferred a slow evolutionary approach that used the best working 
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solutions they discovered in different legal customs and traditions throughout the empire. So they 
used mostly normative logic with some elements especially in early periods of non-normative goals. 
The second period of codification used both normative and non-normative logic. This trend continues 
today. 
4.10.3 Harmonization 
Uniformity can be examined from another angle, which is the relationship between the terms 
uniformity and harmonization. The two terms are sometimes taken to be synonymous.372 Other 
variations of understanding uniformity are also possible.373 Nevertheless, the best interpretation of 
those two terms can be found in one important distinction Martin Shapiro has made. He 
distinguishes between the unity of the judicial system itself (centralization) and doctrinal 
uniformity.374 Thus it is suggested that harmonization covers only the doctrinal unification. That fits 
well in the way Shavell has defined harmonization as the resolution of conflicts in the interpretation 
of the law among lower courts.375 
4.11 Predictability of Law and its Uniformity 
However, there is a problem of predictability of law that is tightly connected to unification. If the law 
is doctrinally unified it is easier to predict what its application will be. The reason is doctrinal 
uniformity means that all courts in the land apply the same rule in the exactly the same way. 
Positivists since H.L.A. Hart, however, have become preoccupied with the search for a "rule of 
recognition" to help identify which of a society's many customs, values, rules, norms, and taboos are 
entitled to be called "law." Such versions of positivism are better suited to providing historical 
explanations of previously rendered judgments than to producing reliable predictions about future 
judgments in hard cases  
Prediction may be possible in "easy" cases that clearly fall within the rule established by an earlier, 
authoritative statute or case. In difficult cases, however, the judge has discretion, and the final 
outcome is indeterminate. Dworkin’s interpretative theory also does not provide clear solutions for 
predictability of the law. His theory states that interpreting the law is like interpreting a work of art. 
So the problem is that is equally difficult to say which interpretation of Monet’s paintings is the best 
one as it is to tell which interpretation of a legal rule is the best one. There are bound to be at least 
several plausible opinions.  
Souichirou Kozuka has found three types of situations in which States have the incentive to adhere to 
a uniform law. The first case is purely non-normative, where the coexistence of different rules is itself 
costly. The second case is where a uniform law, as compared with the existing domestic law, is an 
improvement in its substance, in which case the uniform law is likely to be chosen as a result of State 
competition. There can also be a third case, where the uniform law may be adhered to 
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notwithstanding its flaws because it can exclude the possibility of a still worse law to be chosen. If 
network externality is included in the analysis, the list of such cases might become longer. 
Keith Hylton has made another distinction that can be useful in dealing with uniformity that concerns 
predictability of the law.376 The first type of predictability is static, meaning it determines the scope 
of a rule's application at a given moment. The second type of uncertainty is dynamic. It arises from 
the possibility that the law may change over time or fail to be consistent with expectations. Static 
predictability has three subtypes: statutory interpretation, case law interpretation, rule 
identification, which involves determining the laws that apply to a given case and its set of facts. 
Dynamic predictability is about the likelihood of change in the law in the future.377 That change can 
be caused by social, political, cultural, or economic circumstances. The best example is a regime 
change. When a new regime is ushered in, it is hard to predict what rules will remain and which ones 
will be disposed of. A good current example is the UK’s departure from the EU (Brexit). There may be 
no static uncertainty to the law that will be applied to a case that goes to the courts now. However, 
soon the law can change dramatically for example by erasing all legal rights that come from EU law 
source. Thus there can be tension between static and dynamic predictability. 
An effort to eliminate all sources of static uncertainty in a law would require the legislature to 
indicate the boundary of the statute, which would require a number of precise descriptions of 
instances to which the statute applies. However, it is highly unlikely that the legislator could predict 
all possible situations to which the statute can apply in the future. 
The implication would be that the omitted instances are those in which the statute did not apply, but 
such an approach is likely to reduce the degree to which the statute's application is predictable in the 
dynamic sense. The problem is that it is unlikely that a legislature would foresee all of the instances 
in which the statute should apply. 
Countering Bentham's claim that statutory law was preferable to common law on static predictability 
grounds, Leoni argued that statutory law was inferior on dynamic predictability grounds. Thus it is 
important to note that achieving uniformity is not as easy as it seems because of that tension 
between dynamic and static uniformity.  So trying to commit the judicial machine to a high degree of 
doctrinal uniformity and, consequently, predictability may not be practically desirable.  In other 
words, putting the doctrinal uniformity mini lever of the judicial system to maximum should not be 
done. Thus unification purpose of appeal has to be done within limits.  
5.0 The Contrary Solution of Unification—Jurisdictional Competition  
Is unification such an absolute goal that it has to be followed at any cost? Is it possible to have a 
system that does not value unification much? English Common law evolved differently. There was no 
striving for unification. The courts were centralized by location very early on in London. Until a series 
of reforms that started in 1799, the English system did not try to unify the law but courts were in 
jurisdictional competition. According to Daniel Klerman, that made procedures cheaper, swifter, and 
more effective. The reason for that was judges collected their fees directly from the plaintiffs who in 
turn had a choice of the judicial forum where they would bring their claim.  The law these judges 
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applied must have been not at all unified. Moreover, as Klerman has argued, the law was biased in 
favour of the plaintiffs.  The element that kept such a system from collapsing was competition. So 
this was a system that went for the diametrically opposite solution to unification—jurisdictional 
competition. 
Another good example of jurisdictional competition that has produced remarkable results is the 
development of Roman law. The Roman law has its origin in legis actio procedure.378 That was an 
extremely formal system of actions that required specific gestures and words in order to trigger any 
legal consequences. If these formalistic elements were not done properly, a legal action could not be 
pursued. That process was exclusively applicable to Roman citizens. Later on, a new form of 
procedure, the formulary process, started to develop that was applicable at the beginning only to 
foreigners. It borrowed the best elements of the legal customs and traditions of the peoples 
throughout the Roman Empire and beyond. These two systems existed in parallel. However, since 
the formulary procedure proved to be superior because it was a flexible preator developed law, it 
gradually displaced the old legis actio procedure and became applicable to everyone throughout the 
empire. The better procedure basically won the completion and in the process created the first 
sophisticated system of law that was so successful that could be directly applicable in Europe until 
the 19th century and even today is evident that substantial parts of the French civil code are 
borrowed heavily from Roman law. Extensive unification can stifle such law development. 
5.1. Economic Analysis 
5.1.1 The purpose of unification developed  
Throughout history, the main reason of unification and predictability of law was to strive towards 
improved commercial relations.  But why do unification and predictable law facilitate commerce? 
The economic explanation is that unified and predictable law reduces transaction costs. For example 
unification of the law allows economies of scale in production and trade because of similar safety 
standards.  
There are two ways to define transaction costs. The traditional approach (narrow definition) is that 
transaction costs are costs involved in the market exchange: discovering market prices and the costs 
of writing and enforcing contracts. A more comprehensive view (broad definition) includes within 
transaction costs the other market failures for example information problems and externalities.   
5.1.2 Doctrinal uniformity 
What does it mean for the law to achieve that reduction of transaction costs at the doctrinal level? It 
is suggested that the broader definition is quite illuminating. The reason is that besides the reduction 
of transaction costs, doctrinal uniformity first reduces market failures such as information problems 
and externalities.  
In the information sphere, when the law is applied in similar fashion across a specific territory, its 
predictability increases. That means there is better information about the applicable law. For 
example, it is easier to write a contract if the law that concerns the contractual domain is 
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unambiguous and thus predictable. Second, it deals with another maker failure—externalities. From 
an externalities point of view, the emphasis is on the fact that economic agents need clearly-defined 
property rights so they can adjust their behaviour accordingly, meaning they have the liberty to 
renegotiate the optimal allocation of such rights if necessary. Clarity also reduces unnecessary court 
and legal fees expenditure because the parties to a conflict do not need to go to court in order to 
define property rights. 
Clearly-defined rights allow the person who values a specific entitlement the most to acquire it from 
the person who holds it. So if two courts within the same territory decide the entitlements differently 
there are unclearly defined rights and thus higher transaction costs for economic agents.  
Transaction costs are important because it matters to whom the courts assign property rights. 
Moreover, if through unification the rights are assigned to the lowest cost avoider, which reduces 
even more transaction costs. If the courts cannot agree to whom to assign those rights or assign 
them to the wrong person the transaction costs are higher. 
So if there is no way to bargain around unclearly defined rights and obligations caused by conflicting 
judicial decisions (high transaction costs), negative externalities matter even more. That underlines 
one more time the importance of the unification purpose of appeal—it reduces externalities caused 
by conflicting judicial decisions. As economic theory states, when there are externalities, 
centralisation (unification) is needed. A uniform system of appeal thus serves to reduce externalities 
that conflicting judicial decisions produce.379 
Thus unification as the purpose of an appeal makes sense. Expending limited resources in order to 
achieve it has value for the system. The question is how much the externalities cost society and 
whether the society expends an adequate amount of its scarce resources on the appeals process in 
order to deal with the externalities/high transaction costs that result from conflicting laws.   
It is an empirical question though whether or not unification has better outcomes along the 
dimensions (for example whether strong unification role and reduction of transaction costs is more 
important than the huge costs that proactive role entails).  
5.1.3 The ways doctrinal uniformity relates to the other purposes of appeal 
 Doctrinal uniformity is a purpose of appeal closely related to both law development and to error 
correction and law making. The relationship with error correction is the following: when 
harmonization tries to serve a specific goal, for example, promoting social good such as equality, it is 
reflected in error correction because it is the criterion used to separate correct from wrong decisions. 
This role can be called instrumental. 
The connection with law making/development: In the absence of such strong goal that directs 
judicial decision making doctrinal uniformity, involves a high degree of interpretation. Interpretation 
of the law implies law development because interpreting the law necessarily adds a new element 
that did not exist before.  
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The law can vary among trial courts because of differences in their circumstances; nevertheless, it 
may be desirable for the law to be harmonized because of reduced transaction costs.380 Where 
harmonization serves instrumental ends, it comes about when there is correct judicial decision 
making, which reflects these ends.381  
5.1.4 Final inferences for the Unification mini lever of the judicial machine   
The bottom line is that doctrinal unification has an important role because it is basically a choice that 
the judicial machine has to make. Strong commitment to uniformity means that the functioning of 
the judiciary will be improved by reducing transaction costs. Consequently, social welfare will be 
improved as well.  However, that has to be balanced against the fact that legal development may 
suffer and opposite opinions will be eliminated.  
Error correction can be controversial and may not produce “correct” results, highlighting that a 
degree of uncertainty is bound to be part of the law because of its nature. Thus conformity to one 
solution may not be optimal. If all other alternative solutions some courts may give are eliminated, 
that may be eliminating decisions could form a future dominant opinion. If divergent thinking is 
eliminated, these superior solutions will never emerge. Thus some lack of uniformity may be more 
beneficial than complete harmonization of the law.  A degree of choice between different 
procedures and judicial forums may be a solution to that problem. There may be different social 
circumstances in which some degree of jurisdictional competition can produce better results than 
unification. The next chapter will deal with the relation of the judicial with alternative jurisdictions 
such as private dispute resolution. That relationship can sometimes be competitive as well. There is a 
tension between social interests in the long term because better law will emerge over time (law 
development) and reduce transaction costs of predicting the law at this given moment. That means a 
maximum commitment to appeals cannot be justified by doctrinal unification. Setting the unification 
mini lever at its maximum will reduce transaction costs but may have a more harmful effect because 
it has to be considered together with allowing for some competition between conflicting 
interpretations that improve the development of the law and procedures that increase the efficiency 
of the way courts function.  
Strong hierarchy eliminates opposite opinions and strong unification; that means the judicial 
machine will not produce many new and innovative solutions because the divergent opinions, 
procedures, and ideas will be radically eliminated. 
There is a triple danger that the different purposes of appeal will produce interests that coincide with 
one another. The result will be too many appeals; supposing the purpose of appeal is regime 
protection, it can be concluded that the regime is willing to spend more on appeals than is optimal in 
order to promote its power and appease possible dissent in society. Additionally, aggravated litigants 
also desire appeals because they can correct what they see as trial errors. Not everything that is seen 
by the losing side as error is actually an error. It is also possible that the rich and powerful also desire 
more appeals in order to price the poorer people out of the use of the judicial system. 
From a unification point of view, the state may desire too much unification as well. The reason could 
be a taste for conformity with its idea of good society. Imposing that vision by using strong judicial 
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hierarchy can reduce divergent and original judicial decisions and more efficient procedures.  The 
problem then is that there may be three interests that coincide and may not lead to optimal social 
results. So an extensive appeal system may not be optimal for society.  
Unification and error correction can be quite legitimate goals as well. Correcting errors has its value 
as long as we know what exactly we mean by error. Unification can reduce transaction costs. And 
regime stability, even if it is not the best possible regime is preferable to uncertainty and chaos.  
Thus in setting the multiple mini levers of the appeal part of the judicial machine, we should pay 
attention to all those considerations in order to find the optimal position that corresponds to the 





Chapter 7: The Judicial Machine and its Counterpart—Alternative 
Dispute Resolution 
1.0 Identifying the Main Lever Positions of the Judicial Machine 
This chapter deals with identifying another main lever  of the judicial machine. This lever is about 
turning the judicial machine on and off.  Switching the judicial machine off means redirecting dispute 
resolution to private adjudication; the other position is to let all disputes be resolved exclusively by 
the official state courts.  
. In the past, development of judicial systems there were examples of other state led systems of 
adjudication that were alternatives to each other.382 In modern times, it seems that private systems 
of adjudication are the only alternative to state led official court systems. The main question is, then, 
what is the optimal use of the judicial machine in relation to that alternative?  
The leading French academic, Loic Cadiet, has argued in favour of a pluralistic theory of procedure. 
The main features of that theory are diversity, flexibility, and reactivity. That means that the way 
justice is delivered has to suit the needs of the specific litigation. In his words, justice has to be not 
“pret a porter” but “sur mesure.” Justice may be delivered in a summary procedure and be quick or 
not at all. That plurality includes not only different regimes within the state-run judicial system but 
alternative modes of resolving disputes. The switch from one system to the other has to be easy.  
Adjudication according to Cadiet is a social mechanism designed to maintain the social peace through 
quality justice. 383  Thus the mode of delivering justice can be different but it simply has to be a 
guarantee of quality.  
So the question is how this plurality theory can be applied. Here in this chapter, the focus is on one 
part of this plurality theory. This part is concerned with diversity, flexibility, and reactivity between 
private and public adjudication. The questions answered are the following: 1) what does a switch 
between those two systems involve? 2) Are there any obstructions to the switch from the official 
judicial system and alternative modes of dispute resolution keeping in mind the main goals of such a 
theory: maintaining the social peace and quality of justice?  
The problem of Cadiet’s theory is that it examines only the legal process and not the judicial 
organization and structure. The reason that is a concern, as will be shown later in this chapter, it is 
less problematic to redirect first instance cases to alternative dispute resolution (ADR). However, 
there are serious issues preventing such a switch when appeal cases are concerned. Thus judicial 
organization and structure of superior courts cannot be ignored when discussing this issue.  
The Nobel Prize winning economist Ronald Coase has made one very important argument in that can 
help deliver better quality justice and make Cadiet’s theory more practical. Following Coase’s logic 
can help create shortcuts of dealing with cases, thus providing better judicial services.  In his article 
"The Lighthouse in Economics,"384 he has argued that “we should try to develop generalizations 
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which would give us guidance as to how various activities should be best organized.”385 There can be 
a plurality that gives diversity, flexibility, and reactivity to the justice machine. However, there needs 
to be generalizations made in order not to decide how to deal with each case from scratch because 
that would require extensive expenditure of judicial resources and thus would be extremely 
inefficient. The solution is optimizing the organization of judicial services in addition to individualized 
justice. The main goal then is to create these generalizations that can be applied to Cadiet’s theory.   
In order to create the guidance and general path on which to base Cadiet’s flexibility theory can be 
placed in practice, a few other questions need to be addressed. The main one is when and how to 
switch on and off the judicial machine. Under what circumstances is it best to choose the private and 
when the public system? What are their positive and negative sides and how to use them optimally? 
What is the level of government involvement needed? Surely there should be some. It will be 
extremely expensive to have extensive consideration on a case-by-case basis, which will be 
practically impossible unless the judicial budget without limits. 
6.1 Public Private Dichotomy: The Issue 
The main issue is to draw the line between private and public adjudication in order to use to 
strengths and avoid the weaknesses of each of the two alternatives. In order to do that benefits and 
drawbacks of the private (ADR) and public (official state courts) adjudication must be considered. 
This work is concerned with the official judicial machine that can be turned off to redirect some cases 
to a private alternative to dispute resolution. This analysis will start by examining the private/public 
dichotomy, which is useful but has its limitations; thus private and public levers that are taken as the 
two extreme positions will be defined. However, there are also intermediate positions of this lever. 
These are different degrees of use of private and public elements in delivering justice that can be 
measured by examining the government’s involvement.  
From an economic standpoint, the issue was first explained by Coase in his 1937 seminal article, “The 
Nature of the Firm.”386 There he has argued that some of the exchange cannot be done by markets 
and organizations are needed to deal with problems more efficiently. Thus the choice involved here 
is whether to let the market dictate the exchange between disputants by letting them have their 
dispute adjudicated by a private judge (ADR) or the price is too high to use this market-provided 
mechanism and thus an organization(the official court machine) is required to resolve the dispute. To 
make this choice, there will be an examination of in what situations the market price mechanism is 
preferable and when the mechanism of organizations produces a better result. As Coase said, “the 
relative cost of the transactions under the two mechanisms is what will determine the choices we 
make.” In this case of this work, we have to decide where to put the lever of the judicial machine. 
Coase has maintained that usually there is a cost associated with using the market price system. He 
has found three problems. First, there is a cost involved in finding out what the relevant prices are. 
For example, that could be the time disputants spend in researching the available ADR services, their 
reputation for quality, their availability at the desired time, etc.  Second, a contract has to be drawn 
up to provide the basis for private dispute resolution. Not all legal disputes are the result of a 
contractual relationship. For instance, the dispute could have arisen as a result of tort and the parties 
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could have even known each other. To put it simply, it can be really costly to draw up contracts. 
Third, there may be conditions under which parties do cannot agree on how to proceed with the 
resolution of their dispute. In those cases, too, an official judicial organization may do a better job. 
6.2 Defining Public and Private   
Coase’s contribution is important because he challenged the dogmatic thinking of where the line 
should be placed. In his article, "The Lighthouse in Economics,” Coase made the argument that some 
services that have been considered to be exclusively in the public domain can actually be delivered 
by private providers.387 His example has been based on lighthouses, an example given by authors 
such as John Stuart Mill as public service. Coase has examined the institutional regime of lighthouses 
in Britain for a considerable span of time (1513 to 1898). However, he has been heavily criticized for 
the assertion that this common example of a public good can actually be private.388  
One of Coase’s critics, David E. Van Zandt, has said that “the government played a substantially 
greater role in the provision of lighthouse services than Coase's term ‘private.’ Even when private 
parties provided the capital for lighthouses (thus making them ‘privately owned’), the government 
provided a number of services above and beyond those provided to purveyors of other goods and 
services.” The important point here is that the private and public are often intertwined. It is rare in 
modern societies that a service is purely private or purely public. So it is important to follow and 
explore that division line in order to see in the specific case of the dispute resolution when there are 
more optimal adjudication services. In other words, that will help in the decision-making process 
when the judicial machine should divert cases to private dispute resolution systems.   
This chapter examines the dividing line between private and public in the dispute resolution and 
draws the conclusion that only appeals are purely public. But first, it is worth defining the terms 
private and public. 
What does Coase mean by private? The role of the government was limited to the establishment and 
enforcement of property rights in the lighthouse. In making this claim, Coase uses the standard 
meaning of "private." The private provision means that the role of the government is limited to that 
of establishing and enforcing property entitlements to resources and enforcing freely-agreed-to 
contracts.389 As Van Zandt argued, that is a very common definition includes both private and public 
elements, excluding the purity of one of the two systems and pointing out at interdependence.  
6.2.1 The distinction between private and public  
French legal theorist Jean Dabin has made a similar distinction between private and public placing 
the government at the center of the definition. The criterion he uses is the nature of the 
relationships that define the regulatory role of law. More precisely, the main distinction between 
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public and private is the relationship of the subjects of law that is defined by the role of the state.  
Thus, it is the role of the state that is chosen to be the dividing line between public and private.390 
6.2.2 The distinction defined midway between economics and law 
The creator of the public choice theory James Buchannan has defined public and private the 
following way. When people are observed to demand and to supply certain goods and services 
through political institutions, these goods are called public.391These can be contrasted to demand 
and supply of goods and services through market institutions which are called private goods. Thus, it 
can be said that alternative dispute resolution services are private goods and official state court 
services are public goods. The provision of adjudication services by political institutions in 
Buchannan’s terms means that it is a public good. So the two alternatives under evaluation here the 
court system and in particular appeals and ADR are in fact public and private goods 
The private system to be defined in this work is Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The methods 
of alternative dispute resolution vary from one another; they share the feature that “a third party is 
involved who offers an opinion or communicates information about the dispute to the disputants.”392 
6.3 Economic Definitions  
The economic definitions of “Public Good” can also be useful in examining the relationship between 
private and public when adjudication is concerned. A public good is a product that one individual can 
consume without reducing its availability to another individual, and from which no one is excluded. 
Economists refer to public goods as "non-rivalrous" and "non-excludable." National defense, sewer 
systems, public parks, and other basic societal goods can all be considered public goods. 
Almost all public goods are considered to be nonrivalrous and nonexcludable goods. Nonrivalry 
denotes any product or service that does not reduce in availability as people consume it. This is 
obviously not the case with the judicial system. The more people use it, the less availability there is 
for others because judicial resources are limited.  
Nonexcludability refers to any product or service that is impossible to provide without it being 
available for many people to enjoy. Therefore, a public good must be available for everyone and not 
be limited in quantity. A dam is another example of a public good. It is nonrivalrous and non-
excludable in that all people within a society benefit from its use without reducing the availability of 
its intended function. The judicial system can be classified as non-excludable. The reason is, in 
theory, everyone in society (at least the democratic ones) has the right to use it. 
Also, it is reasonable to see the judicial system as a quasi-public good, which are goods and services 
that have characteristics of being nonrivalrous and nonexcludable but are not pure public goods. 
Roads are a good example of a quasi-public good. All infrastructure is built for the benefit of the 
public, but as more of the public uses the infrastructure, it causes traffic and congestion, lowering 
the value of the good. 
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Club goods are those that can be provided by both or either public authorities or private entities. 
Defining public and private in these economic terms can be slightly misleading, so the following 
distinction between public and private fits best our purposes. This distinction is concerned with the 
role the government plays in adjudication services, as most definitions above have most commonly 
been centered around. It simply identifies different regimes according to the degree of government 
involvement. These are basically the intermediate positions in which the lever of the judicial machine 
can be placed for its ADR alternative in order to produce the best possible results for delivery of 
justice in society.   
Applied to the courts, Van Zandt’s phase distinction between private and public would look like this: 
Having a lever that (1) provides private adjudication with no government involvement in the form of 
enforcement of the decision such adjudication system produces; (2) having private provision that is 
combined with government enforcement private adjudication decisions; (3) Another lever possibility 
is to have both private and courts provision of adjudication services in competition with each other 
(4) government provisions have reserved areas of dispute resolution that limit the role for private 
adjudication; and (5) Only government courts provide adjudication services.393  
These possibilities range from a completely private system to an exclusively public provision of 
adjudication. The benefits of each system will be examined so it may be determined which lever 
position creates the most benefits and avoids the most problems of the two extremes—pure public 
or private provision of adjudication services. The third intermediate lever position is interesting 
because it creates competition between jurisdictions (between public and private).394  
6.4 Benefits of a Purely Private System 
6.4.1 First criterion: Dispute resolution that determines whether a rule has been violated 
A foundational article of Landes and Posner has examined the question of benefits and drawbacks of 
public and private systems of adjudication.395  The two coauthors have argued that there are three 
products that a dispute resolution system provides that will allow us to evaluate the public/private 
alternative positions of the judicial machine. The first one is dispute resolution, which determines 
whether a rule has been violated. The second is rule formulation, which clarifies rules and develops 
them and is basically a byproduct of deciding the case at hand. The dispute resolution has also a third 
final product which is channeling right behavior in society. 
For a private system to work, it needs the costs of providing the good not to exceed the revenues 
collected. The benefits Landes and Posner have found can be summarized as follows. In a private 
system, through competition between and among judges, disputants can receive high-quality dispute 
resolution so that there is an optimum amount of quality of judicial services at minimum social cost. 
The reasons are the following. First, people will select a judge that is mutually agreeable. Second, the 
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selection will be based on the popularity of the judge, in other words on her reputation.  That will 
also lead, in turn, to further motivation for private judges to do a good job in order to be considered 
to be at the top of their profession and be able to charge the highest fees. Third, the competitive 
process would produce judges who were competent.396 Competence can be shown by giving reasons 
for a decision that convince the disputants and the public that the judge has ability and knowledge. 
Fourth, judges will strive to be impartial because a judge who was not regarded as impartial cannot 
get future disputes submitted to her for resolution. 
Another author, Steven Shavell, has provided further arguments that demonstrate the benefits of a 
private system of adjudication.397 The effects of ADR depend on a very important distinction of the 
starting point or the source of such dispute resolution. Shavell has argued that ex ante agreements, 
when they lead to private dispute resolution, produce more benefits than ex post agreements. Ex 
ante agreements are those that employ ADR arrangements made before disputes arise and ex post 
resort use of ADR after disputes have arisen.398 
There are several positive aspects of this system. ADR can produce mutually beneficial results for the 
parties. That can raise the social welfare as well because it increases the joint satisfaction of the 
parties that decided to enter into an ADR agreement. The positive result of an arbitration decision 
depends on several factors. The first one is personal.  If the arbitrator has some special skills the 
decision can be one of wisdom. Shavell has maintained that in such situation ADR may produce 
superior incentives through greater accuracy of results, for example, when a substandard 
performance of a contract would be correctly assessed by expert arbitrators under ADR but not by 
courts.399 In such a situation, the personal characteristics of the arbitrator are superior to an 
unknown judge whose expertise may turn out to be insufficient.  ADR will create incentives for better 
performance of one party and better compliance with the contract of the other party. Thus, 
contracts will be able to play their positive role in society by fulfilling their purpose with precision. 
Moreover, the ADR agreement will reduce litigation that might have arisen because of inaccurate 
performance. The second is procedural simplicity:  ADR may lower the cost of resolving disputes or 
risk. This is the standard argument for ADR being more efficient than courts. The reasoning is that the 
formality, length, and complexity of ADR are usually less than those of official proceedings. The third 
is concerned society and the optimal amount of litigation, ADR may result in improved incentives to 
engage in disputes or to refrain from that. Thus it may induce the right amount of litigation in 
society. The number of disputes brought under the legal process would be excessive, dissipating 
substantial resources of the parties without instigating mutually desirable changes in behavior. Thus 
an ADR agreement that would serve to limit the number of disputes would be advantageous.400 
Private adjudication also avoids the “slack” problem that Posner has found to exist within official 
judicial services. He has argued that judicial services resemble non-profit organizations where slack in 
the motivation of the people working for those organizations occurs as a result of lack of incentives 
to work hard. Posner, who is actually a sitting judge in a high-level US federal appellate courts, has 
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argued that judges have the incentives to work less hard than lawyers employed in private firms. 401 
The way private adjudication avoids that slack is because the private judge has to satisfy a market 
demand and that means she has to perform well otherwise she will lose her clients. 
Shavell has based his argument on a distinction between two kinds of arrangements to employ 
ADR—ex ante (arrangements before a dispute arises) and ex post (after the dispute has arisen).  Ex 
ante agreements are mutually beneficial because ADR can lower the cost of resolving the dispute but 
more importantly, it can provide superior incentives to knowledgeable parties through superior 
results. The example Shavell gives is when the arbitrator can correctly assess a substandard 
contractual performance but the courts will not be able to do that because of lack of expertise. Thus 
adopting an ADR can induce good contractual performance. And finally, ADR can provide improved 
incentives not to engage in disputes—for example, when the parties spend too much of their 
resources on litigation and do not get the best result or when litigation is excessive. 
6.5 Shortcomings of a Private System of Dispute Resolution 
Even private systems cannot function without some degree of a public intervention. Landes and 
Posner have correctly identified and discussed two of the problems with such a system that will not 
allow it to be efficient: “Public intervention may be required (1) to ensure compliance with the 
(private) judge's decision and (2) to compel submission of the dispute to adjudication in the first 
place.”  
Landes and Posner identify the second complication as leading to a selection of the judge problem.  
The disputants may not agree on a judge because one of the sides can drag their feet in agreeing to 
select a judge who will hear the case because she may think there is a high probability of losing the 
case. There is “a serious difficulty in determining when the bargaining over the choice of the judge is 
in bad faith—it is not bad faith.”402 That can lead to an escalation of the conflict. 
There are further problems with private systems that have to be examined. Below are some 
examples. Compliance with private judicial decision and submission of a dispute will have to be done 
through self-help if there is no one to enforce it. That can affect the main aim of dispute resolution 
that Cadiet has highlighted. Keeping the peace will disappear because self-help is often equal to 
violence. In that situation, the more powerful party prevails and the question is not about delivering 
justice anymore. 
The efficiency of private judicial services can also be doubted. Landes and Posner have argued that it 
is possible for private judicial services to function without any market failure.403 As stated in the 
previous chapter and the discussion on error correction, it is difficult to say what is law and error in 
law. So even if users of judicial services have some sense of whether they have received justice, the 
sheer complexity of law does not put them in the best position to evaluate the quality of justice they 
receive. If that were the case, the best criterion for whether a judge made an error is what the 
parties to the process say about the work of the judge. The reason that is not possible is that the 
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parties’ evaluation will be solely based on whether they have won or lost. That opens the door for 
opportunistic behaviour from providers of judicial services which will necessarily lead them to 
demand extremely high fees. This price distortion is the foundation of market failure in private 
judicial services. Consequently, there is a market failure that reduces the efficiency of judicial 
services provided by the free market. 
The output of a full-service judiciary cannot readily be evaluated. As a result, the public is reluctant to 
buy that output from a profit-making enterprise, which would be tempted to grab for big profits 
skimping on the costs of the services. 
Having competitive alternative adjudication services has a significant weakness, which concerns the 
quality of justice it can produce. Legal services, including to certain extent judicial services, are 
credence good, meaning that for someone who uses them is difficult or even impossible to evaluate 
their utility. 404 None of the customers of the alternative adjudication system can have an even 
approximate evaluation of the quality of output these it produces unless they have extensive legal 
education. Their sole criterion will necessarily be, as mentioned above, whether they win or lose the 
case.  
Shavell has deducted some shortcomings of the private adjudication from his distinction between ex 
post and ex ante agreements.  ADR ex post agreements cannot induce good performance (behaviour) 
because it is already too late for performance. So ex post agreements do not bring about the same 
benefits as the ones made ex ante. 
Shavell has stated that when knowledgeable parties make an ex ante ADR agreement they increase 
their wellbeing and as a result, the social welfare is improved. Shavell’s crucial statement though is 
that this is valid only when there are no external effects. In other words, what can be deduced from 
this argument is that for ADR is more efficient than courts when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the 
parties should have perfect information about confirming that the arbitrator’s abilities are superior 
to those of judges from the official state-run authority. For example, parties considering arbitration 
should know for sure that the ability of the arbitrator to assess the substandard performance of the 
contract is superior to that of a judge. The second condition is that there are no external effects. That 
means that other individuals which are not part of the arbitration process are not affected in any way 
by its result (small future behaviour effect). What is also doubtful is whether this better result 
achieved by the arbitrator can be achieved by specialized courts and whether it is valid only in 
contract law. Only then can it be ascribed as having “better performance.”  
Shavell has assumed that ADR is cheaper and reduces costs. If that is true then both ex post and ante 
ADR agreements can reduce costs to litigation. However, it is possible to argue that ADR is cheaper 
only as far as lawyer fees are concerned otherwise the cost can vary and it cannot be assumed 
automatically that ADR is cheaper than litigation. The reason it is usually cheaper is courts usually 
have more complicated and longer procedures that involve more lawyering work. Whether it is 
cheaper depends on the arbitrator’s fees. When the procedures of arbitration are not open to 
scrutiny and when they follow the usual configuration of the arbitration tribunal of three arbitrators, 
one hired by each party and one independent on whom both parties agree. The arbitrators have only 
one way to open to them to decide a case—they have to decide for the party that hired them. 
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Otherwise, if the word gets out that they do not support the party that hired them they will never be 
able to find another client who will hire them as an arbitrator in their case. 
In using an economic perspective, the problem is asymmetric information.405 The party that hires the 
arbitrator has only one goal and that is to win the procedure. They do not know what happens during 
the decision making process because everything proceeds behind closed doors. So the party pays 
“her” arbitrator to “represent” her interests. In other words, the arbitrator is paid to get a result. The 
party to the dispute has no way to control the arbitration process herself. Put differently, the party 
lacks information because all the information is in the hands of the arbitrator. That complete 
dependence on the arbitrator and the party’s lack of information about the actual process leaves the 
disputant to evaluate the performance of her arbitrator only on the result the latter gets. 
Consequently, the party is ready to pay a huge amount of money in order to get the desired result. 
That explains the exorbitant fees arbitrators receive. They are paid to achieve a result, not to decide 
the case as a neutral judge would.  In a public lecture, a famous Swiss arbitrator at the end of his 
career said that he had allowed himself to decide against the party that hired him only once or twice 
right before his retirement because he had nothing to lose anymore. 
The question is then whether in the French system where there are unprofessional judges in the first 
instance commercial courts (usually business people are appointed as judges)  who decide 
commercial disputes using informal and simplified procedures can achieve the same or better results 
than arbitration? 
ADR can lead to better incentive because a different rule would be applied than one in court. As long 
as ADR leads to changes in behaviour that raise the joint value for both parties mutually beneficial 
agreement involving ADR is better than using the legal system. 
The next few are presupposed by the characteristics of the system of arbitration. If the system lacks 
transparency, as most arbitration tribunals today do, the problems will be the following. When the 
procedures of arbitration are not open to scrutiny and when they follow the usual configuration of 
the arbitration tribunal of three arbitrators, one hired by each party and one independent on whom 
both parties agree. The arbitrators have only one way to open to them to decide a case: they have to 
decide for the party that hired them. Otherwise, if the word gets out that they do not support the 
party that hired them they will never be able to find another client who will hire them as an 
arbitrator in their case. 
A related problem is that arbitral awards are only rarely published, meaning a lot of publicly valuable 
information never gets out and is practically lost. That information can be useful for reducing further 
conflicts and to provide socially valuable information for existing problems in society that need 
resolution. Arbitration has spread very wide because investors do not trust the courts in many of the 
countries they invest into and it is easier for them to have some control over a tribunal of whom they 
can choose at least one member. 
But as seen in the subway case, arbitration can be used by a party with more resources to subdue 
any protests from a party on whom they have imposed their own arbitration system that is not 
neutral at all and out of reach for that party.   
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6.5.1 Second criterion: Rule clarification and development   
The advantage here is clearly on the side of the official state court system. According to Landes and 
Posner, private judges are there only to resolve disputes. They do not have incentives to interpret or 
develop the law. Thus a system of voluntary adjudication is strongly biased against the creation of 
precise rules of any sort. Arbitrators do not have any interest to clarify the law for future parties 
because that will reduce their future inflow of cases. In other words, there will be less demand for 
their services because if the law is clear, fewer people will need to go through an adjudication 
process. They only need to try to produce a result in the dispute before them that enhances their 
reputation. If they release the information on how they have resolved the case, they will confer 
benefit not only on other future disputants but on other judges as well. Imagine a private adjudicator 
who finds a good way to please the parties to a dispute and any future disputants that may choose 
her to resolve their case. She has no interest for others to know how she did that.  
Unification of the law is also only possible under an official court system that provides full judicial 
services. If there are many judges, there are likely to be a bewildering profusion of different 
interpretations of legal rules and no obvious method of harmonizing them. The result will be lack of 
predictability of the law because individual contemplating some activity will have difficulty 
discovering their legal consequences.  
Landes and Posner have correctly argued that unification can hardly be achieved by means other 
than a monopoly, with the highest judicial hierarchy having the final say in the interpretation of legal 
rules.406  
6.6 Advantage of Judges  
The public would find it difficult, should it hire judicial services from a private organization, to 
determine the extent to which its contractor was producing “justice.” 407  Private arbitrators only 
provide dispute resolutions. On the contrary, judges produce the full range of judicial services that 
include rulemaking through issuing of opinions and interpretation of the law and stand by a system 
that adjudicates when the parties cannot agree on the private arbiter. 
6.6.1 Third criterion: channeling right behavior in society  
If ADR is cheaper, it will help reduce the amount of litigation; people will not choose to go to 
litigation because they have an inexpensive alternative to resolve their dispute. The opposite 
problem though is that in the absence of low-cost ADR a lot of disputes will not go to court because 
of the cost of litigation even though it is socially optimal for those suits to be brought so that socially 
harmful behaviour can be stopped.408 So ADR can have positive social effects when the cost of 
litigation is too high to bring a suit. However, that benefit is limited because finding against a 
litigant’s harmful behaviour in one case does not transform into a barrier against similar behaviour in 
the future.  
Landes and Posner gave a good example showing why private adjudication services cannot channel 
the right behavior in society or provide for socially optimal rules. They give the example of airline 
                                                          
406
 Posner. What do judges maximize? 
407
 Posner, ibid., 
408
 Shavell,”Alternative Dispute Resolution” 
172 
 
companies that cause extreme supersonic noise. This noise is a negative externality. The question 
they posed was whether a private adjudication system would make these companies internalize the 
externality (will private adjudicators make them pay for the damage their activity is causing) they 
were causing to people affected by the noise. Landes and Posner assumed that such a rule would be 
socially optimal in the circumstances of the case. 
A private judge who imposed strict liability in such a situation would never get another airline 
company as a client. They would simply refuse to submit cases to her in the future. Thus the problem 
is the interest of the private adjudicator who wants future disputes submitted to her is contrary to 
the social interest. The private interest of the adjudicator will always prevail over social interest and 
will not channel the right behaviour in society.  
 6.6.2 Assessing appeal against the alternatives Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
However, it should be made clear that only higher courts have enough power to change social 
behaviour though concepts such as jurisprudence constant and precedent. First-instance courts can 
rarely achieve reduction of harmful behaviour in the future. In the US courts future rules are usually 
coined at the circuit courts and the Supreme Court, in the UK Court of Appeal and Supreme Court 
and in France at the Cour de cassation. So ADR is somewhat neutral as compared to first-instance 
courts; neither achieves the socially optimal result as seen from social benefit perspective when law 
suits are brought.  
6.7 The Dynamic Switch of the Lever from The Judicial Machine to ADR 
Shavell has maintained that ADR should not be subsidised by the state because there are no 
particular benefits from that.409 However, an exception exists if potential users of this alternative 
system lack information about the benefits of ADR and that information cannot be otherwise 
communicated to them.410 If the state decides to promote voluntary ADR anyway—for example, so 
that the caseload of courts can be reduced—the result is that the state subsidizes both ADR and 
litigation. The reason is that litigants do not pay for all the costs of court proceedings because they 
are in part covered by the state and they will also not pay the full costs of ADR because the state by 
promoting that procedure reduces its cost to potential users. The reason is simple— when the state 
provides easy access to an ADR procedure it reduces the cost of searching adequate ADR procedure 
by potential users. 
If ADR is cheaper than litigation, there can be some benefit, though less than the one produced by an 
ex ante agreement because the cases sent to the ADR procedure are only ex post agreements. In 
other words, there is no behavioural benefit (for example good performance of a contract) that the 
ex-ante agreements have. Shavell has proposed some answers that repose upon intentions of 
litigants. So he has argued that when ADR is up to the choice of the parties (voluntary), the 
propensity to sue is the same with or without voluntary ADR. The reason is the aggravated party 
must be willing to go to trial in order to have a credible threat against the defendant.411  
                                                          
409
 Shavell.  
410





Shavell’s analysis is also based on the strong predictability of law. He has argued that when the court-
sponsored ADR is initially introduced, the threshold of probability of success of the cases brought 
before the court is the same. That means that at the beginning, the availability of the ADR procedure 
will not affect the official court system.  
Shavell has maintained that after the system of ADR becomes well established and it turns out that it 
predicts trial outcome very often, the result could be that more suits would be brought in order to 
reach an agreement or resolution through ADR. The reason is the system can introduce speculative 
suits with a lower threshold of probability of success. Still, the increase in the number of trials 
probably will not be substantial. The reason is in most cases the plaintiff has to have a reasonable 
threat that she will take the case to trial in order to be successful in the ADR process. 
If ADR predicts the outcome of the trial with high probability, the parties will not go to trial. They will 
reach an agreement using the ADR procedure. The chances of the parties choosing trial diminish 
proportionally to the increase of the strength of the parties’ beliefs in the predictive force of ADR. 412  
The reason is there is no point of using the courts when the same result can be achieved by shorter 
and cheaper procedure. So the number of trials is reduced.  
The problem with Shavell’s argument is twofold. First, there is no way to know if a threat is credible. 
The intentions of the plaintiff are not revealed from the beginning and there is no way to know from 
the start what her intentions may be. Thus, it is suggested that availability of easily accessible 
voluntary ADR procedure will increase the number of law suits filed because the plaintiff’s hope will 
be that even if she is not willing to continue with the lawsuit, she will be able to reach an out-of- 
court agreement with the defendant. It is difficult to distinguish between a bluff (speculative lawsuit) 
and real intention to sue. The intention will be revealed much later when the plaintiff has to decide 
whether to actually proceed with the lawsuit. The result will be that the number of the actual law 
suits will not be affected and they will remain about the same. The increase will affect only the ADR 
procedures with the assumption it is much cheaper and made easily available by the judicial machine 
that helps redirects cases to it.   
Second, it is difficult to have court-sponsored ADR with high predictive force. The previous chapter 
explained the uncertainty surrounding the problem of error in law. High predictability of ADR is hard 
to achieve in practice. It cannot be about the private adjudicator not making any errors in the 
application of the law. It has to be about not following definitive answers produced by unified court 
hierarchy.  So the task of court-subsidized ADR cannot be used to predict the trial outcome. It is 
suggested that a purpose such as resolving easy cases where the judicial hierarchy has produced 
definitive answers and there is no large effect on future behaviour in society has to be the goal of 
court-sponsored ADR, especially if it is mandatory to all litigants.  
There is one very important condition for this system of mandatory ADR that is subsidized by the 
official court system to work. It has to have specifically trained private adjudicators who can 
distinguish between easy cases that have a low probability of being decided differently413 but more 
importantly these adjudicators have to be able to distinguish cases with a low impact on future 
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desirable behaviour in society. In other words, they should be trained to refuse hearing cases that 
can produce negative externalities on other affected parties or other members of society.  These 
cases should be the exclusive domain of the official judicial machine. Shavell’s analysis has continued 
with the situation when ADR has no predictive force. The reason he has given is that an additional 
procedure, which is time and cost consuming and results in no benefits for the parties. That follows 
from the fact that the parties would have incurred costs, have lost valuable time. 
It is suggested that is also hard to achieve because if you repeat the chances of successfully predict 
trial outcome are around 50% in a long run. Even if arbitrators have no legal knowledge at all, over 
time they will be able to predict the trial outcome in at least with 50% probability. Assuming that 
private arbitrators have some knowledge of the law and there have to deal with some easy cases 
their predictability percent will be higher. So Shavell’s prediction that the parties will never choose to 
elect ADR is questionable, especially for parties that are inclined to reach an out of court agreement. 
Even with relatively low predictability, such an ADR decision has some bargaining power that can be 
used to induce an out of court settlement. Can that be a useful way to separate the plaintiff who is 
willing to sue and who want only to reach an agreement? 
Shavell is correct to point out at this weak spot of court promoted ADR. Adding this additional 
procedure will produce additional cost and may not be useful enough to justify the additional 
expenses. Thus litigants will try to avoid it, especially if its only purpose is to predict the trial 
outcome. Thus, before sponsoring such extra procedure courts have to make sure that such 
procedure serves other purposes such as promoting settlement of easy cases and avoiding 
externalities. 
Even predictability can be one of these purposes but that would mean a close relationship between 
the private adjudicator and the judges. The former has to make sure she knows the judges and their 
decision extremely well. That is a similarly costly effort, in which lower judges have to make in a 
strong judicial hierarchy to make sure that they do not get reversed and disciplined for their 
decisions. Whether these efforts and the consequent costs are justifiable is a harder question and 
depends on whether the private adjudicator can cheaply acquire such information. 
After having discussed the case of voluntary mediation, consider then what happens if the state 
decides to make arbitration mandatory in order to escape the situation in which parties choose not 
to engage in mediation that has no trial predictive force? The state can do that when the courts 
cannot cope with their increasing caseload.  The situation will be similar as for non-mandatory ADR. 
However, the additional costs incurred by the parties will be unavoidable and thus make the whole 
litigation process more expensive, which is an undesirable outcome. In such a situation, the courts 
should make sure that ADR actually serves other purposes and that they have well trained private 
adjudicators who can provide a worthwhile service to litigants.  
If it is mandatory parties will have to engage in ADR procedures regardless of their preferences of 
whether to do so or not. Predictability does not play any role. Then the role of the judicial machine is 
even more important. It has to make sure that ADR provides benefits and does not only make the 
normal court procedure more expensive by adding an additional ADR stage to it. In such a situation 
the desirable purposes of ADR that mentioned above: resolving easy cases, following the official 
previous court decisions on the issue, dealing only with cases that have nothing to do with 
channeling future desirable behaviour in society and having no negative external effects and hiring 
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only well trained private adjudicators that understand those issues is absolutely necessary. For courts 
to promote binding, mandatory ADR, that would mean relinquishing jurisdiction altogether. If there 
are no strict criteria of doing so the judicial machine will run into the problems that will be examined 
further in this chapter. 
In sum, how does that affect the judicial machine? Should it redirect cases to ADR? In what 
circumstances it should put the judicial machine lever in an off/redirect position? That is only if the 
concerns that Owen Fiss has expressed can be addressed in his article “Against Settlement.” 
Considering certain points come close to the perfect system that Owen Fiss describes as desirable, 
what are the main points in Fiss’ argument? Which ones are different from the French system and 
how do they apply to the French system?  
Owen Fiss has made a two-pronged argument maintaining that courts should have exclusive 
jurisdiction over some cases. The first reason is that the existence of potential litigation shows there 
is a breakdown in the social relations that requires serious intervention by the courts. The second is 
that as previously argued, the law affects third parties and not only the litigants. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the purpose of an appeal is more complex than it first appears. Even more than 
trials, an appeal is not only a process to resolve disputes. Even though Owen Fiss also does not 
analyze appeals specifically his argument can be applied with greater force to appeals. So let’s 
examine his twofold account of complexity role of the courts. First, he has argued that courts did not 
arise “to resolve quarrels between neighbors who had reached an impasse and turned to a stranger 
for help.”414 It is an oversimplification to treat courts as an institutionalization of the stranger and the 
power he exercises.415 Instead, Fiss has pointed out one other significant element of adjudication— 
that there is a breakdown in the social relations between the neighbors.416 Cases that reach appeal-
level courts indicate an even more substantial breakdown in social relationships because even a 
judgment at first instance did not suffice to resolve the social problem.  
The second significant element in Fiss’ argument is that court judgments are backed by the authority 
of the law whereas private settlements have no such authority. This authority is important because 
law affects third parties and not only the litigants. In other words, the courts have a public authority 
component that ADR does not have.  “The authority of judgment arises from the law, not from the 
statements or actions of the putative representatives, thus we allow judgment to bind persons not 
directly involved in the litigation even when we are reluctant to have settlement do so.”417 
Furthermore, ADR fails to achieve the same result as courts because it reduces the social function of 
the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes. As Fiss has put it, adjudication should be understood 
in broader terms. It is applied where there is a genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation 
of the law.418 That analysis will help us answer the question as Owen Fiss put it whether seeing 
adjudication/ appeal as essentially public or private is just matter of outlook.  Owen Fiss has argued 
that he sees adjudication in more public terms: Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for 
using state power “to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.”419 The example he gives 
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is Brown v Board of Education, which changed the political landscape in America by ruling against 
racial segregation. “I suspect instead that what divides us is much deeper and stems from our 
understanding of the purpose of the civil law suit and its place in society. It is a difference in outlook. 
Someone like Bok sees adjudication in essentially private terms: The purpose of lawsuits and the civil 
courts is to resolve disputes.” It is suggested that seeing the appeal as simply resolving disputes 
ignores economic of externalities created by disputes. 
So the legal analysis, it is suggested, led to a few revelations as to the character of appeal. Courts do 
not deal with simple disputes between neighbours but with a persistent breakdown in social 
relations, court adjudication, and more specifically appeal, has a public element that derives 
authority from the law. To a greater degree than a trial, appeals affect third parties. To further 
illuminate these issues and evaluate court adjudication especially at appeal level against the 
alternatives (ADR), an economically inspired analysis will be used. 
To summarize, three major authors—Shapiro, Fiss, and Hayek—see a public element in the appeal 
system. Shapiro sees it from a state perspective and a political regime issue. From a legal/political 
perspective, Owen Fiss sees private law litigation as an institutional arrangement for using state 
power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals. From economic/legal perspective 
Hayek sees the court system as an institution that is a necessary exception to his preference for 
spontaneous order because the judiciary is the guardian of that order.  
Fiss’s twofold argument has directed us towards a deeper exploration of the public private 
dichotomy. ADR has its advantages and can in certain circumstances be used instead of the public 
court system. The next important question then is: when does the public system becomes 
indispensable and cannot be replaced by ADR?420 To put it differently, in what circumstances the 
judicial machine can afford to abandon jurisdiction and redirect cases towards ADR? 
6.8 Indispensable Procedures that are Exclusively a Public Domain  
The argument here is that the judicial system at appeal level simply cannot be displaced by ADR. 
Appeals are almost always provided by the state court system. Private appeal systems are an 
extremely rare occurrence.421 That is in contrast with disputes at the initial stage. At the trial stage, 
the state judicial services can compete with alternative dispute resolution methods such as 
arbitration or mediation. At the appeal level, the situation dramatically changes.  
What makes appeals different so that they are almost exclusively a domain of state-led (public) 
adjudication?  Having an appeal is sometimes important in that some arbitration disputes end up in 
courts to be decided on public interests grounds. A good example is the Bernard Tapie case discussed 
in the beginning of this work.  Other examples are cases in the area of enforcement of (foreign) 
arbitral awards becoming actual appeals because general arbitration treaty clauses such as public 
interest are used to substantially change the arbitral awards. 
6.9 Appeal as a Public Good  
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In fact, the public element idea can be traced to Adam Smith who has called the establishment of the 
judicial system a public good.422 Polynsky and Shavell have also argued there is a public and private 
enforcement difference; their idea is that private parties may have a hard time fully capturing the 
benefits of developing expensive but socially worthwhile information systems to aid enforcement, 
which has wider implications in the public-private divide.423  
To see when the official judicial machine cannot be replaced by ADR and address the two problems 
Owen Fiss called a breakdown of social relations,424 Tyler Cowen’s article, “Law as a Public Good the 
Economics of Anarchy”425 will be used as a point of reference.  Cowen’s article is one of the few 
touting the judicial system as a public good that has gained traction. The author has dealt with a 
hypothetical libertarian state and whether anarchy can work better than the current system.426  
6.9.1 Cowen’s demonstration of the public element  
The strength of Cowen’s article is that it outlines a situation in which there is no state/public good 
provision. So by erasing the state and the provision of public goods including adjudication of 
disputes, he was actually able to examine what it would be like to have an alternative to the state-
led-adjudication system. This analysis will allow a better understanding of what the current public 
court system actually achieves. 
The attention of Cowen’s work is actually on dispute adjudication even though his intended focus is 
on the provision of protection services. The reason is that in a state of anarchy the problem is not 
with protection services and their funding but with the fact that disputes must be adjudicated 
between two or more protection services providers.427 The fundamental issue is that adjudication of 
such disputes involves at least two parties but has the potential to affect third parties.  
In order for adjudication to produce externalities, two or more competing protection agencies have 
to produce two or more conflicting judgments (laws) on the same issue. In other words, in the state 
of anarchy, these contradictory decisions (laws) are the result of the existence of different 
adjudication structures that apply different law codes of conduct. Cowen’s example bears on two 
adjudication agencies; one decides to apply capital punishment for murder and the other chooses an 
alternative sentence (life imprisonment). The agencies can go to war each time a conflict happens.428  
If there is violence, there will be externalities to third parties who will be severely affected by the 
conflict. David Friedman has pointed out that war may not be the most likely result because it is too 
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costly for the agencies. He has argued that Coasian-style negotiations are more likely.429 Thus there 
will be a payment from the agency that values a right more to the other agency that values it less. It 
suffices to see a movie about the Italian mafia to realize that this is exactly what happens in a place 
where there is state power vacuum. Conflicts between the different clans arise because of some 
conflicting judgment from the clan bosses. One only needs to see the statistics of the frequent mafia 
family conflicts to see that Friedman is probably wrong. Whichever scenario is more likely is not that 
important because a political negotiation each time there is a conflict between adjudication agencies 
can involve very high transaction costs. For example, a rule for or against capital punishment can 
involve such strong ideological convictions that negotiation will be impossible.  In another instance, 
mafia clan leaders can feel such deep animosity towards each other based on centuries-old feuds 
that negotiations are impossible.   Thus any standoff can cause externalities. To go back to chapter 
on unification purpose of appeal actually exists in order to reduce externalities caused by conflicting 
judicial decisions. As economic theory states, when there are externalities centralisation (unification) 
is needed. A uniform system of appeal thus serves to reduce externalities that conflicting judicial 
decisions produce. 
Whether following the analysis of Cowen that adjudication networks arise from the threat of 
Hobbesian style state of nature, or Friedman’s account of political negotiation between conflicting 
protection agencies with the added element of high transaction costs that block these negotiations, 
the result is the same. There needs to be a system of unified adjudication. The mechanism judicial 
systems have developed to achieve unification is an appeal to a higher court. The key element that 
makes the appeal system successful is that it uses mutual agreement to use public institutions to 
settle disputes. In other words, appeal promotes cooperation, not violence.  
So the question is why appeal is different from initial adjudication proceedings. The answer is that 
appeal is almost exclusively the domain of the state institutions. Initial proceedings, in contrast, can 
be delivered through market institutions such as arbitration and mediation. That means appeals are 
almost exclusively public goods because they are delivered through political institutions. The reason 
is appeal serves another role: promotion of agreement, cooperation, and peace which is Cadiet’s 
main aim of public adjudication—to maintain the social peace. Whereas, courts at first instance can 
be regarded as club goods which can be defined as goods that can be provided by both public 
authorities and private entities.  
Friedrich Hayek, in a similar vein, has argued that the role of the judge who has been sent by a ruler 
is not to enforce his will or authority but to preserve the peace by settling disputes that may disturb 
the established order. That role can be contrasted with an inspector or supervisor who assures that 
the orders of the public authority are obeyed. 430 In modern societies, the role of a judge sent by an 
authority to resolve a dispute and thus preserve the peace may be played by a first instance judge if 
the disputants choose the public court system. Most certainly, that role is played by appeal-level 
judges who resolve disputes that persist after the first judgment. In other words, disputes that reach 
appeal level, if not resolved, threaten the established order to a greater degree. 
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The underlying economic logic behind that conclusion is that unified appeal system that clearly 
assigns rights within its jurisdiction leads to reduced negative externalities, which can occur when the 
established order is disturbed and peace is broken.  
Owen Fiss has gone further in his argument that the public element is not only about protecting the 
peace and helping private parties maximize their ends but it is about the judicial power of 
interpretation of the values incorporated in authoritative texts in order to bring reality closer to 
those values. In other words, Fiss has expressed preference towards another public purpose of 
appeal which is the development of the law.  
16.9.2 Competition and public character of appeals  
Competition adjudication is another example of why appeal is almost exclusively a public good. 
Competition is a special case of appeal related to the existence of a state. Competition policy 
enforcement is a public good that can only be provided by the state. The fact that in France only the 
Cour d’appel de Paris and the Cour de cassation hear competition cases is clear evidence that 
competition as a public good provision can only be given by the state and it has to be done at appeal 
level where as argued above the public higher public role as protectors of the peace and promoters of 
agreement and cooperation.   
The logic is that only the state can promote competition because completion policy cannot exist 
outside of an independent environment that regulates business.  The reason is when there is no 
state, there is no one to enforce competition so firms will try to achieve a market dominant position 
and perhaps turn into tyrannical states themselves.431 The important question is if, without state 
adjudication, there will be three big firms or 10,000 as Friedman argues? The difference is huge 
because three firms with fixed territory will reduce competition; people won’t just pack all their lives 
and go to a territory with better rules. But with 10,000, there will be competition.  
So the number of firms that are on the market touches upon the fundamental question of 
completion law is whether the market has a natural tendency towards creating monopolies or even 
more importantly whether those monopolies can lose their dominant position without any outside 
intervention. Good examples are the technological giants such as IBM, Microsoft, and Google. At 
some point in time, IBM and Microsoft looked like they were going to dominate the market for many 
years to come. However, they both lost their dominant positions. Was that the result of pure market 
forces or the competition enforcement had something to do with their demise? Will the same 
decline of market share happen to Google? These are important questions that in their core come 
down to whether there should be an adjudication as a public good or arbitration as a private good to 
resolve the disputes between firms. The number of the firms on the market and their sizes matter.  
16.9.3 Solutions to ADR problems 
A simple way to remedy these problems of arbitration is to publish the arbitral awards and make 
arbitrators publically accountable of bad decisions. That will enable weeding out arbitrators who 
make unprofessional decisions in order get more clients in the future. Thus, the solution for 
arbitration is transparency. 
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Arbitration is only a tool and everything depends on how it is used. Despite that, arbitration is in the 
middle of a public versus private debate. The private system of arbitration fails when there is an 
asymmetric information problem; the solution is to make public all the information by making the 
arbitration tribunals more transparent. That argument fits very well with what Peter Drucker has 
maintained about what a modern theory of information should be based on—information becomes 
more valuable the more people have it.432 
One side idealizes arbitration because of this private character. It claims that public court systems are 
usually slow and sometimes even clumsy in resolving disputes. There are many procedures to be 
followed some of them quite costly. The alternative is the private arbitration tribunal. It has no 
specific procedures to follow, no complicated rules on evidence and fewer possibilities to delay the 
case resolution. So a lot of the arguments are that arbitration is more efficient in dispute resolution. 
That position is defended by libertarians such as David Friedman. On the other side are those who 
argue that there is public interest involved in dispute resolution that goes beyond the particular case 
(i.e., Cowen). Cowen’s voice is much weaker and less propagated. The ones who can criticize 
arbitration for its lack of transparency are law professors who are the beneficiaries of the system. 
They are the ones that get hired as arbitrators and the ones receiving the high fees because of the 
transparency/information problem.  
In reality, there are cases better suited for arbitration and cases that contain valuable social 
information that are better suited for resolution by the public courts. So besides the parties’ wishes, 
deciding which forum is more appropriate should be based on the availability of publically valuable 
information in the case at hand. The problem is no one is trained, including judges, to make the 
difference and as a result, nobody tries to make that difference in practice. Public interest, or 
publically valuable information more precisely, is definitely not the same as defending the nationals 
of your own country as a lot of courts actually do. 
So what actually happens when an arbitral award has to pass the routine procedure of enforcement 
in front of national courts? The latter seizes the opportunity play their normal role of defending the 
public interest. Courts turn this simple procedure into a sort of “unofficial appeal.” That is usually 
based on legislation that provides for review of the award if it is contrary to the public interest. Such 
provisions are so large that they can include absolutely anything a judge wishes them on contain.  
The problem is judges are not very well trained to see what really affects the social interest. As a 
result, very often such “appeal” review degenerates into protecting their own industries and even 
citizens against the “evil foreigners.” Another problem is that judges are prejudiced against arbitral 
awards. The thinking follows the lines of “a decision that has not been taken by following procedure 
cannot be a good decision.” In conclusion, deciding when to switch the judicial machine on or off has 
to be based on the strengths and weaknesses of private and public adjudication systems. There is no 
one-track solution, as it is often argued for example that ADR is more efficient and it should be 
preferred to the courts. As shown in this chapter, private adjudication may outperform the public 
system in certain aspects but has serious drawbacks in other circumstances. The main criterion that 
should be used in order to decide whether a case should go through the official court system or not is 
the importance of the social information the dispute contains. At the appeal level, the existence of a 
strong public element clearly demonstrates that a purely private system cannot deal with such 
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important social information. Thus, leaders who deal with the judicial system should not be able to 
decide that part of the caseload of the courts should be redirected towards ADR without clear 
understanding when that switch should be made. The reason for that was demonstrated to be not 
only the degree of importance of social information contained in the dispute but also the different 
incentives the different types of ADR create. In other words, before switching on and off the judicial 

















Chapter 8: Comparative Analysis of Guiding Theory of the Judicial 
Machine 
1.0 Comparative Study: the Influence of the Environment 
The comparative study in this thesis is concerned with the environment in which specific 
arrangements of the procedural organization and theory of the judicial system have evolved. The 
broad concept of the environment includes many dimensions: social, political, cultural, historical, 
institutional, or legal. The legal arrangements can be other rules that have a direct influence on how 
the lever regulations of the judicial machine function. These environmental influences are 
intertwined and they function together.  
The environmental influence on the judicial machine provides the conditions for specific judicial 
organizations to be created and developed in different countries. It also shapes all organizations by 
exerting economic, social, political, and other pressures. Lastly, it is the ultimate selection 
mechanism for determining which judicial systems are vibrant and function successfully.433 
The sheer complexity of all the different environmental pressures means there can be no definitive 
conclusions as to what degree they influence the judicial system. Causality is not inevitable but 
probable. This study only aims to observe trends and patterns in order to provide possible 
explanations. The hope is that later studies will show and measure in more detail causality.  
 The aim of the comparative analysis is to show how to improve the French judicial system. This study 
uses the other systems as examples that reveal features of the French system that may otherwise 
remain unnoticed. That is why there is not a comparison between the three systems in some 
chapters. In the Theory chapter, for example, it is more important to concentrate on what the 
development of the theories underpinning the English judicial system can reveal about the French 
judiciary. The reason is the evolution of the theories applied to the English legal system is the most 
profound.  Of course, the main theory that is applied (Kaplow and Shavell’s theory) to both systems 
originated in the US.   
Here, the aim is to further explore the dichotomy of lever choices identified in the Theory chapter. 
The question is whether the advantages found in the application of the line of theories against 
complete justice are confirmed. There will also be an examination of whether the superiority of one 
rule over the other may be strongly influenced by independent parameters. There will be 
descriptions of some examples that have influenced the performance of judicial system regulation. 
Finally, there will be a conclusion on which theory works best in practice and what should be 
proposed for the French judicial system as a possible solution. 
2.0 Case Study of Theory Development in England 
2.1 The Two Lever Positions 
In England during the 19th and 20th centuries, the civil justice system was committed to a specific 
theory of administration of justice. The purpose of that theory was to achieve justice in the individual 
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case by arriving at a decision on its merits. The term substantive justice is used to indicate that the 
court decision is reached because true facts and the right laws have been applied.  The term 
substantive justice is interchangeable with complete justice.  
The purpose of the civil justice system was to vindicate rights and, where necessary, enforce legal 
rights and obligations of individuals, businesses, and local and central governments.434 
Substantive justice is usually achieved by introducing procedures that are dubbed to be “fair.” In 
most cases, that means a procedure that is reasonably exhaustive. According to this traditional 
approach, the purpose of litigation is to produce correct outcomes. This approach is strictly ex post (it 
looks only at the facts as they happened).  This is the lever position that is identified with a theory 
guided by an understanding of justice based on complete/substantive theory. So the question is 
whether that is enough for a modern judicial system. 
In England, the government and the two reform commissions they appointed, led by Lord Woolf and 
Lord Jackson, pragmatically answered negatively to that question. They understood there is a 
problem in applying a theory based on delivering complete justice. However, the reforms were done 
with insufficient theoretical elaboration and understanding of the functioning of the judicial system. 
Thus in England, there was a serious step towards refusing to achieve justice and to channel their 
efforts towards achieving a specific type of justice. These reforms moved the lever position of the 
English judicial machine, taking a wrong step, but in the right direction. It is the wrong step because 
as formulated, the theory applied to the judicial system is simply an imposition of government 
austerity measures to the courts. The direction is the right one because a specific theory is applied. 
Moreover, that theory was constructed with the understanding that how justice is delivered best is 
the key to a well-functioning judicial machine.  
2.2 Why Discussing the English System is Important for France 
The French judicial system has gone through some of the same stages of development and currently 
faces the same challenges. Both systems have started from a similar position of achieving complete 
justice. However, the English have made a step that may be pending in France. The reason is that 
both judiciaries have to find a way to operate within the limited recourses that the state allocates to 
them while being pressured to perform better. Arguably though, the recent reforms in England have 
taken a somewhat dangerous direction. The reason is that the quality of the judicial system and thus 
the decisions judges make435 has been reduced.436 That erroneous path is likely to be repeated in 
France, which this study warns against.  
A second reason for the importance of the English experience is that some authors such as John 
Sorabji437 have usefully defined the issues that will allow us to evaluate the directions both systems 
have taken and propose ways for future improvement. 
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A third reason for the importance of English law is that in modern times, both English and French law 
have been profoundly influenced by the same European standard of litigation that is set in article 6 § 
1 of the European Human Rights Convention. Thus, it is important to see how the two systems react 
to the same European law determines the direction of both jurisdictions.  
Fourth, there is a functional reason, which is based on the fact that both judiciaries have to find a 
way to operate within the limited recourses that their governments allocate to them. 
Finally, the recent English reforms led by Lord Woolf and Lord Jackson have been said to be the third 
most influential development in Europe of procedural rules since the 1806 French code of civil 
procedure.438 
2.2.1 Historical overview of the lever positions in England 
The greatest impetus for reform and thus change of the policy lever that English courts have been 
following has been the English disdain towards cost and delay of court proceedings. 
The origins of this disdain can be traced back to back to the medieval times. The Magna Carta (1215) 
was the first attempt of a reform partly motivated by this issue. Before the 1870s, several 
commissions were charged with finding a solution to the problem but failed. In 1867, the Judicature 
Commission was appointed. Contrary to the previous incremental attempts, this time the agenda 
was the implementation of a fundamental reform. The aim was to change the existing features of the 
English judiciary. Consequently, the reform introduced changes into the two fundamentals of every 
judiciary—court structure and the nature of procedure. 
2.2.2 The 1867 reform or unifying the alternatives  
The English court structure at the time of the 1867 reform was extremely complicated. There were 
two separate civil justice systems. Since medieval times, the English civil justice had dual nature. 
Common law rights and obligations were under the jurisdiction of the common law courts. The three 
common law courts were King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. Every case that did not fall 
within the formalistic requirements of the common law was dealt with by the equity courts, more 
specifically by the High Court of Chancery. The access was broader and the condition for admittance 
to the justice of these courts was a payment of a fixed fee. The most important royal, non-common 
law court was the Chancery, sometimes known as the court of equity.439 By 1600, their civil 
jurisdictions existed in parallel.440 
The 1867commission proposed both structural and procedural reform. Structurally, it recommended 
that the two different jurisdictions be merged under a new single superior court. The appeals court 
structure was created. Procedurally, it proposed the creation of new procedural rules or a new 
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procedural code. The result was a new code called the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC)441 formed as 
part of the Judicature Act 1873.442 The system was simplified, with the best aspects of both common 
law and equity courts being used. The third element of each system was the theoretical 
underpinnings were also clarified. The theory of justice to be implemented was the one from 
equity—complete justice. In the next 20 years, the result of the reform and the application of the 
new theory was that RSC had become more complex and there was a 20% increase in litigation 
cost.443 
This difference between the two types of courts equity and common law is important because the 
main difference between them was the theory of justice applied by the two types of courts. Common 
law courts applied an extremely formalistic theory that required the plaintiff to select the right 
procedural basis for his claim, choosing the correct form of action and obtaining the relevant writ 
from the Royal Chancery. If the litigant chose the wrong form of action, the court was impeded from 
applying the right law.444 Equity, on the contrary, applied a flexible theory of justice that was at first 
up to the discretion of the clergyman acting as judges. They applied complete justice theory. 
The equity approach then engaged in the pursuit of accuracy irrespective of the time it took or the 
cost. It developed distinct procedures with a strong commitment to error correction in juridical 
decision making and liberal approach in following procedural rules. 445 These characteristics have had 
strong consequences for the functioning of the English judicial system.  
The 1867 reform officially chose the equity procedure and thus complete justice theory as the 
guiding force behind the functioning of the English judicial system. In practice though, the common 
law formalistic theory still had a strong influence on how the courts operated. These are the origins 
of bifurcation of the English judicial system which resulted in a long-term constant flux from the rules 
of one system to the rules of the other. That resulted in wavering commitment to the principles of 
complete justice. Importantly, all that can explain why the English are ready to consider changing the 
guiding theory of justice.   
2.2.3 The failures of complete justice  
John Sorabji has argued that the adoption of equity’s approach446 to securing substantive justice had 
a fatal consequence for its efficiency. The reform failure shows that complete justice uses many 
additional resources. Satellite procedural litigation was endemic with significant costs and delays,447 
likely due to the loosening of procedural rules and the complete justice approach to procedure, 
which allows a lot of contradictory issues to be raised.  
The limitations of how much extra burden the judicial system can take are exposed. The extra influx 
of cases at all levels of the court system, along with the extra procedural burdens designed to find 
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the truth at all costs, and the creation of new costly structures (for example, extensive appeal court 
structure) in practice do not serve an important purpose as is generally thought by propagators of 
complete justice.  
2.2.4 The danger of ignoring procedural rules  
If procedural defects are too easy to cure, the rules become optional.448 That creates an incentive 
problem. These kinds of rules generate deliberate tactical noncompliance with procedural rules in 
order to make the other party settle disadvantageously or even withdrawing the claim without a 
settlement.449  
Satellite litigation on procedural rules means that the rule does not function well. Any rule that 
generates more disputes means that is not applied as it is supposed to. A rule that meets no 
opposition and people follow it is optimal. The result of such litigation is increased complexity, delay 
and increased costs in the individual claims. In turn, individual claims used more court resources and 
unequal distribution of resources. The fact there is strong judicial discretion on procedural issues led 
to uncertainty; many appeals on such issues were not based on the merits of the case. John Sorabji 
has drawn two conclusions from the two centuries of reforms of the civil justice in England. First, 
society changes and the structures and procedures of the judicial system have to constantly change 
to keep up with the evolution of society. Secondly, he has maintained that the basis of those reforms 
was false. The reason is that established general principles have reached their limit of usefulness. 
There is a need for a fundamentally new approach.  
Sorabji is right on both accounts. Social preferences and needs change over time and more 
importantly, old methods cannot perform new complicated tasks. However, he searched for the 
answer for this new approach in the application of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian approach that served 
as a basis of the  reforms of Lord Wolf and Lord Jackson. The direction English authors have taken is 
the right one. However, Bentham’s approach was developed in the 19th century, which is why it is 
used mostly as inspiration for this work. Utilitarianism is the predecessor of modern economics 
which has developed a lot further. That will become evident in the next chapters in which economic 
analysis of law will be employed to clarify some of the problems the judicial systems face.   
The bottom line is that the complete justice approach has failed in England and is probably failing in 
France, although it seems there is not much attention paid to the problem.  
2.2.5 The latest reformist agenda in England: Treading the new path of justice 
Two recent fundamental judicial reforms led by Lord Woolf and Lord Jackson have found the 
traditional approach based on complete justice lacking. In pursuit of a shared between them view, 
they have both tried to change the direction of achievement of complete justice towards a new path. 
There were two reforms because the Woolf reform was deemed to be unsuccessful less than ten 
years after its introduction on April 26, 1999. Sir Rupert Jackson was appointed to head another 
commission that examined the perceived problems of cost and delay in civil procedure.  In January 
2010, he presented his report. The failure of Lord Woolf’s reform has more significant implications 
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than Lord Jackson realized. It is suggested that the reason for that is that the reforms are based on a 
flawed theory of justice. 
These new reforms have put limits on achieving substantive justice. The state decided that 
individuals cannot use its resources in an unlimited fashion. The limit imposed is twofold: first, a 
court can refuse to allow a claim to proceed to a judgment.  Second, it restricts the amount of time 
and money spent on litigation.450 In other words, the English system has moved away from a theory 
of complete justice and towards proportionate cost justice based on the economization principle.  
That means that the new reforms followed the view that there should be limits on the use of the 
judicial system. However, their failure is that they did not draw the line as to what kinds of limits 
should be imposed. 
The aim of the reforms was to change the position of the lever of the judicial machine in order to 
introduce rationing to the judicial system so that more litigants can use it. Even if this new approach 
is a rough approximation of Bentham’s utility principle—greatest happiness for the greatest 
number—the analysis is insufficient. The problem is that the calculation used by Lord Woolf and Lord 
Jackson does not include the effect of the judicial system on the individual welfare and from their 
influence on the whole of society. Thus, it is argued that the reforms are the wrong step in the right 
direction. The right direction because a new approach has been used that goes in a specific direction. 
The reforms are the wrong step because they basically introduce an austerity government measure 
to simply reduce spending on the judicial system. That is what wider public interest really means in 
the case of the judicial system because the functioning of the judicial system has a strong influence 
on the whole of society.  
2.2.6 Where did the reforms of Lord Woolf and Lord Jackson go wrong? 
Some have argued that the judicial system in the UK has now taken a turn towards a wider public 
interest.451 To implement that change in article 1.1 (1) Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) the specific 
reference to “proportionate cost” were included and a new related sub clause 1.1 (2) was also 
included. Now the complete article states the following: 
 (1) These rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal 
with cases justly and at proportionate cost.  
 (2) Dealing with cases justly and at a proportionate cost, so far as it is practical. 
Lord Dyson, the Master of the Rolls,452  interpreted the new scope of the administration of justice to 
go beyond the immediate parties to the litigation. “The court has to consider three things: the 
claimant’s perspective, the defendant’s perspective and importantly, the perspective of other court 
users.”453 The main idea of the overriding objective of CPR is that it is in the public interest to serve 
“the needs of all litigants, all court users.”454 In Jeremy Bentham’s terms, this reform aggregates the 
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interests of all court users. That means in fact that the English reforms have equated “wider public 
interest” with the interest of court users (litigants). It is suggested that this approach has too narrow 
of a definition of public interest and thus the aggregation is too narrow and thus impedes the courts 
to fulfill their purpose in society. Instead, the aggregation should include the interests of everybody 
in society and not only the court users. 
2.2.7 The three guiding principles of the reforms  
Sorabji has cited a 2005 Lord Woolf lecture given at University College of London in which the latter 
has stated the three objectives contained in Part 1 of CPR (the Overriding Objective),455 specifically,  
commitment to delivering decisions on the merits of the case, economy, and efficiency.456 
The lever of the judicial machine has shifted from simply providing substantive justice through 
extensive and expensive procedures towards the pursuits of economy, efficiency, expedience, and 
proportionality.457 
Let’s clarify those terms: 
• Economy, according to Sorabji, means limiting expenses. 
• Proportionality means expenses should be less than the amount of money involved in the 
lawsuit (the stakes of the lawsuit). 458 
• Sorabji defines efficiency as “[s]aving time and expense obviously referred to the principles 
of economy and efficiency. At best it is understood to mean that litigants should expend no 
more resources than necessary to secure a merits-based decision. What was necessary was 
determined by to the nature and value of the claim.” 459 
2.3 Economic Analysis and the Problem of the Guiding Theory of Justice 
The first two principles simply introduce limitations to expenditures. The understanding of efficiency 
is also correct. What is considered efficient is when the goal (decision on the merits) is achieved 
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using the minimal possible resources. The resources include time, efforts, money etc. In other words, 
there is efficiency when the resources are not wasted. The key to that definition is the interpretation 
of the value and nature of the claim under the new proportionality rules. 
Under every rule, there are winners and losers, as determined by the Kaldor Hicks criterion of 
efficiency.  As mentioned in the Theory Chapter, Kaplow and Shavell have argued that for Kaldor 
Hicks efficiency to lead to determinate results, there need not be any distributive effects. So let’s 
examine who wins and who loses under the new rules  introduced by the reforms in England.  
The winners are plaintiffs with claims for large amounts of money (large stakes of the case) because 
they will be judged to have claims proportionate to the expenses the judicial system will incur in 
dealing with the case. Two such types of plaintiffs spring to mind: first the ones with claims for high 
amounts (high stakes) such as individuals suing large companies.  The second group is big businesses 
that sue each other for large amounts. These two types will be privileged over plaintiffs with small 
amount claims, which ordinary people usually have when they do not face big corporations. 
Such claims can be very important. Imagine an individual having a small claim against a company. The 
stakes of the cases are lower than the expenses, thus the result is the claim will be stopped by the 
courts. Further, imagine that this is not the only claim of the sort but there are a hundred more. All 
together, they are worth deciding460 according to that new rule, but individually they are not. The 
result is that the damaging behavior of the company is not corrected.    
The obvious losers are plaintiffs who can expect to win less than it costs to the judicial system to hear 
the case. The proportionality sections 1.1 (1) (c) and 1.1 (1) (c) (e) in particular have been interpreted 
by the courts as restricting court access to some claims.461 Will these sections trap some important 
and complex cases which would have been otherwise heard?462 
Section 1.1 (c) (ii) says that this proportional assessment is dependent also on the importance of the 
case. The problem is that assessing importance is not placed on any rational criteria. 
How the next section 1.1 (c) (iii) deals with plaintiffs with complex cases? If complexity is judged to 
be excessive meaning that resolving the case will take more resources and time for the courts than 
the amount at stake between the parties the courts will refuse to hear that case.463 There is a serious 
problem with this provision. If the cases were not complex they would have been settled. There is a 
chance that the courts will dismiss such cases that have implications beyond the parties to the 
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process and affect the whole of society. In other words, important problems will remain unresolved 
and will persist in society. 
The overriding objective has significant distributive effects, thus the Kaldor Hicks analysis is 
indeterminate; the effect of CPR on individual welfare needs to be analyzed to see wider public 
interests and not just those of the users of the justice system. 
2.3.1 The solution  
Kaplow and Shavell have made a very persuasive argument on the issue: lawsuits may make 
everyone better off even when the cost of litigation exceeds the stakes of the case. So a rule that 
encourages litigation may not be generous enough. On the contrary, suits may make everyone worse 
off even when the costs are only a small fraction of the stakes. On the contrary, a stringent general 
rule that limits suits would be insufficiently strict. The point is when trying to reduce spending on the 
judicial system and restrict the access to some cases all the pertinent factors have to be considered, 
including the effect of the suit in channeling future behavior in society.464 That way, the wider public 
interests cannot be restricted only to court users. Public interest includes future channeling desirable 
behavior in the whole of society. Thus the reforms of Lord Woolf and Lord Jackson cannot work well 
and are simply an austerity government measure. 
Kaplow and Shavell explain the issues that occur under different procedural rules. Plaintiffs will be 
affected by different procedural regimes when they make the decision whether to sue or not.465 
There are three possible regimes. 
The most important element is to introduce social improvement by channeling future behavior that 
also leads to improved individual welfare. To achieve that, Kaplow and Shavell include one more 
element in their model—the cost of taking care (fulfilling contracts, avoiding accidents) that the 
defendant incurs to avoid the negative result. 
There are four possible situations depending on the costs of care and litigation, which were detailed 
in Chapter 4. 
2.3.2 The new position of the lever of the English judicial machine  
The policy lever position can be classified by starting from the position that everyone pays her own 
legal costs but in case one cannot afford it, there is some access to legal aid in civil matters. So there 
is a subsidy system in place. However, under the CPR regime, there is also a sort of prohibition to sue 
when the stakes of the case are lower than the resources expended on the case. It evokes expenses 
and proportionality of the stakes, importance, and complexity of the case at hand. It also allows 
distribution of court resources to other cases.  
The problem of the English regime is that it does not make a difference between the different 
situations and the different costs and incentives they create. It tries to put everything under one 
principle. The regime treats all potential litigation the same way. So instead of saving resources, it 
may prohibit the wrong lawsuit, or restrict beneficial lawsuits, which has an important influence on 
future behavior.   
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The most common problem in England is that Lord Woolf and Lord Jackson’s reforms postulate that if 
lawsuits are more expensive, the stakes should be restricted. As noted above, that is not always the 
case. Lawsuits may make everyone better off even when the cost of litigation exceeds the stakes of 
the case (point two: low cost of care and high litigation cost). Thus the factors to be considered are 
more numerous than the lords thought.  
So a complex litigation will most probably be long and expensive. Under CPR 1.1 1 (c) iii, that means 
legislation that is too expensive should be restricted. Instead of directly using the prohibitive regime 
(above Shavell & Kaplow, third possible regime), other relevant factors should be looked at. The 
reason is expensive legislation may need to be subsidized rather than prohibited. That will depend on 
the costs to the defendant to take care. If it is inexpensive for her to take precautions, this lawsuit, at 
a minimum, should be allowed and if it is too expensive for the plaintiff to bring suit (costs of a 
lawsuit too high compared with the expected award) it should be subsidized. Otherwise, the desired 
future behavior of potential defendants will not be channeled and everybody will be made worse off. 
So here there is a contrast between having a high cost of legislation and a high cost of a defendant’s 
care. 
Section 1.1 (1) (c) (i) is about the amount of money involved. That means high stakes of litigation. 
High stakes of litigation naturally lead to more litigation. That is the case even when the lawsuit is 
speculative. For example, if the plaintiff knows that his case is weak and he has only 10% chance of 
winning he will still fail a suit when the potential reward is really high. So if at a cost of 10 (the 
litigation costs) the plaintiff has a 10% chance of winning 1 million he will still file the suit even 
though that will not channel proper future behavior the reason is that if he is allowed to file a suit 
and even more if he wins it there will be more speculative lawsuits in the future. That is one more 
way in which the criteria for allowing and disallowing cases in the courts that Lord Woolf and Lord 
Jackson have introduced completely fail.  
What the examined CPR provision seems to suggest is that it follows quite the opposite logic. When 
the claim has low stakes, it should be prohibited since it is not proportionate to the costs of the 
lawsuit. However, such low-stakes claims may channel future behavior that is socially desirable 
because potential defendants will take care in the future, whereas speculative lawsuits for high 
stakes will never channel proper defendant behavior in the future.  
Section (c) (ii) deals with the importance of the case, which should be measured against the future 
impact of the case on the law, which can sometimes be hard to predict because a new line of cases 
and thus a new direction in the law can come decades in the future. The danger is then that an 
important case for the future development of the law may be deemed unimportant when it is first 
heard. 
2.4 The Right Way to Save Expenses from the Judicial System  
Based on the premise of overall societal good, where should the savings (the economy, the third 
principle of Lord Woolf’s reform) come from? From the fourth element of Kaplow and Shavell model 
when the cost of care is high and plaintiff’s cost of the suit is high. Many complete justice theorists 
who believe in the maxim fiat justitia ruat caelum (let justice be done though the heavens fall) will 
object to that part of the model. However, if economization is to be truly applied in a judicial system 
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it makes way more sense to do it when a judgment cannot change the situation in society because it 
makes very little sense for the defendant to take care. 
In sum, the failure in the UK reform has been the use of a theory of proportionality and 
economization that has not allowed them to create more flexible rules that take into account the 
above-mentioned factors. In other words, a working theory needs more flexibility and not simply 
replacing one guiding principle of justice (complete justice) with another (cost proportionality). The 
first one calls for total expenditure for the legal system and the second for the austerity of 
government spending for the court system. Leading law and economics scholars such as Shavell and 
Kaplow have shown, at first sight, a more complex path but one that leads to better results in the 
protection of individual and social welfare. Flexibility on spending control is the key feature of this 
theory. 
3.0 France and the Guiding Force of Stability  
England’s judicial system developed as a result of a bifurcation between common law and equity. The 
major difference between the development of the judicial system in England and France is that 
France’s system developed mostly as a result of another legal philosophy that was based on 
stability.466 It took major regime changes to induce a desire to change French procedure and court 
organization. Even that was not enough to introduce major changes for four centuries between 1667 
and the mid-1900s. French procedural law underwent only minor changes. Structural changes in the 
way the judicial system is organized strictly followed political influences and the struggle of who will 
dictate what the law is in France. These factors have led to an interesting result. In France, the search 
for a theory that governs the way the courts function has been significantly less important than in 
England, where the construction of the judicial system has always been a matter of making choices 
between the various existing alternative systems and regulative arrangements. 
3.1 Historical Overview of the Lever Positions in France 
3.1.1 Ancient regime and the Ordonnance of 1667  
The Ordonnance of 1667 was a procedural code with no significant theoretical elaboration. It was 
conceived as an important step towards the building of an absolute monarchy in France.467 As 
Dauchy has explained, this Ordonnance was conceived as a war machine against the parlements (the 
regional courts), which diluted the royal authority.468 It was a consolidation code that used the 
standards of judicial proceedings shaped over previous centuries.  
The innovation was mostly structural, putting the King and his council at the top of the judicial 
hierarchy. Interpretation was forbidden to judges. If one was needed, they had to refer the case to 
the King who had to declare his interpretations.469 The hierarchical tool created for ongoing control 
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of the judges’ jurisprudential work was the Council of Parties, which formed part of the King's 
Council.470 
Before the adoption of the Ordonnance, the position of all parliaments as supreme courts was equal. 
The one in Paris played a more central role because of the size of its jurisdiction, which had a span of 
more than the half of the kingdom.471 Thus, the Ordonnance changed the hierarchical importance of 
judges, especially of those most highly placed within the judicial system. 
What is remarkable is that the procedural part of the code remained extremely influential for 
centuries. This codification of existing procedures that was supposed to produce a code that was only 
practical proved progressive. The result was a vibrant and recyclable piece of legislation with parts of 
it remaining in use until the mid-twentieth century. Most significantly, the stability it provided 
allowed it to survive the change of a few significantly different political regimes.  
In England, the driving force behind all reforms was the concern with cost and delay. In France, for 
the drafters of Ordonnance that was also important. In the preamble, they used that cost and delay 
to attack the courts and condemn their arbitrary decision making. The instrument they used to do 
that was the excessive procedures and their costs that courts used at the time which also resulted in 
an ineffective judiciary that did not satisfy the needs of King’s subjects. 
In sum, although in France there were some concerns of cost and delay in the beginning, they did not 
lead to different solutions for improving the functioning of the judicial system.  The political struggle 
between the courts and the king resulted in the reform which gave strict hierarchical power to the 
King and his Council of Parties. Strengthening of one single vision of how the judicial system should 
operate stopped profound theoretical elaboration in its tracks.  
3.1.2 The French Revolution 
In general, during the Revolution, the implemented regulatory measures concerning the judicial 
system were mostly extreme. There were efforts to wipe out the old legal profession (i.e., both old-
style judges and the auxiliaries and various categories of counsel).  The result of these radical reforms 
was a backlash that in practice ensured, in many respects, the continuity and the survival of many of 
the Ancien Régime’s institutions and practices.472 
The Revolution introduced informal means of dispute resolution. A statute reduced the whole civil 
procedure to a handful of rules. The old procedures and institutions were replaced by informality 
inspired by the spirit of equality and fraternity between citizens. As a result, the quality of justice 
suffered. The lack of sufficiently detailed procedural rules and the inadequacy of many newly elected 
lay-judges soon generated a sense of arbitrary justice. 473 
3.1.3 The Napoleon regime  
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The new system had to pay homage to the revolutionary ideals while providing a stable and 
functional institutional basis for resolution of conflicts in society. The only system that could do that 
was the well-known Anciene regime procedure, which had to be reintroduced quietly through the 
back door.  
At the time of Napoleon, a more realistic attitude prevailed.474 Besides the fact that the old 
institutions made a comeback, the Napoleonic legislators used some of the less radical revolutionary 
principles. The Code was not a repetition of 1667 Ordonnance but rather a sort of fusion between 
the two previous regimes’ arrangements in civil procedure. The old institutions that were suited for a 
monarchy were not contrary to the interests of the Empire. For example, the advocates were one of 
those pre-revolutionary institutions that made a successful and lasting comeback under the new 
regime. 
There was no general theoretical part included in the code. That meant there was no specific 
theoretical direction.475 The reason is that the Napoleonic Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in a 
complex post-revolutionary context. That meant that there was a clash of the revolutionary ideals of 
informal and lay-persons dispute resolution that proved inadequate and led to strong perceptions of 
arbitrary justice and the need to have a code that works in practice.476 The commission charged with 
the drafting of the new rules was made up of practitioners who were familiar with only one 
procedural system— that of the Anciene regime. The draft was ready within two years and was 
submitted to the Cour de Cassation and the Courts of Appeal. The courts’ remarks on the draft were 
printed. 
The most important aspect of this chapter's analysis of the 1806 Code was that it was perceived only 
as a transitory and temporary step in the development of the French judicial system. The result was 
that a profound theoretical foundation and examination of procedure and the judicial organization 
was not accomplished at the time. 
3.1.4 The 20
th
 century and the new code 
The New Code of Civil procedure was conceived mainly as a result of sweeping changes in French 
society that brought about a new way of thinking. The 1806 code was based on liberal ideals such as 
party autonomy. In a society with a strong state power and predominant interventionist policies, 
keeping the power of the judicial process in the hands of the parties was seen as individualistic 
policy. In the words of Tissier, "nous avons en France une conception trop individualiste de la 
procédure."477 
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 The New Code is a theoretical mix that tries to “conciliate the liberal principles of French tradition 
which make parties the owners of the lawsuit, and the affirmation of the powers of the judge, who 
must – as a procedural mandate – realize his mission to achieve the fairest solution to the 
dispute.”478 A leading French specialist on the subject, Loic Cadiet, continues further: “Justice is a 
public service and impartiality is not passivity. In fact, it is justified to say that Articles 1 to 13 of the 
New Code define a genuine principle of cooperation between the judge and the parties in the 
elaboration of the judgment. This is, of course, the aim of civil procedure.”479 What that means is the 
theoretical underpinning of the code is only concerned with resolving the allocation of powers 
between judges and parties in the conduct of a lawsuit.  
The only exception to that narrow view of civil procedure is the phrase that follows that statement. 
Loic Cadiet said all that has to be done with the mission of the judge is “to achieve the fairest 
solution to the dispute, which is in the general interest.”480 How this general interest will be assessed 
is not mentioned. 
In sum, what that means for the search of a French theory in the New Code is limited. The Code does 
not say how the judicial system should operate. The aim of theoretical explanations of the code is 
only concerned with justifying the inclusion of new interventionist position the judge in legal 
proceedings and how they can be reconciled with the liberal traditions of the French judiciary. 
That also means that the French judicial system is a mixture of ideas and it does not have a clear 
recipe for how to achieve them. It simply tries to achieve everything. The commitment of the whole 
academic community is strongly towards fairness and doing complete justice. That is clear from 
Cadiet’s idea about the role of the judiciary to achieve the “fairest solution to the dispute,” which is 
also in “the general interests.” 
If the commitment to undefined fairness is excluded, the aim of the French theory has common 
elements with Kaplow and Shavell’s theory. As explained above, their theory proposes a clear way to 
reach the best solution that improves individual and social welfare. So the application of such theory 
in practice in France will be able to reconcile the liberal foundation of the French tradition by 
improving individual welfare by giving direction to judicial decision making and will also help improve 
social welfare that seems to be the aim of the New French code. Following vague and contradictory 
ideas about justice will never improve the quality of the French judicial system. It will only lead to the 
application of cross subsidies by trying to achieve everything even if it is contradictory. The lever that 
makes the judicial machine function in order to produce complete justice simply does not work. 
3.1.5 The comeback of cost and delay concerns under the European influence 
The cost and delay analysis in France must be considered seriously again. The first such consideration 
was part of the 1667 Ordonnance. The reason for the comeback is the influence of Article 6 § 1 of the 
European Human Rights Convention and the studies conducted by the European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice. An analysis of the current situation in France cannot be done without first 
looking at the law at the permeating European influence and is in a way the foundation of the French 
system in modern times.  
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3.1.6 The influence of Article 6 § 1 of the European Human Rights Convention 
The most important European influence is contained in Article 6 § 1 of the European Human Rights 
Convention. Benoît Frydman has pointed out that this article creates an obligation on the part of 
national signatory states to organize their judicial systems in such a way so as to facilitate the 
functioning of their judicial systems. Chronic obstructions are no excuse for continuous 
malfunction.481 That means a profound analysis has to be made of the French judicial system, one 
going back decades or even centuries, that examines past measures in order to see if they promote a 
well-functioning French judicial system or not. This is the exact aim of this work. 
As Natalie Fricero has interpreted it, Article 6 § 1 has a dual dimension: a system of values and 
economic efficiency. 482 Thus the former is, in essence, an equitable process characterized by 
impartial justice that promotes equality, accessibility, and predictability to be achieved through 
enhancing values. The latter is economic, which centers on the performance of the judicial system 
(reasonable delay).483 
The author is certain that her analysis has found an economic logic in the performance of the judicial 
system to satisfy litigants’ private interests. However, the danger is that by focusing on the expenses 
of the judicial system, the result will be very similar to the English analysis in the previous section.484 
That type of analysis will not provide real quality of justice in France. Minimizing expenditure, on its 
own, is a dangerous goal if it is done in the English manner. 
Benoît Frydman has expressed a similar opinion, arguing that it is indispensable to deal with the 
conditions in which justice is rendered and administered.485 According to Jean Paul Jean and the 
Council of Europe, it is the quality of the process and the debate that leads to a judicial decision and 
its efficiency.486  
The view of Natalie Fricero of quality has also focused on social wellbeing, which requires an 
impediment to the strategic behavior of litigants that artificially provoke delay by the parties who use 
their better economic position to elevate and to increase the cost of proceedings. 487 Two of the 
chapters of this work, Appeal and Access to Courts, deal with how the state can improve its own 
economically viable strategy in order to stop such behavior. The problem of social welfare is central 
as well to this work as well and it will receive a wider examination not only in connection with detail. 
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Reducing the delays that have burdened the English system for centuries and are now part of the 
European agenda of improving the existing judicial systems on the Continent has been transposed 
and is the law in France: Following Article 6 of the European Convention Human Rights article L. 111-
3 of the Code de l’organisation judiciaire says, "les décisions de justice sont rendues dans un délai 
raisonnable."488 
In France, excessive delays are the most common critiques of the way the judicial system functions. 
The Ministry of Justice has shown statistics that this is not a common place. However, several cases 
of extreme delays have been quite prominent.489 The critics have said that the cause is bad 
organization of judicial services and use of human resources, the complexity of the system, and lack 
of transparency.490 These criticisms will be examined in the following chapter from an economic 
perspective. The analysis will be of the judicial organization (complexity of the system and 
organization of judicial services) and incentives for judges to function properly within the judicial 
system (human resources aspect and transparency).   
The delay caused by the parties in France can be even greater than in its two common law 
counterparts. The reason is the multiple hearings procedure. In order to avoid surprises, the French 
system allows for the parties to demand postponement of the hearing every time there is new 
evidence or some new events occur. That procedural arrangement is completely contrary to the 
common law tradition of a day in court. That difference exists because of the historical development 
of the two systems. In England, the judges had to travel outside of London and had a limited time to 
spend in a town. Plus, the system was built around jury trials that required the gathering of 
nonprofessional jurors for whom multiple-day trials were inconvenient. In France, an elaborate 
procedural system of centralized trials with appeals to the central authorities in Paris was established 
quite early on.  The result that the French system was not built around a minimalistic view on how 
many days the process should last. Consequently, the opportunities the parties have to postpone 
proceedings are even more pronounced than in common law systems, where tactical maneuvering, 
traditionally fostered by the party control of the process, is one of the most common causes of delay.  
The problems of the French judicial system are clearly exposed in the reports of the European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice. France ranks very low in the budget allocated to the 
judiciary, 491France scored particularly low in increases in the budget allocated to courts and judges 
available per capita of the population.492  
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All that spending has had to increase and will probably continue to rise in order to meet European 
standards.  The question of how this new budget allocation is spent will become even more 
important. Without a theory of justice that helps improve the way courts function all the money 
poured into the system will simply go to waste.  Thus, Natalie Fricero’s article is extremely important 
for this work because it has given it important directions to follow in the search of quality of the 
justice system that concentrates on the economic understanding of how to better organize the 
judicial machine.  
3.2 The Scope and Domain of the Needed Analysis 
Benoît Frydman has defined it very well: The focus of administration of justice is general because it 
does not deal with particular cases and how judges decide them but with the whole mass content of 
the judicial system. They deal with the production of justice. Thus, the field of application is much 
larger because it concerns the criteria that affect the quality, efficiency and the functioning of the 
justice system as public service. Further theory details include the nomination promotion of 
magistrates (Hierarchy chapter), the means to dispense of the official machine of justice (Public good 
chapter), caseload (public good chapter) in terms of the budget of justice (Appeal chapter), how 
litigants are treated and whether they receive satisfactory service (Access to Courts chapter), and 
ways to improve the collection of evidence (Information chapter).493Of course, the direction as seen 
above is much larger because some of the authors did not provide an exhaustive list enumerating all 
issues that such analysis deals with.  
In sum, the current developments in France strongly confirm the direction taken by this work. 
3.2.1 The opposing views  
The first question that has to be answered in the search of possible opposition to the view described 
here is whether there is a contradiction between the economic approach and quality of justice. The 
law of 1 August 2001 concerning the laws of finance [LOLF] has a primary objective of formulating 
justice by rendering quality decisions within a reasonable delay. So is there a contradiction between 
demanding efficiency in judicial decision making? Or as Jean Paul Jean has put it –does justice 
depend on the environment in which it is rendered? "C’est donc de qualité sous contraintes dont il 
s’agit : contraintes de la procédure, du temps, contrainte de la productivité, contrainte budgétaire" 
(Quality under restricctions of procedure, time, productivity, and judicial budgets). These very same 
questions have been asked for years in the UK.494 
As mentioned in the Theory Chapter, Kaplow and Shavell's propositions improve quality of justice. It 
is an economic approach that is not based only on efficiency—which is only an approximation 
measure of the social interest—but also incorporates individual welfare to bring about better social 
results. Moreover, efficiency is often confused with economization. The latter concept is basically an 
austerity measure that governments such as the UK implement to reduce spending on judicial 
services. That approach is entangled with calls for more efficient use of the resources. Such a way of 
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thinking cannot lead to better quality justice. It will reduce justice, as it did in England. What is 
needed is to have efficiency analysis that is not subordinated to economization but to economic 
welfare analysis.  
3.2.2 Further critique of our approach 
Jean-Paul Jean has an important argument against efficiency. He has stated that efficient justice will 
sentence 100% of the accused.495 It is suggested that his idea is based on the confusion between an 
economic theory of justice that cares more about the functioning of the judicial system and a theory 
of adjudication, which is concerned with the actual decision making. There is a gap in the French 
literature on the issue that further research should address. This gap is evident throughout the entire 
book on Quality of Judicial Decisions. In the same volume, some of the authors talk about a theory of 
adjudication and some talk about the theory of the environment in which decisions are taken. So a 
well-functioning system of justice may sentence 100% of the accused only if the theory of 
adjudication that the courts apply says that they have committed a wrong and not because of the 
fact that the system functions economically well.496 
To put it in economic terms, there is a choice of a social welfare function that has to be made. No 
modern society has preferences for sentencing all of the accused. The social welfare function will be 
based on purely legal criteria, for example, on who should be put behind bars. It is extremely hard to 
imagine a contemporary economic theory that propagates on grounds of efficiency that every 
accused should be found guilty. The role of economics is to assist the legal system to achieve its 
goals, whatever that may be.497  
Jean Paul Jean has another concern. He thinks efficiency considerations will result in a more 
standardized justice.498 This work will demonstrate that such fears have a foundation only if 
economic criteria of quality are misunderstood and/or simplified as sometimes it has happened in 
England. However, this work will maintain the argument that nuances should be examined carefully. 
Just choosing one standard, which says that will make the judicial system function better without 
even looking at how the proposed solution works or what consequences will be for the different 
parties involved will simply have a negative impact on the functioning of the judicial system. A good 
example of standardization is the following statement by Jean Paul Jean: “to improve efficiency the 
alternative methods of dispute resolution should be used.”499 ADR is not always the optimal choice. A 
more profound economic analysis shows that distinctions between different situations have to be 
made in the Public Goods chapter. Sometimes it is more socially beneficial to use the court system to 
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resolve disputes rather than alternative methods. This problem will be discussed in detail in the 
Chapter for ADR and public goods. Only a profound analysis of the issues in order to achieve a 
socially beneficial result can help us avoid standardization of the law and allow the judicial system to 
improve its quality.    
3.3 Conclusion  
Having a clear idea of what justice should be is extremely important for any judicial system. Without 
a clear direction, a judicial system will try to do everything.  Throughout the ages, justice has been 
interpreted differently because it is an inherently contradictory concept. Choosing a theory that has a 
positive impact on both individual welfare and overall social interest is essential for improving the 
functioning of any judicial machine. This work has concluded that a theory providing complete justice 
to the parties cannot produce good results because of intrinsic contradictions of such theory. We 
have stated that the theory lever of the judicial machine cannot be put in the position of complete 
justice. The theory that provides the best solutions is economic. From the theories described above, 
the one proposed by Kaplow and Shavell comes closest to providing quality guidance as to how to 
organize a judicial system. So the theory lever of the judicial machine should be put in a position that 
follows this theory. Kaplow and Shavell’s theory is neither complete nor perfect. Further research is 
needed to expose working solutions that are inspired by the science that deals with providing 
improved solutions to organizational function—economics. 
Our comparative analysis confirmed that preliminary finding. We found that in England the reforms 
that followed complete justice ideas failed. The study of the English judicial system also revealed that 
not producing a sophisticated economic theory also leads to problems in the functioning of the 
judicial machine.  
Another important finding has been that the political and legal environment in England predisposed 
for a more thorough development of theories that accompany the reforms of the judicial system. The 
reason for that was shown to be that the early regulation of the judiciary in England created a 
fragmented judiciary underlined by the diversity of procedures and strong competitive forces acting 
between them. That created a fruitful environment to consider theories that can optimize the 
functioning of the judicial system.  
In France, such alternative systems did not exist. The first reform that oversaw the enactment of the 
1667 Ordonnance eliminated opposing opinions by creating a strict judicial hierarchy. Historical 
considerations such as the extreme solutions enacted during the French Revolution period and the 
perceived temporary character of the 1806 Napoleonic Procedural Code led to a lack of profound 
debate on the theory of judicial organization. The 20th-century reform only concentrated on 
reconciling the French liberal traditions with new judicial interventionist regulation. Only now with 
the European influence and critique of the way the French judicial system functions the path for 
considering new theories of the judicial organization has been open. This thesis tries to propose one 
such theory that examines the main elements that are relevant to the method of improving the 
functioning of the judicial system based on an economic analysis of law. The comparative analysis 




SECTION II: COMPARATIVE PROCEDURAL LEVERS OF 
THE JUDICIAL MACHINE 
 
Chapter 9: Access to Courts in France 
And Squeezing the Middle Class 
1.0 Introduction 
It has been made apparent that complete access to justice is an illusory idea suitable only for a small, 
ideal society. There is clear superiority in a complex lever position that tries to achieve maximum 
access to justice by taking individual and social considerations into account. This chapter will attempt 
to show that in practice, the general conclusion is also valid for France.  
The question is how to improve access to courts for individual and social benefit in France. The 
reason for trying to do that is because in France, the right to access justice is recognized as a 
fundamental right and is supported by diverse legal mechanisms500 that guarantee supporting it 
including the French 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the 1950 European 
Convention of Human Rights, and several codes including Article 4 of the Civil Code. Decisions of 
Conseil Constitutionel (the French Constitutional Court) have also confirmed that fundamental right. 
Decisions 88 248 DC of 17 January 1989 and 96-373 DC of 26 January 1996 have held that access to 
courts is an essential component of the Constitution. These decisions are based on Article 16 of the 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which states that where rights cannot be 
guaranteed, there is no constitution.501  
That strong statement is reminiscent of an approach that is not possible to achieve in practice unless 
the budget for legal aid is unlimited or at least extremely large.  The practical approach to achieving 
the best possible result of access to justice is to first examine find out where the French judicial 
system comes short in providing access to courts. The goal is to answer the question: who are the 
individuals who do not enjoy enough access to the courts. 
The next step will be to verify the preliminary conclusion. Finding superiority of this approach 
requires examination of specific environmental factors (independent parameters) in France that may 
influence the result. Such issues may have either positive or negative influence on the conclusion. 
Again the number of independent parameters can be substantial. The challenge is the vastness of 
possible legal, historical, political, social, cultural and ethical norms that can influence the values of 
the dependent parameters, the regulatory levers, of the judicial system. Therefore here only some 
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possible influences will be examined and the hope is that further research will elucidate the issue in 
more detail. 
The final step will be to reach a conclusion on access to courts in France. 
2.0 The Problems of Access to Courts According to Galander Adapted for France 
Let’s have a look briefly at the three claims of Marc Galander that in practice restrict access to courts 
for the have-nots. First, the “haves” possess superior resources that allow them to hire the best 
available legal representation. They can also handle delays. That is even more important in France 
because it has a   protracted process that continues in a number of hearings in order to reduce the 
introduction by one of the parties of elements that can surprise the opponent during the litigation 
process. The result, however, is that can be a way to discourage poorer litigants from continuing with 
the litigation because the costs mount with every additional hearing. Only the judge has the power to 
stop this strategic delay tactic by saying that she is ready to make a decision.  
Second, more often than not, the “haves” are “repeat players” in the legal process whereas the have-
nots usually take part a legal process just once. Consequently, they enjoy a superior experience in 
handling cases that result in freedom to choose which cases to take to court and where to take them. 
Thus, they are able to choose whether to go to court in particular instances and it is suggested more 
importantly to choose their forum. One of the cases, featured at the beginning of this thesis, clearly 
shows that Bernard Tapie was a repeat player and able to choose his forum twice. First, he chose his 
case to be decided in ADR proceedings.  And second, when the court refused to enforce the arbitral 
award, he took his “modified” claim to the official court system when he should have been barred 
from commencing a procedure twice on the same issue. It was the skill of the best lawyers available 
that allowed him to do so. 
Third, repeat players have strategic advantages in shaping the law because they can settle cases that 
can lead to disadvantageous to them new rule outcomes. At the same time, they can afford to push 
cases that can create advantageous to them rules. Have-nots, on the contrary, should be willing to 
trade off the possibility of making "good law" for tangible gain. So the question is who can dictate the 
rules and to whose detriment in France? For France that is has to be taken with the limitation that 
judge made law is far weaker source of law than legislation. In practice, Cour de cassation or Conseil 
Constitutionel interpretations play a significant role in shaping the law.502  
The question is: who do we want to go to court? Is it worth protecting individuals? Do they have 
valuable information for society? How does their information stack up against information of 
organizations? What are their legitimate goals that we also want to protect, such as business 
organizations that need to create wealth in order for society to function?  
2.1 Methods for Extending the Access to Courts  
To answer the question of who are the have-nots in France, we have to first examine the way in 
which access to courts is improved by various legal regulations.  
2.1.1 Court fees  
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Part of the effort in France to widen the access to courts is to waive court fees and provide free 
access to all courts.  On the contrary, other states draw revenues from court fees,503 including 
England and Wales, where the civil and family courts are, in the main, self-funding with the majority 
of the cost funded by court fees. The part of cost not covered by fees is met by the general taxpayer 
as part of the resource budget of the Ministry of Justice .504 It is questionable that the French solution 
that puts greater burden on the taxpayers is a reasonable solution. A more complex solution that is 
based on the previously discussed formula proposed by Kaplow and Shavell have suggested subsidies 
and burdens on court fees and thus access to courts seems way more reasonable. 
2.1.2 Legal aid 
The main method to extend access to courts is by providing legal aid to people who cannot afford to 
pay for legal services. However, Damaska has argued that maintaining a functioning legal aid system 
is a very costly activity for the state, which has to invest its limited resources and actually improve 
the quality as well as the quantity of legal representation. The state has to be able and willing to 
spend enormous resources to subsidize litigation assistance in order to be effective.505 That is 
probably one of the main reasons, besides the laissez faire traditions. In the US, legal aid is only on a 
voluntary basis in civil cases. There, legal aid has minimal impact on improving access to courts as 
mentioned in the chapter, “Access to Courts.” 
2.2 Strong Historical Traditions of Legal Aid in France  
On the contrary, in France, the commitment to access to justice has strong traditions. It can be traced 
back to the 8th century. Back then the kings instructed their judges to decide cases of indigents and 
elderly without and cost and with no delay. The image of thirteenth century Saint Louis dispensing 
justice equally to the poorest and the lowest is a fundamental block of the French legal culture. It is 
not surprising then that the French revolution was in part triggered by the disenchantment of the 
French people with the functioning of the justice system. The result was the above-cited article 16 of 
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Other reforms trying to improve the 
access to courts also followed. 
The first substantial attempt to establish a modern legal aid system can be traced to 1851 when a 
system of financing for persons with low income was created. This system did not work well. In 1971, 
it was estimated that only 6% of the court users benefited from legal aid support.  
2.2.1 The French Budget for Legal Aid  
In recent years, this strong French commitment to access to courts has come under pressure. Both 
internal sources506 and external reports from the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 
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have criticized heavily the French legal aid system. One of the results has been its increased budget. 
The total annual approved public budget for allocated to legal aid was increased from 187 million in 
1998 to 367 180 000 € in 2014.  
A brief comparison with the budget in England and Wales for the same year (2014) shows that there 
the total budget was more than six times larger: 2 350 470 057. 507  For the total population of around 
58 million In England and Wales as compared to France of almost 65 million more than seven million 
less than in France.  
Considering the rate of inflation for those years and that other countries spend in times more on 
legal aid that is not a significant increase but it still shows some commitment of the French 
government to provide legal aid to its citizens. Nevertheless, that increased commitment of the 
government requires increased awareness of the way this budget is spent. 
In that year, the annual public budget allocated to legal aid for cases brought to court 308 120 000 €.  
Annual public budget allocated to legal aid for non-litigious cases or cases not brought to court (legal 
consultation, ADR, etc.)  was 59 060 000€.508 
The legal aid budget included in the above table is the total amount for those benefiting from legal 
aid, including lawyers. This expenditure does not include legal aid administrative costs.509 In France, 
the legal aid budget has other sources than the government; for example, the notaries and the bar 
associations also contribute to the annual legal aid budget. 
2.2.2 The French regulation of legal aid problem 
In France, the level of legal aid to be granted is determined by a general inflexible rule provides for 
full or partial coverage of the litigation costs.510 The legislation that regulates legal aid is called Loi n° 
91-647 du 10 juillet 1991.511 Some studies on the legal aid in France have shown that there are still 9 
000 000 of French citizens who do not have access to justice.512 It is suggested that this is a very low 
estimate. The reality is much bleaker than that as the examination of the two sides of the legal aid 
process (lawyers and users) show.  
2.3 Lawyer’s Perspective  
From the perspective of lawyers,513 legal aid is disastrous. They lose per each hour they work on such 
cases around 27.96 euros. In order to keep her practice financially viable, the lawyer will have to 
compensate for the loss that comes from legal aid cases. This means that she will charge other 
people more than the actual price of 75 euros. If a lawyer is losing money by dealing with such a case 
and not some other case, she will probably send a junior associate to deal with the legal aid case. 
That means the legal aid system does not provide the quality of lawyers needed. 
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 Lawyers are not the only legal profession that provides legal aid in France. Since they deal with the vast 
majority of cases we will not deal with the other providers. 
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Studies on the profitability of law firms in France have shown that in order to pay all the fixed taxes 
and charges that are equal to 50% to 70% of the monthly income, they have to charge the clients 
around 75 euros per hour. The increase of the fee lawyers receive for legal aid cases has increased 
with only 0.15 per years since 1991. The amount does not consider the time spent on the case, its 
complexity, or the charges to be paid. The French state has not conducted a precise economic study 
to determine the amount that has to be paid to lawyers to make taking legal aid cases viable. This 
regulation thus is completely inadequate and obsolete. 514  Everything is based on one general 
inflexible rule. 
Besides, some lawyers decide to stop practicing or specialising in areas of the law where Legal aid 
cases are the most numerous. The problem is that quite often such areas of the law are concerned 
with very important social issues for which clients need legal advice: Family Law, Labour Law, 
Consumer Law etc. Demand for representation in many of these areas of law is inelastic. That means 
that people do not have a choice of whether to use a lawyer or not. For example, in cases concerning 
to child custody, demand is inelastic (the price does not determine the demand). One has to hire a 
lawyer if he/she wants to see his/her children again. Thus, the price increase because of the 
compensation for the existence of the legal aid system is a great burden on many users of the court 
system with low or middle-class income. 515  
This legislation creates the wrong incentives. The reason is if lawyers are not paid a flexible amount 
that at least considers the time spent on the case, the complexity and charges they have to cover 
even if they take on the case they will not put any effort into it. The quality of representation cannot 
exist under such an inflexible regime.  
One of the results has been that only a small number of firms that use economies of scale can make a 
profit in dealing with such cases. In 2011, the Law Committee for the Assemblée Nationale reported 
that only about 400 lawyers out of 45 000 who are admitted nationally to the bar, deal mostly with 
legal aid cases.  The typical legal aid firm according to 2014 Senate Law Commission report consists 
of two to three female lawyers. These firms have a share of 80% legal aid cases in their total 
workload.  
What that means for the quality representation of legal aid cases is that these firms take on a large 
number of cases, spend little time and effort on individual cases, and have developed practices 
(templates) that will cut the time and effort to deal with each type of legal aid case. That does not 
lead to the highest quality of representation.   
2.3.1 Individual perspective 
According to Article 4 of the legislation concerning legal aid,516 if a person earns 1 000 euros or less 
per month, the legal aid will fund 100% of the lawyer’s fees. If the person earns between 1001 and 
1182 euros, legal aid will fund 55% of the fees and between 1183 and 1500 euros, 25% of the fees. 
For people with income slightly over the minimum limit for example with a monthly income of 1185 
euros, the price for hiring a lawyer is much higher. So the program of legal aid has the result to 
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increase the prices for all other users of the court system. That makes the already high prices even 
more unaffordable for working people (low-middle and middle class). According to a 2014 Senate 
Law Commission report, 14. 3 million people are entitled to receive legal aid, 7.4 million can receive 
full coverage, and 6.9 million can receive partial coverage. 
In 2012, a total of 915 563 cases could benefit from legal aid. What is more interesting is that from 
that number 821 777 were full coverage and only 93 786 were the cases that benefited from partial 
legal aid. That in practice means that people benefited from partial legal aid managed to use the 
courts eight times less than those who benefited from full coverage.  
There is one more consideration that will most probably reduce further this number. It will be 
interesting to see more detailed statics because in most of these cases it is possible that the plaintiffs 
just had no choice but to go to court. In economic terms, the demand for such cases is inelastic. 
What that means is someone who earns 5, 50, or 500 euros more than the maximum amount of 
income (1000 euros) is practically barred from using legal aid and uses it only when he/she does not 
have a choice and must go to court with or without legal aid.  Thus, in practice only slightly above 7.4 
million people in France can benefit from legal aid.  
According to Galander’s analysis, repeat players can introduce changes in the law whereas the have-
nots cannot do that easily. As seen in the Bernard Tapie case, people at the top with strong political 
influence can use freely different procedures to receive access to justice to try to get the result they 
desire. From the above discussion, it follows that to a certain degree people in the lowest income 
bracket can also defend their rights in court but with low-quality representation. That means that in 
a limited way, they can still send some information of what they see as wrong in society by getting 
heard in court.  
That also means that the middle class gets the least access to courts.  What is important to note is 
that in France, the income difference between the middle class and those in the lower income 
bracket is much smaller than in countries like the US. For example, the tax burden is much higher so 
the living income difference between someone who earns 1000 euros per month and someone who 
earns 2000 is minimal. The OECD and World Bank 2016 report called “The squeezed middle class in 
OECD and emerging countries–myth and reality”517 shows that the percentage changes in household 
disposable income of middle-income households in France bears the fourth highest tax burden in 
Europe after Greece, Ireland, and Portugal for the period between 2010-2015. It also has the lowest 
benefits increase. That means that the middle class in France faces one of the highest pressures in 
Europe. For the stability of a modern democratic society, a stable and content middle class is pivotal. 
In the same report, another worrying statistic shows that France scores very low on social trust. The 
correlation that the report has found is that trust is lower in countries with a squeezed middle class. 
All that can have dangerous results for the stability of the French society. 
What does it take in order to provide the weaker party with adequate representation assistance? 
That is a very costly activity for the state that has to invest its limited resources and actually improve 
the quality of representation not just to provide on paper some representation. The state has to be 
able and willing to spend enormous resources to subsidize litigation assistance in order to be 
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effective.518  In the UK, the criminal representation was heavily subsidized until recently. The result 
was that the profession attracted a substantial talent. However, the cost of the judicial system has 
caused great concern and reforms were instigated to reduce spending. Instead of providing viable 
solutions, the reformers have simply implemented austerity measures.  
In sum, government subsidies for improving the representation of the weaker party are rarely 
enough. In order for such a system to work, it has to provide that party with both sufficient quantity 
and quality of representation. This model is extremely expensive to implement and it needs a 
working system of case selection. 
2.4 A Way Forward: The Economic Solution  
Article 12 of Loi n° 91-647 du 10 juillet 1991 provides for the existence of Legal Aid Bureau attached 
to the Tribunal de Grand Instance that decides the admissibility of cases for legal aid claims. Section 
13 describes the function of those bureaus and the selection of cases they make. Mostly the 
selection is for higher level courts and administrative courts. According to Section 16, each legal aid 
bureau is presided by a magistrate from either Cour de grand instance (first instance court) of Cour 
d’appel (Appeal Court) for civil matters.  
If this Legal Aid Bureau could consist of magistrates with special training who can apply a more 
sophisticated criteria on selection of cases and not the discretion they have at the moment the legal 
aid system in France could work a better. It can select the cases that need to be subsidized and the 
cases that need to be restricted.  
Certain restrictions which are based on the bureau decisions already exist. Some authors have 
argued that, in the context of Article 6 of the European Convention for Human Rights, they are 
admissible only if they aim at "a legitimate aim and if there is a relationship Reasonable between the 
means employed and the aim pursued."519 
That is absolutely correct. However, if the aid is to function optimally and produce positive results 
both for individuals and society as a whole, clear criteria for selecting the cases that go through the 
system of legal aid have to be devised. 
It is suggested that the Kaplow and Shavell criteria employed in chapter “Access to Courts” will 
produce the best results. That means that access to legal aid should be allowed when the cases at 
hand stand a good chance of making everyone better off even when the cost of legal aid exceeds the 
stakes of the case. These legal aid cases should be encouraged generously. On the contrary, suits 
may make everyone worse off even when the costs are only a small fraction of the stakes. So a 
stringent general rule that limiting legal aid would be insufficiently strict. 520  All that should be 
considered in light of what cases can channel the appropriate future behavior in society.  
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The proposition made for a lever position in general for putting the regulatory lever at a flexible 
juncture between restrictions and subsidy of access to courts applies as an extension to legal aid. It 
will both save resources by restricting cases based on clear criteria and will subsidize cases that have 
important information on things that are going wrong in society that need fixing. 
The condition for this proposal to work is that the members of the legal aid bureau and especially the 
presiding magistrates be specifically trained to distinguish the two types of cases. That will 
necessarily involve some training of the magistrates in law and economics.521 
In sum, in France, the quality of the legal aid system is doubtful because of the fourfold problem 
identified here. First, there is relatedly low-level budget allocation for legal aid. Second, the wrong 
incentives are created for lawyers and finally, the existing legislation does not allow people with 
relatively the same income to receive legal aid based on robust criteria of their claim and its 
influence on channelling desirable future behaviour is society. Fourth, expensive court structures for 
case selection exist but the magistrates are not trained on how to distinguish between cases that 
should be subsidized from cases that should be restricted.  
2.4.1 Legal insurance  
One development that is facilitating access to justice in European states, particularly for individuals 
who are not granted legal aid, is the availability of private legal expense insurance.522 Individuals are 
able to insure themselves to cover the cost of legal advice, legal assistance, and representation in 
court proceedings.   
Legal insurance’s influence has a similar effect as legal aid because it is not paid for achieving a result. 
Many people and businesses in France now take on insurance in case of legal dispute and they 
expect quality representation. The fact is the scope of coverage is contractual. That means that 
insurance companies will not pay for the whole costs of legal proceedings unless the insured takes on 
a very expensive insurance.  
The insured can freely choose her lawyer but the coverage insurance contracts have limits which can 
include: limit of the legal field, price ceilings of what is covered by the insurance, ceiling of lawyer’s 
fees and territorial restrictions, etc. It is then important for the client to know what the limitations of 
the contract are.523 
If the ceilings of lawyer’s fees are very low that practically limits the choice of lawyers. Legal 
problems for individuals is not something that they can easily predict so they will not know from the 
beginning what kind of insurance policy to buy. Thus, insurance contracts, which contain restrictions 
on the area of law, can be a significant detriment to court access for individuals. In any case, it does 
not seem that such a scheme can provide high-quality legal representation unless the insurance 
policy is quite extensive. 
Moreover, legal services resemble a sunk cost auction. That means a plaintiff who thinks her 
insurance will cover her costs will start a lawsuit. When she realizes that she has put a lot of money 
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and effort in the lawsuit she still needs to invest more in order to get the desired result she will not 
want to stop there and may continue pouring money in the lawsuit even though the benefit is lower 
than the amount spent. That may also lead to a situation when the socially optimal amount spent on 
the lawsuit is much lower than what is actually spent. The reason is part of the expense is covered by 
insurance, which the plaintiff does not count as an expense. Thus, the amount she spends in addition 
to the insurance coverage can be much larger than what is socially optimally to spend on that 
particular lawsuit. 
In sum, the availability of legal insurance can have some positive effect on access to justice but it can 
also create further distortions to the market for legal services that can have a negative social effect. 
2.4.2 Contingent fees rule analysis 
As seen in the Access to Courts chapter, in the US one of the main methods for extending access to 
justice in the US has been contingency fee arrangements. In France, such structuring of the legal fees 
is also called with its Latin name,  pacte de quota litis is strictly forbidden by Article 10 de la loi n° 71-
1130 du 31 décembre 1971.524 A French lawyer may be disbarred in the event that she was to 
conclude a contingency fee agreement with a client. The French alternative to contingency fees is a 
written agreement with the client that can allow the lawyer to get a sort of bonus if they win the 
case.  
This “bonus” almost amounts to contingent fees use. It still creates incentives for French lawyers to 
work hard to win the case but it cushions them in a case she loses. So it is a win-win situation for the 
lawyer.  
Own Fiss has been very critical of contingent fees arrangement because it shifts the power from the 
claimant to her lawyers. They can choose only cases from which they can gain a lot and ignore 
others. Moreover, this arrangement works mostly for personal injury cases. But it should be noted 
that without such possibility many cases will not get the attention they need at all. The French “win 
bonus” arrangement has the same effect and gives even more power to the lawyers so it does not 
make sense to exclude one way to provide legal services to at least personal injury plaintiffs.  
In sum, the French “bonus” rule has a bit weaker incentive for lawyers to do well, plus it does not 
extend the access to courts at all so it does not make sense to forbid contingency fees arrangements 
in France. 
2.4.3 Out-of-court settlement  
Another source of more general access to justice is out of court settlement of cases. How does that 
work in France? The outsider perspective on the French litigation process is clear from the website of 
one of the big international law firms that deal with French litigation: 
It is possibly for this reason among others that, once the initial writ has been served, some 95% 
of matters would tend to go to full trial and this is generally the perspective of the typical French 
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Attorney. Thus, any early suggestion of settlement by Attorneys from outside France could 
possibly be perceived to be indicative that they consider that they have a weak case.525 
It is suggested that seven years of teaching experience in the French law schools also confirms that 
perspective to a certain degree. French law students are not taught to first try to negotiate their 
cases. The prevailing attitude is to bring cases to court straight away. However, that is only part of 
the picture. The French perspective is not so much about settlement but conciliation and mediation. 
So for French lawyers, out-of-court settlement is more about alternative dispute resolution.  
The origins of that attitude can probably be traced to legislation from the French revolutionary 
period, Loi of 16 and 24 August 1790 which established simple justice system geographically close to 
its users. What is more interesting about this system is that it was based on conciliation and equity 
judgments.  It created the so-called “juge de paix” (peace judge) that existed until 1958 when it was 
replaced by tribuneaux d’instance that is now complimented by juges de proximite, created in 2002. 
These local judges of proximity, mainly in civil matters, still have the same aim of conciliation and 
mediation which provides speedy resolution at a low cost and, if possible, avoidance of appeals.  
The French civil procedural code also contains a provision in which French judges are supposed to try 
to reconcile the parties before commencing the litigation.526 There is also obligatory conciliation 
procedure in the employment tribunal. The Assemblée National Commission recommended 
extension of legal aid to mediation as well.  
Another way that mediation and conciliation are intertwined in France with settlement is through 
various initiatives. Conciliators have their own website that says that in 2013, 233 472 cases were 
submitted for conciliation. 527Another one is, for example, the initiative of the First President of the 
Court of Appeal of Toulouse, who has helped create a mediation center that tries to reconcile 
litigants before the proceedings of have started in court.  
So is the number of 95% that go to trial without settlement correct? Some authors have argued that 
465 000 cases settled out of court with the help of legal aid advice and assistance. The truth is that 
settlement rates are lower than in other judicial systems528 and part of the burden of the judicial 
system can be reduced by settling easy cases. Whether that will be done through mediation and 
conciliation services or direct settlement conferences is not important.  
                                                          
525
 For more, see http://www.triplet.com/70-10_litigation/70-30_structure.asp 
526




 Report, p. 53. In the US, the number often given for cases that settle is 95%. Although not exact it shows 
that settlement is big part of the American legal culture. In the UK the number of settlements is not clear but is 
lower than in the US. The following statement of Lord Jackson in his reform report gives an idea about the 
numbers of litigation and somewhat of settlement in the UK.  “High Court litigation. During 2007 approximately 
75,00020 cases were brought in the High Court. Out of these 75,000 cases, approximately 10% were contested 
and thus potentially gave rise to significant costs orders. Overall numbers. As set out in section 2 above, the 
volume of county court litigation far exceeds the volume of High Court litigation. A fair overall summary of civil 
litigation in 2007 may run as follows: approximately 2.1 million civil cases were launched, of which at least 95% 
were brought in the county courts. Approximately 90% of all civil cases were concluded without any prolonged 
contest and at costs proportionate to the issues at stake. The remaining 10% of cases were contested (whether 
or not settled before trial) and potentially gave rise to significant costs liabilities.”  
212 
 
Recently, the judiciary in France has started to promote greater private resolution of cases in order 
to reduce trial rates. As Hadfield has argued, the results of such policy are not always fully successful. 
The reason is increasing settlement rates may not decrease the burden of trials; it may only decrease 
the cases that go to non-trial adjudication. For France that means that new policy to have more cases 
mediated (settled in a way) in the  mediation centers attached to courts529 may only decrease the 
number of cases that go to another new procedure well known to American courts—the fast track 
procedure that allows cases to be decided by summary judgement rather than a full trial. And the 
third option is that this promotion of settlement through mediation centers in courts can reduce the 
number of cases that go to the conciliation services provided by the French association of 
conciliators.  
Another possible situation that has to be avoided according to Hadfield can be that efforts to 
promote greater settlement in cases that have organizations as plaintiffs may be a poor target. The 
reason is these cases are already very likely to settle. Moreover, they are much less numerous than 
the individual plaintiff cases.530 That means further selection of cases is needed in these centers.  
That mediation initiative in the Cour d’appel that tries to promote settlement has to be implemented 
with other issues in mind as well. The initiative has to have different strategy techniques to 
overcome barriers to settlement in individual plaintiff and organizational plaintiff cases because the 
plaintiff types have different goals.  For example, the barrier to settlement in organizational cases is 
largely an informational one, which can be solved through mediation efforts focused on increasing 
information exchange and case assessment.531 Individual plaintiffs, however, have chosen the public 
courts and not a private system of adjudication for a reason. For example, they may have less 
information and worse representation. Consequently, they hope that the court will play a more 
active role in supplying the information and promoting their case. So a simple information exchange 
effort will not be enough because the side with better representation will not be willing to share its 
superior information. Thus, informal judicial settlement efforts will not have a great effect. 
The bottom line is that settlement has to be done with the clear criterion of cases that can be settled 
and those that cannot. Cases that can channel desirable future behavior in society need to go to the 
courts. The types of cases that need to be settled are: First, simple cases in already well developed 
areas of law; second, cases that go to trial only because of informational asymmetry (for example 
disputes between large corporations where one of them has substantially more information that the 
other); third, clear attention has to be paid to the type of plaintiff and defendant to make an 
informed decision on whether it is beneficial to settle the case. Finally, cases that contain important 
information that can channel desirable future behavior in society have to go to trial. As a 
consequence, these centers, if organized in a knowledgeable way, can have a strong positive effect 
on access to justice. If not, they can have a harmful effect on access to courts and society as a whole. 
2.4.4 Fast track and summary judgments 
Fast track procedures and summary judgments can extend the access to courts or shrink it. On the 
one hand, they can lead to one of the dangers Galander has identified which is they allow the haves 
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to shift important cases towards such procedures because they have better representation. In that 
way, they can quietly get rid of important cases. As seen in the English legal aid case featured at the 
beginning of this work, the bank’s lawyers managed to use an outdated procedure to dismiss the 
claim of the plaintiff who had his house seized by the bank for the surprising and doubtful claim that 
he has not paid mortgage for the impossible period of 15 years.  
On the other hand, such procedures can help the courts dispose of easy cases that do not deserve 
full trial resources. In that way, the judicial system can afford to spend more time and resources on 
important cases. The biggest problem is to distinguish between the two types of cases.  
The certainly wrong approach is the proportionality based rule used in England.532 Both individual 
and collective proportionality (distribution of resources) would determine the appropriate 
procedural track. Three procedural tracks were recommended within the Interim and Final Reports: 
Small claims track – 5000 pounds in value (1000 for personal injury claims) fast track - 5000 -15000 
(for personal injury 1000 to 15000) and multi-track for claims over 15000. The way the value of the 
claims to be estimated there were first allocation questionnaires that were later replaced by 
administrative track allocation as part of Lord Jackson’s reform.533 
The problem is that in such situation is more useful to use a more complex standard instead of a rule 
that gives exact amounts. The Kaplow and Shavell standard has been used to frame the whole issue 
on access to courts; it deals with the complexity of the issue of what cases are too important not to 
get the attention of the courts. Their approach can certainly be applied to decide which cases are 
appropriate for fast track procedures. An additional criterion could be to take into consideration the 
apparent mismatch in representation and resource power between the two parties to the process.  
These procedures now exist in France and it is essential for the quality of the judicial system to 
examine further their possible negative impact on the have-nots but at the same time understand 
their usefulness for streamlining the caseload of the judicial system in order to be able to deal with 
more cases.  
2.5 The Nature of Legal Services  
Hadfield has argued that the change of the landscape and character of legal firms in the US has 
caused a difference in the quality of legal services that individuals receive as opposed to big 
companies. The emergence of the big corporate law firms that deal with massive commercial 
lawsuits can be contrasted to small and medium law practices dealing with individual claims. 
This change is coming to France as well, albeit more slowly. When the big international law firms 
open offices in France face almost no competition in attracting big business from the relatively small 
law firms in France. To latest accounts there they are 58 224 lawyers, organized in 161 local bars and 
most importantly, over one-third of lawyers are sole practitioners and many more operate in small 
firms.  
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The French legislator has previously shown protectionist tendencies. It is sufficient to see the banking 
regulation in France and the creation of national champions companies534 will most probably be 
tempted to restrict the entry of big international law firms to the French legal market. However, that 
is not the right solution. Isolationism has never brought competitive advantages and moreover 
increasingly the business becomes multinational so protectionism in France simply will not work and 
will put French law firms decades back in time and incapable to deal with the new international 
trends. The reason is foreign investors will trust more these big international law firms than local 
French firms. It will also have extremely negative impact on the French economy because it will 
negatively affect international investment confidence in French law and institutions. 
2.5.1 Summary of who the Have-nots are in France  
The people in the lowest income bracket (under 1000 euros per month) receive some legal aid. The 
quality of this aid is doubtful because it is provided on a large scale with little attention to individual 
cases. However, the people who are in the income bracket from 1000 to 1500 receive partial legal 
aid. They are eight times less likely to use the legal aid system and the courts than the people in the 
previous income bracket. How about the people who have income just above 1500 euros per month? 
Further studies on the subject are needed. However, it is suggested that people just above that 
income bracket may not be getting access to the courts at all. The reason is even if the whole income 
difference of 500 euros is used for legal purposes, it cannot pay for more than a few hours of legal 
services. Moreover, these people do not benefit from other social programs and they are burdened 
by heavier taxes. After the 2008 financial crisis, the burden of the French middle class has been one 
of the heaviest in Europe. So are the have-nots in France the middle class and the hardest working 
people? The answer needs to be found in further research on the subject. This is important because 
in modern democratic societies unsettled and unhappy middle class means unstable society. 
Do the other methods of increasing access to courts have a negative impact on the have nots in 
France? Legal insurance for all those who buy it is certainly helpful in increasing the access to legal 
advice and court access to a certain degree. The danger is that legal services can be similar to a sunk 
cost auction and more resources can be spent on litigation than is optimal for plaintiffs and society as 
a whole. Also, insurance contracts can be mostly beneficial for insurance companies if their terms are 
not sufficient to provide for adequate legal protection.  
The lack of contingent fees reduces the access to courts for some personal injury cases and thus 
makes the have nots a bit poorer and less protected. The promotion of more mechanisms to induce 
out of court settlement can have a positive or negative impact on access to courts depending on how 
well these mechanisms are organized.  The same is true for the increased number of fast track and 
summary judgments. Finally, the increased number of big international law firms can have can bring 
disequilibrium on the quality of legal services big companies have as opposed to individuals. 
However, any protectionist measures against these big law firms may have a negative impact on the 
whole French economy.  
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2.5.2 The influence on the law 
 Does the law change work to the detriment of the have-nots because they cannot take their claims 
to court? In the Subway case examined at the beginning of this thesis, it was demonstrated that 
cases are diverted to procedures such as ADR, which are far from being impartial because the 
powerful side designates the only arbitrator. These “new” procedures go across national borders and 
judicial systems like they do not exist. These diversions from the official courts make participation in 
such procedures (in our example arbitration proceedings in New York) impossible to attend for the 
small entrepreneurs in France. 
There are also cases like Bernard Tapie’s, the French multimillionaire with substantial political 
influence who through the power of his lawyers can dictate what procedures to be used, even if on 
paper he has no right to use them all. France the most opportunity equalizing system on paper begs 
the question: can one buy himself justice? How could that possibility have any social benefit? A 
French millionaire succeeded in using the arbitration system and then the legal system as a means of 
appeal to buy himself justice. 
The problem of access to justice is serious and needs further detailed examination in France.  In 
conclusion, even in France, a country with strong traditions in providing access to courts and with 
numerous provisions that protect this access, the judicial machine is far from achieving full access to 
courts. The levers of the judicial machine can be adjusted so that the courts can do better in both 
saving resources but most importantly improving the access to courts to citizens that really count for 
the stability of French society—the middle class. Improving the regulation of legal aid can help 





Chapter 10: The Problems of Implementing a Managerial Model of 
Judicial Information Gathering   
 
1.0 The Two Lever Positions  
The two traditions of legal process information gathering are liberal, which is based on party control 
of information gathering, and interventionist (managerial); these are also the two lever positions of 
the judicial machine identified in the Information chapter.  
Here, the focus will be on the difficulties that emerge from changing the regulation of the judicial 
machine from one lever position to the other. This work will concentrate on the managerial model, 
which is based on judicial intervention in information gathering.535 More precisely, this chapter will 
answer the following question: Does this managerial lever position create application difficulties 
caused by lack of incentives for judges to apply their new powers?   
This chapter will examine the traditions and development of information (evidence) gathering by the 
courts of the three judicial systems examined in this work: France, the US, and England. It will 
examine how well the introduction of new managerial powers has worked in the three systems. 
1.1 New Independent Parameters  
The new parameters that can influence the performance of the lever positions examined here are: 
legal traditions, procedural formalism, the introduction of pro-managerial changes in legislation, and 
their influence on liberal procedural traditions.  
1.2 The Argument  
The problem of using the managerial lever position is the lack of incentives for the judges to use their 
managerial powers. This is based on the idea introduced by Richard Posner, who has argued judges 
have the work motivations of a nonprofit worker.536  Additionally, John Sorabji maintained that 
reforms take a while to take hold because there are costs of implementation. What that means is the 
legislator cannot simply decide that judges have to exercise their prerogatives in a certain way. They 
will not change the way they work unless the legislation creates the right incentives for them to do 
so.  
1.3 Posner’s Nonprofit Analogy  
According to Richard Posner, the nonprofit provider has less incentive to be efficient than a profit 
maximizing provider. He has argued that in a nonprofit enterprise, there is a higher possibility that 
there will be “more slack.” 537 Because judges have been placed on a nonprofit basis, judges do not 
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work as hard as lawyers at their age and ability.538 In the US, caseload increase has been 
accommodated by hiring additional staff539 rather than by overworking the judges.  
What happens to judges in other systems such as the French and, to a certain degree, the English 
when they have to deal with the increased caseload themselves because the budget for hiring 
additional staff is limited? In those systems, there is no incentive for a judge to work harder, as they 
are paid the same amount regardless of their caseload. How many judges will voluntary decide to 
work harder without receiving something additional in return?   
1.4 France 
1.4.1 The French liberal tradition of information gathering  
The procedural tradition of information gathering in France has its roots in the Ordonnance of 1667, 
which was a procedural code that consolidated the practices and the standards of judicial 
proceedings shaped over previous centuries. This codification of existing procedures was designed to 
produce only a practical code but in reality, the codification proved progressive, both for its own time 
and for centuries to come. Consequently, parts of this vibrant and recyclable piece of legislation 
remained in use until the mid-twentieth century. The main strength of the provisions included in the 
code was stability they provided. That stability allowed the code to survive the change of a few 
significantly different political regimes.  
One characteristic of the Ordonnance that stood out was party autonomy. In other words, the code 
placed an emphasis on the individual responsibility of the citizens to find the necessary information 
and present them as facts in the courts. The code’s general inclination can be summarized as liberal 
because it was the parties who supplied the information (evidence) and who had complete control 
over what parts of it were to be used during proceedings. 
The Napoleonic reforms, which introduced the procedural code of 1806, used a realistic attitude, 
meaning they adopted large parts of the 1667 Ordonnance.540 That meant that the party autonomy 
and thus the liberal approach to information gathering survived the French Revolution.  
1.4.2 The image of omnipotent civil law judge 
Most common law lawyers have an image of the civil law judges as omnipotent masters of the legal 
process.541 As seen so far in this work, it is not the French tradition to have the judges control the 
introduction of evidence and the processes as a whole. The question then is: where does this image 
of the omnipotent Civil law judge who is master of the proceedings come from? It was not part of the 
1667 Ordinance, neither was it included in the 1806 code. Had the French judges ever had the power 
to intervene in information gathering and in the litigation process as a whole in order to reduce 
delays for example? Common law lawyers have been in the grip of the false description of French 
judges, who have always had the means to force the parties to put their "cards on the table" at any 
stage of the lawsuit. As Van Rhee noted, the provisions of the 1806 code gave the parties the 
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opportunity to make their allegations until the end of the last oral hearing.542 It is also important to 
note that the code gave extensive opportunities to the parties to introduce new allegations on 
appeal. 
In fact, the tradition of the active judge who controls the evidence and the legal process has never 
been in the French system, but rather that of Austria. The actual source of the image of the French 
judge as interventionist master of the process is surprising. It actually came from anecdotal evidence 
from someone who may have had interests to present French judges as activists to justify the 
provisions of his own code.  
It was Franz Klein, the “father” of the 1895 Austrian Code of Civil Procedure, who would herald a new 
era of civil procedure in Europe. In the 1890s, he claimed that even though the French Code of Civil 
Procedure did not grant the French judge far-reaching case-management powers, such powers were, 
in practice, exercised by him without a legal basis in the Code. Making the Austrian judge an active 
participant in the process had to be justified and since it was the French code that was the example 
to follow at that time, any new ideas had to pretend to come from the practice surrounding that first 
major procedural code in Europe—the French. 
The claim of the activist practice of French judges was echoed in observations made by French 
authors themselves, writing much later from the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards. 543  
Nobody has verified the veracity of such statements. Such verification would require extensive 
research of the French case law and of day-to-day practice during this period. However, that 
statement makes very little sense because the power is not included in the code and incentives for 
judicial behavior run contrary to the having procedurally active judges. Thus, the reason for French 
authors of the 19th century to claim that is most probably political. In France, judges have been seen 
as a political danger from everyone in government starting with Louis XIV who championed the 
Ordonnance of 1667 as war weapon of his aim for centralized authority against independent regional 
courts, the leaders of the French revolution who were afraid that the old regime judges and lawyers 
will protect monarchist interests, Napoleon who saw judges as having very little leeway in the work 
they did and later republican regimes who also were afraid of strong judiciary.  
This negative attitude towards the judiciary is even evident in the current constitution of the Fifth 
Republic that states the judiciary is only an authority and not an equal branch of government as the 
executive and parliamentary powers. The whole misperception shows the dangers of trying to 
categorize legal systems into inquisitorial and adversarial and as common law or civil law. All that 
rhetoric and classification with which comparative law has been obsessed is completely 
counterproductive. It only puts a common denominator on all systems in one family or group and 
gives them false features that they have not possessed.   
What can be shown beyond the speculations is that the French procedural system had liberal roots. 
In other words, the French system was based on a sort of laissez faire regime. Foyer made that 
statement in the most precise way in his comments on the Civil Procedure Code  of 1806: "[C]e Code 
de procédure civile, en effet, était l’exemple de ce qu’on pourrait appeler le libéralisme judiciaire ou 
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le libéralisme procédural: ce n’était pas tout à fait le Code du laisser-faire,  c’était plutôt le Code du 
laisser ne pas faire."544   
That can be called a “negative laissez faire.” That little twist in the conceptualization of the issue 
highlighted the point that French liberalism in procedural matters was not so much about promoting 
freedom of the parties but it was about restricting the power of the judge. That means French 
procedural liberalism exists in a combination with formalism. The latter concept was supposed to 
guard against arbitrary judicial decisions. 
1.5 The Roots of French Procedural Formalism  
Formalism as a guard against arbitrary decision making is very clearly exhibited in the words of the 
famous German jurist Rudolf Von Jhering, who said that procedural formalism is discipline and order 
and enemy of arbitrariness.545  
A further justification of formalist theory French authors has found in the works of Jeremy Bentham. 
The way he is understood in France is far from the pragmatic theorist who wants the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. In France, Bentham is most often cited as someone who has 
justified formalism.546 He is not seen as the great reformer who wanted to improve judicial systems 
around the world but as a formalist who justifies the limitation of judicial power. This prominence in 
France of that otherwise minor part of Bentham’s theory547 probably explains why there the 
utilitarian project and arguably economic analysis of law (seen by many as its extension) as 
reintroducing formalism and even positivism. 
A major proponent of formalism with a great influence on its inclusion as a cornerstone in the French 
legal tradition was the prominent French politician from the revolutionary era Jean Baptiste 
Treilhard. He managed to retain his position as a leading statesman of the time despite the dramatic 
regime changes. He took part in the committee that drafted the 1806 code. It is thus not surprising 
that the code defends a strong formalist vision for the French procedural system: "en proposant un 
système qui doit tout prévoir afin que rien ne se fasse qui n’ait été ordonné, ceci afin d’imposer dans 
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les procès une marche fixe qui ne permette pas l’arbitraire dans l’instruction, parce qu’il seroit 
bientôt suivi de l’arbitraire dans le jugement."548 
1.6 Formalism as Means to Restrict Judicial Power in the French Procedural Codes 
The goal of the Ordonnance of 1667 proclaimed loudly and clearly the dominant control of the royal 
power over the judiciary. As Dauchy has explained, this Ordonnance was conceived as war machine 
against the parlements (the regional appeals courts), which diluted the royal authority.549 Thus, the 
formalism of the 1806 Code was simply a result of political circumstances in which Louis XIV wanted 
to impose centralized royal authority and limit local influences and sometimes even insubordination 
of the local judicial authorities, the parlements.  
In France, the royal power in the early periods of the French monarchy was not as strong as in 
England. It was counterbalanced by strong local authorities. This lack of initial strong centralized 
power led to efforts to have stronger control over the local judiciary,550 which led to restrictions in 
their powers to control the process and in particular the way parties presented evidence in court. 
The next restriction on judicial powers over the process came from the Napoleonic procedural code 
of 1806. It promulgated the principles of legality, neutrality, and limitation of the power of judges. All 
these principles were dictated by the concern with the power of the judge. Consecutive regimes had 
reasons to limit judicial power. The Anciene regime saw judges as a conduit of local power, the 
revolutionaries as a way to sneak through the back door the old regime and Napoleon saw possibly a 
combination of the two dangers. The result was clear. Judges were denied the role of a master of 
procedure. In other, words they had no managerial powers including control over information 
gathering. Formal restrictions were multiplied and an arsenal of disciplinary measures was ready to 
sanction any judicial disobedience.551 
These principles of the 1806 Code, legality, neutrality, and limitation of judicial power were achieved 
by putting in place formality innovations. These formalities were different from the old arrangements 
of the Ordonnance. The new procedural elements were based on accusation and seemed to multiply 
the formalities.552As it was explained above, these formalities were seen as guarantees against the 
arbitrary power of the judges. That meant that more provisions had to guide the legal process. The 
following measures were introduced: a detailed codification of forms of procedure, interdiction to 
judges to interpret the law, oral and public procedure, and obligation of the judge to motivate his 
decisions.553     
The neutrality principle was used as a tight belt fastened around the judicial power. It was the parties 
that had to lead the process. The judicial role was officially limited to a contributory overseeing of 
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procedures and helping the search for truth. In practice, it made judges passive observers of the 
procedure.554  
1.6.1 Exceptions: Limited managerial powers in the 1806 Code 
It is worth highlighting that there were exceptions and some limited managerial powers were 
included in the 1806 Code. The drafting of the Code had more than one influence. Following the 
demands of the appeals courts (the old parlements), provisions providing for surveillance of 
procedure, judges had to also play the role of guardians of public order and even more interestingly 
they had to fulfill a policing function. Thus, judges had to, for example, verify the taxation of 
expenses and were able to fine lawyers.555 So the code included limited managerial powers because 
of influences of higher ranking regional judges.  
In sum, the general position of the Napoleonic legislator was that he had to anticipate every situation 
and bind judges by imposing on them complete neutrality. Imposition of managerial powers thus was 
hesitant at best. To judge was to apply the law. That was transferred even to procedure where the 
margin of appreciation of the judge was reduced to an absolute minimum. Judges were “confined” in 
an oral and public procedure.556 
1.6.2 The New Code 
The New Code of Civil procedure was conceived mainly as a result of sweeping changes in French 
society that brought about a new way of thinking. The 1806 Code was based on a liberal ideal of 
party autonomy. In a society with a strong state power and interventionist policies, keeping the 
power of the judicial process in the hands of the parties was seen as individualistic. In the words of 
Tissier, "nous avons en France une conception trop individualiste de la procédure."557 
1.6.3 The purpose of the code defines the allocation of power between the parties and the 
judge: 
The New Code has departed from the French liberal tradition. It is just a mixture of traditional 
theories in France that simply tries to add new judicial powers to the mix. L. Cadiet argues that this is 
not so:  
Also, this ‘charter of distribution of roles between the judge and parties’ is not the establishment 
of an ‘interventionist’ procedural model, ‘inquisitorial as its dominant characteristic,’ 
‘administrative and authoritarian’ as declared or feared after the promulgation of the Code.55 
The Code is essentially a work in composition, neither adversarial nor inquisitorial; these 
qualifications do not suit what civil litigation fundamentally is. It is a work in composition, 
because it must conciliate the liberal principles of French tradition which make parties the 
owners of the lawsuit, and the affirmation of the powers of the judge…This doctrine is not the 
fruit of a spontaneous generation, issued to satisfy some academic satisfaction. The Guiding 
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Procedural Principles, and the conception of civil litigation that they convey, have a long 
history558 
But how does the New Code reconcile the principle of neutrality and strong liberal traditions not 
based on party freedom in conducting the process, particularly expressed in the principle of 
neutrality of the Napoleonic code with new managerial powers of judges, and new interventionist 
approach? These are contradictory traditions that are not easy to reconcile with allocating the power 
between judges and parties in a few provisions. 
The result has been institutional inertia and contradictory judicial interpretation. Henry Motulsky, 
one of the authors of the code, has admitted: "in light of a divided doctrine and —above all—a 
hesitant, not to say contradictory, case law, the essential boundaries of the judge’s mandate and the 
distribution of procedural functions between the judge and the parties."559 There are, as he stated, 
contradictions in the demarcations of the judicial powers to conduct the process. 
Articles 1 to 13 of the New Code delineate the powers of both parties and judges to conduct the 
process. When it comes to judicial powers, the language the legislator uses is: judges “can” (Articles 8 
and 13) or the judge “has the power to” (Articles 3 and 10). That is not obligatory language, in other 
words, the legislator prescribes judicial discretion. In order for judges to apply in practice their 
discretionary power, they need to have incentives to use it. Judges do not have these incentives 
because for them that means even more work on top of an extremely heavy caseload. In contrast to 
American judges, and now to a certain degree English judges, even top judges do not have clerks560 
that can do the job for them so there is no way they will use this power except in extreme situations. 
The only obligatory language in dividing the powers between judges and parties is Article 5 in which 
the legislator forbids the judge from making a pronouncement outside the arguments that the 
parties have presented to the lawsuit.  That article is the only one that is about imposing duties on 
the judge and not powers. Thus it is part of the formalistic approach of restricting judicial power not 
of granting new managerial powers. This article will be strictly followed by judges first because the 
incentives are aligned with its execution, and second, that article follows a strong French tradition of 
party control of the lawsuit that cannot be easily displaced by a few discretionary rules.561 
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In sum, if the aim of the New Code of civil procedure is to allow judges in rare situations to have the 
power to intervene in the process then the code will sometimes serve that function. However, if the 
aim is to have a code that clearly prescribes for judges to be active procedural participants with clear 
managerial powers, to acquire information from the parties in order to reveal the truth of what 
happened562 then the aim is unachievable with the current provisions of the code. The reason is the 
discretionary rules of the Code, in practice, give a choice to judges to work harder or to work less. 
Given that choice, few people will choose to work hard. Judges are no exception. To put it differently, 
the New Code is more concerned with following the French formalist tradition of restricting the 
judicial power and less in granting managerial powers to the judges. The result is that the New Code 
does not weaken much the French liberal tradition of party control of the process. 
1.7 Reality in Practice:  Do French Judges Have More Powers After the New Code? 
That observation has been confirmed by the empirical research conducted in France as part of this 
study. For example, the ex-president of the court of Premire instance de Toulouse Judge Henri de la 
Larosière de Champfeu in an interview conducted in June 2016563 confirmed that he does not direct 
the procedure and that the lawyers control the process. He also said that his main source of 
information for deciding the case comes from the written statements of the parties. That makes a lot 
of practical sense. The reason is an active judge who intervenes has to conduct his own research and 
build an opinion on the case from an early stage of the proceeding.  Judge de Champfeu did not have 
any law clerks to assist him in that task while working at Cour de premiere instance de Toulouse. 
Thus considering the heavy charge of cases he has to deal with on a daily basis, he could not have 
physically been able to be the ideal of “active civil law judge.” The time and effort consumption of 
actively searching and molding the information a judge receive is way greater for an active judge. 
Passively receiving information is much easier and realistic task for an overwhelmed by modern 
caseloads judge. The control of the process is limited to one power according to judge de Champfeu, 
saying that he has heard enough evidence and he is ready to pronounce his judgment and thus 
curtail any further delaying tactics on one of the parties. That power is very limited and when 
considered together with the almost unlimited ability to appeal and the possibility to introduce new 
evidence, it has very little managerial effect on the entire process. It can only serve to save time and 
effort of first instance judges when they see that further proceedings are pointless.  
That view has been confirmed by Professor Arneau Raynouard who, in a lecture at Toulouse 1 
Capitole, has said, “If one looks beyond the statute books, the French procedure for civil cases 
appears to be a mixed system, as are most civilian systems.564 Indeed, according to the best 
description in English of modern French fact finding in actual practice, the French system is largely 
adversarial.”565 
If there is to be a real move of the French judicial system towards a managerial model,there should 
be a better use of the juge de la mise en état. With proper training that goes beyond the normal legal 
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training, judges receive at the Ecole de Magistrat in Bordeaux this judge can actually perform an 
investigatory function (finding out information for the court to consider as evidence) and actually 
direct the pace of litigation in order to reduce delay and strategic behavior of the parties.  
Incentives are crucial; why would he do it when he could avoid doing it? The reality is thought that 
this preparatory judge, le juge de la mise en état, in practice seldom uses the statutory powers to 
investigate, and does not direct factual investigation in the pre-trial phase or the pace of litigation.566 
In practice, the division of powers between the parties and judges has not moved considerably more 
the French system towards a managerial system of information gathering. Managerial models 
seldom work in practice for three reasons. First, they create the wrong incentive. They give a choice 
to judges whether to work harder or to work less. Very few will choose to work harder unless the 
circumstances are exceptional. Second, the New Code goes against legal tradition. The French 
tradition is liberal where party control of information gathering. As described in the chapter on 
Information, the interests of the parties to the process are in gathering information and reveal some 
parts of it to the court. Third, the discretionary language the New Code uses when it comes to 
conferring managerial powers to judges is not enough to induce a considerable shift of the judicial 
practice.  
2.0 England  
2.1 The English Judicial System 
The question then is whether the finding can be confirmed that legal traditions and mostly judicial 
incentives do not allow an easy switch from the position of the lever that grants freedom of the 
parties to find and introduce information in court to managerial model.  
The English judicial system has recently experienced the same shift to a managerial model. However, 
in order to have a fuller picture of how the two systems can be compared, the additional parameters 
such as formalism and centralization of the English procedural traditions must be examined. 
As noted previously, until the mid-nineteenth century in England, there were two separate civil 
justice systems. Common law rights and obligations were under the jurisdiction of the common law 
courts: the Courts of Common Pleas, King’s Bench, and Exchequer. Every case that did not fall within 
the formalistic requirements of the common law fell under the jurisdiction of the most important 
royal, non-common law court, the Chancery, sometimes known as the court of equity.567  
The equity approach then was engaged in the pursuit of accuracy irrespective of the time and cost of 
proceedings. It developed distinct procedures with a strong commitment to finding the truth in court 
proceedings. It also, at the beginning, did not apply strictly procedural rules.  On the contrary, the 
purpose of Common law rules was to follow formalistic procedure. Accuracy to decision making was 
secondary. That led to the fusion of procedure and substantive law. The form was more important 
than discovering the facts and thus the truth.  There was definitely no preoccupation with the search 
for the accuracy of information. The English system cannot be examined without highlighting the 
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initial existence of choice of procedure and the consequent flux of the English judicial system from 
one set of rules to the other coming from these initial alternative settings of the English judicial 
machine. What is more interesting is that the French system has shared features of both systems. 
2.1.1 Common law and English formalism  
The common law tradition was extremely interested in the form and less in the content.  That was 
done in two ways. First, the plaintiff had to select the right procedural basis for his claim by choosing 
the correct form of action and then obtaining the relevant writ. If the litigant chose the wrong form 
of action, the court was impeded from applying the right law.568 
Second, each form of action had its own procedure that had to be strictly followed. Any deviation 
meant there was no mere procedural error but a misapplication of substantive law.569 The wording of 
the pleadings had to exactly follow the wording of the form of action. If any of the following 
happened, the claim failed: difference in the allegations pleaded and those proved at trial; the 
pleadings were not taken in the required order; or there were drafting errors. That meant the form 
was more important than the actual evidence (information). 
2.1.2 Equity and obtaining of evidence (information) 
Under equity, finding out the truth is the ultimate purpose. Equity procedure necessitated that all 
parties joined to the proceedings, all relevant issues were properly defined and then subjected to 
proper scrutiny and investigation.570  
In order to find the truth, equity developed the two most important ways for obtaining information 
by the parties: The first one is documentary discovery (disclosure). Lord Bowen called it a way to 
"scrape the conscience" of an opponent by securing all relevant and probative evidence.571 The 
Chancery Court was designed to be a court of Conscience that should secure the reformation of sin 
through correcting a litigant’s corrupt conscience.572 Thus discovery was a procedure created to 
relieve consciousness and reformation of sin in front of an ecclesiastical court. This type of procedure 
cannot function the same way when it is used by a secular court, which is an essential problem for 
modern discovery proceedings were modeled after the equity model.573   
The second way of obtaining information under the equity regime was the Interrogatory.  Through 
that regime, parties could procure relevant evidence of fact and thereby promote accuracy in judicial 
decision making. 
Originally the equity process did not use any fixed rules of procedure, there were just broad 
principles of Equity and conscience.574 That practice, however, did not last long and a highly technical 
and complex system of rules developed.575 
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The modernization of the English procedure and judicial organization was done in a new code called 
the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC)576 that formed part of the Judicature Act 1873.577 The common 
law and equity procedures were unified in a single court system. The RSC adopted the common law’s 
trial process, not equity’s quasi-inquisitorial process, although there was no reason in principle to 
adopt equity’s process.578 That demonstrates the fallacy of the claims of some comparativists that it 
is the biggest mistake to compare common law trials to civil inquisitorial trials because the reason for 
choosing a regime in England that is similar or opposite to the civil trial is adopting is not even clear..  
The English reforms failed. Procedure became more formalist, more technical points were raised, and 
more claims were determined on technicalities than ever before.579 In the next 20 years, the result of 
the reform and the application of the new theory was that RSC had become more complex and there 
was a 20% increase in litigation cost.580 One of the reasons for that may have been the prevailing 
culture stemming from the common law tradition. The actual result of this reform was that the 
English system has been in a constant flux between equity and common law traditions. 
2.2 The Type of Formalism in England  
In England, that formalism mostly dominated the common law proceedings but with time, 
formalism's complex rules crawled their way into equity and then into the unified system that came 
into existence after the Judicature Act of 1873.  
In England, the formalist restrictions were felt by both the parties and judges. The parties were 
confined in strict formalism that came mostly from the common law tradition of actions and writs 
but also from the increasingly formalistic equity process. After 1873, procedures continued to be 
restrictive to the parties.  There was also a political restriction of the English judges that came into 
existence because of the coincidental desire of both ends of the political spectrum to restrict judicial 
powers. Thus in England, formalism restricted both judges and the parties to the process. 
The English formalism led to a reduction of the quality of information that the parties supplied to the 
court that in turn hurt the quality of judicial decision making. The reason was that not every piece of 
information could fit in a formalistic system of the common law actions and thus could not be 
presented to the judges. In other words, the judges lacked a substantial amount of information when 
making their decisions.  
2.3 Historical Comparative Analysis in England and France 
In France, Louis XIV used the tool of procedural formalism to restrict the power of judges in the 
Ordonnance of 1667. As a counterbalance to this undesirable judicial power, the procedural code 
tried to give more powers to parties to the process.   
The fact that the restrictions in France were strongly oriented towards restricting judicial power and 
the parties had more freedom to control the process meant that the French system was at least 
initially more liberal and pro-party oriented than the English.  
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At that time, the English system was characterized by competition between jurisdictions with judges 
trying to attract more litigants to their courts because they received part of their pay directly from 
the litigants. In addition, judges had the power to design procedural rules. Even though there may 
have been a pro plaintiff bias as a result of judges trying to get more cases in their court, the power 
was on the side of the judges and not the parties.581 
2.4 The Different Types of Liberalism in France and England   
It has been stated previously that the French procedural system was more liberal than the English. 
What does that mean exactly? To find the answer, this work will examine the difference Hayek 
makes in defining two types of liberal thought. He calls them “British” and “French” traditions of 
liberty.  
The “French” tradition is defined by the question who and for whose benefit interferes in the social 
order. Whether that interference amounts to despotism or liberty is decided solely by the fact for 
whose benefit that interference is made. Hayek sees that as a model as the foundation of modern 
society or as he calls it “totalitarian democracy.”582 
The British tradition sees interference by a public power in the social order as always being either 
absolutism or aristocracy, or even dictatorship.583 This is the foundation of modern liberal 
democracy. 
So following this distinction of the types of liberalism, it turns out that the French procedural 
tradition under the regime created by Louis the XIV was liberal in the second sense because judges 
did not control the legal process. The French monarchy needed to control independent local courts 
(les parlements) and as a result gave more power to the parties to the process. The parties owned 
the legal process with very little interference from a public power.  
On the contrary, the English procedural tradition seems to have been controlled by a public power—
the judges. The reason for that arrangement was that England had a centralized monarchical system 
that included the courts that were all based in London. The result was that in the earlier period of 
development of the English judicial system the power was shifted to the judges who were an 
extension of the royal power. Thus judges interfered with public order in their own interests and only 
one of the parties benefited but only as a consequence created pro-plaintiff rules. Thus, according to 
Hayek that procedural system could be called even despotic.  
So what happened? Why was French procedure more liberal in the “true” sense, as described by 
Hayek? And how could the French tradition be more fitting to what Hayek called the British tradition 
of liberty?  
The theoretical developments that can explain that paradox came nearly a century after the 
enactment of the Ordonnance of 1667. The emergence of the “British tradition” can be traced to a 
group of Scottish moral philosophers led by David Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, and 
popularized in England by Josiah Tucker, Edmund Burke, and William Paley. On the other side, the 
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French tradition can be traced to the French Enlightenment. The best-known representatives are 
Rousseau and Condorcet.  
Despite these initial arraignments of England procedure, a series of reforms starting in 1799 took 
away the power of judges584 and moved the English system towards what Hayek has called the 
“British” liberal model.  
The important thing that Hayek has noticed was that the division of the two types of liberalism does 
not fully coincide with national boundaries.585 Frenchmen like Montesquieu, Benjamin Constant, and 
mostly Alexis de Tocqueville are probably nearer to the “British” than to the “French” tradition.  
2.5  Complexity of Legal Traditions 
The example of the Ordonnance of 1667 that created the French liberal tradition of procedure shows 
how complex legal traditions can be. They transcend national borders and they can change 
dramatically over the centuries. Moreover, the legislator rarely examines a new piece of legislation 
from a deep theoretical perspective in order to avoid contradictions and find solid foundations to 
base their legislation. So it will not be surprising if two pieces of legislation follow different parts of 
the legal traditions in one country and have influences from abroad as well. In other words, legal 
traditions are fluid; they can be changed and influenced by different factors.  
Basing a reform on traditions by saying that the new piece of legislation is based on centuries of 
different traditions, as Loic Cadiet has done, is basically saying that the code has no clear direction or 
identity. In any case, it is curious how the New French procedural code has defined as its main aim to 
reconcile the two contradictory ways in which liberalism is understood today. So the big question is 
whether it is possible to put the two opposite spectrums of Hayek’s liberal dichotomy in one 
principle of cooperation as the New Code proclaims. Can that principle provide a solution that 
works? Is it a coincidence that French judges do not often use their interventionist powers? 
In that early liberal era, the idea of the powerful civil law judge and the common law judges as 
neutral arbiter was probably not true. The division between inquisitorial and adversarial system did 
not exist either. The origins of the two systems are completely the opposite of the “mythology” 
created by some comparativists, such as Rene David, in the 20th century. Initially, it was the French 
procedural system that was more adversarial and liberal than the English. What is important to note 
is that traditions have a solid way of persisting in the practice of courts because of inner court culture 
that persists despite code changes and what is frequently dubbed institutional inertia. 
The question is whether the unification of the dual English system also unifies the extensive 
formalism of common law with the goal of delivering complete justice propagated by the Equity 
courts? Considering the fact that both traditions continued to exercise a strong influence on the new 
unified system, the possibility is quite strong. Did that mean double expenditure of resources for 
judges to pay attention whether formalistic requirements were fulfilled and then try to deliver 
something as complex and unattainable as complete justice?586 
2.5.1 Technicalities  
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Both the English and the French systems have been strongly influenced by extensive formalism. Even 
the English Equity process, which in the beginning was not formalistic and quite free of procedural 
difficulties, gradually became a highly technical and complex procedure. In France as well, the 
Ordonnance of 1667 was enacted to deal with complexities and delay in the process but it also 
became technical and complex. At the time of the French Revolution, the law of the Anciene regime 
had the image of consisting of chain regulation that shackled many activities because of the 
impossibility to satisfy the never-ending legal requirements. That means French formalism must have 
had an initially strong technical element that further developed later on. So the effects must have 
been very similar.   
In any case, the effect of formalism is that cases were decided on the incorrect information because 
of the necessity to follow rigid rules of procedure. The result was the imposition of huge costs on the 
system: it was not seen to do justice so the image of the system suffered but more importantly, the 
system did not allow members of society to use the information they possessed and in their role as 
litigants to help reduce obviously erroneous decisions. That means the costs of error are very high. 
Also, the role to channel behavior in future cases was reduced, which is the extremely negative result 
because that is the best way to reduce future judicial mistakes at low cost. Strict application of 
procedural rules creates justice that is based on technicalities rather than merit. 
Another important characteristic of the French “liberal” formalism was that it was designed to 
reduce the power of judges to intervene when they saw a problem in litigation (such as informational 
issue). Thus, it reduced the managerial character of the French system.  
2.5.2 The contrary: Danger of not enough procedural formalism  
The issue of procedural formalism is not one-sided though.  The danger of relaxing procedural rules 
as John Sorabji has argued, caused by the adoption of equity’s approach to securing substantive 
justice had a fatal consequence for its efficiency. It undermined its ability to secure its very aim and 
thus satellite procedural litigation was endemic with endemic costs and delays.587 If procedural 
defects are too easy to cure, the rules become optional. Satellite litigation is a sign that the rule 
applied most likely does not work well unless it gets settled quickly by a judicial decision (Nash 
equilibrium). Such litigation may be deliberate. One party can use tactical noncompliance with 
procedural rules in order to make the other party settle disadvantageously or even withdrawing the 
claim without a settlement.588 That causes problems to delivering any sort of justice (except the 
variation that says might makes right) that allow the party with more resources to dictate how and 
whether justice is delivered. That can be called an initial distribution problem to justice. The cause is 
that incentives are created not to follow procedural rules because the parties know they will not be 
followed anyway.  
The result is complexity, satellite litigation delays, and increased costs in individual claims. In turn, 
individual claims used more court resources, had an unequal distribution of resources, and justice 
was denied in many cases. 
2.6 The Modern Procedural Rules in England and Wales 
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The aim of this section is to see if the result of the introduction of judicial intervention rules of 
procedure in England and Wales is the same as in France. These new type of rules that shift the 
power of conducting the legal process and thus unearthing evidence(information) from the liberal 
tradition of party control to more power of the judges. This shift of the lever position of the judicial 
machine was introduced by two consecutive reforms led by Lord Woolf and Lord Jackson.   
2.6.1 The Lord Woolf reform  
One of the main changes that Lord Woolf’s reform has introduced has been judicial active case 
management. The main focus has been reducing cost and delay of the judicial system. That is not 
very different from giving extensive powers of judges to uncover information. They are both 
managerial tasks that work the same way: judges have to step out of their way to perform an 
additional work. 
Similarly to the French cooperation principle between the parties and judges, the English active case 
management is accompanied by an attempt to divide the powers to the process between the parties 
and the judge. The English rule though is stronger and it contains a positive obligation on litigants to 
assist the court in achieving the overriding objective of proportional justice. 589 In practice, making 
the parties’ obligation work seems far-fetched. For it to work, judges have to work harder in order to 
impose the obligation on the parties. They in return have to reveal information and avoid strategic 
behavior contrary to the incentives they have (which are to win the case).590  
These changes had been intended to work through early identification of the real issues in the 
dispute. Supposedly, that would lead to narrowing of these issues and reducing the degree and 
extent of evidence gathering required.591 So can an early judicial directions and a positive obligation 
on the part of the parties to the process lead to the use of more straight to the point evidence in 
court?  It is suggested that this rule will not have different effect that of mandatory disclosure.592 
Plus, similarly to the French code, it does not seem that the English legislation contains any 
incentives for the judge to actually do the extra work required. 
Early identification can facilitate early introduction of expert witnesses. Basically, Lord Woolf’s 
reform wanted the lawyers and the judges593 to be both well prepared from the start and give all the 
evidence. 
2.6.2 The problem with party control of litigation (excesses of the adversarial system) 
One of the main goals of the reform was to reduce the problems of the party-led procedural system. 
Parties pursued success whether they had merit or not.594 It is normally the plaintiff who sets the 
pace, the role of the judge is to adjudicate on issues selected by the parties.595 Lord Woolf sees 
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judicial control as a way to weaken the existing extreme adversarial culture that resembles a 
battlefield.596   
Litigants seek to exploit every technical error of the other party, increasing cost and delay by using 
strategies of evidence introduction in order to force a favourable settlement or end the litigation. 
The goal is often to simply price out the other party from the litigation. That laissez faire attitude was 
judged by the reformers to not have worked. The solution was to introduce case management and 
more active duties for the court. For the litigants, that has meant more discipline and greater inter-
party cooperation. Similarly to France, the answer was perceived to be a more consensual judicial 
process.  
2.7 Lord Jackson’s Reform   
The Woolf reform was deemed to be unsuccessful less than ten years after its introduction on April 
26, 1999. On November 3rd, Sir Rupert Jackson was appointed to head another commission that 
would examine the perceived problems of cost and delay in civil procedure. 
It is not surprising that the most significant area where problems were identified was case 
management, the vehicle through which Woolf’s new theory of justice ought to have been 
implemented.597 The reason for that failure was not identified. It is suggested that the reason is that 
case management or interventional policy requires more effort from judges and they don’t have the 
incentives to put in extra work. The reality is simple—overworked judges facing a huge caseload 
cannot be good case managers because they lack the incentives to do that extra work and to apply 
the new procedural rules.  
In any case, it was believed that the courts had failed to use their new managerial functions and the 
new proportional theory.598 The argument proposed by legal scholars has been that in England and 
Wales, there the legal culture of active judges does not exist. The argument continues that since case 
management is a new skill unfamiliar to them judges simply stuck to the old lax approach to rule 
compliance procedural default.  
The situation was identical in France.  The introduction of the New Code shows that in France where 
the New Code of civil procedure introduced more managerial powers the incentives dictated that 
French judges did not often use their new powers. To argue that it is the French and English liberal 
traditions that stopped judges from implementing the managerial procedural reforms is also 
possible. However, to verify that claim, it would be beneficial to examine, for example, the Austrian 
judicial system that has the strongest traditions in having omnipotent judges that control the legal 
process. That system, however, is beyond the knowledge of this author and thus the scope of this 
work. What is within the scope is to affirm that the wrong incentives for judges to apply the new 
procedural rules in both France and England impeded the practical application of the reforms. 
Whether Lord Jackson’s reform would work is still unknown. The American system may confirm our 
argument that the lack of incentives for judges to be active managers of the legal process and thus 
the task of unearthing evidence has not been performed in practice as well.   
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In sum, both the French and the English traditions have been found to have liberal roots to 
procedural regulation and that judges definitely lacked incentives to use their managerial powers 
including for the purpose of uncovering evidence. A great example in France was the juge de mis en 
etat, who has the possibility to exercise managerial powers but rarely does so. 
3.0 The US 
It is a telling story that the same effort to introduce case management in the US had previously failed 
as well.599 That effort lasted for 40 years before being quietly relegated to unimportance. The pThe 
problem that will be examined here was identified by Jonh Sorabji. According to him, the use of 
sanctions for judges not implementing managerial powers has failed in the US.600 
3.1 Comparative Problem 
Before embarking on an analysis of the US system, one clarification of a comparative problem is 
needed. The number of procedural systems in the US is very high. The reason is that each state 
follows its own procedural rules and that there is a federal procedure system as well. For 
convenience, only the federal procedural system will be analysed here. However, the problem of 
focusing on the US federal civil procedure is that, as Judge William Schwarzer has acknowledged, 
despite federal courts having a leading role, most of the civil litigation in the US is at the state level 
(around 98%).601 But Schwarzer also argued that many states have followed the model of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in creating their state procedures in civil matters. Still, the problem persists 
because some states have failed to adopt some of the reforms federal rules have undergone.  
There is also a diminishing influence of federal procedural rules. The reason Schwarzer has given for 
that is the over politicization of civil justice reform. The once existing independent experts who 
drafted the rules have now been strongly influenced by special interest groups.602 For the purposes 
of this work, there are two cautions to be made from this situation of the state of civil procedure. 
Frist, the American model is more complex; it cannot reasonably be examined in its entirety in this 
work. The focus on federal rules of civil procedure is done only for simplicity in order to avoid 
ambiguous criteria for choosing a given state’s procedural rules are instead of another’s.603 Plus, 
federal rules still remain the most influential.  Second, there should not be an over glorification of the 
American model precisely because of these political influences that do not always produce the best 
possible procedural rules and court organizational models.604 
3.2 The US Procedure as Valuable Comparative Target  
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Despite these comparative problems, the US procedural system has great comparative value. The 
reason is it has combined great commitment to understanding information gathering and at the 
same time, it also has been prone to the greatest excesses of the adversarial system as compared to 
the other two procedural systems.  
The cause of these excesses may be in the use of the Equity discovery process that had religious 
origins and aimed at finding out the truth. Other adversarial systems were designed more to 
dissipate conflicts than to find the truth. That specificity of the American process and the unique 
commitment to understanding information gathering by the courts makes it the perfect target for 
comparative analysis. 
3.3 Bifurcation of American Trial: Trial and Pretrial 
Another complication is that the American procedure has two phases. That is not the case in France 
where there is one continuous procedure and there are only remnants of such division in England 
and Wales. That is important because most of the informational issues occur at the pre-trial stage. 
3.3.1 Pretrial stage 
At this stage, the documentary evidence, witness testimony, pleadings, discovery, and various 
motions are introduced. This phase is designed to identify and narrow the issues in dispute between 
the parties including through access to information in the hands of third parties. Other devices such 
as motions to dismiss and summary judgment are designed to determine the legal merits of the 
dispute when there is no genuine factual dispute between the parties.  
3.3.2 The origins of discovery and interrogatory 
The main method the American system uses to uncover information is the discovery process. As 
noted earlier in this chapter, its origins are in the English equity process. The origin of the procedure 
is religious, so discovery as a procedure was created to relieve the conscience and for the 
reformation of sin in front of an ecclesiastical court. It does not function in the same way in front of a 
secular court. Litigants do not reveal all the information they have to save their soul and conscience.   
The American system thus adopted an extreme procedure that was designed to work driven by 
strong religious incentive. Problems were bound to follow.  
3.3.3 The US reforms and the information problem  
Until the 1970s it seemed that the adversarial process was working well in the US. However, at that 
time voices were raised against the inefficiencies and abuses of the system. These critiques gradually 
increased in number and prominence. The conclusion the American legislator drew was that the old 
system was not working anymore. The critics against pre-trial have identified the broad discovery 
and easy statement of claim and defense as main targets of the reforms.605 Another issue was the 
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lack of sufficient independent investigation and encouraging a war of attrition to encourage 
settlement.606  
Similarly to the reforms in France and in England, the US legislator also saw case management as the 
solution.  Judicial officers had to exercise supervision of a case through the imposition of sanctions in 
the control of the pretrial conferences.607 
In 1983, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules introduced the use of sanctions to deter undesirable 
behavior of lawyers in court when uncovering of evidence was concerned. Amended Rule 26(g) 
required that discovery requests, responses, and objections be signed by an attorney.608 This 
signature served as a guarantee that the discovery requests for information were reasonable in the 
context of the case at hand. 
The public perception of out-of-control discovery abuse prompted a Congressional action that 
resulted in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. In the area of information acquisition, the 1993 
amendments included mandatory disclosure and limited discovery.609 The new rules stated that 
mandatory disclosure had to occur prior to the traditional request-and-respond discovery devices.610 
Mandatory disclosure requires that each party discloses to the other side certain "core" 
information.611 No discovery request was needed at first. Sanctions were previewed for incomplete 
disclosure. That procedure serves the same purpose as the early identification of an issue in England 
and Wales.  
Mandatory disclosure marks a shift away from the adversary process. This procedure, supposedly, 
has to rely on the professional standards and ethical obligations of lawyers which require the lawyers 
to come forward with information even when it may be damaging to their client. 612 
These conferences were the target of the first attempt at reform.  Rule 26(f) was introduced. It 
authorized the judiciary to supervise the discovery conferences. Prior to the amendment, there was 
no judicial presence at the pretrial stage of the legal process. 
The 1983 reform blamed mostly inactive judges and glutinous lawyers for the delay in US Federal 
courts. Thus the problem the reform tried to solve was the excesses of the adversarial process. 
Without control over the lawyers, the adversarial process was not achieving what it was meant to do: 
to produce a voluntary settlement on the merits or speedy and adequate judgment. The existing 
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rules instead of channeling the adversarial process had “turned it loose to frequently run 
rampant.”613 
As a consequence of the reforms that involved the judge more in the management of the legal 
process, the US judicial machine’s regulatory lever was moved a bit closer to the managerial position. 
Judges were supposed to become more active in the judicial process. That means that the US system 
has tried to activate judges who can now impose slightly more control on the process and on the 
lawyers in order to perform managerial tasks in order to channel the gathering of information 
needed for conducting the legal process and other tasks such as reducing delay. 
3.4 Dealing with the Information Problem: US Specificities 
The discovery process was amended in 1993. Mandatory disclosure and limited discovery were 
introduced. However, 48 of the 94 districts in the US opted out of that disclosure rule and created 
their own regimes. Mandatory disclosure undermines the adversary system. However, that has been 
the case in the UK for a long time without compromising the adversary system. 614 Mandatory 
disclosure represents an attempt to change the American adversarial system by making the lawyers 
balance their duty as “officers of the court” and their duty to the clients.615  
3.5 Did the Reforms Work? 
One statistic that can help us see if US judges have used the new rules is based on the proportion of 
attorneys that reported being involved in a case in which a sanction was imposed was: 9.9 per cent 
from the Seventh Circuit, 7.6 per cent from the Fifth Circuit, and 6.2 per cent from the Ninth 
Circuit.616 That number seems low because attorneys are usually involved in a large number of cases. 
Moreover, the imposition of sanctions is only a proxy estimate to the application of the “managerial” 
procedural rules. The reason is it can be imagined that judges could use the sanctions for other 
reasons. It can also be speculated that legal culture plays an important role in the imposition of 
sanctions because of the lack of uniformity of application. The reason is the difference in mentality of 
judges in the different circuits. 
The US reforms were probably most precisely targeted the problems of the liberal (adversarial) 
approach to a procedure that gives more power to the parties. The reason is it targeted both the 
liberties of the parties, which were restricted by sanctions (that can be contrasted with the 
recommendatory language the French legislator used in the New Code of Civil Procedure) and also 
because judges actually received more power to deal with the information management. It has to be 
highlighted as well that the US procedural system was most prone to excesses of party control of the 
process.  
The question posed in the beginning of this section is whether Sorabji is right that the US reform has 
failed. The statistics provided by the use of sanctions seem to show a very low number of sanctions. 
More precise statistics are needed to judge that though. Out of how many cases in which the lawyer 
participated they were imposed sanctions? Nevertheless, it has been argued that US judges do not 
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use their new powers and do not intervene enough.617 The situation seems similar to the one in 
France where judges intervene only when that is absolutely necessary. That is despite the advantage 
US higher court federal judges have over their counterparts in France and England—they have 
supporting staff that can help them accomplish the task if the judge directed them to do so.  
Overall, the US procedure pays more attention to control of the information problem than the other 
two systems examined here. The American judicial machine uses the most complex information lever 
position. It implements mandatory disclosure and discovery proceedings plus since the reforms 
judges have had strong managerial powers backed by sanctions that they can impose on the parties 
for noncompliance.  
In conclusion, all managerial judicial powers including information gathering are difficult to 
implement in practice. The reason may be lack of traditions of the managerial judiciary in all three 
systems examined here. However, it has been argued that the main reason is that there is a lack of 
incentives for judges to use those powers regularly because that means they have to expend way 
more effort if they apply the powers instead of ignoring them. That means that in practice the use of 
the managerial lever position of the judicial machine is problematic unless the judicial incentives 
problem is resolved. Possible solutions may be hierarchical control imposing on judges the use of 
their managerial powers or creating a unique set of incentives that will make judges use more 
effectively their prerogatives. 
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SECTION III: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL 
ORGANIZATION 
1.0 Purposes of Appeal 
1.1 France: Multiple Purpose of Appeal  
Error correction is the obvious purpose of appeal but especially in France, as Shapiro has argued 
there are multiple purposes of appeal.618 So this section will examine the other purposes of appeal as 
they are illustrated by French appeal procedures. 
French literature formulates the purpose of review by the Cour de cassation in France as “disciplinary 
(censorship of erroneous application of the law)” 619 and “normative (harmonization of case law).”620 
Equally important is the fact that the Cour de cassation in the fulfillment of its appellate functions 
has been denied any social or political role.621 So how can the reasons behind this rather short and 
overburdened formulation be deciphered? The answer will distinguish between disciplinary, 
harmonizing, normative, political, and social function because the boundaries between these terms 
and functions are not as obvious as the author claims.  
Before examining in detail the disciplinary purpose of appeal, it will be beneficial to see what error 
correction in France means. The reason is disciplinary error correction is a subtype of the general 
error correction. 
1.1.1 Error correction  
Error correction can be defined as being “primarily for the benefit of the individual parties to a 
particular case, involves a review of the actions of the trial court to determine whether it failed to 
follow some previously established substantive or procedural legal rule , made an error as to the 
facts, or abused its discretion so that reversal or modification of its judgment is required.”622  The 
chapter, Purpose of Appeal, noted that error correction depends on whether we perceive whether 
the judicial decision making can provide the right answers.  
1.1.2 Error correction and the connection with commitment to right answers  
The main function of all appeal courts is error correction. How do the different systems perceive the 
efforts of the judicial system to achieve right answers? 
1.2 The Contrast between the US Model and Continental Commitment to “Right Answers”  
The first specificity (independent parameter) of the legal systems examined here is their attitude 
towards whether judicial systems can produce right answers. To avoid that semantic sting there 
needs to be an examination of the basic, underlying concepts such as “right answers” form the points 
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of view of the different systems and try to trace the origins of different understanding how things 
work. So let’s start with the concept of “right answers.” 
Among Damaška’s many contributions to the analysis of the judicial system, a very pertinent one has 
been the analysis of the ‘no right answer’ problem. Indeed, Damaška has vividly shown the different 
attitude of legal systems in seeking “the right answer.”623 
Damaška has argued that American law was exceptional among leading western systems in its 
reluctance to seek the right answers.  That is especially evident in the theory of Ronald Dworkin. He 
has based his theory on the idea that the right interpretation is the one that provides the best 
possible answer. The only thing that comes close to a right answer is that it has to follow the current 
political morality and has to fulfill the criterion of “fitting” well into the existing legal system. Thus 
such a theory displays the weakest commitment to the goal of right answers. 
Damaška has argued that Continental lawyers will seek the right solution, 624whereas his American 
college will display a liberal agnosticism about “right” answers, coupled with a procedural outlook. 
Instead of seeking the right answer, the American lawyer "will be primarily concerned about good 
arguments for a case."625 The conclusion Damaška has reached is that American law was exceptional 
among leading western systems in its reluctance to seek the right answers. 
In his analysis of Damaska and Dworkin’s work, Whitman has shown an important distinction that 
there are actually two distinct ideals. The first one is that a judicial system can be fully committed to 
giving definitive answers without having any particular commitment to giving correct answers or 
even accepting the possibility of giving correct answers.626 The European Continental tradition 
displays a strong commitment to the proposition that there must be ‘unique correct answers.’ The 
Continental systems tend to seek answers that are not only correct but also definitive.  
The tradition started with Roman lawyers who thought that there is one optimal rule that can be 
reached when the positive law found the ultimate rule that was identical with what natural law 
prescribed. Finding this optimal rule was done by seeking out the best rules throughout the Roman 
Empire and applying them to alternative systems. From a certain period onwards, these rules came 
into competition with each other. The goal was then to find global rules that best suited the specific 
Roman conditions. 
In contrast, what modern continental systems try to do is to find an optimal rule that is also definitive 
rule they do not account for the fast changing dynamic and complexity of the modern world. That 
means there is way less time to observe which rule is the optimal one. Also, modern Continental 
systems do not try to implement these rules in a variety of alternative competitive systems. As a 
result, the modern Continental commitment to right and definitive answers is less pragmatic than 
what the Romans did. The reason is modern thinking bears the mark of the Enlightenment era, in 
which the human mind was held as all powerful and capable of discovering all the specific 
environmental problems can be discovered by a single human mind.  In contrast, the Romans used 
an evolutionary approach, which was based on competition between alternative rules to discover the 
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optimal ones. As said in the introduction of this work, environmental elements in different judicial 
systems are the biggest problem for extensive and comprehensive conclusions for each judicial 
system.  
It is suggested that in order to have the right answers there should be no change in the social 
conditions in which law operates. In times of very slow change, it is easier to have right answers. The 
other problem is complexity. If the law regulates simple issues it is easier to have one rule and very 
few or no exceptions. When the law gets complicated there is a need for multiple exceptions 
sometimes to a degree that they undermine the rule itself.  The American system avoids that 
problem of an optimal definitively correct rule by turning to the argumentative side of the law. There 
is no expectation that all legal officials will generally produce the same answer to any given question.  
Nevertheless, the American judicial system is not as agnostic towards finding the right answers as 
Damaska and Whitman have argued. The federal civil procedure rules and in particular the discovery 
process have been designed to increase the probability of finding the right answers by acquiring 
more information that will serve as the right premise to reach the right conclusion.  The real 
difference then lies in the fact that the American tradition tends to devote itself to the search for 
correct answers to a certain degree but largely lacks the desire to find answers that could be 
definitive.  
In contrast, the French legal theory does not often question the fact that there are right answers. It is 
said that legislation, for the most part, predetermines the outcome of judicial decision making. That 
view, however, is challenged by the practice.627 French judges have said that each case can be 
decided either way and that legislation does not itself provide clear answers that predetermine the 
outcome of litigation.628 Plus, some French judges question the fact that there are definitive 
answers.629 One comment was that a certain morally charged problem is not the law in France at the 
moment but that the moral attitude towards the issue was changing and that the minority position 
will become the law in the future. That means that under the surface, the attitudes towards right 
answers and definitive answers are not that different. However, the theoretical strong commitment 
to both results in an attempt to reach not so much the right answer in each case but a definitive one 
in order to claim that the courts have found the right answer.   
1.2.1 Right answers found in the different attitude towards evidence  
The basic position is the following: fact-finding involves establishing congruence between statements 
about the world and the world itself. But that does not work as well in practice. Instead, in most 
cases, adjudicators are expected to accept a story as true when it is supported by enough items of 
evidence relating to the facts of the case. What is enough evidence though? Legal systems in the 
common law tradition try to have a standard to decide what amount of evidence is sufficient to 
prove a claim. In non-criminal cases, these systems use the term preponderance of evidence. That 
means 50% or more of the evidence is sufficient to prove a claim.  
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In contrast, the French civil procedure does not have such a rule. In France, there is no attempt to 
quantify evidence and to draw a clear dividing line of what amounts to sufficient evidence. The 
reason for that is the evidence is seen as an all-or-nothing proposition—it either proves the truth or 
it does not. That is clearly a consequence of the theoretical attitude that shows complete lack of 
doubt that there are right answers to adjudication problems. To a common law observer, such 
absolute certainty of whether the evidence proves the position of one of the parties to a civil dispute 
resembles the criminal standard of proof that states that criminal conviction is possible only when 
the evidence shows beyond reasonable that the accused is guilty. 
Whitman’s conclusion is that the American tradition is not afraid of the lack of right and definitive 
answers because it is not afraid of judicial authority. In contrast, continental lawyers tend to seek 
right answers because they do not trust judicial authority.  
However, even in French theory, the position is not absolute. The search for absolute and definitive 
truth has been softened by the views of authors such as Francois Geny, who as early as the late 
nineteenth century came to the conclusion that it was impossible for the law to dispose of all 
questions in advance with certainty. This led Gény to insist that judges often had to decide cases 
through free scientific research.630 
1.3 The Evolution of the French Understanding of Legal Error  
To further disprove the image of French rigidity towards right answers, it is important to examine the 
evolution of the French understanding of legal error.  
1.3.1 The school of privatistes and the primacy of the text of the law  
The first attempt to define legal error can be traced back to the school of privatistes. In the 
nineteenth century, this school of French theory played an important role in legal scholarship. The 
reason is they produced comments on the most important piece of French codification efforts— the 
Civil Code. The school exhibited a full commitment to the literal implementation of legislation as the 
right path to quality of justice. According to them, judges had to submit to ideals such as fidelity to 
the law. This movement desired personal humility, in which judge’s reason was subordinate to the 
law even if the latter appeared to be contrary to natural reason.631 
That concept of legislative intent as the most important value to be followed by the judiciary is the 
origin of Cour de cassation jurisdiction that was supposed to control only the legality of lower court 
decisions. The Court could not substitute its position for that of the lower court judges. It could only 
control them if they had applied the law incorrectly. The function of the court was to police and 
sanction any deviation from the application of the law. Even if legislation went against any natural 
reason, the highest court could only police its exact application and sanction any deviation from the 
text of the law. In other words, the Cour de cassation could not interpret the law. Thus, for the 
school of the privatistes, only incorrect application of the law qualified as a legal error. 
1.3.2 François Geny and the international movement of jurisprudence 
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At the end of the nineteenth century, a new international movement of jurisprudence of interests 
emerged. This movement and its most important representative, François Geny, were inspired by the 
sociological theory of law. Their understanding was that law is an instrument of regulation aimed at 
the resolution of conflicts that were caused by conflicts of interests in society. 
The model of this new movement was based on a consequentialist analysis of effects judicial 
decisions on the resolution of conflicts of interests and social progress.632 It is evident that Geny’s 
understanding of what law does comes very close to the modern economic approach used in this 
thesis. Geny understood that law regulates social interests and new rules can create both winners 
and losers. He also paid attention to the effects these rules have on social progress, which comes 
close to the aim of making everyone better off in society through legal regulation. That model 
presupposes an understanding of error with the inclusion of more elements than just following the 
law. Thus, error is what stops social progress and leads to an imbalance of conflicts of interests in 
society.  
Of course, the French tradition of putting strong limits on judicial power is evident in Geny’s 
understanding of the way judges exercise their prerogatives. Again, the higher court judge is not 
supposed to substitute his own understanding for that of the lower court judge. However, the idea is 
that the higher courts have to verify whether the lower court judge has not made an error in the 
balance of interests at stake in the case at hand.633   
The control that the Cour de Cassation exercises is definitely not based on that concept because the 
court sees control of identification, evaluation, and the comparison of different social interests as 
being within the power of the lower courts.634 That is strange for a high court that needs to regulate 
more social effect of legal rules. Moreover, as demonstrated in this chapter, there are officials such 
as the avocat general that are supposed to express an opinion in the social interest. The problem 
comes from the divided loyalties of the avocat general who has to decide whether the social interest 
lies in a balance between different individual interests in society or in the interests of the 
government.  
1.3.3 Chaim Perelman and error as infringement upon values 
The other significant theory in the development of the Francophone concept of error is the one 
propagated by Chaim Perelman in the latter half of the twentieth century. He sees the judicial 
decision as a judgment of values; to him, error is a decision that imposes the wrong values.   
Ultimately, the French understanding of right answers and from there of what is error is as diverse 
(or even more so) as in the other judicial systems examined here. The visible image of the official 
portrait of the judicial system comes mostly from the understanding of the Privatistes school of legal 
thought but has gradually been eroded or questioned by other theories and the actual practice in the 
courts.  What has to be highlighted here is the meaning of error and thus the task of the higher 
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French courts of error correction is a complex process that has been interpreted very differently, 
which means that its nature is up for debate.    
The problem of error correction is a universal legal issue. It is not only the US and France that have 
struggled to define what it is. A brief overview of the English experience with error correction can be 
useful to highlight the complexity of the issue.  
1.4 The English Understanding of Legal Error 
In England, there was a division between Equity and Common law procedures. They also had a 
different understanding of what legal error is.  
1.4.1 Error under equity 
The equity procedure was simply a request for discretion on the part of the King (in practice, the Lord 
Chancellor fulfilled that function). The cost of the procedure was 200 pounds. The court had full 
discretion to render any judgment it thought appropriate. In fact, this was a de novo procedure with 
little regard for what had happened at the previous proceedings.635 This was a procedure that applied 
complete justice theory to procedure. 
Unlike under common law, strict procedural rules and a formalist approach to compliance under 
equity were not ends in themselves. Any errors in the pleading process could undermine the 
achievement of complete justice. The reason was that issues could be missed and not be put in front 
of the court; the relevant parties and their interests may not all be considered. So a strict approach 
was needed to achieve complete justice by evaluating all possible sides (legal and factual) of the 
issue.636 So error would be not the totality of what is relevant to the case. 
1.4.2 Error under common law 
Error under common law meant not following the correct procedure because following procedure is 
an end in itself. 637 Complex rules tend to increase the error rate.638 Both common law and equity 
developed as systems with complex rules. Complexity and strict formalism also meant procedural 
points were raised often by the parties which produced undesirable satellite litigation. Writ of error 
allowed the losing party (plaintiff in error) at trial to sue the winning party. This was a matter of right 
and its effect was to stay the execution of the lower court’s decision. That was done on the condition 
that the plaintiff in error provided security for the amount of the judgment and any damages that 
may supersede the postponed execution of the judgment. The review was limited to errors of law. 
Facts were determined by the trial court. Some exceptions to fact review were permissible such as 
the status of the parties or their capacity to sue. In general, the purpose of appeal under that 
procedure was to examine only whether the trial judge had made an error in a legal ruling and was 
not concerned with whether the party that presented the best evidence won.639 That meant the writ 
of error procedure was a formalistic limited appeal, the purpose of which was to correct legal errors. 
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The appellate judge was not concerned with dispensing justice and did not encroach upon the trial 
judge’s fact finding and decision-making prerogatives.   
1.4.3 Different effects of procedural error under the two systems 
The strict formalist Common law approach to error correction could not deliver the desired results 
because in too many cases, procedural errors would become substantive impediments to delivering 
justice. The liberal approach to curing procedural errors of equity led to a considerable amount of 
noncompliance with procedural rules. The end result was an expensive and prolonged procedure 
that spent too much time on the parties’ applications to cure procedural error, rather than on the 
substance of the cases.  Thus neither extreme procedural solution to error correction produced the 
desired results of reducing cost and delay.  
1.4.4 Simplification of procedure in the 1873 reform 
The Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 introduced a reform that attempted to simplify procedure.  It 
introduced a single form of organizing process to replace the multiplicity of writs through which 
common law actions were commenced.640 The procedure of equity was preferred in order to simplify 
procedural formalities that resulted from the writ procedure. This simple procedure was supposed to 
allow judges to deal with the merits of the case and not with complicated procedural rules. However, 
the result was a rift between theory and practice. The purpose of appeal to do justice between the 
parties existed only in theory. In practice, it was subverted by a more restrictive purpose of appeal. 
On questions of law, the subject of most appeals, the court limited itself on the issues raised by the 
parties at trial; it considered new point only if all the facts necessary to rule on the issue were 
developed at trial, the court could not overrule a direct finding of fact by the lower court because the 
latter had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses giving testimony.641  
As a result, the English system has been in flux between the common law rule and the equity rule. 
The English system has been defined by the search for the optimal rule situated somewhere between 
the two extreme understandings of legal error. In other words, the English system has had 
considerable difficulties in finding a definitive answer to what legal error is and how the courts 
should deal with it. So the question is whether the same is true not only for the French theory that 
defined error in at least three different ways but for the French practice in the courts. 
1.4.5 Disciplinary purpose of appeal—The strong French version of error correction  
The specific characteristic (independent parameter) that defines the French judicial system’s attitude 
towards error correction is the availability of disciplinary error correction. That is a more complicated 
version of the simple correction this work has examined so far. It is suggested that this specificity 
moves the lever of the judicial machine towards very strong error correction.  
Disciplinary error correction adds a further layer of intricacy to the French judicial system. In France, 
the disciplinary purpose of appeal is more often mentioned than simple error correction. To see why 
this is the case, there needs to be a closer examination of what disciplinary error actually means and 
how it is used in France.  
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In a study ordered by the Cour de cassation, the disciplinary purpose of appeal in front of the Court is 
defined as “censorship of erroneous application of the law.”642  That definition is based 
predominantly on the idea of error correction as defined in the works of the school of privatistes who 
had great influence on the type of hierarchical control the Cour de cassation exercises.  
More precisely, the review of the Cour de cassation was created to exercise only control of the 
application of the text of the law (literal interpretation). The court had a policing and sanctioning role 
when the law was applied incorrectly. After the constitution of 1791, the review of Cour de cassation 
was extended to include both the letter and the spirit of the law. 643  However, this initial strong 
policing role remains the main prerogative of the court.  
Here it is argued that the disciplinary function of the court follows the tradition of the policing role 
and can be seen as error correction but with stronger connotation, which also comes from the 
administrative style of organization of the French judiciary. This definition also has undertones of a 
strong hierarchical system both from within and outside the judiciary, which tightly controls the 
judges and the errors of their decisions.  
The main effect of disciplinary control over the judiciary is further strengthening of the hierarchy 
within the French state in general and within the French judiciary in particular. In addition, it is 
argued that error correction is a complex enough problem that French theory gave three different 
definitions of error. Thus adding hierarchical and administrative layers of complexity to the term and 
turning it into disciplinary error correction makes analysis even more difficult.  
It is suggested that the focus on an exact definition of disciplinary error correction may be a very 
complex task. Consequently, after a brief attempt of an overview of the attempts that have been 
made to define it, this chapter will concentrate more on the question of whether disciplinary error 
correction works in the social interest and whether it adds anything worth the expenses of 
implementing this additional way to introduce accountability of French judges.  In other words, the 
effects of disciplinary error correction are what truly matter. 
1.5 Attempts to Define Disciplinary Error Correction 
It is important to look at the issue of a disciplinary approach to error correction because the French 
system struggles with defining a disciplinary error. Probably the clearest explanation comes from 
Hélène Pauliat, who made technical distinctions between process and processus in order to deal with 
different types of error and who should control each type.644 She distinguishes between 
administrative disciplinary correction, in which there is a dysfunction of judicial services (processus).  
There is also a simple procedural error that is about the process and it should not be a part of 
disciplinary error correction. Making that distinction in practice seems extremely hard. It is suggested 
such a distinction will cause additional satellite litigation and confusion. The economic result will be 
that the cost of error correcting procedures will go up.  
1.5.1 The Official attempts of the French judicial authorities to define disciplinary error 
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The highest administrative court in France, The Conseil d’Etat, has tried to define disciplinary error. 
An opinion of its Interior Section of 19 October 2006 has disciplinary error defined as: “[a] deliberate 
violation of the main principles of civil or criminal procedure.”645  According to Hélène Pauliat, that 
opinion was not helpful in defining error because it introduced a risk of confusion between the 
appeal and cassation level judges and disciplinary judge. 
The French constitutional court, Conseil Constitutionnel, has also examined the question of 
disciplinary error. It was defined as failure of the duty of the magistrate towards the state, his 
honour, and his dignity.646 It was also a serious and deliberate violation of procedural rules that 
constitutes a guarantee of the rights of the parties.647 
What these two official definitions show is that there are two elements; one seems to come very 
close to ordinary error correction of procedural mistakes. The other one speaks of deliberate action 
on the part of the judge that hurts one of the parties’ rights and the integrity of the judicial 
institution. Besides the difficulty in proving intent on the part of the judge, it seems a rather scary 
prospect that there are judges who intentionally violate their duties to such a serious degree. 
It is an empirical question to see whether the disciplinary error correction in France deals more often 
with ordinary error correction issues or with serious violations of the ethics and integrity of the 
judicial office. For the purpose of this study, it will be assumed that most disciplinary review is on 
rather minor judicial offences. If that is incorrect the problem has to be fixed at its source—judicial 
selection. If judges are unfit to guard the integrity of the office, that means they were wrongly 
selected for the profession. That could be the case in France because most judges start their duties 
very early in their careers without first being able to prove their professional and personal qualities 
to be judges. 
1.6 Types of Errors 
The account of types of error to be corrected given by Hélène Pauliat suggests that normal 
procedural error correction is the most common type of error that has to be dealt with by the 
disciplinary error correction process: if the party could benefit from a lawyer, if she had the time 
needed to present her case, if she could present all proof available, if the defendant was allowed to 
express herself, and if budgetary constraints affected the everyday functioning of the court.648 
This list is also reminiscent of the application of the complete theory of justice and thus of what the 
English considered to be an error under the Equity system. That demonstrates that the French 
version of disciplinary error, for the most part,649 is nothing else but error correction imposed by 
administrative and hierarchical quasi-judicial bodies. 
1.6.1 Who should control disciplinary errors? 
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The next important question is by whom the disciplinary error correction should be exercised. Hélène 
Pauliat has argued that it has to be either the normal appeal courts that control disciplinary error or 
there are two possible administrative solutions that give an authority outside of the judicial 
hierarchy. The first possibility is that the function to impose disciplinary control over judges to be 
fulfilled by the Mediator of the Republic.650 The second is to delegate the task to an administrative 
body such as Conseil supérieur de la magistrature (CSM).651  
Since 2011, the parties to the process can directly demand disciplinary review from CSM for judicial 
errors as stated in Article 65 of the French Constitution.652 That new possibility was one of the results 
of the constitutional reform of 23 July 2008. Three commissions were created to examine claims. 
Two exist for reviewing the actions of sitting magistrates and one for floor magistrates. Two 
magistrates and two qualified persons compose the commissions. This disciplinary review does not 
deal with the decisions themselves. What is interesting is that this procedure does not involve only 
the judge who has committed the “error,” but also her hierarchical superior.653 That puts additional 
pressure on the judges to never get involved in the disciplinary review of their work. 
1.6.1.1 Why there is no clarity of what exactly disciplinary error is 
The first reason for this lack of clarity is the difficulty and controversy involved in saying what legal 
error is. That is confirmed by the different views of what error is throughout the evolution of French 
legal theory. Second, because of its inclination towards strong hierarchy and administrative style 
judiciary, the French system is simply trying to add another level of complexity to the problem of 
what error is. The idea of a disciplinary error is simply a result of the French tradition of strong 
judicial hierarchy and administrative style judicial authority. Keeping judges in check with the threat 
of being disciplined simply makes them administratively accountable to a hierarchy either within or 
outside the judiciary.  
1.6.2 Deciding whether disciplinary control brings benefits  
Instead of trying to clearly distinguish between disciplinary and simple error correction, it should be 
ascertained whether adding another layer to legal error with the introduction of disciplinary error is 
in the social interest. The Hierarchy chapter used the adjusted model of Jean Tirole of an official’s 
accountability to strong judicial hierarchies to answer exactly that question: is it beneficial to have 
more accountability of judges? 
Tirole argued that accountability (strict control) does not always produce desirable results because 
such control does not always produce an alignment with social interest. Nevertheless, the effect of 
that accountability to a hierarchical superior can be positive. Periodic evaluation creates two major 
potential benefits. First, it may induce a judge who is otherwise inclined to act in the public interest. 
If the superior cannot always evaluate the official's actions directly, but must still act in the right way 
because she is concerned that there may be controls in place, Jean Tirole calls that "moral-hazard-
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correcting" benefit of accountability.654 Second, evaluation by the hierarchical superiors may allow 
for correcting undesirable judicial behavior. It can also set “the right kind of judges” on the path to 
promotion. Tirole calls this the "adverse-selection-correcting" effect.655 
On the negative side, Tirole has argued that accountability also carries serious possible drawback. In 
order to have a successful career, a judge may choose an action, not because it is right for the 
litigants and for society, but because it is popular with her supervisors.656 Thus, accountability may 
provide an incentive for wasteful information acquisition. That means the judge will expend more 
efforts to learn what her superiors think instead of acquiring information about the optimal decision 
for the litigants and society.  
Since the introduction of disciplinary error means an overall strengthening of the hierarchy, what 
should actually happen is for judges to be made accountable to control of their judicial careers. The 
result is that judges are likely to follow the preferences of the judges higher up in the hierarchy and 
they will try to please their superiors. More precisely, since the immediate superior of the judge is 
also called by CSM during the review, judges will make sure that even if wrong, they follow the 
desires of their immediate superior in order to maintain their relationship with their superior. The 
immediate superior is important for judicial careers because she expresses her opinion on her 
inferior judges in the judicial files they all have which serves as a sort of recommendation to CSM for 
promotion. 
That means the French judicial system incurs one additional cost. The reason is in such a system, 
judicial careers depend on pleasing their immediate superiors and an additional evaluation from an 
administrative body such as Conseil superieur de la magistrature.657 In order to do that, judges have 
to undertake the costly activity of finding out additional information, which is their superiors’ 
preferences, which may or may not be aligned with the social interest. Still, for the lower level judge, 
it can be at least as costly to research this information as it is to find out what the social interest is. 
Thus the lower court judge performs two tasks: decision making and research of the opinion of 
superiors. It is optimal for them to render only judicial decisions and not to research socially 
unbeneficial information. 
Another problem that occurs in the French judicial system because of the extra control is that the 
judges who get promoted may not be the most talented but rather the most likable, servile, humble, 
or those least likely to make original or innovative decisions. In other words, the danger is that such a 
system will promote mostly those who most smoothly navigate the complex waters of court politics 
and not those who are capable of producing the best judicial decisions. That is a direct result of the 
French system of promotion, which is dependent on the existence of a judicial profile system in 
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which the direct superior writes his or her opinion and then the evaluation goes through an 
administrative reviewing body such as the Conseil superieur de la magistrature.658 
The conclusion is that it is doubtful that adding a disciplinary control over inferior judges will harness 
their motives and align them with the public interest. Additional expensive control over judges will 
not produce better decisions but more submissive behavior of judges to forces both within and 
without the judicial hierarchy.659 This style of control also imposes additional cost to the public 
coffers because a court-like authority such as Conseil superieur de la magistrature incurs conducts an 
additional over judges that may be handled by the top hierarchical courts at a lower cost. 
There may be exceptions to that conclusion. More disciplinary control can be justified if it is found 
that, in practice, a lot of judges do not do their job well. There could be two reasons for that. Richard 
Posner has argued that judges are inclined to work less than their lawyer colleges of the same age 
and ability because of the non-profit incentives judges have. If that problem is found to be significant 
in France then such extensive disciplinary control would be more than needed. Another problem that 
would justify such extensive control is rampant judicial corruption. Disciplinary control from a few 
different and independent sources would produce some positive effects in reducing corruption. 
However, if both these reasons for control are not common, this additional disciplinary control may 
produce more negative than positive results. 
2.0 Lack of Political Purpose for the French Courts   
The next independent parameter that has to be examined here concerns the absence of a political 
role of French judges. This is a complex issue. The main mantra of French theory is that in France, 
judges were supposed to have an apolitical role. There are complications that contradict that desire 
becoming reality. There are two issues here. The first one is that there is nothing more political than 
an apolitical system. The second issue follows from the first. The problem is that in order to maintain 
the appearance of apolitical judiciary important problems arise, which affect judicial independence. 
2.1 The French Apolitical Judiciary  
The power of French judges has been confronted by practically all political regimes. It has been 
described previously how King Louis XIV dealt with regional appeals courts—his opponents in the 
quest for absolute monarchical power. Then after the French Revolution, the appeals process served 
a very distinct political purpose. In contrast, in England, where there has never been a lasting change 
in regime,660 in France after the revolution, the new republican authorities needed to establish their 
authority. They needed the appeal to provide evidence of how “just” the new regime is. That led to 
generous provisions of allowing appeal as a way to strengthen citizens’ loyalty to the new men in 
power. In other words, in order to protect their power, the new republican authorities needed to 
provide a more generous system of appeal, in which they can be seen to dispense justice better than 
the old regime. That was done by enacting Loi of 16 and 24 August 1790, which specifically granted 
access to appeal without filtering in law and fact. As Martin Shapiro has argued such extensive appeal 
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system provides catharsis for litigants661 and a generous system of appeal has a stronger influence on 
how citizens feel about the new regime. The litigant could reach the top court, the Cour de cassation, 
without any hurdles in civil and criminal matters. That highlights the function of the appeals process 
as a showpiece that demonstrates that the new regime serves the people better by providing them 
complete access to justice. 
So how did the regime create an “apolitical” court when the courts served such a strong political 
role?  The politically motivated rule that created such a court came about as a result of the fear of 
the judicial activism of parlements.662 Thus judges had to be denied any political and social role.663 In 
other words, anciene régime judges who retained their positions were not allowed to have too much 
power. The instrument that allowed that restriction was a system of cassation not appeal.664 That 
meant that the Cour de cassation could not adopt decisions but only break the decision of the lower 
court. The decision is remanded to another or to the same cour d’appel (with a different judicial 
composition) for another de novo review. To further limit the power of the Cour de cassation the 
appeal court had the right to confirm its decision and oppose its superior court. The result was a 
system of checks of Appeal Courts and the Cour de cassation on each other.  
This tradition of trying to have apolitical courts lives on in the current French Constitution of October 
4 1958. In Article 64 the French judiciary is given the status only of an authority and is thus by 
definition not equal to the legislative and executive powers. 
2.1.1 Judicial independence  
The desire for apolitical judiciary is often reflected in the structure of the French legal institutions 
that interfere or even limit judicial independence. Here, the primary focus is on the degree to which 
the relationship of judges to politics in France involves hierarchical subordination that goes beyond 
the judiciary. In other words, the degree of judicial independence in France is what matters here. 
Article 64 of the Constitution makes the President of the Republic protect judicial independence. In 
this task, he is assisted by the Conseil superieur de la magistrature (CSM).665  
In the case of Cour de cassation, the President of the Republic appoints all the sitting magistrates of 
the court (the First President, the presidents of chambers and the conseillers).  It is the Conseil 
superieur de la magistrature that makes the proposals.666 CSM also disciplines judges. The main 
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purpose of existence of CSM is to assist the president in protecting judicial independence. In other 
words, on top of the judicial hierarchy firmly sits the president of the Republic who also happens to 
be in charge of the body that helps him protect judicial independence. In addition, the fact that 
France is a presidential and not a parliamentary republic that gives further powers to the President.  
All that simply means that in France separation of powers and thus judicial independence is weak. 
The French system comes much closer to the British tradition of balance of powers where the Lord 
Chancellor used to represent all three branches of government. That triple role was justified in the 
following way: 
The advantages which accrue to the Cabinet from the presence of a colleague who is not 
only of a high judicial reputation, but who can represent to them the view of the judiciary; to 
the legislature from the presence in it of one who is both a judge and a minister; and to 
judiciary from the fact that its President is in close touch with current political affairs, is 
enormous. 667       
That means the system of balance of powers is defensible in principle. The difference between the 
French and the English systems was that in France, the power is concentrated in more powerful 
figure than the Lord Chancellor— the French President.668 The doubt of the appropriateness of such a 
system comes from the current social and mostly political conditions. In the current era, dangerous 
populist candidates are one step away from gaining the presidential office. If there is that much-
concentrated power in one person, instead of creating checks on his or her authority, there is the 
dangerous possibility of authoritarianism. That is why judicial independence is important. In such 
dangerous times, the judiciary has to exercise some level of control over the executive and the 
legislative powers. In France, high officials have previously been prosecuted, mostly after leaving 
office.669 However, considering that ordinary courts670 in France are all under the president’s 
hierarchical influence means that both civil and criminal prosecution can be stopped by a strong 
authoritarian president.  
The reason for that subordinate position of judges in both France and until recently, in the UK, is 
historical. In the formation periods of the power of the judiciary, the political forces wanted to 
restrict judicial power.671 
The story of the dependency of the French judges on the executive does not end here. The other part 
of the French magistrates the so called parquet is also directly subordinated to it and in particular to 
the Ministry of Justice. So again it is the executive that is the hierarchical superior to the judiciary. At 
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the Cour de cassation level, there is le procurer general who is assisted by the first avocat general 
and twenty-two avocat generals. They are also appointed by a decree of President of the Republic on 
the recommendation of CSM.  John Bell has argued that the French procureur position has built-in 
confusion between two duties: first, representing the executive and second representing the nation 
and social interest. 
John Bell has expressed the opinion that the CSM has helped to somewhat reduce the political 
pressure on judges when it comes to their appointments. This is the case with the procureurs, though 
these are positions that still remain firmly in the grasp of the government and are “very much in the 
gift of the Government.”672 
There is another problem of such additional control, especially if it is an administrative style control 
from outside judicial hierarchy because it will negatively impact judicial independence and will 
reduce the quality of judicial decision making because as stated above judges will do more research 
on what their superiors desire and not what will benefit the individual parties to the process and the 
social interest.  
It seems that such administrative control from outside of the judiciary can interfere with judicial 
independence. However, according to Article 64, the main purpose for the creation of Conseil 
supérieur de la magistrature is to assist the President of the French Republic to protect the 
independence of the judicial authority.673That seems contradictory that the chief executive authority 
has to protect the independence of the judiciary by having disciplinary authority over it.  That means 
there is political power over the judiciary, which is supposed to be apolitical.  
Having outside influence on the judiciary is something characteristic when the judicial branch is weak 
as compared to the other two branches of government. That is not something unique to France; until 
very recently a similar constitutional arrangement existed in the UK with the balance of powers.  
Giving so much power to the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature means that they have to be 
able to promote the right kind of judge to the highest possible position. The problem is that like in 
any other job interview, the most information about the candidate is known only to herself and 
not the people who examine her. In other words CSM has as a goal to correcting adverse selection 
by reducing this information gap. This is why agency theory does not work for the judiciary 
because they cannot control the hiring of their staff. 
2.1.2 Evaluating judicial independence  
The question here is whether judicial independence is worth protecting and at what cost. The basic 
assumption is that judicial independence is a positive development that helps the functioning of the 
three branches of government. In reality, the issue is more complicated because there are both 
advantages and disadvantages of judicial independence. 
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2.1.2.1 Advantage: No political influence 
Political influence on the judiciary reduces its independence and can be counterproductive because 
judges will not be able to decide the case in the social interests but instead will concentrate on 
pleasing their political and hierarchical superiors. That is especially the case when posts are gifted 
out not for ability but for political reasons.  
This critique applies to the civil part of the French system so criminal charges are outside of the 
scope, but it is important to note that prosecutors and advocate generals play a role in civil litigation 
as well. Thus gifting out those positions would mean the appointees will care much less about 
defending the social interests and way more about pleasing their hierarchical superiors who handed 
them the positions.  
2.1.2.2 Disadvantage: Judicial bias  
The disadvantage of judicial independence is that they will impose their own bias on the law. In the 
absence of a significantly better education of judges as compared to elected officials and clear theory 
of justice applied by the courts that could be problematic and drive the system and the decisions it 
produces in different, even contradictory, directions. It is worth examining the problem a bit deeper 
through and Landes and Posner economic model on judicial independence. 
2.2 Landes and Posner’s Economic Model  
The economic theory by Landes and Posner, which describes what effects judicial independence 
produces, states that legislation is supplied to rival groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of 
favourable legislation.674 These groups can be voters, campaign contributors, etc.675 Politicians set 
their price by making promises for enacting specific policies or to act in favour or protect different 
groups.  The winners are those who manage to create or simply be a part of some sort of coalition 
that outbids the rivals and elects the candidate with the “right” policy proposals. The interest groups 
expect that once in power the politicians they helped get elected to fulfill the campaign promises and 
defend their interests not those of the opposing interests groups. The role of the judiciary in this 
process is that, through interpretation in their judicial decisions, it can subvert the meaning of the 
policies enacted by the newly elected official. In other words, the judiciary is free to act as it wishes 
and will impose additional costs on the sale of legislation.676 
2.2.1 The position of the legislator  
More often than not, the legislator wants its position to be continuously obeyed over time. There is 
no doubt that the initial legislator who creates a new society or makes fundamental changes in it 
wants its policies to have a permanent character.   
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A legislative body that wants its desires to be carried out and its laws enforced needs the judiciary to 
be on its side. However, the members of this legislature can change. That may result in a change of 
the preferences towards specific laws. The problem posed to the initial legislator is to make its 
influence last over a long period of time. In other words, the initial legislator desires permanence of 
its laws. To do that, it needs two things: 1) an independent judiciary that will not be affected by a 
new composition of the legislative body with different views from the original legislator; and 2) a 
theory that provides for literal reading or more to put it more precisely for interpretation that follows 
the intent of the original legislator.  
It is the second condition that is decisive of what role judicial independence will play. If judges stick 
to the original intent of the legislator, they increase the cost of enacting new legislation. The reason 
is there are transaction costs for a legislative body to assemble, to draft a new piece of legislation, 
and overcome all the hurdles that stand in the way of its enactment.677 Aligning all these elements is 
a time- and resource-consuming process and even more importantly it is not always possible for all 
the elements necessary for the draft to become law are in place. Thus, when judges increase the 
likelihood that the old legislation is interpreted faithfully, the value of new legislation increases. That 
is the case because it is much cheaper and faster for judges to use some loopholes in the language of 
the old legislation to interpret it differently from the original intent than to enact a new piece of 
legislation. 
The inference is that the role of the judiciary may be to either facilitate or impede interest groups 
politics and their influence on the law depending on the type of interpretation the courts apply. That 
is why when the Cour de cassation was created, its original interpretive powers were extremely 
limited. The French revolutionary legislator simply wanted its policies to be carried out in a 
permanent fashion. 
So the ideal court to implement some initial legislator’s policy preferences is an independent court 
with limited interpretation powers. So why did the revolutionary power fail to create a more 
politically independent court? They actually did that. The way it was done is to have judges elected 
and not appointed by the President of the French Republic. The change occurred towards the end of 
the Napoleonic era in 1814.678 So the French Cour de cassation was the perfect initial legislator. Then 
changes assured that the Court was more dependent on the current government and not designed to 
only uphold the wishes of the initial legislator. 
To conclude, judicial independence can serve to protect the stability of the policies enacted by the 
initial legislator if it applies the right theory, namely the theory of initial intent of the legislature.  
Otherwise, the independent judiciary can impose costs on the current legislator by finding ways to 
subvert the application of legislation of the current legislator. That, in turn, raises the value of 
legislation that interest groups are after. In other words, the independent judiciary may impose costs 
on the sale of legislation by politicians. To avoid that extra cost, the French system has limited judicial 
independence. That could be a good thing if judicial bias on the law is a concern, but it can be quite 
negative if judges make better decisions based on higher principles than the politicians. In times of 
an unstable political system with a high danger of populist politicians gaining power, judicial 
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independence can be crucial for preserving the intent of the initial French legislature of reasonable 
policy making and free society.   
2.3 Unification and Harmonization Purposes of Appeal  
As seen in the chapter on Purpose of Appeal, unification is the second and arguably more powerful 
type of hierarchical control besides error correction. These are both methods used to move the law 
in a certain “right” direction.  
What is the purpose of appeal as harmonization? Vogel has talked about the harmonization rather 
than the unification purpose of the appellate review of the Court de cassation. So an examination of 
the relationship between these two terms is necessary. The terms unification and harmonization are 
sometimes taken to be synonymous.679 Other variations of understanding uniformity are also 
possible.680 Nevertheless, it is suggested that the best interpretation of those two terms can be found 
in one important distinction Martin Shapiro has made. He distinguishes between the political unity of 
a state or empire achieved with the help of the courts and doctrinal uniformity, which is basically 
uniformity of interpretation of the law by the courts.681Here it is suggested that harmonization covers 
only the doctrinal unification. A view that confirms this understanding has been expressed by Steven 
Shavell, who has also defined harmonization as a resolution of conflicts in the interpretation of the 
law among lower courts.682 It is suggested that that is practically the same thing as doctrinal 
uniformity. 
2.3.1 The basic economic analysis of doctrinal uniformity  
Besides the legal purpose of doctrinal unification that reduces different interpretations of the laws 
and allows every individual within a specific state to receive equal treatment of his or her case, there 
is an economic rationale behind harmonization.  
The economic purpose of unification of the law is to reduce transaction costs. There are two ways to 
define transaction costs. The traditional neoliberal approach (narrow definition) is that transaction 
costs are those involved in the market exchange: discovering market prices and the costs of writing 
and enforcing contracts. A more comprehensive view (broad definition) includes the other market 
failures within transaction costs, for example, information problems and externalities.   
What does it mean for the law to achieve that reduction of transaction costs at a doctrinal level? It 
means that people will be able to conduct exchanges freely within the economy because they will 
know the results of their actions and the cost will be as defined by the law. From an information 
perspective, that means when the law is applied in a similar fashion across a specific territory its 
predictability increases. Thus there is better information about the applicable law. For example, it is 
easier to write a contract if the law that concerns the contractual domain is unambiguous and thus 
predictable.  In looking at predictability from an externalities point of view, the emphasis is on the 
fact that economic agents need clearly defined property rights so they can adjust their behaviour 
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accordingly. Clearly defined property rights reduce externalities. Clarity reduces unnecessary 
expenses because that means the parties to a conflict do not need to go to court in order to define 
property rights. 
Clearly defined rights allow the person who values a specific entitlement the most to acquire it from 
the person who holds it. So if two courts within the same territory decide the entitlements differently 
there are unclearly defined rights and thus higher transaction costs for economic agents. 
So if there is no way to bargain around unclearly defined rights and obligation caused by conflicting 
judicial decisions (high transaction costs) negative externalities matter even more. That underlines 
one more time the importance of the unification purpose of appeal: it reduces externalities caused 
by conflicting judicial decisions. As economic theory states: when there are externalities 
centralization (unification) is needed. A uniform system of appeal thus serves to reduce externalities 
that conflicting judicial decisions produce.683 
Thus unification as the purpose of appeal makes economic sense. Expending limited resources in 
order to achieve it has value for the judicial system. So what is the cost of externalities to society and 
does society expend an adequate amount of its scarce resources on the appeals process in order to 
deal with the externalities/high transaction costs that result from conflicting law?   
Kornhauser has argued that unification has to be justified because it involves costs. Adding an 
additional appellate tier should “rest on a more complex articulation of the organizational aim. If the 
caseload is sufficiently heavy and jurisdictions sufficiently large, a desire for uniformity conceivably 
would suggest a structure of geographical jurisdictions with two levels of appeal.”684 
The important inference to make is that the right amount of society’s resources should be spent in 
order to deal with externalities caused by different interpretations of the law on a sufficiently large 
territory, on which geographically diverse courts provide dissimilar interpretations of the law. Thus 
the question to ask about the strong French commitment to harmonization is whether or not such 
strong doctrinal unification has better outcomes for society. Likewise, is a strong unification role and 
reduction of transaction costs more important than the huge costs incurred because of the proactive 
role of the Cour de cassation in harmonizing the law?  
2.4 Historical View of Uniformity in France  
In France, the importance of the two types of unification has shifted from primarily political 
unification to doctrinal unification (harmonization). The origins of the strong French tradition of 
unification can be traced back to the Anciene regime. At the time of Louis XIV, the endeavor for 
political uniformity and absolute monarchy dictated the need for harmonization of the extremely 
diverse at the time interpretation of the laws by the powerful regional courts, the parlaments.685 
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Thus, during this period, the political reason for such fierce desire to unify court decisions 
(jurisprudence) was to maintain the royal dominance over the regional parlements (courts) in order 
to eradicate any challenges to the central royal authority. 
The first major attempt at regulating civil procedure, the enactment of the Ordonnance of 1667, also 
had a strong unification aim. Its author Colbert did not specifically state the political purpose of 
unification, which had to be more important to the royal regime, but he clearly highlighted the 
harmonization direction: to end the diversity of court decisions (jurisprudence).686 That objective had 
been affirmed by a number of royal decrees since the 15th century.687 The 1806 procedural code 
directly followed the 1667 decree; this objective remained extremely important for French 
procedure.  
At the time of the French Revolution, as Martin Shapiro has argued, the regime realized that there 
was a need mostly of uniformity of statutory interpretation.688 The reason was the country was 
already unified and establishing strong central authority was not needed, but protecting the ideals of 
the new regime was strongly required. They created a new court that could perform that 
harmonization function. So at the top of the judicial system, the Tribunal de Cassation created in 
1790 expressed the lawmaker’s concern that national legislation be uniformly applied by all the 
courts, a concern which was further also expressed in the compulsory procedure of referral to the 
lawmaker himself on issues of statutory interpretation (référé législatif).689 
The Cour de cassation was the only one capable of doing that because it was the only national court 
in civil matters, whereas the appeal courts in France were regional and could not serve such a 
function. Consequently, it makes sense that the current French analysis of the role of the Cour de 
cassation has concentrated on the doctrinal unification of the law and not on its political 
counterpart. Thus in the French context, it makes perfect sense to talk about doctrinal unification 
using the specific term that describes it—harmonization—and ignore the general aim of unification 
that includes political unification as well.  In other words, the French system currently strives mostly 
for doctrinal uniformity.  
2.4.1 High degree of uniformity promotion in France  
The high level of commitment to the unification of the law in France requires an examination of the 
degree to which the French judicial system uses its extensive promotion in order to see whether the 
French system over-commits to doctrinal unification (harmonization) of the law. 
One number that clearly demonstrates this strong commitment to harmonization is that the Cour de 
cassation hears more than 20,000 cases each year.690 That number can be compared to the around 
80 cases that the US Supreme Court hears each year. The US court also hears further 50 cases 
without hearing arguments. 
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Nevertheless, even in France, it seems that the attitude towards strong commitment to 
harmonization is waning down dramatically. 691 A 2002 reform has allowed the Cour de cassation to 
filter out cases.692 The guiding provision is  Article L131-6, Code de l’organisation judicaire. By 
applying it, the court decided not to hear around 31.5% of its total caseload. 693 
There is a related organizational arrangement of the Cour de cassation that induces a further 
problem with the strong French commitment to harmonization. This organizational problem is 
twofold. First, the Cour de cassation is divided into different permanent panels (in French 
chambers
694). The result of that division is that the Cour does not always speak with the same voice 
and two chambers can give different interpretations on similar issues. Cour de cassation deals with 
conflicting decisions by deciding cases in plenary sessions that include all chambers. Second, the 
number of magistrates in the Cour is large (in 2010 they had 163). As a consequence, that 
arrangement further increases the unpredictability of how the court will decide a case and increases 
the possibility of divergent opinions within the court. 
2.4.2 The consequences of extreme commitment to harmonization of the law 
This substantial reduction of the number of cases the Court de cassation hears signals one of two 
things. Either the judges within the Court think that they are overburdened with cases and they 
cannot deal with them all, or they do not see the benefit of such extensive harmonization effort. The 
most probable explanation is that the cost of hearing that many cases to the magistrates of the Court 
may be substantial. It is obvious that less than 200 magistrates (in 2010 they were163), who have to 
deal with more than 20,000 per year (more than 122 cases per magistrate) will feel the weight of 
their overburdened schedules, lack of time and resources to hear all cases properly. It also means 
that the resources of the court are insufficient to deal with such a huge caseload. 
Or, it is the case that a strong unification role and reduction of transaction costs are less important 
than the huge costs that proactive role that provides extensive harmonization of the law entails. 
Examples of such costs can be the resources the government spends on the judicial system. Also, 
there may be a problem with an increased length of procedure that is caused by reviewing the 
conflicting decisions by the highest court. 
In order to resolve that dilemma, it will be useful to examine the other alternatives to such a strong 
commitment to harmonization of the law.  
2.5 The US 
Martineau has provided a useful definition of what uniformity as a purpose of appeal means in the 
US: “in a particular jurisdiction individuals in substantially the same circumstances will have the law 
interpreted and applied in a consistent manner and in accordance with a similar procedure.”695 In 
following Shapiro’s distinction here, the definition fits the doctrinal uniformity (harmonization). 
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Martineau has gone as far as to claim that there is a dominant position of unification as the purpose 
of appeal and that error correction and law development are not separate purposes of appeal but 
that they only serve the goal of uniformity.696 
In addition, the US went through an abrupt regime change as a result of its war of independence. 
Thus it is reasonable to expect there should be substantial investment in political unification as well. 
That is even more pressing goal because of the large diverse territory of the country.  
This dominant place of uniformity as the purpose of appeal has certainly had its origins in the desire 
to integrate the federal state and promote the power of the central regime. However, political unity 
and federalism in the US have always been met with resistance from the individual states that have 
had strong desire to retain control over certain issues. Thus, the existence of a contradictory attitude 
towards unification (both doctrinal and political) is not surprising. 
In the US, the regional appellate courts (circuit courts) produce conflicting decisions. The appeals 
courts in the US are 13 and the 11 of them plus the DC judicial circuits are geographically defined. 
The thirteenth circuit is the United States Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit. The number of 
conflicting judicial decisions in the different circuit courts is high.697 However, the reality is that the 
US Supreme Court hears only a very limited number of cases as compared to the huge caseload of 
the appeal courts (less than 1%). So even though authors such as Martineau have argued that the 
main purpose of appeal in the US is unification, in practice, the courts only marginally pursue it as a 
goal and thus only reap marginal benefits from this pursuit. The Supreme Court resolves only a small 
number of these inter-circuit conflicts.698  
So the US a country with a huge territory spends a comparatively small amount of resources on 
unification. The only national court the US Supreme Court hears less than 1% of the cases of the 
caseload of the circuit courts.699 
Mark Galander has provided an explanation of this paradox that both claims pervasiveness and at the 
same the elusiveness of the goal of provision of uniformity in practice in the US: “[I]n the higher 
reaches of the system where the learned tradition is propounded an unrelenting stress on the virtues 
of uniformity and universality and a pervasive distaste for particularism, compromise, and discretion. 
Yet the cultural attachment to universalism is wedded to and perhaps even intensifies diversity and 
particularism at the operative level.”700 
What that means is the American system of appeal often just declares uniformity as its main goal but 
in practice, it does not expend much effort towards achieving uniformity in its judicial institutions 
(hierarchy), nor does it try to achieve doctrinal uniformity at any price.  
That is in sharp contrast to a relatively small country like France, which has a very proactive approach 
to doctrinal uniformity and thus to reducing externalities/transaction costs caused by conflicting 
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judicial decisions. Without precise and complex statistics on both countries, there can only be a guess 
as to the effects of such diametrically opposed approaches to harmonization of the law. Intuitively it 
seems like the US economy is losing a lot because the court system underestimates the problem, 
whereas in France the issue of doctrinal uniformity is overstated and the French taxpayer overspends 
on harmonization of the law.  
Also, the French Cour de cassation’s magistrates are overburdened with achieving a goal that is not 
helped by the way the court is organized allowing different chambers to produce opposite decisions 
also due to lack of unified identity of the court caused by the large number of magistrates.     
In sum, in the US there is only lip service is paid to the goal of unification as the most important 
purpose of appeal that may show that the French system over-commits to achieving harmonization 
of the law. 
2.5.1 Pre-nineteenth century England  
Examining the traditional English model can be beneficial because it actually has the opposite 
tradition to doctrinal unification.  
2.5.1.1 Weak commitment to uniformity in England  
In England, there was no necessity for the courts to provide political union. The reason for that was 
that the system of justice was unified very early on, so the need for political unification was never a 
necessity. This early unification came into existence in the form of only territorial centralization, 
which meant that justice was served either in London or people had to wait for a king's judge, who 
came to their town on circuit duties from the capital.701 Even during the British Empire, the Privy 
Council702 did not serve to provide doctrinal unification role but merely political unity by resolving 
conflicts throughout the Empire.703 Thus, the historical circumstances led to only very limited 
development of political purpose of unification and no need for doctrinal unification of the law. 
Thus, a sharp contrast can be drawn between twelfth century England and France from the point of 
view of the distribution of power between the king and the local nobility. In England, there was a 
strong royal power. On the contrary, in France, the power of the king was counterbalanced by strong 
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local powers.704 The centralization of justice in the courts at Westminster and the entire system was 
thus a substitute for the elaborate chain of appeals leading from the countryside to the capital that 
was found in France.705 The result was a different attitude of the judicial systems towards unification.   
The most interesting result was a peculiar institutional and organizational arrangement of the English 
courts until 1887 reform— English courts lacked clearly defined appellate functions, by which one set 
of courts could comprehensively review the decisions of others.706 Thus, in England, only a basic 
notion of appeal existed. More precisely, there was no distinct hierarchy of trial and appellate courts. 
King's Bench and Common Pleas were both trial courts of roughly equivalent jurisdiction, yet King's 
Bench heard appeals from Common Pleas.707 Neither of the two "higher" courts of appeal was a 
distinct entity; the Court of Exchequer Chamber was simply all the judges of the trial courts sitting 
collegially. The House of Lords, though it heard certain appeals, was essentially a legislative body. 
This tradition has been carried on in the current system where, for example, the High Court often 
acts as an appeal court and as a result, the Court of Appeal acts sometimes as a court that hears a 
second appeal.708 
This English tradition provides an interesting lever position of weak unification aim for the judicial 
system, which needs to be examined. The reason is this position will provide us with the institutional 
alternative to the strong French unification tradition.  
2.5.1.2 Jurisdictional competition in the pre-nineteenth century English courts  
In pre-nineteenth century England, the court organization was based on the principle of jurisdictional 
competition. The following features of the pre-1799 court jurisdictional arrangements as they have 
been explained by Klerman demonstrate clearly the principles of this early English court model: 
“Each court was free to develop its own law. The development of judge-made common law amply 
demonstrates this freedom. Courts defined and expanded their jurisdictions, developed new 
procedures, and introduced doctrinal innovations without asking permission from Parliament or any 
other authority.”709 So the question is whether this alternative lever position characterized by 
jurisdictional competition instead of strong unification produced positive or negative results? 
Competition between courts in England was possible mostly from around 1500 until 1799 when 
statutory reforms took fees away from the judges.710 The legal arrangement that provided the 
possibility of court completion was allowing judges to receive part of their pay from fees imposed on 
the parties to a dispute.  
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The effect of jurisdictional competition, as Klerman has argued, was that it gave plaintiffs more 
choices, made their procedures cheaper, swifter, and more effective. He has based his opinion on 
Adam Smith who also thought that jurisdictional competition produced better law. 711 
Klerman has also cited J.H. Baker, a prominent English law historian, who has painted a vivid picture 
on how competition between courts worked: “Cynics might criticise the judges and clerks for making 
the court a family business and they undoubtedly had more than a professional interest in the 
success of the procedures under their control. But they had no monopoly, and they thrived only by 
satisfying litigants and the profession at large."712 
Baker has also argued that the innovations introduced around 1500 were valuable because they 
created a competitive legal market in which the King's Bench Court had no monopoly over the cases 
heard in England and resulted in "satisfied" litigants customers and “the profession at large.”713 
The critics of that view, including Jeremy Bentham, have stated that competition had a negative 
effect because it encouraged judges to create complicated, time-consuming procedures that 
multiplied the opportunities for the courts to collect fees.714 Still other historians, most prominently 
A.W.B. Simpson, have scoffed at the idea that judges were influenced by competition or fee income. 
715 
The price, however, of lack of conformity was most probably a pro plaintiff bias because it was the 
claimant who chose the court so he would choose the most advantageous for his case. At least three 
scholars have suggested that competition produced a pro-plaintiff bias. Landes and Posner briefly 
suggested as much in 1979. The relevant sections are quoted at the beginning of this thesis. 
In the mid-1980s, Clinton Francis published two articles on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
contract law arguing that jurisdictional competition produced a pro-creditor (and hence a pro-
plaintiff) bias.716 
2.6 Implications for the French Commitment to Unification 
To go back to our question of whether France is not expending too many resources on unification, 
the lesson learned from the pre-nineteenth century English experience is that unification is not 
absolute quality. There is a tradeoff involved. More unification means that fewer externalities are 
imposed on legal practice. If unification is done well there is more certainty in the application of the 
law. The tradeoff is that there is less law development. However, creating many levels of appeal 
contradicts gives unification the undertone of law development because a three-tier system even 
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less so a four tire system leaves to the higher courts nothing else to do but to develop the law. That is 
a huge contradiction of aims. The result is the judicial resources are spent on contradicting aims.  
In France, the emphasis on unification clearly has political origins. That combined with the tendency 
to stability and keeping all legal traditions in the mix of current solutions has resulted in keeping an 
extremely high commitment to unification with a shift towards more doctrinal and less political 
unification because the latter purpose has become almost completely obsolete. Also, the political 
desire to make the appeal a showpiece of the Republican regime after the French revolution led the 
system to over-allocate resources to appeal. 
Political influences do not produce positive results often. That is not surprising and is in line with 
Buchanan and other authors have maintained about the political process being inefficient.717  
Transaction costs have a substantial effect on the operation of the economy they dictate the types of 
exchange the market would prefer. Measuring the effect of unification purpose of appeal on 
reducing transaction costs in the economy is a complex undertaking and deserves a special 
econometric project.718 Here the research is restricted to pointing out a potential problem with 
exaggerating the commitment to unification purpose of appeal.  
The French system of appeal tries to fulfill a lot of purposes. When a system tries to achieve too 
many goals, it incurs additional costs. Moreover, appeal is seen as a continuation of trial. The first 
instance judicial decisions are not seen as final.719 The resulting doctrine from those political 
struggles is that officially the French courts are denied a law development powers. Even though a 
session with a French lawyer is usually dominated by what the Cour de cassation decided, the fact is 
that law making is not an official priority of the French system. Officially,  the idea of law 
development through the divergent decision making at different lower courts sounds even less 
appealing to French officials. However, the existence of different first instance courts such as 
commercial court, prud’hommes, and so on with very different procedures has the effect of 
developing the law through divergent decision making. The difference is there is no jurisdictional 
competition because the rules for choosing jurisdiction in France.  
3.0 Law Development Purpose of Appeal  
Law development is done for the benefit of society or the law in general and not primarily for the 
litigants of a particular case. The essential aim for the courts is to adopt, revise, and interpret 
different doctrines, case law, and legislative provisions in order to introduce clarification and even 
improvements to the law. 
Unification and law development purposes of appeal are related. Unifying diverse judicial decisions 
requires at least two different directions that the law has the possibility to take.  Making a choice 
between these directions means that Cour de cassation makes normative choices that give direction 
to law developed.  As Chartier, an honorable conseiller at the Cour de cassation and author of one of 
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the leading books on the Court has put it, «sans risque d’être contredite elle [Cour de cassation] 
pouvait librement faire évoluer le droit.»720 
The normative role of the Cour de cassation is more controversial in France. On the one hand, French 
courts do not play any policy role but on the other, they have a normative role. This seems like a 
contradiction in terms. How can a normative role avoid creating policy changes? The normative role 
of French courts is deep enough to merit a separate profound research project. Nevertheless, here it 
is important to note that one whole area of law, tort law, has been entirely developed by the courts 
in France and it was based only on two vague articles in the Civil Code.721 
As Shapiro has argued, the rift between fact-based decision making (the lower courts and the courts 
of appeal) and decision on law that was created should not be underestimated. This rift defines the 
French system.  What is the effect of that political decision to make appeals process a showpiece of 
the republican regime and then to restrict the power of French judges? The result was that the new 
republican regime had incentives to expend more resources on creating an elaborate appeal system 
that is more for demonstrating itself ‘just’ than to actually produce effective adjudication. The need 
for that expenditure was further reinforced by the interests of aggravated parties at trial who also 
have the interest to continue the appeals procedure. 
In order to restrict the power of the Cour de cassation to render final decisions, the regime had to 
expend further resources that the cassation system requires; after cassation, a court of appeal has to 
decide the case again, following a de novo procedure. The court of appeal can either confirm or 
change its opinion. In case of confirmation, one more stage of appeal is created.  
3.1 Optimal Number of Appeal Levels  
The optimal number of appeal levels, according to Shavell, can be decided by the state. It chooses 
the number of levels of appeal, the resources utilized at each level, and costs and subsidies to 
litigants at different levels.722 In order for the existence of a second level of appeal to produce 
optimal results, the investment in the second-level process, the cost of the second-level appeal plus 
the expected harm from failure to reverse error at that level has to be less than the certain harm that 
would be incurred if second-level appeals are not allowed. If the state decides to add a third or even 
fourth level of appeal, the consequence of failure to reverse error at the second level is that there is 
an additional cost of another appeal that the litigants will make has to be added to the social cost of 
the error that has not been corrected. Furthermore, Shavell has also doubted the common sense of 
allowing multiple levels of appeal for the purpose of error correction. The reason is it is quite unlikely 
that a second-level appeals court does not enjoy knowledge or be able to employ techniques that 
were unavailable to the first-level appeals court.723 So for the purpose of error correction, only a 
single level of appeal is most probably sufficient.   
Creating a final court at the third level of appeal leaves it with little else to do but to serve law 
developing and unification role. The reason is, as explained above, the court is unlikely to find errors 
not corrected by the first level appeal and if does it probably it is not in the application of the law but 
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in the essence of the law. In other words, there is a connection between the three main purposes of 
appeal: law development, unification, and error correction.724 However, law development goes 
deeper because interpretation can go to the roots of the law and change it or add a new significant 
element to it. What is important to emphasize is that second-level appeal courts have a significant 
impact on the law because their error correction goal is limited and also they do not have 
instruments significantly different from the lower appeal court and thus they engage in law making. 
Another model that can be helpful in examining the optimal number of appeal levels is Kornhouser’s. 
He has identified specialization and geographically diverse courts as a justification for having two or 
three of tiers in judicial hierarchies. Kornauser starts from the idea that in a limited set of cases, the 
trial stage is sufficient and there is no reason for further deliberations over the cases. That means for 
some cases it is optimal to have only trials and to disallow appeals.  
In other cases, there is a need for specialization which justifies the use of appeal courts. That 
necessity arises when there is more complex structure to the law. In this situation, “there are two 
types of legal questions that confront the judicial system. Courts must first decide the best doctrinal 
structure and then work out the legal details. On this account, further specialization of labor might 
be desirable with a second hierarchical tier concentrating on identifying the best doctrinal structure 
while the first tier elaborates that structure.”725 
Unification purpose of appeal can also have its place in a judicial system that justifies the third level 
of appeal. In the words of Kornhouser, “the justification of a second appellate tier rests on a more 
complex articulation of the organizational aim. If the caseload is sufficiently heavy and jurisdictions 
sufficiently large, a desire for uniformity conceivably would suggest a structure of geographical 
jurisdictions with two levels of appeal.”726 
Martineau has described the way the three main purposes of appeal are arranged in the US model. 
He has argued that the US Federal Appeal courts serve primarily an error correction function, while 
the US Supreme Court727 is mostly occupied with law development.728 Since the Supreme Court 
annually hears less than 1% of the cases decided by the circuit courts, its unification role is limited 
and that forces it mostly to fulfill its law development purpose.729  
So let’s first take a more detailed look at the French system and see what the functions and 
organization of the different courts in the civil system in order to evaluate the purposes they fulfill 
and the structure and organization of the French judicial hierarchy, which direct the functioning of 
the judiciary.  
4.2 Establishing A Functional Equivalency between the US and French Judiciaries 
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In order to compare the functions of the different tiers of the French judiciary with their US 
counterparts, it must be established whether the Cour de cassation, which is at the top of the 
hierarchy in civil matters (and criminal as well) plays the role of a Supreme Court or not.  
Some authors have argued that the answer is no. The reasons Yves Chartiers, an honorable councilor 
at the Cour de cassation, has given are the following: First, from a hierarchical point of view the 
French judicial system is dualistic because a separate administrative order exists. The superior court 
in that administrative system is Conseil d’Etat. To make things even more complex, there is also 
Conseil constitutionnel, which plays a separate and extremely important constitutional role. 730 
Chartiers highlighted a second point of contrast of the French Cour de cassation with the US and UK 
Supreme Courts. He argued that the functional prominence of the two Common law courts is much 
greater than the French court. The reason he gave for that is that these two Supreme Courts have a 
choice on the cases they hear and that the Cour de cassation has to pronounce itself on all cases 
brought before it.731  
His conclusion is that Cour de cassation is not a third-level jurisdiction. In other words, he has argued 
that Cour de cassation and the several regional appellate courts are at the same second tier of courts 
in France.732 Cour de cassation itself also understands its role as a second-tier court. The reason is, 
interestingly enough, the court looks at itself from the point of view of the litigants. For the court, its 
own jurisdiction is not at the third level of the judicial hierarchy because the court pronounces 
judgments not on facts but on law only.733 That sounds like a strange justification, for the common 
law observer, because that is exactly what common law appeals courts do; they are specialized to 
examine only the law and not the facts. That is what makes them appellate courts at the second and 
third tier of the judicial system and distinguishes them from first instance courts. 
Chartier also paradoxically argued that the Cour de cassation is at the top of the judicial hierarchy in 
civil and criminal matters and that it cannot easily be challenged.734 The other problem with that view 
is that the Chartier’s otherwise strong argument that the Cour de cassation does not select its cases 
is simply not true anymore. The reason is the sweeping changes to the Cour de cassation’s 
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jurisdiction.  Now the Court exercises a serious selection of the cases and refuses to hear a 
substantial amount of cases (31.5% in 2002).735  
Another opinion is that all three of France’s highest courts—Cour de cassation, Conseil d’Etat, et 
Conseil constitutionnel—form the French Supreme Court. That sounds as a more convincing opinion.  
What can be concluded is that the Cour de cassation is an institution in a transitional period of its 
development. The fact is that there are three courts that consecutively and in hierarchical order hear 
the same case: first instance, appeal and cassation. Saying that two of them—Cour d’appel and Cour 
de cassation—are both at the second tier of the judicial hierarchy simply sounds like the two have a 
redundant function, which is not the case and can have confusing results.  
Whether the self-image of the Cour de cassation and Chartiers’ opinion that the Court is not a 
Supreme Court is correct or not, this is not critical for our analysis. Ultimately, the court’s designation 
is simply a technical distinction with little practical effect. What really matters is the practical effects 
the way the French judicial hierarchy is organized and the functions it fulfills.  
4.3 The Origins of Cassation Procedure 
To do that it will be illuminating to see the development of the top French court in civil and criminal 
matters. The origin of Cour de cassation can be found in the royal power of the French kings. As early 
as fourteenth century there was power emanating from the king, which he had delegated but could 
always retake at will. Thus, the first cassation procedure was extraordinary in nature. It happened in 
front of Conseil du roi and more precisely Conseil de parties or “Grand Conseil” created in 1578 and 
further clarified in a regulation from 28 June 1738.736   
The current cassation procedure started to take shape during the revolutionary period. It was loi des 
27 novembre 1-er decembre 1790, which established the Tribunal de cassation. The distinction 
between the Revolutionary and Royal cassation procedure was that the power had shifted from the 
head of state and his council to the judges.  
4.4 The Review Powers of the Cour de cassation and the Regional Appeals Courts  
4.4.1 Cour de cassation 
At first, the revolutionary authorities created a Court with very restrictive review power –it could 
only exercise control of the application of the text of the law (literal interpretation). After the 
Constitution of 1791, the review of Cour de cassation was extended to include both the letter and 
the spirit of the law. That continues to this day because the court controls both the motivations 
behind judicial decisions and their compliance with the law.737  
Currently, as Chartier has pointed out the Cour de cassation power “[a]t the top of the judicial 
hierarchy, without a risk of being contradicted [the Court] can make law evolve freely.”738 That points 
to a law-making function of the review this court exercises.  
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4.4.2 The appellate courts 
As Martin Shapiro has argued the difference between trial and the first level of appeal in France is 
not obvious, at least for the common law observer to whom appeals appear as a second trial 
system.739 The reason is the specialization that occurs at common law appellate courts, whose review 
is only based on points of law,740 which is not part of the task of the French appellate courts. They 
review the case de novo and even allow new evidence to be introduced. 
To be more precise, the Appeal courts in France exercise control both on facts and the law over the 
judgments submitted to them. The court can either confirm or annul or change the lower court 
decision either in its entirety or in part. In this latter situation, the appeal court decides anew the 
dispute. These decisions can be challenged in front of the Cour de cassation.741 The rule of double 
jurisdiction which means that there is a trial and de novo appeal as a right is one general principle of 
French procedure, which was created to guarantee the interests of the parties to the dispute and is 
supposed to be in the interest of justice.742 That double jurisdiction was introduced by the 
revolutionary legislator in Loi of 16 and 24 August 1790, which allowed access to appeal without 
filtering in law and fact. 
That makes the question of the purpose of the first state of appellate review (at cour d’appel level) 
more complicated. Shapiro has maintained that at that level the purpose of the appeal is error 
correction.743 That appears to be the same as the situation in the US since Martineau has argued that 
the US Circuit courts also serve mostly error correcting function. 
Nevertheless, there are two major differences between the French appellate structure and that of 
the two common law courts used as comparative templates here. The first is that the division 
between law and fact is introduced at the Cour de cassation level whereas this specialization of the 
task occurs at first appeal level in the two common law systems examined here. Thus, as Martin 
Shapiro has pointed out in practice the French system provides for two trials (at first instance court 
and at appeal level) and review the law only at the Cour de cassation level. 
The positive effect of something that resembles double trial is doubtful. The reason is that in an 
interview some Cour d’appel judges744 have said that the first thing they read is the decision of the 
first instance court. That creates a cognitive bias. That bias occurs because people tend to believe the 
first information they study in more detail than any subsequent information they may receive. The 
result then is that judges more often than not will decide the case similarly to the trial judge because 
that is where they got their first information from. That casts a shadow of a doubt on the idea that 
the appellate judge can spot things that the trial judge could not. Again an exception would exist if 
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the promotion system within the judiciary works extremely well and the highest quality judges are 
always promoted to the higher courts.  
The second difference comes from the fact that the appeal is a de novo procedure that allows new 
evidence.745 The effect of such a rule as the First President of the Cour d’appel de Touluse, Judge 
Franclieu has described it, is that “it is no longer the same case, it has grown substantially in volume 
and even the issue is not the same anymore.”746 The positive effect of deciding a case on a different 
issue is doubtful. A litigant’s case is supposed to signal a problem in society that needs to be resolved 
by the courts. If that problem grows into something different and the only purpose becomes the win 
of the aggravated party, the social value of lawsuits will be lost. They become only about winning and 
not correcting problems in society.   
Similar generous provision of appeal situation is not completely historically known to the English 
judicial system. The difference is that even the old English Equity courts at their inception did not 
allow new evidence to be presented at appeal. That also means the appeal courts in France have 
surpassed the most generous procedure that ever existed in England. In any case, it seems doubtful 
that to allow the introduction of all new evidence that changes the nature and the issues at stake in 
the case is beneficial for the quality of justice rendered by the courts.  
Thus, the effects of the rule that allows the extensive introduction of new evidence may be reducing 
the quality of justice. The reason is that such rule creates the wrong incentives for the parties not to 
find and provide all the existing evidence at trial. After all, they have all the time to do that at appeal 
proceedings.  So even if new evidence allows better error correction, it might make the parties to 
strategically uphold evidence and protract the case longer than necessary in order to wear down the 
opposition either financially or morally.  
4.5 The Political Reason that Drives the French Generous Appeal System 
The reason for this generous French organizational arrangement of appeals is the political purpose of 
appeal as regime power promotion in France after the Revolution. The result was the creation of four 
stages of appeal. Moreover, the authorities’ desire to create the fourth stage was enhanced by fear 
of too much power in the hands of the top judges, who may have been pro Anciene regime oriented. 
Since these reasons for the existence of such generous regime of appeal are exclusively political, this 
fourth stage requires further analysis of its role and effects in the current French judicial system. 
For the sake of clarity here are the four levels of appeal that the current French judicial system has: 
First-instance appeal that resembles the second trial with new evidence transforming the case into a 
different case, cassation, and then the return of the case to a different appeal court that has the right 
to challenge the cassation decision and send the case back to a plenary hearing of the Cour de 
cassation.  
5.0 The Fourth Tier of Judicial Hierarchy: a system of checks of the appellate courts on each other 
The fourth and last tier is the most interesting because it does not involve the litigant’s desire to 
continue the appeal. The propellant of this stage of appeal is a difference of opinion of what the law 
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should be between two courts of appeal and the Cour de cassation. The conflict works in the 
following way: At that fourth level, a differently composed Cour d’appel or another Cour d’appeal 
can decide to confirm a previous Cour d’appel’s decision and resend its decision to a general 
assembly of the Cour de cassation (en banc procedure). 
That en banc procedure also exists within the US circuit courts. When there are conflicting decisions 
the courts sit en banc, meaning that all the judges in circuit sit together to resolve the conflict.  That 
procedure can be contrasted to the normal procedure when circuit judges sit in panels of three 
judges.  For the small circuits, En banc procedure means that all nine judges participate. In the larger 
circuits, far less than the entire membership of the court is sufficient. En banc decisions are binding 
on other judicial panels. However, in France, that procedure is taken to an extreme and it involves 
three courts: two courts of appeal (or one with a different membership of the panel) and the Cour de 
cassation first sitting in a panel and then the en banc (the whole assembly).   
This process has nothing to do with doing justice between the parties or with error correction. That 
means there is no bottom-up channeling of the litigant’s information. In other words, a litigant who 
is normally driven by a desire to correct an error or important social problem that she sees as 
injustice is not the driving force of this tier of appeal. This jurisdictional conflict does not bring about 
the many social benefits that litigant led process can but only unifies the law to an extreme and 
reaches a definitive decision acceptable to most judges.747  
Yves Chartier has argued that Cour de cassation is a second-tier court.748 It is exactly that view that 
allows such jurisdictional conflict. According to that interpretation, cassation is not the last possible 
procedure but a different type of review rendered by courts that are supposed to influence each 
other. Of course, Chartier has contradicted himself because he has also said the Cour de cassation is 
at the top of the French judicial hierarchy and can make the law evolve without being challenged.749 
Allowing such a blatant contradiction to exists in the French court organization means that 
jurisdictional conflict with unclear benefits is inbuilt in the judicial system.  
That conflict involves high costs such as convening three separate courts, including an extremely, 
time money and effort consuming plenary session of the Cour de cassation. These are all extra 
expenses to the French taxpayer. That also leaves the case unresolved for the parties for a much 
longer period of time.750 It is doubtful that such an arrangement can account for better error 
correction, nor that will unify the law better nor will improve law development.  
What is at first glance surprising is how often that happens. In around 40% of the cases in which a 
Cour de cassation decision is challenged by the appeals courts, the plenary assembly of the Cour de 
cassation changed its mind and agreed with the Cour d’appel that confirmed a previous decision of 
another or differently compose appeal court. That means the Cour de cassation, in its much larger 
composition, changed its own decision after being challenged by courts of appeal.751  
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To understand the problem of why the Cour de cassation changes its mind 40% of the time after the 
case has been sent back to them from the appeal courts, the problem needs to be examined from an 
economic perspective. That analysis reveals a serious issue with the way the Cour de cassation 
decides its cases. The problem is that cases come in front of the Cour de cassation after many 
informational distortions. The reason the decision of the appeal courts is so often convincing is that 
they have more information on the case. Remember, every level of hierarchy cuts the information 
roughly in half. Moreover, when the information reaches the Cour de cassation, it has been 
transformed into a succinct formalistic form in order to cut out the messy life details out of the 
proposed decision. The magistrates at that level receive only summaries of the legal problem and no 
real life facts.752 On the contrary, Cour d’appel judges deal with a more lively case full of details. In 
other words, they simply are closer to the real life situation and understand better the issue because 
they have better information about it. That is why they are able to convince Cour de cassation judges 
so often.    
The Four-stage appeal in France is an example of the violation of the Pareto principle—it makes 
everyone worse off; the judges have heavier caseload, the litigant’s resolution of the problem is 
delayed, and the French taxpayer has to pay for probably the most expensive proceedings because 
they involve three different panels of the highest judges in France. At the end, it is really doubtful 
that French society receives the best rule or even if the optimal rule for the current circumstances is 
found there are certainly cheaper ways to achieve that result. An example would be an improved 
structure of decision making at Cour de cassation level that does not destroy so much of the 
information that reaches the court. 
The only beneficiaries that benefit from this rule are litigants that want to use the long procedures to 
delay justice.  And it is exactly unsuccessful applicants who want to delay the day of reckoning that 
should not benefit from the organizational arrangements of the judicial system.  
The reason the problem has persisted for so long is that there that the aggravated parties to the 
process and the unrevised interest of a regime that does not operate in the same circumstances 
coincide. The parties may be interested in continuing the proceedings as long as possible because 
they want to either delay the day of reckoning or because they cannot accept a certain result. The 
political regime blindly following the impetus from the revolutionary era even though the situation 
has changed dramatically and the current government does not have to show to the same degree 
that they provide justice as the new at the time revolutionary regime did. The result is that the 
interests of the regime and aggravated litigants have drowned into silence the diffused interests of 
the French tax payer who pays a few euros more (the sum is around 65 euros per inhabitant for 
2013, and even larger for active taxpayers).753 In economic terms, the transaction costs for the 
taxpayer are too high because their interests are too dispersed and no one will take action for a small 
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amount of extra taxes on which they do not even have the information that they are paying. Thus the 
French taxpayer will not take action in order to ask for a better allocation of scarce resources.  
That fourth stage of appeal is not the only rule that shows that there is a hierarchical paradox in 
France. This paradox is reflected in the fact that the first president of each Cour d’appel is also a 
member of the Cour de cassation and attends several meetings per year at the latter court.754  The 
French system has simply created too many checks of the appellate level courts on each other that 
are not productive. 
The commitment of the revolutionary legislator to keep an upper hand over the judiciary is evident 
from another constitutional rule. Under the 1791 French Constitution, a fifth stage was possible, in 
the case of resistance of the appeals courts, after two cassations, a demand for legislative 
interpretation leads to a decree declaring the law.755 That fifth level was created for fear of resistance 
against the decisions of the Tribunal de cassation. There was a brief period in which that happened 
the Tribunal managed to impose its authority. That was reinforced by the change of its name and its 
role in 1804.756 What is important though is that the excessive levels of jurisdiction were created in 
the revolutionary period for political reasons. 
To summarize, a major problem for the quality of a judicial system, as Natalie Fricero has argued, is 
with the complexity of procedures and uselessness of certain phases of litigation.757 The reason is 
that these useless and complex procedures can be used to delay the judgment by the party with 
more resources that can continue the ligation for many years through an elaborate appeal and 
procedural system. The fourth stage of appeal also increases the burden to the French taxpayer, 
increases the caseload to the highest level French judges and produces dubious results from error 
correction, unification and law development functions of the appellate courts in France. It also the 
four levels of appeal can be one such instrument of de facto denying justice through an extremely 
prolonged litigation. 
5.1 Hierarchical Implications in the French Judicial System 
France has the traditions of a strong hierarchy, mostly concentrated around the other branches of 
the French state such as the President of the Republic and a committee that is supposed to assist him 
in protecting judicial independence such as the Conseil Superior de la magistrature. The judicial 
hierarchy has been subordinated to that state hierarchy. It has been further diluted by mutual checks 
between the appellate courts.   
Continental European judiciaries, including those of France, were strongly influenced by the 
successful unification process of the Catholic Church and the strong hierarchy it created. The result 
was stronger traditions of appellate justice in France. 
However, the state centralization efforts of Louis XIV and later the revolutionary reforms that 
tradition was somewhat interrupted by the system checks that surrounded the introduction of the 
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new Cour de cassation as seen in the previous section. Nevertheless, the French judiciary retained 
many characteristics of a strong hierarchy that need to be examined as well. 
Another purpose of hierarchy is to impose a particular vision or to “put a lid” on things.758  Stronger 
hierarchies exist in order to impose more intensely a particular vision of how things should be 
according to someone at the top of an organization.  
5.2 The Judicial hierarchy and the Role of Judicial Promotions 
5.2.1 Positives 
The positives of a strong hierarchy are that strong control from the top can in certain social 
circumstances produce better decisions. The condition is that the people at the top know more or 
have a superior vision of what society actually needs. Strong hierarchical judicial control is extremely 
useful for new political regimes that want to impose a new vision of what society should look like and 
what values it should have. To work well, strong hierarchy needs the best judges to be promoted to 
the top positions in the system. The reality is that there can only be a limited number of great legal 
minds per generation. If these judges sit on top of the pyramid and correct and improve judicial 
decision making at lower levels, society will benefit substantially. It can also increase productivity and 
quality judicial decision making. Thus, the aim of the strong hierarchy should be to create the best 
possible system of promotion of judges. The fact that strong hierarchies exercise control over a large 
number of cases can thus be quite beneficial for the quality of judicial decision making.  
5.2.2 Negatives 
As seen in the chapter on Hierarchy, among the problems that Professor Ian Shapiro has pointed out 
strong hierarchies are lack of upper mobility of talented staff with diverse background ideas and 
thinking. The consequences are that if the promotion system is flawed the quality of decision making 
and superior control of judicial decision making throughout the system will suffer.  
5.2.2.1 Promotion and evaluation of judges in France 
In strong hierarchies, higher judges play a role in the promotion and evaluation of judges that work 
under them. That makes them play a role closer to the traditional principle in the principal agent 
theory examined in the Hierarchy chapter. Still, higher court judges can be restricted in that role by 
administrative style bodies that also play an important role in the promotion and evaluation of 
judges as is the case in France with Conseil superior de la magistrature. In France, it is the superior 
judge in the same court that plays the important role in the promotion and evaluation of judges. 
Through the power of recommendation and evaluation, these judges can significantly affect the 
conditions of employment of their inferiors.  The CSM evaluation comes only after that and it is 
unlikely to follow the recommendation of the direct superior in the career file of the judge.  
5.2.2.2 Cour de cassation appointments 
One of the factors that help diversity and having the best people in charge of the judicial hierarchy is 
the way the judges at the pinnacle are appointed.  
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They are appointed by the president of the Republic on the recommendation of the Conseil Superior 
de la magistrature. The composition of the court includes Premiere president, presidents of 
chambers, conseillers, and conseillers referendaires.  
There is no written rule for who can be Premire president of Cour de cassation and president of 
chambers. However, the list is very limited. They are chosen among people that are just one level 
below such as coseillers and avocet general at the Court.759 What that means that in charge of the 
hierarchy there can never be anyone who is not deeply immersed in work and politics of the court. 
An outsider with fresh ideas can never be in charge.  
The diversity in the Cour de cassation comes from “an old and precious tradition”760 that allows the 
court to appoint university professors. That tradition allows different theoretical points of view to 
confront the career judiciary point of view. The result is that the debate in the court is enriched.761   
Moreover, Article 40 of l’ordonnance du 22 decembre 1958762 states that outside of the court 
hierarchy can be appointed to occupy the posts of conseillers and avocat general, people who have 
been directors of Ecole de Magistrat, lawyers at the Cour de cassation and Conseil d’Etat, law 
professors, chef de service in the Ministry of Justice with at least five years of experience.  
The list is still rather small. The reason is Article 39 of the same ordonnance, no one else can be 
appointed to the Cour de cassation if he or she has not been magistrate outside of the court 
hierarchy, avocat general or president de chambre at a court of appeal.    
5.2.3 Protecting social interest and inserting diverse opinions in the judiciary 
Another way the French system attempts to introduce different opinion is the role of the avocates 
générales. The French judicial system has divided the magistrates into parquet (sitting magistrates) 
and siege (flour magistrates). The procureur general is at the top of the parquet magistrates 
hierarchy and he has authority over 22 avocates generals.763 They are all Ministry of Public Affairs 
employees. 
Avocates generales have the specific role to defend the public interest. They express their opinions in 
every Cour de cassation case to that end. As stated in the theory chapter, the public interest is a 
vague concept. It means a different thing for each theory of justice. Trying to just say that avocates 
generales defend the public interest without specifying a specific theory simply means that they all 
apply a complete theory of justice, which has contradictory tendencies and can lead to cross 
subsidies of opposite ends. The reason is that most theories of justice exist in contradictory pairs. In 
other words, each theory has an exact opposite one that pretty much contradicts the aims and ideals 
of the first. The Parquet and Siege magistrates receive the exact same education. So the division and 
the role of avocates generales as protectors of public interest do not make much sense because they 
are not trained differently because both parquet and siege magistrates are graduates of the Ecole 
National de la Magistrature in Bordeaux.  In order for avocates generales to be successful in their 
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role, they have to receive special training of what the social interest is. To put it in economic terms, 
they have to be able to recognize and apply a specific social welfare function that the public 
authorities in France have accepted. That means that they have to be able to apply notions such as 
for whom the judicial system works, whose interests the judiciary defend and who has access to it.  
5.2.4 The parquet and strict judicial hierarchy 
The hierarchy in the parquet is very strict. According to article R. 132-3 COJ, the procureur general 
has the authority to even change the opinion that avocates generales submit to the Cour de 
cassation in important cases. If the avocat genral persists, the procureur general can delegate the 
task of writing a new opinion to a different avocat general.764  
The procureur general also participates in the promotion of magistrates process because he is part of 
the Commission d’avancement.  
However, as with the whole French judicial system, there is a counterbalance. The Procureur general 
is only in charge of the 22 avocates generales that are part of the Cour de cassation. He has no 
authority over the avocates generales attached to the Courts of appeal. That is one more way in 
which the hierarchical authority in France is cut and that results of court of appeals not being a 
different tier of courts than the Cour de casssation.   
The paradox though is that according to Article 5 of the Ordonnance of 22 decembre 1958 every 
avocat general is absolutely free to expresses his or her opinion. In practice though, that freedom 
exists only if the avocat general does not contradict the wishes of her hierarchical superior.   
Another specificity of avocates generales is that there are very few as compared to the other 
magistrates in the Cour de cassation so the result is that they know each other very well and they 
have frequent meetings around the procureur general. That also helps to keep these magistrates 
under strict hierarchical control.  
In sum, as far as the parquet magistrates are concerned, the hierarchy is very strong but it is a state 
hierarchy and not a judicial one. The interruption of the hierarchical chain at the appeal level might 
be beneficial in cutting the government influence over the conduct of legal proceedings in France. 
5.3 Information Flow and the French Judicial Hierarchy  
The next issue is that every hierarchical level cuts the information that goes through the judicial 
system roughly in half. Thus, even with the best judicial minds at the top, there is a tradeoff with a 
correct understanding of the social problems that caused the dispute. The reason is these extremely 
talented top judges do not receive accurate enough information on what the problem in society is. 
Cour de cassation judges receive only short summaries that are done for expedience and to allow 
many cases to be heard.  However, the result is that judicial decisions may be based on distorted 
information because at every level there was an interpretation of different court official and thus the 
premise from which the decisions are made may be flawed. To put it in different words, the judicial 
machine works on information which is its “fuel.”  The low-quality fuel mixed with undesirable 
impurities reduces productivity and quality of the functioning of the judicial machine. 
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What causes the reduction of the information flow simultaneously also increases formalism and 
technicality of decision making. The binary choices judges make can also have a negative impact on 
whether optimal resolution of conflicts is achieved. The reason is complex social and individual 
relations are rarely binary. The result of decision-making process that does not take that complexity 
into account and it can give the wrong oversimplified signal back to society and may not reduce 
future similar problems. All these problems reduce the quality of judicial decision making the French 
hierarchy produces. 
In the French judicial hierarchies, the delegation is combined with more stringent control. It would be 
easier, faster and cheaper to delegate the task to the agent. Or benefits associated with strong 
control exercised by the top hierarchical level. 
One of the main manifestations of the degree of hierarchical strength is the number of cases the 
superior court considers annually in proportion to the number of cases delegated to lower courts. 
The Cour de cassation hears around 20,000 cases per year. Strong hierarchies consider many more 
cases than the weak ones. In other words, they have more hands on approach to the control of the 
lower courts’ decisions. To put it in the words of the principal agent theory: The principle expends 
more resources to directly control the agent and relies less on proxy monitoring sings. It thus reduces 
the possibility that her desires are not followed because of the information problem that states that 
the agent possesses more information than the principle. In this way, she also reduces the moral 
hazard problem because it observes the agent directly. However, there is a trade-off. Doing that is 
more costly and undermines the whole principal agent relationship. 
To put it in economic terminology, for perfect enforcement, the Cour de cassation uses micro-
management. That means the Court reviews a large number of decisions given by the courts below. 
However, that is a way to deal with the problem of principle’s control over the agent. It reduces the 
moral hazard, adverse selection (because they do not have to control who is hired at the lower 
courts), continuous observation issue, and different interests problems. However, the sheer volume 
of lower court cases make such a practice an expensive one.  
The question is then how to reduce the cost of micromanagement. The solution is to have a large 
number of highest court judges (Cour de cassation has a bit less than 200 magistrates) to hear this 
large number of cases at a lower cost. In other words, this kind of system creates economies of scale 
to deal with the large caseload of higher judges. A crucial problem remains though. The identity of 
the principle is watered-down. Who is the principal if you have a large number of judges fulfilling that 
role? For the US Supreme Court of nine or the UK Supreme court of twelve, that is not an easy task to 
have a distinct identity. How about a court with a bit less than two hundred judges? If the court has 
that many judges it is inevitable that the identity is diluted and various different interpretations and 
even contradictory decisions are bound to exist at the same. In that situation, the principle does not 
really exist. So there is a need for a more elaborate scheme to create a single judicial identity such as 
identical legal education for judges and similar career paths. That training is done in the Magistrate 
School situated in Bordeaux. However, that means only like-minded people are part of the 
organization and one of the main reservations Professor Ian Shapiro had about hierarchy was that it 
destroys opposite opinions and it needs to add new divergent people with different opinion. 
Such elaborate micromanagement in a court system also increases the cost of access to justice. The 
reason for that is the use of a court that exercises a high degree of control is by definition expensive. 
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Somebody has to cover these costs. In some cases, that could be the state but that is too expensive 
for the government that needs to substantially increase its budget for the judiciary. More often than 
not, this does not happen and the price is that potential litigants do not get access to the courts.  
The French judicial hierarchy then deals with many of the economic problems that principals can 
have in achieving their goals and imposing its views. That reduces moral hazard and informational 
asymmetries problem by strengthening the control over the agent. However, this result is achieved 
by expending more resources. That is something that has to be compensated for in other ways such 
as having many “principals” and thus creating economies of scale. The need of creating one identity 
of these courts leads to further problems such as lack of divergent judges and lack of influx of new 
ideas of how the judicial system can deal with problems in society. There is also the problem of 
uniformity of interpretation in the decision making of the highest courts.  
5.3.1 Other channels of information flow  
In strong hierarchies, the information flows not only through case decisions but through several 
periodic meetings of the judiciary in which the top provides instructions. An example for such a 
meeting is the annual meeting of the first presidents of Cour de cassation with the Appeals courts 
First presidents. 
6.0 Other Ways of Exercising Hierarchical Control   
As Ian Shapiro has argued one of the dangers of hierarchy especially a strong one is that eliminates 
opposite opinion. There is a need to inject into the system fresh and different opinion.  
How does the French judicial system deal with the need for diversity of opinion and the fact that it is 
a strong hierarchy that tends to suppress divergent opinions? The problem is exacerbated by similar 
education of judges. In other words, how does the system bring outsiders with a different point of 
view? That is important because as strong hierarchies depend on whether the opinion imposed from 
the top is the best possible and that depends in turn on whether the best people are at the top of the 
hierarchy. 
The French system tries to balance imposing strong hierarchical control with introducing divergent 
personnel.   
6.1 Imposing the View from within the Top Judiciary   
6.1.1 Seniority  
One way the top hierarchy exercises control and limits opposite opinion is through the principle of 
seniority. Whether a judge is senior is not calculate by his or her age but at the date of the order that 
his or her first appointment to the Cour de cassation. Respect for seniority can have a different 
influence on the way the court performs. The reason is the way this power is exercised depends on 
the personality of the doyenne. Nevertheless, most judges remark that this is one of the most 
influential principles of the French judicial hierarchy.765 Chantier has called seniority a privilege.766 
The most senior judge is the first to express his or her opinion on a case. That means that if there is 
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such strong respect for seniority, other judges may have difficulties expressing a contrary opinion, 
especially when faced with a doyenne with a strong personality.  
Seniority promotes stability and durability of the judicial process. That is because judges who have 
been longer in the Court refrain from changing judicial decisions in whose decision making process 
they have taken part. In economic terms, that means that more senior judges on the Court increase 
the value of judicial decisions because they are less likely to change them. Promoting stability of 
judicial decisions comes at a cost; productivity and innovation in the courts are reduced. That is 
because senior judges are less likely to change the old decisions in the name of innovative solutions. 
That decreases the productivity of the court because sometimes changes that should be introduced 
because they are optimal for litigants and society are not pioneered by seignior judges. 
Promoting stability and the resulting increased value of judicial decisions has one more effect. The 
temptation to exercise political pressure on judges to change the interpretation of the law increases. 
The reason is the higher value of judicial decisions resulting from stable adjudication makes the 
rewards of getting of getting a new interpretation of the law more tempting to political players. The 
reason is politicians may get higher contributions from interest groups (for example the electorate or 
a large industry) to attempt to change the interpretation of the law given by the court. That may 
result in increased attempts to interfere with judicial independence from political actors. In a system 
like the French, which exhibits rather weak constitutional and thus institutional protection of judicial 
independence, the possibility of a real trade-off between the stability of judicial decision making and 
political interference is quite strong. 
6.1.2 Imposing the view from within the French state or the role of academia in the judicial 
hierarchy  
The French law professors do not sit completely outside of the French judicial hierarchy. They have 
an interesting power to comment French judicial decisions. Since the decisions are extremely short 
and written in an extreme formalistic form they are commented by legal academics. These 
comments have authoritative character. The justification is that academics also possess the status of 
civil servants. In other words, they are part of the same state hierarchy as the judges. The 
commentaries of really important cases are reserved for an elite group of professors who have 
personal connections within the Cour de cassation. Some commentaries are issued almost 
immediately after the Court pronounces its decision. 
6.2 Hierarchical Accountability of the French Judges  
In Tirole’s article, “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government,”767 there is one 
interesting conclusion that is very useful for this chapter. He has argued that accountability (strict 
control) does not always produce desirable results because such control does not always produce 
alignment with social interest. The goal is to harness the motives of judges and align them with 
public interest 
The effect of that accountability to a hierarchical superior can be positive. Periodic evaluation creates 
two major potential benefits. First, it may induce a judge who is otherwise inclined to act in the 
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public interest. The inducement for right behavior comes from the mere presence of control. Since 
the superior cannot always be able to evaluate the official's actions directly but she still acts in the 
right way because she is concerned that there may be control, Jean Tirole has called that "moral-
hazard-correcting" benefit of accountability.768 Second, superior evaluation may allow correcting 
judicial behavior. It can also set “the right kind of judges” on the path to promotion. Tirole has called 
this the "adverse-selection-correcting" effect.769 
What that means for the French judiciary is that the existence of evaluation files of judges in which 
judges receive evaluation by their immediate superiors and then from the Conseil superior de la 
magistrature  may have positive effect and judges will try harder to fulfill their duties and will take 
the best possible decision on the dispute with consideration of the social interest as well. Also, the 
judges who produce the best decisions could be on their way to the promotion where they will 
handle more important and difficult cases and will control in turn their lower court inferiors. This is 
the ideal scenario.   
On the negative side, Tirole has argued that accountability may also carry serious drawbacks.770 
When applying his model to the judicial system, in order to have a successful career, a judge may 
choose an action, not because it is right for the litigants and for society, but because it is popular with 
her supervisors. Thus, accountability may provide an incentive for wasteful information acquisition in 
which the judge will expend efforts to learn what her superiors think and a disincentive for acquiring 
information about the optimal decision for the litigants and society.  
In France, judges in lower courts depend for evaluations on their immediate superiors and Conseil 
superior de la magistrature. A consequence may be that when promotions are concerned judges that 
get promoted are those who are more likable, servile and humble. That means that not necessarily 
the best judges who can produce the best judicial decisions get promoted but those who manage to 
best navigate the complex politics in the court.  
Another problem is that in France the judge who is immediate superior is a member of the same 
court and he rarely reads the decisions of her inferiors. That means she receives signals of a personal 
nature and less of quality of decision making. That opens the door for promotions based on personal 
sympathy and not the quality of judicial skills. 
In a France sometimes especially in the case of avocats generales their opinions may depend on 
hierarchical approval especially in important cases. The direct superior’s evaluation and possibly the 
evaluation of an administrative style commission (CSM) that has final say on the file of a judge can 
have an influence on judicial behavior and decision making.  
In France, the desire to leave a legacy that according to Tirole is probably the best motivation that 
aligns public interest with that of judges does not exist and may be overruled by more immediate 
concerns for maintaining status in the hierarchy. In adding the rule that judicial decisions are collegial 
and speak with one voice, then the desire to leave a legacy is completely eradicated.  
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In conclusion, the French judicial system may be incurring excessive costs in order to fulfill purposes 
of appeal that are not worth the expense and the effort to fulfill to such an extensive degree. The 
lever of the judicial machine is set on a very strong commitment to all major purposes of appeal. It 
seems like that is not an optimal use of the French judicial machine. Moreover, the strong 
commitment to the state-led hierarchy that subordinates the judicial one also raises important 
concerns such as reduced judicial independence and state controlled judicial careers. The tradition of 
the strong hierarchy is also sometimes seen within the judicial hierarchy itself. Nevertheless, the 
judicial hierarchy is often counterbalanced with numerous restrictions and mutual checks that may 
sometimes be beneficial but more often creates confusion and contradictory rules that create cross 
subsidies. These organizational arrangements have created organizational problems such as 4 stage 
appeal, which is a rare example of a legal rule that makes everyone worse off and is thus Pareto 
inefficient. Thus, it can be said that in the area of judicial organization, the strong commitment to 
maintaining traditions and lack of attention and critique of the way the appellate system works in 
France and lack of an overall vision of how the system should look like in the 21st century are causing 
probably the most significant problems with the functioning of the French judicial machine. To use 
Natalie Fricero argument in the French appellate system there is a need to reduce the complexity of 
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The conclusion of this work will be both a recap of the main levers of the judicial machine and an 
attempt to put them in context. There is no more complex topic that determines the way the 
judiciary operates than the right of appeal. Deciding the scope of this right encapsulates every lever 
discussed so far in this work. That issue was also central to one of the cases this work started with—
the legal aid case that was stopped at appeal because of technicality used by lawyers of the bank 
who had superior ability than the legal aid ones. That was allowed by the court despite the strange 
facts and the importance of the institution of private property in our society. 
Theory of Justice and Access to Courts 
Primarily defining the right of appeal requires clear consideration of what theory of justice will be 
applied. It was shown in the theory chapter that even theories as complete justice do not provide full 
access to the courts. That means that also the second lever discussed here the access to courts is at 
play. The reason is there is a choice at first instance as to who should be allowed to use the court 
system. That choice involves following a theory of justice that defines the desired welfare function of 
society.  
That choice becomes even more important at appeal level. That is a consequence of the fact that 
cases that go further in the judicial system leave a more visible and influential trail behind. That may 
be because a system of precedent or jurisprudence constante operates, which means that these 
cases have influence on the outcome of future cases. It could also be because such cases receive 
greater publicity and are discussed by the mass media. In any case, these cases have profound 
influence on error correction, unification of the law and law development. That means that appeal 
level case selection has much more significant and profound effect on the way both society and the 
judicial system operate. 
To recap the conclusion reached at the end of the theory chapter : The choice was between 
continuing with the inertia of having a complete justice theory that leads to cross subsidies and 
following different ends simultaneously with no clear direction and vision. The problem discussed 
was that most theory of justice go in pairs that are diametrically opposite. Thus, lack of clear 
vision/direction was argued to lead the judicial machine sending contradictory signals to society.  
The alternative proposed were the five theories that contradict complete justice. The inspiration to 
be gained from the five related theories was led by the utilitarian theory and, more specifically, the 
reformist agenda of Jeremy Bentham. At least in the construction organization and procedure of the 
judicial machine, it was shown that there was a need of vigorous analysis of how to optimize the 
functioning of the judicial system. 
That can be done only by challenging presuppositions of the way society views the judicial system. 
Kaplow and Shavell have proposed the most compelling theory that can be applied to the problem of 
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judicial organization. Many of the tools and the parallel to markets have come from Posner’s theory.  
This thesis argued that the best evaluation criteria are provided by consequentialist economic 
theories. The inspiration for finding multiple policy solutions will come from comparative theory as 
Sen has argued. 
So how is a regulator supposed to make a choice between giving a right of appeal and to whom?  
Without considering all the issues discussed in this thesis and beyond the choice is more likely to 
make things worse than to improve them. 
Thus this thesis argued that the access to courts is fundamental issue that needs careful 
consideration. Access to appeal is even more important because appeal cases leave a lasting mark 
not only on the litigants to the process but on society as whole. But how that can be decided, when 
there is no clear idea for whose benefit the judicial system should operate and who should be 
granted access to the courts in the first place? 
Information 
To continue with the issues that determines the choice of right of appeal let’s look at the information 
issue. Whose information deserves attention? Who should be able to use it? What information is 
valuable and results in quality of justice. 
It was shown that judges need information to decide their case well. However not all information is 
equally valuable. The judge may not receive enough information or be overloaded with irrelevant 
information. So the question must be examined as to what quantity and what quality information is 
and how can it be optimally delivered to the judge so she can take the best decision she possibly can. 
Competitive markets require full information to function efficiently. If legal parties use the given 
resources to ask each other questions, it is purely distributive information. But if they invest in 
finding new information and that information improves social value instead, then the legal process 
can be improved and should be encouraged. So the question that should be constantly what type of 
information availability produces social value? That is what provides quality. 
Organization 
The next step is to consider the organizational part of this work. After there is a clear answer to the 
fundamental question of whose right of access to courts and appeal is important and whose social 
information deserves to be treated and their issues resolved by the courts, the time comes to decide 
how that should be done. Right of appeal cannot exist without having a clear picture how it should 
be delivered. Whether that should be done through strong judicial hierarchies that put lid on things 
and decide what is important for society and that follows a strong state perspective of what is 
“right”. Should there be strong control over the lower court judges and their decisions.  Or appeals 
should be handled by relatively weak hierarchies with looser control but other incentives for judges 
to solve the issues before them in the social interests such as their desire to leave a positive legacy 
behind a successful and wise judicial career. It was found that in reality judicial machine levers of 
modern judicial systems involve the issue elements of both weak and strong hierarchy with mixed 
team and command structures.  
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Also, it has to be clear whether the right of appeal exists in order to achieve a specific goal. It was 
shown that these goals can be quite diverse and complicated and even controversial when they are 
over delivered.  Dedicating a complicated and costly judicial apparatus to extensive error correction 
may not produce significant positive results especially beyond a certain expenditure point. That is of 
course unless superior judges are much better trained and they have gone through a well-designed 
and effective selection process that assures that higher-up judges are among the greatest judicial 
minds of their time. 
Unification of the law has the value of reducing transaction costs in the application of the law 
because it improves its predictability for its users. However, unification is not an absolute value that 
has to be promoted at any price because it can stifle law development and promote the destruction 
of any divergent opinions. That can be especially the case when strong commitment to uniformity is 
combined with strong judicial or extrajudicial hierarchy. 
So granting a right of appeal for purposes that concern mostly the state’s interests and goals and not 
specifically in the litigants’ interests has to be done very carefully because it can have real negative 
impact on what information goes through the courts and how social problems are being resolved. 
But also, not all litigant interests coincide with the social interest and careful understanding of these 
issues is pivotal in order have a judicial system of quality.  
Comparative Perspective  
From comparative perspective it was shown that even a slight misdirection to the theory of justice 
that the courts are supposed to apply leads to negative results. The example was the reform in the 
England and Wales where theory applied led to government austerity measures towards the judiciary 
and did not provide for optimal use of the judicial machine. The complexities at appeal level are 
greater because every lever of the judicial machine has to be set accordingly. That means the task at 
appeal is much more complicated and needs detailed analysis. 
It was also shown that the use of different rules to provide for access to courts can lead to distortions 
of the way the judicial system and as a consequence society functions.  
From the comparative organizational analysis it became evident that the level of appeal a given 
judicial system provides is closely related to political events and history rather than a pragmatic 
choice. It was thus the old common law influence that became fashionable once again at the end of 
the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century in England displacing the unlimited possibility for 
appeal that characteristic of the equity process. The rational of a more restricted right of appeal was 
shown to be government austerity measures and not so much a profound utilitarian or other 
approach. Usinging Kaplow and Shavell’s model of case selection we showed that this model chosen 
by the two recent reformers in England and Wales, Lord Woolf and Lord Jackson was not optimal for 
society. 
In France on the contrary the choice of an extensive appeal system was made by the revolutionary 
government in order to build loyalty towards their new regime. That rule was optimal back then for 
the regime and even for society because popular loyalty towards the regime would mean less 
tumultuous political events. Of course that political stability proved elusive and one of the reasons 
could be found is the extreme regulator solutions to the levers of the judicial machine that this 
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government built in French the judiciary. Nevertheless, this extremely generous appeal rule survived 
multiple regime changes and it was argued that was now one of the few examples of rules that are 
make everyone worse off in French society: the taxpayers, the judges and even the parties to the 
process because of the prolonged procedures that could last up to 10 years.  
However, the problem does not end there. Half-hearted and not carefully considered restrictions on 
the right of appeal can also have a negative effect on social interests. One example is the extensive 
case selection that is done now at Cour de Cassation level in France. The extremely vague criterion 
that allows the court to restrict their case load does not help in improving the quality of justice. It 
simply provides extensive discretion to judges to decide what cases to hear and what to dismiss. 
Their criteria can be good but it can also contradictory because that means a version of the complete 
justice theory is applied. That means that the number pairs of cases denied or allowed for opposite 
reasons is probably considerable. It may turn out that the negative and positive effects of this rule 
cancel themselves out. But that is not a definition of a well-functioning judicial system that provides 
quality of justice. It is simply muddling along.   
In sum, the right of appeal was useful example that walked us though some of the main themes of 
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This work is a comparative analysis of the primary regulatory choices that determine how judicial 
systems operate from the perspective of laws an economics. This analysis focuses on three judicial 
systems: that of the French, American (United States), and English and Welsh systems. 
This thesis is the story of the performance of the judicial system. The story will be told in two parts. 
The first part follows the model of Jeremy Bentham, who saw the judicial system as a mixture of 
three elements: theory, procedure, and organization. The purpose of this part is to create theoretical 
generalizations of how the judiciary operates. The second part will follow Ronald Coase’s ideas using 
concrete regulatory regimes of the three judiciaries examined here (France, United States, and 
England and Wales) as the best sources of real knowledge of how things work in practice. The goal is 
to draw general conclusions on both the theoretical and practical comparative level of how judicial 
systems operate and potentially how they can be improved. 
To better illustrate the subject of this work, the following analogy will be used to create easily 
understandable and visual image of this work.  The judicial system resembles a machine that has 
several levers. Each lever can be moved into different positions. The positions represent particular 
views of theory of justice, its procedure, and its organization. This is the first part of the story. 
The researcher assumes the position of an operator of the judicial machine. In reality, that role is 
played mostly by the legislator who is capable of introducing changes to the way the judiciary 
operates. In any case, to improve the performance, the operator (or the legislator) can move several 
foundational regulatory levers that are capable of shifting in one direction or the other. So in this 
theoretical part of the study different positions on each lever will be chosen. These lever positions 
will be based on an approximation of regulatory positions that have existed in the past, exist in 
present, or are imaginary but have an important point to make regarding their effect on the 
performance of the judicial system. Here is a visual representation of three of the main levers in a 
judicial system 
This thesis is about the functioning of the judicial system that profoundly affects society. Four cases 
are sketched out to show some of the problems with the current state of the judicial system, which, 
has three main elements: theory, procedure, and organization. These elements are the main building 
blocks of the judicial machine and can be manipulated in order to achieve different results. The 
manipulation is done through what this thesis calls levers of the judicial system. These are subparts 
that can be seen as an extension of Bentham’s three-part model of the judicial system. Examples 
include the access to courts lever, acquisition of information lever, and court hierarchy lever. The 
chapters of this thesis will be centered around these levers. Only the most important levers in the 
judicial machine are examined in this work. The functioning of these levers can be affected by 
country-specific elements such as legal culture, history, and other legal rules that do not exist in the 
other judicial systems compared in this work. These are environmental elements or independent 
parameters. The manipulation of the positions of the levers of the judicial system can be done in 
order to deal with the problems the four cases identified. 





Ce travail est une analyse comparative des principaux choix réglementaires qui déterminent la 
manière dont les systèmes judiciaires fonctionnent du point de vue d’analyse économique de droit. 
Cette analyse se concentre sur trois systèmes judiciaires: celui des systèmes français, américain 
(États-Unis) et anglais. 
Cette thèse est l'histoire de la performance du système judiciaire. L'histoire sera racontée en deux 
parties. La première partie suit le modèle de Jeremy Bentham, qui a vu le système judiciaire comme 
un mélange de trois éléments: la théorie, la procédure et l'organisation. Le but de cette partie est de 
créer des généralisations théoriques de la façon dont fonctionne le pouvoir judiciaire. La deuxième 
partie suivra les idées de Ronald Coase en utilisant des régimes réglementaires concrets des trois 
systèmes judiciaires examinés ici (France, États-Unis et Angleterre et Pays de Galles) comme les 
meilleures sources de connaissances réelles de la manière dont les choses fonctionnent dans la 
pratique. L'objectif est de tirer des conclusions générales sur le niveau comparatif théorique et 
pratique de la manière dont les systèmes judiciaires fonctionnent et potentiellement comment ils 
peuvent être améliorés. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
